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This thesis takes the chancery of the last Sforza duke of Milan, Francesco II (1522–1535),
as  a  case  study to  rethink  Renaissance  written  political  culture.  The  initial  research
hypothesis  is that looking at  (i)  the processes happening  behind  and  around  chancery
documents, and at (ii) the traces these processes left on the documents' material body, can
unfold a novel perspective on political-institutional history.
Exploring this hypothesis leads me to the formulation of three main claims. The
first  regards  the  role  of  chancery  members.  In  Part  I  of  the  thesis  ('The  Chancery
Structure'),  I  demonstrate  that  their  relationship  with  power  was  more  complex  than
clerical: secretaries and clerks were veritable 'shareholders' of power insofar as they were
chosen on the basis of the socio-political capital they brought to the court. 
In the second part of the thesis ('Chancery Practices') I assert that focusing on
informal socio-political practices (instead of abstract structures, official rules, and ideal
representations) reveals that the chancery—supposedly the stronghold of a well-defined
'authority'—was in fact a remarkably open and socially-varied hub of information and
communication. Scholarship widely treats as anecdotal any evidence of deviations from
the monastic-like model of chanceries that is described in normative sources; by contrast,
I put such evidence at the core of my analysis. 
Finally, in Part III ('Chancery Products') I combine written and material culture by
maintaining that a close analysis of the material form of chancery documents reveals the
collaborative process of document-making with great precision, thus complementing our
understanding of the tensions surrounding the chancery. 
To sum up,  I  use  the chancery of  Francesco II  to  enter  the discussion on the
relationship between writing and state formation; my more general contribution consists
in suggesting that state formation by writing was not only an authority-directed, top-down
process, but also a bottom-up construction.
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Note on Citation and Transliteration
Printed publications in this thesis are cited mentioning the surname of the publication's
author,  the  publication's  year  (possibly  followed  by  an  'a'  if  the  author  has  two
publications for one year), and the number of page(s) if needed—e.g.: Gamberini 2005a,
36-38. Complete citations are to be found in the bibliography.
  
Quotations from unpublished sources are always transcribed in the footnotes, or to be
found in section 'Appendix 1;'  citations from publications or edited sources are never
transcribed, unless it is necessary/useful for the thesis's purposes.
In the transliteration of unpublished sources, abbreviations are always expanded silently.
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Introduction
This thesis begins with an early-sixteenth-century charter (fig. I.1, p. 12) written in a
beautiful italic hand—the kind of handwriting style in use in late medieval and early
modern Italian chanceries. Two elements stand out at the very beginning and at the very
end of the charter's text, both clearly signifying the identity of its author, the last Sforza
duke of Milan Francesco II (1495–1535). One is the capitalised intitulation F R A N C I S C
U S . I I .; the other is the duke's huge autograph signature. With the charter, Francesco II
appointed a lawyer, Luigi Taverna, to a minor administrative office. The core of the text is
a peremptory verb, duximus ('we order').
The charter does not communicate only through words: its physical aspect sends
an even more explicit (if, as we shall see, deceptive) message. The very size of the charter
(51X32), bigger than the papers normally used for correspondence, is clearly intended to
hint at the importance of the act. The same can be said for the material the charter is made
of—high-quality parchment, elegant and expensive, created to resist the passing of time,
so much so that  the document is  perfectly preserved after  almost  five-hundred years.
Speaking about the expensiveness of parchment, it is worth mentioning that more than
half of the charter was purposefully left blank. Paying such a precious writing material for
not writing on it was an unmistakable show of wealth, one which reinforced the sense of
authoritativeness surrounding the object. Everything, in the charter, celebrates the power
of Francesco II.
Or does it? On second thought, the trained eye notices that something is clearly
missing  from the  charter.  The most  evident  absence  is  that  of  the ducal  seal—which
charters like this needed to bear in order to be legal. The seal has not just gone missing:
there is no sign that it was ever attached. Furthermore, the text is incomplete: it lacks two
indispensable elements such as the clause of corroboration (declaring how the charter had
been authenticated) and the date (where and when the charter was created.) Therefore, the
charter was left unfinished.
Had the unfinished charter found itself in the archive of the sender—Francesco II
Sforza—its survival would be unproblematic.  It  would mean that the Sforza chancery
started creating the charter,  then aborted the process for some reason, and the charter
eventually remained in Francesco's records: quite a common occurrence. However, the
unfinished charter  I  am analysing was preserved in  the archive  of  Luigi  Taverna,  its
recipient—which has much more interesting and significant implications. It means that a
11
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Fig. I.1: Taverna Charter (ASMi, Archivio Taverna, Parte Antica, 1, undated)
charter, not yet fully authenticated but already signed by the duke, was circulating outside
the Sforza chancery before its completion. Therefore, outsiders to the chancery handled
the charter, and had the chance to tamper with it. How is it possible? This unexpected
scenario  opens  up  a  series  of  further  questions.  Before  posing  them,  however,  it  is
necessary to step back from the charter as an object and contextualise it.
The charter is preserved in the Taverna Archive (Archivio Taverna), the private
archive of the Taverna family, which was acquired by Milan's State Archives as late as
1997. I stress this recent date, because it allows me to discard the possibility that past
archivists arbitrarily moved the charter in question (henceforward 'Taverna charter') from
the Sforzesco archive (the archive of the Sforza dynasty) to the Archivio Taverna. As we
shall see (pp. 39-40), mixing documents coming from different historical archives was
common practice among late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Milanese archivists, but
was deemed as inappropriate (and ultimately forbidden) in the twentieth century. Hence,
the current location of the Taverna charter undoubtedly corresponds to the original one.1 
The Taverna family was very important during the early modern age: it began its
political ascent in the early-sixteenth century, and its members held prestigious offices in
the city and Duchy of Milan until the 1800s. The man who originated the fortunes of the
family was Francesco Taverna (1488–1560), who made a spectacular career in the 1520s
and 1530s as he became senator, ambassador, and eventually  Gran Cancelliere—'Great
Chancellor,' the head of the Sforza chancery —to duke Francesco II in 1533. 
Francesco Taverna was brother of Luigi—the appointee in the Taverna charter.
Naturally, this is a strong clue as to why the charter ended up in the Archivio Taverna: we
can reasonably speculate that Francesco was following so closely his brother's affairs that,
at some point, he (or someone on his behalf) physically handled and brought outside the
chancery the unfinished charter that would sanction Luigi's appointment. However, it is
important  to  highlight  that  this  happened  before Francesco became  Gran Cancelliere,
because the document refers to him only as ‘senator and ambassador’ (see note 2). 
Furthermore, the text of the charter suggests that the Tavernas' involvement in the
process of document-making could have been even stronger. Indeed, Luigi is explicitly
defined  as  ‘the  brother  of  Francesco’ (as  if  it  was  a  'title.')  more  generally,  the  text
underscores  the loyalty of the Taverna family insofar  as it  enthusiastically states that
Luigi has obtained the office because of his long-term support to the duke.2 
1 ASMi, Archivio Taverna, Parte Antica, 1, undated (the act begins with the words ‘Quot et quantis 
incommodis.’)
2 Ivi:  ‘(...)  Egregius  Iureconsultus  Dominus  Aloysius  Taberna,  frater  spectabilis  Iureconsulti  Domini
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Who authored the Taverna charter then? We face a striking mismatch. On the one
hand, the impressive physicality of the charter (big size, fine parchment,) together with its
accurate graphic elements (beautiful handwriting, capitalised intitulation, huge signature)
and the content of its text convey a very simple and powerful idea: duke Francesco II
Sforza, out of his own sovereign will, made the decision of appointing Luigi Taverna to
an administrative office. On the other hand, the circumstances of the charter's production
and preservation suggest a completely different story: not one of top-down imposition,
but of multiple contribution and confusing authorship. Was the charter signed and written
inside or outside the chancery? Was a Sforza chancery clerk or a freelance scribe who
physically wielded the pen to write it? Who worded the text? Moreover, had the charter
been completed, it would have gone back to the Sforza chancery, where it would have
been sealed, its text finished with the missing clause and the date, and signed by at least
one Sforza secretary for approval. There are many blind spots in this chain of events, but
one  thing  is  certain:  the  Taverna  charter  underwent  a  strongly  plural  and  centrifugal
process of production, one which stands in sharp contrast with the oversimplifying and
centripetal message of its material product—the charter itself. 
1. The problems: chanceries, chancery practices, and chancery documents
In  the  specific  case  of  the  Taverna  charter,  it  is  a  series  of  coincidences  (the  casual
survival of an unfinished charter in the 'wrong' archive) that allows us to appreciate the
contrast between the process and the product of document-making very clearly. But the
Taverna charter also epitomises the initial hypothesis of this thesis. Looking at (i) the
processes happening behind and around chancery documents, and at (ii) the traces these
processes  left  on  the  documents'  material  body,  can  unfold  a  novel  perspective  on
political and institutional history: less top-down, more nuanced and participatory. It can
offer us compelling insights on the variety of figures who partook in the endeavour of
making  political-administrative  documents;  on  how  they  practically  partook  in  such
endeavour; and on how the very meaning of chancery documents is transformed once we
are aware of the background of their production and use. 
To further clarify these last points, let us generalise three problems arising from
the  Taverna  charter  and turn  them into  research  questions.  The first  problem regards
chanceries. Thematic dictionaries define the chancery (in Latin cancellaria) as an ‘[a]rea
Francisci Senatoris vel oratoris nostri Dilectissimi, et eo praesertim tempore, quo nos indigne in Arce
Portae Iovis Mediolani obsidebamur, id manifestissimo est  argumento, quod relictis  latibus propriis,
destituitisque omnibus fortunis suis, urbe eiectus, exulare sit coactus (…) cum itaque Praefecti nostri
Annonae Consultorem (…) collocandum esse (…) duximus.’
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or place marked off by barriers (cancelli) in which official documents (...) were stored
and processed,’3 or as a ‘[r]oyal or episcopal office that issued official documents and
preserved records.’4 In other words, these definitions see the chancery unproblematically
as a centralised office and well-defined physical space that oversaw the production and
preservation of documents on behalf of the authorities. However, as we have just seen,
documents  could  easily  move  back  and  forth  between  the  chancery  and  outside  the
chancery at different stages of their production and even before they were finished. So
how did chanceries work? What was their structure and hierarchy? How open were they
to outsiders?
The second problem regards chancery practices. I was unable to find a working
definition of 'practice' for the field of historical research, even though it is one of cultural
history’s central concepts.5 We can understand practice as a reiterated but informal way of
doing something, that a community of participants (or a part thereof) comes to consider
acceptable  (usually  tacitly)  and  to  share,  but  that  remains  distinct  from (or  even  in
contradiction  with)  formal  rules  (or  structures)  regarding  the  same  activity  a  given
practice pertains to; furthermore, the role played by practices in a process is obliterated in
the  formal  representations  of  the  process  itself.  The  notion  of  practice  is  typically
associated with non-institutional behaviours, collective or individual; however, as I will
demonstrate,  it  is useful to apply it to chanceries because this allows me to focus on
unwritten rules, on processes, and on the mixture of official authority and the forms of its
implementation. 
In order to better understand this definition, let us look at two chancery practices
as they emerge from the Taverna charter.  One practice is an outsider to the chancery
(Francesco Taverna, or someone on his behalf) bringing the unfinished charter outside the
chancery; another practice is outsiders to the chancery (Francesco Taverna and others)
actively working on the wording and, possibly, on the material act of writing a chancery
document. As we shall see, nothing of this was tolerated in official chancery regulations;
and as we have already seen, nothing of this would have emerged from the documentary
representation  of  the  finished  Taverna  charter,  had  it  been  completed.  Nevertheless,
informal practices did take place. How essential to the activity of the chancery were they?
And  how  pervasively  should  they  inform  our  conception  of  Renaissance  document-
3 Dahmus 1984, s. v. ‘chancery.’ 
4 Bjork 2010, vol. 1, s. v. ‘chancery.’
5 Peter Burke makes several examples for the rise of the history of practices, but does not provide a
definition for 'practice.' See Burke 2008, 59-64. For other key-works on practices see Bourdieu 1977
and De Certeau 1984.
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making? 
The third problem regards chancery documents themselves: as shown above, it
consists in the tension between the univocal and peremptory message documents convey
as finished products, and the multi-staged and surprisingly plural process they undergo
during their creation. What tools do we have to approach this fundamental tension? In
historical research, diplomatics is the discipline that studies the textual and material forms
of documents, and the techniques through which they were produced. Diplomatics is an
excellent tool insofar as it provides a precise vocabulary to identify all the single features
of  a  document,  thus  acknowledging  the  distinct  meaning they encapsulate.  However,
diplomatics also has two limitations. Firstly, despite being theoretically concerned with
both  the  finished  document  and  its  production  process,  diplomatics  has  exclusively
focused  on  the  first  and  dismissed  the  latter.  Secondly,  born  in  the  late-seventeenth
century  to  draw  a  clear-cut  divide  between  'good'  (authentic)  documents  from  'bad'
(inauthentic)  documents,  diplomatics  has  remained  a  rigorously  descriptive  science.
Diplomatics  describes  all  the  conventions,  protocols,  and  formulae  through  which
authority formally represents itself in documents; however, it  does not ask whether or
how far the resulting representation of authority is reliable.6  
For diplomatics, the Taverna charter (if completed) would have been a perfectly
authentic  and  unproblematic  letter  patent.  The  Vocabulaire  Internationale  de  la
Diplomatique—the standard provider of diplomatic definitions, and the one I will refer to
for the rest of the dissertation—defines the letter patent as ‘an act, characterised by a
relatively solemn form, issued by the chancery of an authority to notify everyone of a
decision made out of the authority's own will.’7 This definition certainly describes what
the Taverna charter represents; but does it explain what the Taverna charter is? What do
we understand of Renaissance authority and power if we are content with the finished
chancery product, and discard the document-making process? What is needed, then, is a
'new diplomatics:' an interpretive (and not only descriptive) version of diplomatics that
looks at the materiality of documents as a means to get into (as opposed to abstract from)
the  socio-political  complexities  of  the  process  of  document-making—these  latter
understood  as  an  integral  part  of  documents  themselves.  As  I  will  explain  more
extensively below (see 2.3), the evolution of the material analysis of chancery documents
should parallel that of bibliography and serve as a key to unlock the sociology of these
6 For a concise history of the origin and development of diplomatics, see Duranti 1998, 36-40.
7 VID, 98. ‘un acte émané de la chancellerie d'une autorité, établi dans une forme relativement solennelle,
pour notifier à tous une décision de sa volonté.’ [my translation]
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texts.
Scholarship has not carried out a thorough critique of Renaissance chanceries and
their  documents  yet.  More  specifically,  the  questions  regarding  the  importance  of
informal  chancery  practices  and  the  need  for  a  new  diplomatics  have  remained
unanswered. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, scholarship has always conceived
the  endeavour  of  chancery-documents  making  in  the  conceptual  framework  of
'bureaucracy:' an impersonal system of government characterised by a clear hierarchy of
authority,  specialisation of functions,  and adherence to fixed rules. As a consequence,
what fits the ideal of bureaucracy (for example the structuring of a chancery in specialised
departments) has been considered substantial and worthwhile of attention; by contrast,
what contradicts that ideal (for example the direct agency of outsiders in the process of
document-making) has been considered anecdotal, or directly dismissed. 
Bureaucracy,  however,  cannot  be  accepted  as  an  ever-valid,  trans-historical
framework, but must be historicised.  In recent times,  Peter Burke argued that ‘almost
everything seems to have its cultural history written these days:’8 but do we really have a
cultural history of bureaucracy? Or, rephrasing the question, do we have cultural histories
that  aim  at  historicising  the  documentary  interface  between  the  authorities  and  their
subjects—that is,  historicising what we have  later  defined as 'bureaucracy?'  I  wish to
rethink Renaissance written political culture setting out from the idea implied by this last
question: that the documentary interface between the authorities and their subjects has not
always  been  based  on  principles  of  bureaucracy  (such  as  impersonality,  hierarchy,
functionality, regulation) but is historically situated.
In  order  to  attempt  this  re-framing,  I  have  chosen  a  case  study—the  one  the
Taverna charter belongs to: the chancery of Francesco II, the last Sforza duke of Milan. In
section 3 and 4 of this introduction, I will explain why this particular case study offers
unique  elements  of  interest  and  the  sources  I  have  used.  However,  since  my aim—
historicising  the  notion  of  bureaucracy  and  to  rethinking  the  nature  of  Renaissance
official written documents—is more general, it is first of all important to discuss (section
2) the historiographical trends that have studied Renaissance chanceries and documents,
their achievements and omissions. 
8 Burke 2012, 1.
17
2. Historiographies 
2.1. Writing and State formation: Federico Chabod and his many critics 
In post-war Italy,  Renaissance chanceries  entered historiography through the decades-
long debate on State formation.  Federico Chabod's  1958 essay  Y a-t-il  un  État de la
Renaissance? (Was There a Renaissance State?) was the beginning of this long debate.
Chabod's thesis was short: the Italian Renaissance state, he argued, was the first model of
centralised modern State. Its establishment and success were mainly due to the emergence
of a massive and complex bureaucratic apparatus, made of offices and chanceries and
manned by officials  owing their  position more to  administrative expertise than to the
personal bond with the sovereign.9 
Since  the  years  immediately  after  its  formulation,  Chabod's  idea  encountered
fierce  criticism.  Between  the  1960s  and  the  1990s,  the  supposed  modernity  of  the
Renaissance (and early modern) state has been rejected, essentially on the basis of two
grounds.  Firstly,  historians  like  Philip  J.  Jones,  Giorgio  Chittolini  and  Elena  Fasano
Guarini  have  underscored  the  territorial  fragmentation  and  institutional  pluralism  of
Renaissance states: they have shown that the states'  peripheries (either urban or rural)
were  able  to  successfully  oppose  processes  of  centralisation.10 Secondly,  a  group  of
historians  gathering  around  the  research  institute  Europa  delle  Corti  ('Europe  of  the
Courts') has long focused on the enduring importance of courtly culture and networks as a
means to highlight the essentially private dimension that the state retained throughout the
early modern age.11 
The  resulting  pluralistic,  fragmented,  and  private  model  of  Renaissance  state
certainly is more realistic than Chabod's 'quasi-modern,' bureaucratic state. And yet, in
devising his model, Chabod gave an interpretation to a phenomenon that is undeniable:
the remarkable growth of central apparatuses managing (and managed by) writing. If this
phenomenon did not centralise state administration (or did so only partially,) then how
9 Chabod, 1964, first published in French in 1958. Chabod built upon a claim of German sociologist Max
Weber,  who maintained that  the Italian Renaissance State was ‘the first  political  power in  Western
Europe which based its  regime on a rational  administration with (increasingly)  appointed officials.’
Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1318.
10 Jones 1965: at page 95, Jones provocatively asked to banish the notion of 'Renaissance state;' Chittolini
1979 and Id.  1979a; Fasano Guarini  1983 and Ead. 1994. See also Petralia 1997. Two anthologies
gathering historians with similar positions are Rotelli and Schiera 1971–1974, and Chittolini, Molho,
and Schiera 1994, whose English translation is Kirschner 1996. For an overview of the state formation
debate, see Blanco 2008.
11 For an overview on the activity of the institute  Europa delle Corti, see Visceglia 2006. An essay on
Gonzaga Mantua remarking the influence of courtly culture on administration is Mozzarelli 1982. On
private networks see Chittolini 1994.
18
should we interpret it? In other words: if the explosion of chancery documents produced
and circulating in Renaissance states was not a by-product of bureaucratisation, in what
other framework of interpretation should we insert it? Posing this important question—
something  Chabod's  critics  fail  to  do—means  re-stating  the  need  to  historicise  the
documentary interface between Renaissance institutions and the subjects they ruled (or
attempted to rule.)
2.2. The Italian 'documentary history of institutions'
Around the mid-1990s, just when the debate on State formation lost momentum, another
Italian  historiographical  trend began to  focus  on  chanceries—this  time  more  directly,
investigating their organisation and functioning. Such trend is now usually referred to as
'documentary  history  of  institutions'  (in  Italian:  storia  documentaria  delle  istituzioni;
henceforward  DHI).  The  DHI's  core  claim  is  that  the  study  of  the  organisation  of
political-administrative writing in Renaissance states offers an optimal vantage point to
appreciate their logic, evolution and ambitions. The first volume to explore such claim in
a  comparative  perspective  was  Cancelleria  e  amministrazione  negli  Stati  italiani  del
Rinascimento (Chancery and Administration in the Italian Renaissance States), edited by
Franca Leverotti in 1994.12
The DHI builds upon diverse historiographical tradition and approaches. The first
is  a  series of late-nineteenth-  and early-twentieth-century studies  that  investigated the
most basic features of Italian medieval chanceries in a strictly institutional perspective.
Among  the  case  studies  involved  were  the  Republic  of  Venice  and  of  Florence,  the
kingdom of Naples and of Sicily, and the papal chancery.13 The second is composed of
anthropological  studies  highlighting  the  cultural  and  political  importance  of  the
organisation of  writing in  any given society.  Jack Goody's  The Logic of  Writing and
Organization of Society is a milestone of this trend, and anthropology certainly influenced
two of the most prominent Italian historians of writing, Armando Petrucci and Attilio
Bartoli Langeli.14 The third strand is composed of scholars who have studied the impact
of the emergence of written administrative communication in polities. From this point of
view, Michael Clanchy's From Memory to Written Record is a point of reference, together
12 Leverotti  1994.  Three  years  later,  Leverotti  edited  Gli  officiali  negli  stati  italiani  del  Quattrocento
(Leverotti 1997), which broadened the analytical perspective to the entire administrative apparatuses of
Italian fifteenth-century states.
13 Baschet 1870, Marzi 1910, Capasso 1894, La Mantia 1918, Tangl 1894. 
14 Goody 1986, Cardona 1981, Petrucci 1986, Id. 1988; Bartoli Langeli 2006.
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with the work of German medievalist Hagen Keller on Italian communes.15 Finally, the
DHI brings  to  the  fourteenth-  and fifteenth  century many insights  from the  work  of
medievalists  who  identified  and  studied  the  thirteenth-century  Italian  'documentary
revolution'—namely  the  steep  rise  and  diversification  of  institutional  documents  that
coincided with the more widespread literacy revolution of the time. According to these
medievalists (among them Paolo Cammarosano and Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur,) there is
a  tight  connection  between  the  appearance  of  a  new  documentary  system  and  the
establishment of a new political-administrative system—that of the Italian Communes.
The novelty of the new documentary system consisted in the preeminence of the laity
(which  ended the  high-medieval  ecclesiastical  quasi-monopoly on writing)  and in  the
cooperation between notaries and political-administrative institutions.16
 In  line  with  these  influences,  the  main  achievement  of  the  DHI has  been  the
detection  of  three  documentary  novelties  that  shaped  Renaissance  states.  Firstly,  the
appearance  of  powerful  central  chanceries  translating  coherent  political-administrative
leadership into writing. Secondly, the development of a capillary network of peripheral
offices,  made possible  by a  continuous flow of  letters  between the state's  centre  and
peripheries. Thirdly, the spread of distinctively seigneurial documentary typologies—like
letters patent—as opposed to the notarial character of communal political-administrative
writings.17 The  analysis  of  these  three  novelties  in  different  case  studies  has  allowed
historians to highlight the interconnectedness of Italian political space, and to provide a
reliable time-line for the all but self-evident shift from communal to Renaissance forms of
power. It is not by chance, then, that the scholar who ultimately gave the DHI its name
(Isabella Lazzarini) and one of its major interpreters (Andrea Gamberini) have recently
focused on the history and concept of Italian Renaissance state.18
As it is clear from this overview, the DHI takes the same process highlighted by
Chabod—the  explosive  growth  of  centralised  political-administrative  structures—and
examines  it  more  accurately  than  him.  The  DHI  studies  the  timing  and  modes  of
15 Clanchy 1979; Keller, Grübmuller and Staubach 1992; Keller and others 2002. 
16 Cammarosano 1991 and Maire Vigueur 1995. Other important works belonging to this trend include, in
chronological  order:  Bartoli  Langeli  1985; VV. AA. 1989; Bartoli  Langeli, 1994; Albini 1998. Very
useful  recap  of  these  developments  in  Francesconi,  2014  and  De  Vivo,  Guidi  and  Silvestri  2015,
especially pp. 10-20. A recent volume that has investigated the documentary culture of the laity since the
Early Middle Ages is Brown and others 2013.
17 Lazzarini 2008; Ead. 2009. Since the mid-1990s, Isabella Lazzarini has been implementing the DHI:
Ead. 1996, Ead. 2001a, Ead. 2004. Other important studies that build upon the insights of the DHI are
Castelnuovo 1994, Senatore 1998, Folin 2004, especially the section ‘La cancelleria ducale;’ Gamberini,
2005, especially Ch. 1: ‘Istituzioni e scritture di governo nella formazione dello stato visconteo.’ 
18 Gamberini  and Lazzarini  2012. The formula 'documentary history of institutions' was introduced in
Lazzarini 2001.
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administrative centralisation for each Renaissance state with great precision, and observes
reciprocal influences between different case studies. Furthermore, it also acknowledges
the  existence  and  importance  of  'peripheral'  institutions,  either  urban,  feudal,  or
ecclesiastical—this  approach  deriving  from  the  success  of  the  'de-centralising'
historiography analysed above (see 2.1). 
However, the DHI is more concerned with structures than with practices. As a
consequence,  it  eventually  keeps  Chabod's  'grand  narrative'  of  progressive
bureaucratisation,  and  tends  to  measure  every  change  in  the  organisation  of  writing
against the ideal of bureaucracy. Therefore,  despite its remarkable achievements, the DHI
fails  to  answer  the  question  I  posed  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section:  what  were
chanceries, what was document making, and how are we to interpret chancery documents
before the emergence of a solid bureaucratic paradigm? More generally, the problem is
that  DHI—the  documentary  history  of  institutions—does  not  reflect  on  what  an
institution is (how informal, plural, collective.)
Going back to the example I used to begin this introduction, the Taverna charter
raises problems that the DHI is not able to address. As we shall see, the Sforza chancery
theoretically  had  a  centralised  organisation;  nevertheless,  Francesco  Taverna
circumvented it by simply bringing the charter outside the chancery. Generally speaking,
the individualised and seigneurial narrative of the ducal charter is readily belied by the
charter's complex, multi-staged construction—which we have the chance to appreciate
thanks  to  the  charter's  'unfinished-ness.'  The  question  is  whether  we  should  ignore
documents like these and accept the linear narrative of the DHI, or we should thoroughly
explore  the  centrifugal  counter-perspective  suggested  by  documents  like  the  Taverna
charter. I choose this second option: I will test such counter-perspective, verifying if and
to what extent it is tenable and fruitful.
2.3. The material analysis of texts
In this attempt I will focus on the evidence of what concretely happened in and around
chanceries, and on the very body of documents. But if 'classic' diplomatics, as pointed out
above (p. 16), is inadequate to reveal hidden aspects of document-making, help comes
from the material analysis of texts other than chancery documents. 
Among the fields that study texts, book history was the first to adopt a material
approach as a means to improve the interpretation of its object of study. Around forty
years ago, through bibliography—the study of books as physical objects—book historians
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ceased to see texts as disembodied carrier of ideas, and started considering their material
form as meaningful and revealing as their words. The analysis of books' layout, paratext,
and non-textual features has brought to the discovery of cultural and social practices of
book production, reception, circulation, and transmission. This, in turn, has opened the
way to the writing of compelling cultural histories. Just to make one example, Mirjam
Foot has argued that book-bindings can be studied as a ‘mirror of society.’19 
The material approach is now widely accepted for the analysis of books, but has
not been systematically applied to chancery documents yet. Historians still tend to see
chancery documents only as containers of information,  or (in the case of charters)  as
unproblematic expressions of authority, with few exceptions (all dealing with medieval
legal charters, or cartularies.)20 This limiting attitude is surprising for at least two reasons.
Firstly, because as early as 1978—that is, even before book history embraced material
culture—French medievalist Jacques Le Goff wrote a seminal essay inviting historians to
go beyond the  most  apparent  meanings  of  official  records,  to  consider  their  material
features and—as he put it—'monumentalisation,' but his plea remained unanswered (see
below, p. 22 and sub-section 2.4).21 Secondly, because in the last twenty-five years the
material  approach  has  successfully  expanded  to  all  kinds  of  textual  objects.  Today
journals, pamphlets, public proclamations, letters and epigraphs have undergone material
analyses that have augmented our understanding of the texts' meanings and functions. Not
for nothing, materiality is at the base of the mechanisms of manuscript culture.22 The lack
of a material approach to chancery documents is especially striking if compared to the
rise of scholarly attention for the socio-political practices associated with the publication
of writings. Indeed, chancery documents like letters patent were public by definition, but
we still know almost nothing about their display and circulation.23
More specifically, one of the major accomplishments of the material analysis of
texts has been the problematisation of authorship. Indeed, considering texts as objects that
19 Foot  1998.  Classics of  bibliography are McKenzie 1986, Genette,  1997, and now the collection of
essays Chartier 2014. A recent valuable overview on books as material and cultural objects is Pearson
2011. 
20 In 2015, Jessica Berenbeim has published a book focusing on the place of legal charters in medieval
England's visual culture: Berenbeim  2015. Other examples include Danbury 1989, Heidecker,  2000,
Kosto and Winroth 2002.
21 Le Goff 1978.
22 A very useful  volume with several  different  case studies  and a methodological  introduction on the
material analysis of texts is Daybell and Hinds 2010. A classic study on the materiality of epigraphies is
Petrucci  1993. On the materiality of letters see Id. 2008, Stewart 2011, Daybell 2012. On manuscript
culture in general, see Beal  1998, Love and Marotti 2002, and Richardson 2009. A paradigmatic case
study is analysed in Scott-Warren 2000.
23 On publication see Fogel 1987, Love 1993, and Jouhaud and Viala 2003.
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are  constructed—instead  of  as  'givens,'  steady  entities—inevitably  blurs  clear-cut
divisions  between authors,  their  aides,  recipients  and publishers.  As a result,  scholars
have explored the extent to which pre-modern authorship of both literary and non-literary
texts could be collective and social.24 But again, chancery documents have been excluded
from such reflection—even though, being political documents, knowing how plural was
their authorship would clearly be fundamental. 
My objective, then, is adding chancery documents to the group of textual objects
for  which  a  material  approach  is  possible  and  desirable.  I  want  to  test  whether  the
analysis  of  chancery  documents'  physical  form,  too,  has  the  potential  of  revealing
something  compelling  about  their  meaning,  their  authorship,  and  the  socio-political
practices behind their making. The key to achieve this, as demonstrated by the example of
the  Taverna  charter,  is  realising  that  documents  can  be  studied  not  only  as  finished
products, but also as dynamic processes. From this point of view, it is worth focusing on
the old Jacques Le Goff's above-mentioned essay, because it offers some precious—and
undeveloped—methodological suggestions.
2.4. Jacques Le Goff's Documento/monumento and the historiography of the 
material turn
Jacques Le Goff's essay is entitled  Documento/monumento ('Document/monument'). By
using this couple, Le Goff claims that every document not only carries its strict contents
(the 'document' proper: for example, in the case of a letter patent, the establishment of a
specific juridical act) but also embeds them in a precise narrative of power and authority,
expressed through the document's form (the 'monument.') In this sense, Le Goff argues,
the document is an 'assemblage' (montaggio), a term that indicates both a process (the act
of  juxtaposing  different  elements)  and  a  product  (the  composite  resulting  from  the
juxtaposition of the said elements.)
According to Le Goff, historians have long been ‘too passive before documents,’
meaning  that  they  too  readily  take  the  documents'   inherent  narrative  of  power  and
authority at face value, as if it represented a historical reality. Instead, historians should
consider the idea that documents, too, can be studied as monuments—that is, as devices
conceived for representing and transmitting a partial memory. Regarding this last point,
24 On the authorship of literary texts, see  Perry 1999, Ezell 2003, Vickers 2004, Clare 2012, Goodrich
2013, Guy-Bray and Pong Linton 2013, Pollack-Pelzner 2015, Todorovich 2016. On the authorship of
non-literary texts see Malena 2012 and Dimeo 2013. On the authorship of manuscript letters, for the
Middle Ages, see Kestemont, Moens and Deploige 2015; the case of Bernard de Clairvaux: Leclercq
1962–1992, vol. IV (1987), 147-153; for the early modern period, on the role of Francis Bacon in the
authorship of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex: Stewart 2009; on Fulke Greville: Framer Jr 1969; see
also Goldring 2008. On women's epistolary authorship: Daybell 1999, Id. 1999a, Shemek 2003.
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Le Goff enunciates three powerful statements. Firstly, he maintains that ‘the document is
the product of the society that created it following the relations of power in force in the
society itself.’25 Secondly, he adds that ‘the document is not innocent,’ but ‘the result of
an assemblage—either conscious or unconscious—carried out by the age or the society
that produced it but also by the following ages.’26 Finally, he concludes.
[t]he document is a monument. It is the result of the effort made by past societies to
impose a specific image of  themselves (...).  A monument  is  first  and foremost  a
camouflage (travestimento), a deceitful appearance, an assemblage. It is necessary to
disassemble,  demolish  such  assemblage,  to  de-construct  that  construction  and  to
analyse the conditions in which that documents-monuments were created.27
Whereas  Le Goff's  essay was primarily intended for  medievalists,  and (in  my
knowledge) neither he nor any scholar interested in chancery documents developed its
intuitions in subsequent studies, my dissertation will draw from his critical principles to
apply them to Renaissance documents. More specifically, I will take three key-terms used
by Le Goff—'relations of power,' 'assemblage,' and 'de-construction'—very concretely in
order to construct my claims. Did relations of power only constitute an abstract domain,
or did they also meaningfully play out in the material domain of chancery practices? Was
the assemblage of documents only an intellectual process, or also a very material one,
taking  place  stage  after  stage,  each  one  with  its  protagonists?  Similarly:  is  the
assemblage's  de-construction  only  a  conceptual  effort,  or  does  it  revolve  around  the
material  possibility of  observing who,  how and at  what  stage produced which of  the
different elements that compose a document?
In  this  sense,  I  will  apply  a  material-culture  perspective  to  documents  and
document-making: a development that Le Goff probably did not foresee, even though
both Documento/monumento and the conceptualisation of material culture had a common
influence, that of social and cultural theory. Indeed, material culture, in the form of the
history  of  consumption  and  the  history  of  everyday life,  first  emerged  as  a  field  to
investigate those sections of society that did not leave substantial written records.28 Later
on,  however,  the 'material  turn'  has  brought  ‘object-based research [to  cover]  a  great
variety of topics and issues ranging from gender to politics and race,’ and it  has also
shown  the  potential  ‘to  re-cast  established  historical  narratives  in  new  and  exciting
ways.’29 This is exactly what I wish to achieve with my thesis: offering a new view on
25 Le Goff 1978, 45 [my translation].
26 Ibid., 46 [my translation].
27 Ivi. [my translation]
28 Key-works  in  the  history  of  consumption  and  the  history  everyday  life  include:  Weatherill  1988,
Goldthwaite 1995, Roche 2000, Welch 2005.    
29 Gerritsen and Riello 2014, 7. Other methodological essays are Prown 2001, Grassby 2005, Rublack
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Renaissance political-institutional history through a material analysis of documents and
documentary production. 
But  why  choose  to  focus  on  Sforza  Milan?  And,  more  specifically,  why  the
chancery of duke Francesco II? After having explained how I aim to bring together a
number  of  different  disciplines  and  historiographical  trends  (diplomatics,  classic
historiographies  of  State  formation,  documentary  history  of  institutions,  the  material
analysis of texts, material culture,) it is time to explain the choice of my case study. 
3. The case study: the Sforza chancery under duke Francesco II (1522–1535)
In this section, I wish to provide summary background information that is necessary to
understand my chosen case study: the Sforza chancery under duke Francesco II.  First
(3.1) I will provide a brief synopsis of the history of Milan from the accession of the
Sforza dynasty to their demise. I will also (3.2) focus in more detail on the history of
Francesco's reign. I will then set out the history of the Sforza chancery between 1450 and
1499, the 'golden age' of the Sforza (3.3). As this is one of the best studied chanceries of
late  medieval  Italy,  I  will  discuss  the  historiography  on  the  Sforza  chancery,  which
however has neglected the chancery's final period, under Francesco II—as we shall see,
early-sixteenth-century Milan  in  general  has  attracted  little  scholarship  (3.4).  On this
basis I make the case for studying Francesco II's chancery, claiming that there are many
good reasons to analyse a chancery, chancery practices, and chancery documents during
an age of turmoil like the years 1522–1535 (3.5).
3.1. The Sforza, ruling dynasty of Milan (1450–1535) 
The Sforza seized the Duchy of Milan in 1450, when Francesco I Sforza—originally a
warlord (condottiero)—succeeded duke Filippo Maria Visconti (who died without male
heirs  in  1447)  thanks  to  the  marriage  with  the  latter's  daughter,  Bianca  Maria.  Even
though the formal legitimacy of this succession was far from solid, the Peace of Lodi
(1454) that stabilised the whole Italian peninsula for forty years, allowed Francesco I and
his descendants to maintain their power until 1499. As anticipated above, the fifty years
between 1450 and 1499 are often referred to as the 'golden age' of the Sforza, and I will
adopt this convenient label for the rest of the dissertation.30
The Duchy was a densely populated dominion of around 1,200,000 inhabitants,
2013.  Examples  of  material-culture  studies  addressing  broad  historical  themes  are  Thirsk  1978,
Pardailhé-Galabrun 1991, Bauer 2001, Avery, Calaresu and Laven 2015.
30 Data  for  the  événementielle  summary  of  this  section  come  from  various  histories  of  the  Sforza:
Cellerino 1998, Somaini 1998, Del Tredici 2012a. 
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located in the middle of a fertile plain, at the intersection of strategic trade routes, and
hosting one of the biggest and wealthiest urban centres in Europe—Milan counted  80-
120,000 inhabitants around 1450 (fig. I.2, p. 28).31 Therefore, controlling the Duchy of
Milan automatically allowed the Sforza to  play a  major  role  in  Italian and European
politics. However, it also exposed them to continuous political tensions: 'super-powers'
like the Holy Roman Empire, the kingdom of France and the Republic of Venice wished
to have the Milanese in their sphere of influence. 
As a consequence of these tensions, the political history of Milan is marked by
hectic and often violent events. When Francesco died in 1466, his son Galeazzo Maria
took  power,  but  was  assassinated  ten  years  later—possibly  because  of  his  despotic
attitude against the Milanese aristocracy. Four years of uncertainty followed (1477–1480),
with Galeazzo Maria's wife, Bona of Savoy, struggling to rule on behalf of her son Gian
Galeazzo, while Ludovico Sforza (Galeazzo Maria's brother) plotted to take control of the
Duchy  from  his  nephew.  Eventually  Ludovico  eliminated  some  of  his  opponents,
confined Bona in  a castle,  and took power—even though he nominally only acted as
regent,  a  tutor  to  Gian  Galeazzo.  When the latter  died,  probably of  poison,  in  1494,
Ludovico  officially  became  duke  of  Milan,  and—unlike  his  predecessors—he  also
obtained an official investiture from the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian of Habsburg. 
Ludovico's  exploit  coincided  with  years  of  unmatched  cultural  and  artistic
splendour for Milan and its Duchy. Indeed, building upon the legacy of his predecessors
from the time of the Visconti, duke Ludovico established one of the most refined courts of
Renaissance Italy. Leonardo da Vinci worked in Milan between 1482 and 1499, designing
several engineering works and completing masterpieces like the Virgin of the Rocks and
The Last Supper; architect Donato Bramante worked on Santa Maria delle Grazie and
many  other  buildings  around  the  Duchy;  in  the  field  of  historiography,  humanist
Bernardino Corio began to write  an ambitious  Historia  di  Milano,  with the  intent  of
celebrating the glory of the Sforza.32 
However, the reign of Ludovico ended in acute political instability as the Italian
Wars broke out in 1494 and the French penetrated into the Italian peninsula. In 1499, king
Louis XII conquered Milan and its Duchy. The years between 1499 and 1535, with six
31 I take these estimates from Somaini  2012, 67. To make some comparisons, Florence counted around
90,000  inhabitants,  its  state  800,000  inhabitants;  Venice  counted  around  100,000  inhabitants,  its
Terraferma 1,500,000 inhabitants;  the  Kingdom of Naples  had around 1,800,000 inhabitants.  For a
longue-durée comparison with Flanders, see Chittolini 2010.
32 For a general overview on the Sforza court see Lubkin 1990. For a more complete study on the Sforza
court at the time of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, see Id. 1994; for artistic patronage in Visconti-Sforza Milan
see Welch 1995; for an overview on Ludovico's age, see VV. AA. 1983. 
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regime changes,  were some of the most uncertain in the entire history of Milan.  The
French ruled between 1499 and 1512, and then again between 1515 and 1521; the Sforza
managed  to  re-take  power  between  1512  and  1515  under  Massimiliano  Sforza
(Ludovico's first-born), and in the years 1522–1525 and 1531–1535 with Massimiliano's
brother, Francesco II; the emperor Charles V of Habsburg controlled the city  de facto
between 1526 and 1530, and then definitely from 1535 onwards. Rich and strategically
located, the Duchy of Milan had indeed been the most valuable prize in the European-
wide competition between France and the Holy Roman Empire (fig. I.3, p. 29).
3.2. Francesco II Sforza, duke of Milan (1522–1535) 
Since Francesco II is the central figure of this thesis, it is therefore appropriate to outline
the main events of his reign. Throughout the thesis, I will refer to Francesco II's age as
'Sforza restoration.' As pointed out above, there were actually two Sforza restorations—
one under Massimiliano (1512–1515) and one under Francesco II (1522–1535)—but the
first has a very marginal role in my arguments, and it is more convenient not to consider
it.33
Francesco II  nominally became duke in  1516,  at  the  beginning of  the  second
French domination of the Milanese (1516–1521),  after  Massimiliano retired in France
(thus  abandoning  every  claim  to  the  ducal  title.)  Starting  from  1516, the  Sforza
headquarters  was in  Trent,  a  South-tyrolean town controlled  by the Habsburg.  There,
Francesco was under the protection of prince-bishop Bernardo Cles—a key-character for
the  education  of  the  soon-to-be  duke,  and  one  that  will  also  play  an  important
'documentary role' in this dissertation. Seven years later, between November 1521 and
April 1522, the Sforza party eventually managed to recapture the Duchy: on 4 April 1522,
Francesco entered Milan.
The  dominion  now  controlled  by  Francesco  II  was  approximately  one-fifth
smaller than that of the Sforza golden age (fig. I.4, p. 30). Between 1503 and 1512, the
strategic northern areas of Bellinzona, Locarno, Lugano, Chiavenna, and the Valtellina
were lost to the Swiss; in 1522, the long-contested rich towns of Parma and Piacenza
were  yielded  to  the  Pope  in  exchange  for  non-hostility  to  the  new  status  quo.34 In
addition, the military and financial support that Francesco obtained from Charles V for
recapturing the Duchy gave the latter the possibility of interfering in Sforza politics. And
yet, despite these limitations, Francesco and his aides did not consider themselves as mere
33 I drew this overview of the history of Francesco II from Benzoni 1998 and Sacchi 2005, vol. 1, 23-57.
34 Muto 2006, 14-15. 
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Fig. I.2: Map of the Duchy of Milan, 1450–1499
29
Fig. I.3: Timeline of rulers of Milan and its Duchy, 1450-1535
30
Fig. I.4: Map of the Duchy of Milan in 1535
place-holders, but showed a remarkable will to formulate political projects. 
Nothing  demonstrates  such  will  better  than  an  ambitious  decree  (called
Constitutio after its starting word) that was issued on 18 May 1522, and established a new
institutional  order  for  the Duchy.  It  included two key-measures.  Firstly,  the  Senate—
despite  being  a  distinctively  French  institution—would  continue  to  exist,  ruling  in
partnership with Francesco II. Secondly, the head of the Sforza chancery, formerly called
primo secretario  ('chief secretary,'  see below, p. 33) would now have the title of  Gran
Cancelliere, and acquire the prerogatives of a plenipotentiary minister— the role of the
chancery was thus outlined in the founding document of the Sforza restoration. The first
Gran Cancelliere  was Girolamo Morone (1480–1529), a very skilful lawyer who had
served  under  both  the  French  and  duke  Massimiliano,  and  had  been  especially
instrumental in preparing Francesco's return. I will discuss the political impact (also on a
documentary level) of both the Senate and the figure of the Gran Cancelliere in greater
detail  later  in  the  dissertation  (pp.  281-283 for  the  Senate,  pp.  68-70 for  the  Gran
Cancelliere).  For  the  moment,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  unfortunately there  is  no
evidence to trace an accurate documentary history of how the Constitutio was conceived. 
The high ambitions of Francesco II's debut met an extremely difficult  political
transition. The French were ejected from the castle of Milan only one year after the return
of the Sforza, in April 1523; in August, Francesco survived a murder attempt; in October
1524, more French pressure and a plague epidemic forced the whole Sforza court to leave
Milan. The victorious battle of Pavia (25 February 1525), in which the imperial army
destroyed the French and even captured king Francis I, looked like the end of Francesco's
problems. To the contrary, it was the beginning of another, more troublesome phase.
In October 1525,  Gran Cancelliere  Girolamo Morone was allegedly discovered
plotting an anti-imperial alliance with the French, the pope, and Venice to curb Charles
V's cumbersome influence on Italian affairs. As a result, Charles V's lieutenants arrested
Morone and besieged Francesco II in the castle of Milan. In August 1526, Francesco—
who always  claimed  his  and  Morone's  innocence—agreed  to  leave  the  city.  He  was
expected to reach Como (loyal to Charles V,) but chose to move to Crema, a town under
Venetian  control:  his  hostility  to  the  Empire  was  now  explicit.  The  following  years
(1526–1530) saw Milan ruled by the imperial party, while the duke tried to organise an
opposition  and  diplomatic  contacts   from  minor  strongholds  like  the  South-eastern-
Lombard cities of Cremona and Lodi. 
In January 1530, after long negotiations, Francesco II again changed sides and
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received the emperor’s official 'forgiveness' and ducal investiture. This process actually
culminated only fourteen months later, between March and April 1531, when the Spanish
soldiers  left  Milan  and  the  Sforza  leadership  could  once  again  settle  in  the  city’s
commanding fortress, the castle of Porta Giovia. The years between 1531 and 1535 were
relatively  quiet.  Francesco's  main  problem was  now that  of  ensuring  his  succession.
Emperor Charles V's consent was crucial for his marriage: the emperor himself finally
designated  Christine  of  Denmark,  daughter  of  the  king  of  Denmark  and  Isabella  of
Austria (the emperor's sister.) Christine was only 12 when she became duchess-consort of
Milan (13 October 1533): too young to have children, and this was probably the reason
why she was chosen in the first place. Two years later (October 1535) Francesco suddenly
fell seriously ill. His life had been considered in danger for years because of his fragile
health,  but  at  the  age of  40 the worst  seemed to  be over.  He died between 1 and 2
November 1535, and the Sforza dynasty ended with him. The Duchy was incorporated in
Charles V's dominion without any political commotion.
3.3. The Sforza chancery between 1450 and 1499
Let us now focus on the history of the Sforza from the point of view of their chancery.
Already before 1450, when he was a condottiero, Francesco Sforza had a small personal
chancery that moved with him.35 However, the chancery was very simple: it did not have
any  functional  division,  and  every  scribe  could  deal  with  any  matter,  without
specialisation.  Indeed,  one  single  series  of  registers  gathered  all  the  issued  ducal
documents  in  chronological  order,  with  no  thematic  distinctions  and  lacking  clerical
signatures of any kind.36
A division of the chancery in four branches rapidly emerged during the 1450s, as
soon as the government structure gradually became more complex. The birth of every
branch can be seen through the appearance of thematic registers in the Sforzesco archive.
The  original  core  of  the  chancery  managed  diplomatic  communication  and  the
correspondence between the duke (or the Sforza leadership) and their officials around the
Duchy of Milan. We can describe this as the political branch in contrast to the second and
third branches (which emerged in succession in 1451): the beneficial chancery—which
dealt  with  ecclesiastical  affairs—and  the  judicial  (or  criminal)  chancery.  The  fourth
35 Papers  produced by this chancery are now held in  a  section of Milan's  State Archives  bearing the
nineteenth-century name Sforzesco Avanti il Principato. ('Sforzesco [archive] Before [the establishment
of] the Principality').
36 For a summary of the main developments of the Sforza chancery, see Leverotti 1994a, especially 310-
318. Further literature is cited in the next sub-section (3.4).
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branch to emerge was the financial  chancery (1456),  which managed the income and
expenses of the ducal  Camera, the financial department. Therefore, after an immediate
structuring in the first two years of the Sforza age (1450-1451), the chancery found its
balance only after the peace of Lodi (1454).
As far as the chancery hierarchy is concerned, every branch had its own secretary-
in-chief and a number of subordinate clerks and coadjutors. The political branch, given its
importance, had most secretaries. Its head—Cicco Simonetta between 1450 and 1480,
Bartolomeo  Calco  between  1480  and  1499—had  the  title  of  primo  secretario  and
supervised the activities of the chancery as a whole. Of the four branches, the political
chancery was the proper cancellaria segreta ('secret,' or 'privy' chancery). However, both
contemporaries  (see  p.  143,  n.  120)  and  scholars  extend(ed)  the  use  of   the  terms
cancellaria  secreta to  include  also  the  beneficial  and  judicial  branches—probably
because the latter were subjected to the control of the primo secretario. By contrast, the
financial branch always had a life of its own, and was largely independent from the rest of
the chancery structure.  I  will  follow this  terminological  distinction for the rest  of the
thesis: in mentioning the 'secret chancery,' I will be referring to the political, beneficial
and judicial branches together; in mentioning the 'chancery,' I will be referring to the four
branches including the financial one. 
In  becoming  more  functional  and  sophisticated,  the  chancery  first  doubled
(between 1450 and the 1460s) and then tripled (1480-90s) its original size, hosting an
ever-growing number of scribes.  On the subject  of  chancery size,  it  is  appropriate  to
introduce here a concept that is strictly related to it, but at the same time transcends it, and
for which I coin a new term: 'wordpower.' With this term I indicate, in the most general
way possible,  the  will  and  ability  to  produce  written  documents  so  as  to  set  up  an
interaction between the duke and his party on the one hand, and subjects and interlocutors
(individual subjects, communities of subjects, Sforza officers, other institutions) on the
other. As it is clear from the connection between the rooting of the Sforza and the growth
of their chancery, wordpower was a decisive component of authority; it complemented
and augmented  other  crucial   powers—both 'hard'  and 'soft,'  like  military power  and
artistic patronage—even though historians are much more used to consider these latter,
and not the former, as the chief assets on which authority rested. The size of the chancery
was one of the most basic elements for building wordpower. It was determined by the
encounter between ambitions (the number of people the dukes would have wanted for the
management  of  written  communication)  and reality (the  number  of  people  the  dukes
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could afford for that management.)37                  
The four-branch organisation of the chancery that structured Sforza wordpower
lasted for  the entire golden age. However, temporary alterations to this pattern did take
place. The judicial chancery, for example, was initially so identified with his secretary-in-
chief, Angelo da Rieti, as to temporarily disappear when he died in 1464; the fact that
Cicco Simonetta was able to control judicial affairs personally from da Rieti's death until
1468 is a sign of the  primo secretario's rising influence. Other major changes occurred
throughout the 1480s, when Ludovico Sforza, then acting  as regent, set up a 'shadow'
personal chancery because he distrusted the men connected to duke Gian Galeazzo, and
wished to manage important matters without interference.
The association between the Sforza chancery (especially the political branch) and
power was so tight that every ducal succession led to reshuffles of secretaries and clerks.
This process normally took place peacefully, usually with the relocation of 'compromised'
personnel  to  minor  administrative  chanceries.  However,  between 1477 and 1480,  the
Sforza chancery was at the forefront of political conflict. After Galeazzo Maria Sforza's
assassination,  it  was  Cicco  Simonetta  who  in  practice  ruled  the  state  and  led  the
opposition to Ludovico. As a result, when the latter prevailed, the primo secretario was
tried and eventually beheaded. 
The year 1480 represents a break in the history of the Sforza as much as in that of
the chancery. Simonetta’s successor was Bartolomeo Calco, who held the post until 1499.
Calco's tenure was less politically charged than that of Simonetta: Ludovico already had
his own loyalists, and needed an acquiescent man to hold the post of  primo secretario.
This is so true that Calco, despite his preeminent role, was not eliminated by the French
as they took control of the Sforza Duchy in 1499. He continued to act as secretary in the
chancery of the newly-founded Senate of Milan.38 
3.4. Scholarship on the Sforza chancery
The golden age chancery has long inspired a rich historiography. From as early as the
late-nineteenth century and up to the 1970s, local historians and archivists carried out a
series  of  seminal  studies  analysing  the  chancery  structure,  editing  some  of  its  most
important documents, and compiling detailed repertoires of chancery members. All these
works are still essential to the researcher who wants to approach the Sforza chancery.39 
37 On the Sforza military see Covini 1998. On artistic patronage Welch 1995.
38 Leverotti 2002, 229.
39 Formentini 1877, Natale 1962, Id. 1962–1969, Id. 1977, Santoro 1948, Ead. 1968.
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Furthermore, starting from the 1990s, scholars of the DHI have then taken the
chancery as a paradigmatic case study to support their claims. Indeed, the history of the
Sforza chancery not only runs parallel to that of the Sforza dynasty, but also helps reveal
and explain  the  dynasty's  unraveling  with  great  precision.  In  this  sense,  the  work  of
Franca  Leverotti  is  fundamental.  In  two  essays  dated  1994  and  2011,  Leverotti  has
charted the evolution of the chancery structure and personnel between 1450 and 1499,
highlighting how changes in the chancery reflect or anticipate changes in the balance of
power within the Duchy's political leadership.40 
In addition, a number of studies have acknowledged the crucial importance of the
Sforza chancery in the wider  context  of Renaissance Italy from the point  of  view of
diplomacy and information management. Isabella Lazzarini, for example, has included
the  Sforza  chancery  in  her  works  on  the  documentary  history  of  fifteenth-century
northern-Italian principalities (Sforza Milan, Gonzaga Mantua, Este Ferrara).41 Moreover,
Francesco Senatore has studied the chancery under Francesco I Sforza (1450–1466) to
conduct one of the most influential monographs of the last twenty years on Renaissance
diplomacy,  ‘Uno Mundo de Carta’ (‘A World of Paper’).  As the book's title suggests,
Senatore's focus lies on the documentary organisation of diplomacy. One of the author's
main claims is that in the mid fifteenth century the Sforza chancery was first and foremost
a high-functioning machine of information gathering and distribution.42 
Finally, Marcello Simonetta has studied Cicco Simonetta—the head of the Sforza
chancery between 1450 and 1480—as the epitome of the Renaissance secretary, putting
him on the same level of Petrarch and Machiavelli.43
With the 'fatal'  year 1499, however,  the interest  in the Sforza chancery almost
disappears. There are only two publications exploring the early sixteenth century,  and
only rather tentatively. Firstly, Leverotti wrote an essay on the chancery's transition from
duke Ludovico  to  king  Louis  XII,  covering  the  first  French domination  until  1512.44
Secondly, Caterina Santoro published a list of chancery members between 1512 and 1515
in  a  repertoire  of  Sforza  offices  and  office-holders.45 By  contrast,  the  chancery  of
Francesco II has never been studied: my thesis will be the first to focus on the last non-
40 Leverotti 1994a, Ead., 2011. For the chancery in the Visconti age see Baroni 1966, Ead. 1977, Ead.
1984. 
41 Lazzarini 2001, Ead. 2001a, Ead. 1999. 
42 Senatore 1998.
43 Simonetta 2004.
44 Leverotti 2002. In 1966-67, Lidia Cerioni wrote an article on Ludovico's chancery between January and
April  1500,  four  months  during  which  the  Sforza  party  managed  to  control  Milan  just  before  its
definitive defeat: Cerioni 1966-67.
45 Santoro 1968, 385-387.
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investigated link of a very significant chancery system. 
3.5. The case for studying the chancery of Francesco II Sforza
However, this fact alone cannot justify the choice of Francesco II's chancery as my field
of investigation. What makes it a truly appealing case study is a series of interconnected
elements that have to do with the chancery's characteristics and, more generally, with the
context of the Sforza restoration and of early-sixteenth-century Milan. 
Firstly, the chancery of Francesco II is structurally suitable for being researched
in-depth— as is necessary if I am to focus on concrete chancery practices and on the close
analysis of the materiality of chancery documents. Indeed, while the rapidly expanding
Sforza chancery of the golden age escapes clear-cut delimitations in size and personnel
and  that  of  Massimiliano  Sforza  is  too  short-lived  to  undergo  a  thorough  analysis,
Francesco  II's  chancery  represents  a  convenient  middle-ground.  Its  life  spans  over
fourteen years, long enough to account for change, short enough to avoid generalisations.
And even if  its  dimensions—as we shall  see—are contained,  they are big enough to
display a good degree of complexity. 
Secondly, an age of repeated political changes like the Sforza restoration provides
a very diverse framework of investigation concentrated in few years. As outlined above,
the  duke  took  power  in  1522  with  remarkable  political  ambitions;  these  ambitions
crumbled between 1526 and 1530, when he experienced exile; Francesco II eventually
returned to Milan as ruler between 1531 and his sudden death in 1535, but the political
landscape had irremediably changed and the duke's aspiration were much more limited
than before. Each of these phases shows a different posture in the organisation of writing,
and we find ourselves in an interesting 'laboratory' for doing documentary history.46 
Thirdly, with a study of the Sforza restoration, I can contribute to the current re-
evaluation of early-sixteenth-century Milan.47 Indeed, an anachronistic historiographical
prejudice, based on a nationalist attitude towards the loss of independence of the Duchy
of Milan, has long dismissed the years 1500–1535 as an embarrassing and uninteresting
age; only from the early 2000s this negative approach has started to change.48 The two
French dominations have undergone a re-discovery that  would have been unthinkable
46 Not  for  nothing,  French  journal  Laboratoire  Italien  ('Italian  Laboratory') takes  its  name  from  the
assumption that Italy is a laboratory for political and socialy history–not only in the Renaissance.
47 In line with a broader renewal of interest for early modern Milan's history, marked by the appearance of
several  volumes  in  English.  Two  general  contributions  are  Gamberini  2014  and  D'Amico  2012.
Monographs include De Boer, 2001, Getz 2006 and Stevens (forthcoming).
48 As  late  as  in  1957,  the  section  of  the  Storia  di  Milano  dedicated  to  the  Sforza  restoration  was
anachronistically entitled ‘Milan in the last Defence of Italian Liberty:’ ‘Milano nell'ultima difesa della
libertà italiana.’ Storia di Milano, vol. 8, 241-276.
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only twenty years ago.49 Furthermore, the  Accademia Ambrosiana—a leading Milanese
institute  of  historical  research—has  recently  published  two  volumes  analysing
institutions, society, religion, literature and arts in early-sixteenth-century Milan.50 
The  main  claim underlying  this  new attitude  is  that  many of  the  institutional
novelties that would characterise early modern Milan until the 1700s originated between
1500 and 1535. Massimo Carlo Giannini and Letizia Arcangeli have demonstrated the
latter,  substituting  the  old  key-word  'decline'  with  the  more  constructive  ideas  of  an
ongoing  'political  dialectic'  and  'experiments  of  representation  and  identity'  involving
Milan, its Duchy and its rising patriciate.51 Significantly, however, Giannini and Arcangeli
exclude  the  Sforza  restoration  from their  argument.  It  is  as  if  Francesco II  were too
compromised with the idea of 'decline' to be re-evaluated. Therefore, one of the basic
aims  of  my dissertation  is  to  demonstrate  the  revealing  potential  of  a  still-neglected
period of crisis.
Indeed,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  first  and  only  monograph  centred  on
Francesco II is as recent as 2005. Even though it is a detailed study of ducal art patronage,
the author, Rossana Sacchi, explains that she was forced to act as a political-institutional
historian to fill in a series of basic gaps in the history of the Sforza restoration. 52 Sacchi's
effort is indeed remarkable (and I will repeatedly refer to her book throughout the thesis,)
but it does not constitute the focus of her study. The only other recent piece of scholarship
on Francesco II actually deals with Venetian diplomacy between 1531 and 1533, and—in
an  old-fashioned  manner—has  the  anachronistic  aim of  describing  ‘the  agony of  the
Sforza Duchy.’53 
Time has come to carry out a study of the Sforza restoration avoiding hindsight.
Francesco II  was  not  the  doomed 'last  of  the  Sforza'  when he  was  alive;  he was  an
embattled Renaissance prince whose struggle to maintain authority can teach us much of
the importance of chancery personnel and wordpower (see above, pp. 33-34) in securing
political power. Precisely because Francesco went through an age of turmoil, we get the
chance to observe the continuous construction and de-construction of his chancery. As we
shall see, this movement highlights political-administrative (and therefore documentary)
49 Arcangeli 2002, Meschini 2006, Id. 2008, Id., 2014, Contamine 2003, Elsig and Natale 2013, Di Tullio
and Fois 2014, Woodcock (forthcoming).
50 Rocca and Vismara 2012, Bellini and Rovetta 2013.
51 Giannini, 2001, Arcangeli 2004. For a general re-evaluation of the Italian Wars, see Mallett and Shaw
2012. 
52 Sacchi 2005, vol. 1, 13-14.
53 Olivo 2002. Other than this, the works dealing with Francesco II are three old articles from the journal
Archivio storico lombardo discussing the guilt or innocence of Francesco II with regard to three political
homicides: Romussi 1874, Portioli 1875, Guastella 1948-1949.
37
dynamics that tend to remain hidden in periods of relative stability like the Sforza golden
age. Marco Gentile has recently made a similar point for the age of the last Visconti duke
of  Milan,  Filippo Maria  (1412–1447),  remarking the 'heuristic  potential  of  periods of
conflict' like the transition from the Visconti to the Sforza age. Looking beyond Milan,
another example of this attitude can be drawn from the work of Guido Rebecchini, who,
focusing on the same critical period of Francesco II, has shed light on the extraordinary—
yet in many respects exemplary—profile of Cardinal Ippolito de' Medici (1511–1535).54 
One last, more general question remains to be addressed: why choose the Duchy
of Milan for this  dissertation,  and not other  case studies? What  makes  Milan and its
Duchy a particularly interesting field of investigation for a political and cultural history of
chanceries and their production? I have two answers. One is historiographical: despite not
being part of the triad of the most-studied Italian Renaissance cities—Venice-Florence-
Rome—Milan has long been the testing ground of  political  historians proposing new
models, whether Federico Chabod's bureaucratic state or Giorgio Chittolini's pluralistic
regional state. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the DHI too often used Sforza Milan as
a representative case study. Therefore, situating in Milan a study that attempts to re-frame
Renaissance  written  political  culture  allows  me  to  re-evaluate  critically  all  these
approaches  while  also  shedding  light  on  the  city  at  an  important  yet  understudied
historical juncture.55
The second answer points to what Andrea Gamberini has recently defined as ‘one
of the most characteristic traits’ of the state of Milan, if not its very ‘distinguishing mark,’
namely  its  strongly  polycentric  and  pluralistic  character.  In  states  like  the  Venetian
Terraferma,  Florentine Tuscany,  and the  Papal  States,  centre-periphery mediation  was
increasingly monopolised by great families and a well-defined patriciate. Instead,  Milan
had a peculiarly fragmented political-administrative dynamism. Not only cities, but also
smaller towns and villages, communities (of valleys, lakes and parishes,) rural lordships
and non-territorial bodies could establish direct links of clientage with the Sforza court
and  the  central  authorities.  The  chancery  dealt  with  this  peculiar  political  landscape,
following  diverse  (and  often  unpredictable)  patterns  and  strategies.  This  is  why  the
attempt to historicise document making is more compelling and revealing if tested on the
54 Gentile 2015, 1 and n. 1. Rebecchini 2010.
55 Chabod 1934, Id. 1971, Id. 1971a. A fundamental essay of Chittolini dealing with the fragmentation of
the Sforza Duchy is Chittolini 1982. Not coincidentally, Chittolini's studies have opened a long (and still
ongoing) debate on the fragmentation of the Duchy of Milan (more urban-based or more feudal-based?).




Before concluding this introduction with the outline of the thesis structure, there is yet
one overview to provide: that of the sources I am going to use. Being a study of the
Sforza chancery, the core of the sources for this dissertation is to be found in Milan's State
Archives.
4.1. The organisation of Sforza sources in Milan's State Archives
Milan's State Archives house an archive called Sforzesco. It is divided in four major series
called  Registri  delle  Missive  ('Registers  of  Letters  Missive'),  Registri  Ducali  ('Ducal
Registers'), Carteggio Interno ('Internal Correspondence') and Carteggio Estero ('Foreign
Correspondence'). For a detailed description of the Registri delle Missive and the Registri
Ducali see 4.3 and 4.4 below. The Carteggio Interno and the Carteggio Estero preserve
the  incoming  and  outgoing  correspondence  between  the  Sforza  leadership  and  its
interlocutors within and outside the Duchy of Milan: the incoming documents are original
letters, whereas the outgoing documents are drafts of the letters the chancery dispatched.
However, contrary to what its name suggests, the Sforzesco cannot be considered
as the actual 'archive of the Sforza.' Instead, it is a recent creation, by early-twentieth-
century archivists who followed convenient (yet very arbitrary) criteria. They aimed at
remedying  the  late-eighteenth-  and  early-nineteenth-century  dismemberment  of  the
original Sforza archive, promoted by three generations of archivists who were among the
most enthusiastic supporters of ordering the archives 'by-subject' (in Italian ordinamento
per materia). The ordinamento per materia advocated the mixing of documents coming
from different  archives  into  new collections  organised  following  artificial  categories,
which were thought to make the research quicker and easier for administrative (and, later,
historical-scientific) use. In contemporary Archival Science the ordinamento per materia
is  now  deemed  totally  inadequate,  mainly  because  it  makes  much  more  difficult  to
understand the historical evolution of an archive over time. The method in use today is
indeed called 'historical method' (metodo storico) and advocates the maintenance (as far
as reasonably possible) of the archives' original order.57 
Today,  as  a  result  of  these  archival  operations  and  counter-operations,  Sforza
documents  are  scattered  in  many  different  archival  series,  each  one  with  its  own
56 See Gamberini 2014a, especially pp.  13-15 (citations at page 13).
57 The most complete article on the application of the  ordinamento per materia  in late-eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Milan is Bologna 1997.
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anachronistic  logic  and bias.  On the one hand,  the  four  series  of  the  Sforzesco  were
created with the strong 'statist' bias typical of the early-twentieth century, imagining that
all registers and letters emanated from (and converged to) a single and well-identifiable
centre of Sforza power. On the other hand, the series created following the ordinamento
per materia are divided in two major archives—the Atti di Governo ('Governmental Acts')
and  the  Diplomatico  ('Diplomatic  Archive')—and  bear  names  like  Acque  ('Waters'),
Commercio  ('Commerce'),  Finanze  ('Financial  Affairs'),  Famiglie  ('Families'),  Comuni
('Municipalities'),  Autografi ('Autographs'),  all  betraying  the  taxonomic  tendencies  of
positivism.58 
Questions related to the turmoil of the Sforza restoration add to this troublesome
archival situation. For the years of Francesco II, we lack all the Carteggio Estero between
1522 and 1525; as we shall see, documentation for the study of the duke's exiled years
(1526–1530) is scarce; and generally speaking, the Carteggio Interno has several gaps.  
Despite these issues—which all in all are inherent in doing research—I retrace the
history of the Sforza chancery under Francesco II with a good level of detail by using a
variety of sources that have survived in Milan's State Archives (and elsewhere, see 4.7
and 4.8). In the next few pages, I will provide a basic contextualisation of the materials I
have used most systematically.
4.2. The chancery ruoli
Among my main sources are the chancery ruoli—lists recording the names of chancery
members paid for their services. The ruoli are the most direct way of identifying who was
active in the chancery at a given time, and of reconstructing the network of chancery
members during the Sforza restoration.
Unproblematic as they may look at first glance, the ruoli are not easy to find and
use.  As far as their  preservation is  concerned,  nineteenth-  and early-twentieth-century
archivists filed them in (at least) four different series belonging to two separate archives.
In the  Atti di Governo  archive, they are to be found in the series named  Finanze  and
Uffici e Tribunali Regi (‘Royal Offices and Courts’); in the Sforzesco archive, more ruoli
occasionally surface  from the  Registri delle Missive. In total, I could find seven  ruoli
produced at the time of Francesco II. One of them belongs to the  Registri delle Missive
and dates 14 September 1525. Another one is to be found in the Uffici e Tribunali Regi
58 For a detailed archival description of the  Sforzesco archive, of the  Atti di Governo archive and of the
Diplomatico archive, see GGAS, vol. 2 (1983), 926-928, 913-923, 902-913 respectively.
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series of the Atti di Governo, and dates 20 October 1525.59 The five remaining ruoli are
preserved in the Finanze series of the Atti di Governo. They are undated, but, as I have
reconstructed, they were drawn between 1531 and 1537.60
There are two problems in the use of ruoli as sources. Firstly, they do not list all
the members of the chancery, but only those who were paid on one specific occasion.
Payments  normally  occurred  at  irregular  intervals,  and  the  ruoli  often  report  the
distribution of extra benefits—typically quotas of salt. Therefore, finding a ruolo listing
ten names does not mean that the chancery had ten members in total, but that at least ten
people  were  active  in  the  chancery in  that  moment.  Ascertaining  that  moment  is  the
second problem, because many ruoli—as pointed out above—are undated. Dating, then,
requires a certain amount of detective work. Knowing the date of death of a chancery
member sets a terminus ante quem; in addition, following the promotions of coadjutors to
clerks and of  clerks to secretaries at least helps establish the chronological order of the
undated ruoli.61
Indeed, a very useful feature of the ruoli is that they always signal the members'
position in the chancery hierarchy. Names are normally followed by roles (secretario,
cancelliere,  coadiutore and so forth); when the latter are missing, the hierarchy can be
reconstructed by looking at the amounts of money (or salt) paid to each person. Thus,
reordering the  ruoli  in  chronological  order is  an excellent  way to trace the career  of
chancery members.
4.3. The Registri delle Missive
The Registri delle Missive are the chancery copybooks: they gather the transcripts of the
letters close that the chancery sent to Sforza subjects—peripheral officers, communities,
individuals—in chronological order. There are six surviving registers from the period of
Francesco II, covering the years 1522–1525 and 1530–1535.62
The  Registri  delle  Missive  will  represent  a  key-source for  this  thesis,  in  three
respects.  Firstly,  together  with  the  ruoli,  the  Registri  delle  Missive  will  allow me to
discover the identity of chancery members. This is because , each register entry bears the
signature of the  primo secretario  or  Gran Cancelliere  (in the  bottom-left  corner);  the
59 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 223, l. 74, 1525 September 14; ASMi, Atti di Governo, Uffici e Tribunali
Regi Parte Antica, 86, 1525 October 20. The  ruolo  in the  Registri delle Missive  is actually a list of
chancery members who were exempted from the payment of taxes in the city of Milan.
60 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Finanza Parte Antica, 857.
61 Downgrades must in fact have been rare: if for any reason a chancery member was to downgrade, then
the best solution was relocating him to the chancery of a less important office, or ousting him directly.
See Leverotti 1994a, 323.
62 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220-225. 
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signature of the secretary who was responsible for the production of the correspondent
document (bottom-right corner); and the signature of the chancery clerk who materially
wrote the original document (bottom-centre, or bottom-right corner under the secretary)
(fig.  I.5, p. 43). Thus,  browsing the registers allows the researcher to compensate for
some of the blind spots of the  ruoli. Secondly, the  Registri delle Missive  shed light on
many aspects of the organisation, language, and governance failures of the chancery, thus
providing an accurate picture of its functioning, ambitions, and limits. Thirdly, I will rely
on the contents of the letters transcribed in the registers to study how outsiders were able
to influence document making.
4.4. The Registri Ducali
The Registri Ducali, unlike the Registri delle Missive, typically record governmental acts:
documents with a juridical value, not letters that  the recipient could reply to. Given the
artificial nature of the  Sforzesco  (explained above), the series preserves a very diverse
ensemble of registers: some originated from various branches of the Sforza chancery;
some others originally belonged to different magistracies under Sforza control. They are
more numerous than the Registri delle Missive.63 
As  demonstrated  in  introducing the  history of  the  Sforza  chancery during  the
golden age (pp. 32-33), analysing the organisation of the  Registri Ducali is essential to
detect the chancery structure. Furthermore,  as we shall see,  the contents of the acts can
shed light on the array of privileged relations and special businesses that bound the duke
and his chancery’s members in ways that were much more complex than mere 'clerical'
transactions.
Generally speaking, I will not exploit the Registri Ducali as systematically as the
Registri delle Missive. Nevertheless, they will offer some precious evidence throughout
the whole dissertation.
4.5. The chancery Ordines
The  Ordines  are a set  of chancery regulations compiled between 1453 and 1475, and
gathered  in  three  manuscripts  preserved  in  Milan:  one  housed  at  the  State  Archives
(ASMi, Registri Ducali, 214), one at the Ambrosiana Library (BAMi, Ambr. Z 198 Sup.),
and one at the Trivulziana Library (BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325). 
Although they do not belong to the period of Francesco II, the Ordines represent
an excellent source to grasp the mismatch between the apparent solidity of the chancery
63 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 26, 47, 68-82, 93-95, 138-142, 193, 194, 202, 210.
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Fig. I.5: ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 222, 1525 June 18. Typical entry from the
Registri delle Missive. On the bottom-left corner of the entry, there is the signature of
Gran Cancelliere Girolamo Morone (Visa HMoronous); on the bottom-right corner, the
signature of primo secretario Bartolomeo Rozzoni (Barts Rozs); underneath the latter, the
signature of the clerk who materially wrote the letter, Agostino Parravicini (Per
Paravisinum)
structure and the  fluidity of  chancery practices.  More  specifically,  I  will  offer  a  new
reading  of  the  regulations,  arguing  that  the  anxiety  to  normalise  the  activity  of  the
chancery  is  in  fact  a  very  good  vantage  point  from  which  appreciate  the  chancery
unruliness. 
4.6. The memoir Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali 
The memoir  Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali  ('Information about the
Tasks of the Ducal  Secretaries')  is—as I  will  demonstrate—an early-sixteenth-century
account of the  functioning of the  Sforza chancery. It complements the insights coming
from the Ordines, and I will use it to show that the chancery was a complex association
rather than a neutral 'office' for documentary production; furthermore, I will explain why
I believe it was written, for practical reasons, at the beginning of Francesco II's reign. 
Unfortunately, the original memoir is not extant: it was included in a manuscript
of the Trivulziana Library (either  Cod. Triv.  171 or  Cod. Triv.  172) that was destroyed
during the Second World War bombings on Milan. The memoir's text survives in two
transcriptions that appeared in the journal  Archivio storico lombardo in 1881 and 1939,
when Sforza scholar Caterina Santoro gave the text its modern title.64
4.7. Sforza chancery letters close
Since  the  materiality  of  chancery  products  will  be  one  of  the  main  focuses  of  my
dissertation,  I  will  also  need  to  leave  Milan  and  analyse  original  Sforza  chancery
documents in the archives of their recipients. To study the materiality of letters close, I
will  move to  two northern-Italian  archives:  that  of  the  Gonzaga (Archivio  Gonzaga),
housed in Mantua; and that of the prince-bishop of Trent, Bernardo Cles (Corrispondenza
Clesiana), housed in Trent.65 The first is the archive with the highest number of letters
close coming from the chancery of Francesco II; the second preserves a special collection
of Sforza chancery letters, because special was the relationship between the duke and
Cles (see pp. 154-155).
4.8. Sforza chancery letters patent
For the study of the other main typology of Sforza chancery documents—letters patent—I
will turn back to Milan to examine two collections: one is to be found at Milan State
Archives,  and  is  named  Diplomi  e  Dispacci  Sovrani  ('Sovereign  Diplomas  and
64 Porro Lambertenghi 1881, Santoro 1939, 39-43.
65 ASMn,  Archivio Gonzaga,  Dipartimento  di  Affari  Esteri,  Milano,  Lettere  dei  Signori  di  Milano ai
Gonzaga, 1616-1618; ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10.
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Dispatches');  the  other,  called  Cimeli  ('Memorabilia'),  is  housed  in  Milan's  Archivio
Storico Civico (Municipal Historical Archives).66
5. Thesis structure
In  order  to  link  the  'macro'-problems  I  discussed  in  the  opening  sections  of  this
introduction  with  the  'micro'-problems  relating  to  my  case  study—the  chancery  of
Francesco II—the thesis structure will follow the three main themes that emerged from
the  general  research  questions  (pp.  15-18).  Therefore,  the thesis  is  divided into three
parts, each one further divided in two chapters. Firstly, I study the system of Francesco
II's  chancery;  secondly,  I  analyse  chancery  practices;  thirdly,  I  carry  out  a  material
analysis of Sforza documents: the chancery products. 
In Part I, 'The Chancery System,' I throw light on the four most essential features
of the chancery as they change throughout the different phases of the Sforza restoration.
In Chapter 1, I discuss the chancery structure, size, and hierarchy—the raw wordpower of
Francesco II. In Chapter 2, I analyse the networks of chancery members. Displaying these
data serves three purposes. The first is laying the essential frame of reference to orientate
the rest  of the thesis—explaining some basic concepts and chancery terminology, and
introducing  the  characters  that  will  come  up  more  regularly.  The  second  purpose  is
analysing the Sforza restoration through the perspective of the chancery—that is, showing
how the changes in chancery organisation reflect and explain the ever-changing strategies
and ambitions of Francesco. The third purpose is offering a social history of the chancery
network.  As  we  shall  see,  secretaries  and  clerks  did  not  have  a  simply  clerical—
bureaucratic, impersonal—relation with power. They belonged to a  resilient group of
Sforza supporters who brought their whole socio-political capital at court, often having
significant economic ties with the duke. Realising this means beginning to problematise
the  very  idea  of  the  chancery  as  institution.  To  what  extent  can  the  chancery  be
considered a mere bureaucratic 'office.'
This question is the starting point of Part II, 'Chancery Practices,' and I answer it
by observing the concrete  dynamics  through which  the chancery operated.  Chapter  3
studies the social, political, and cultural practice that were undertaken in the chancery.
Firstly, from a social point of view, I raise a problem that, banal as it may seem, is mostly
unaddressed by scholarship: was secrecy the main characteristic of the self-styled secret
chancery (cancellaria secreta)? Was the chancery a monastic-like scriptorium? In other
66 ASMi, Diplomatico, Diplomi e Dispacci Sovrani, Milano, 13; ASCMi, Cimeli.
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words:  how  clear-cut  was  the  separation  between  chancery  insiders  and  outsiders?
Secondly, from a more specifically political point of view, I argue that looking at the role
of the chancery in the management of  flows of  information and communication at the
Sforza court is bound to further problematise its status. We usually think of the chancery
as  an  office  just  providing a  documentary output,  but  was  it  actually  the  case?  Was
document  making  strictly  separated  from  more  political  activities  like  information
gathering and decision making, and from the world of the court? Finally, from a cultural
point of view, I make an overview of the  non-administrative activities of the chancery.
Was the chancery only a centre of political-administrative documentary production, or
was it—more generally—a centre of writing? Did chancery members see themselves only
as writers at the service of their master, the duke, or did they behave like a self-standing
community in a broader sense?
The aim of all these questions is rethinking the most basic framework of written
political culture through which we interpret the chancery. Following up in this matter, in
Chapter 4 ('The Practice of Centre-Periphery Correspondence'), I will re-frame as a self-
standing and meaningful practice an activity that is usually treated as purely logistical and
perfectly neutral:  the deployment of chancery documents around the Duchy of Milan.
Why did Francesco II invest great amounts of money to reach the Duchy's periphery with
his letters? Was it only for strictly administrative reasons, or was it also the performance
of a symbolic act? Answering this question, too, contributes to re-thinking the chancery
and its documents. For example, it lays the ground for a more critical approach to the
language of chancery products.
'Chancery Products' is also the title of Part III, which brings all the claims made
throughout the previous chapters together, to analyse documents on a material level. Part
III studies how chancery practices affected the very form of chancery documents; and,
vice  versa,  how  studying  the  form  of  chancery  documents  can  help  us  refine  the
knowledge of chancery practices. In this part I wish to demonstrate the new diplomatics I
introduced above (pp. 16-17): a material analysis of documents that does not just describe
their  authoritative final aspect,  but gets  us into the socio-political  complexities of the
plural  process  of  their  making.  Building  upon  Le  Goff's  Documento/monumento,  I
approach documents as assemblages in the attempt to de-construct their production and
understand better their true meaning and functions.
I test my method on two basic typologies of chancery documents. Chapter 5 is
devoted to what diplomatics defines as 'letters close'—that is, informative letters normally
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used for correspondence;67 Chapter 6 is devoted to letters patent—documents establishing
juridical acts. In both cases, it is the authorship of the documents that falls under scrutiny.
Firstly,  as far as letters close are concerned, what emerges is the tension between the
institutional epistolary authorship of Francesco II, shared among many characters, and the
personal epistolary authorship of Francesco II,  expressed graphically in various ways.
Secondly, in the analysis of letters patent, what stands out— as in the case of the Taverna
charter—is the mismatch between the solemn monumentality of the finished products and
the complex, collaborative processes that led to their creation. My use of material culture
to interpret written culture problematises the very meaning of chancery documents: to
what extent were documents channels for the top-down imposition of authority coming
from  a  well-defined  sovereign,  and  to  what  extent  were  they  instead  open  and
participatory platforms? Not coincidentally,  there is  a  strong paralle  between this  last
question and those discussed in dealing with chancery practices in Part II.
In  the  last  chapter  ('The  Chancery  from Outside:  Documentary  Interaction')  I
finally abandon a perspective internal to the chancery, and I analyse the chancery as seen
from  the  point  of  view  of  outsiders.  What  attitude  did  peripheral  officers,  subject
communities and individual subjects have toward the chancery and its documents? Were
they acquiescent  to  the  documentary strategies  of  the  central  authorities,  or  did  they
respond with documentary tactics? The clash between  strategies (understood as the aims
of practices undertaken from above) and tactics (the aims of practices undertaken from
below) frames my final effort to understand the meaning of documents in relation to what
happened around them.68 Can we understand the documents coming from the authorities
without considering their reception? 
Ultimately, what I want to achieve with this dissertation is a first cultural history
of the institutions that oversaw the production of political-administrative documents, and
of  the  political-administrative  documents  themselves—a history  that  does  not  take
chancery documents as mere containers of historical evidence and their production as a
trans-historical phenomenon, but one that approaches these elements as a means better to
understand power, authority and society. It is, in a sense, a micro-history, because it is
committed to  the close  study of  its  objects  (chanceries  and their  documents)  in  their
precise historical context, as an antidote to a certain teleology of political and institutional
67 VID, 99:  ‘a letter through which a person, public or private, communicates with another in order to
inform her of something, to ask her information, to explain her something, to ask her to do something or
to send for her’ [my translation]
68 For the strategy-tactic couple,  originally elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau, see
Burke 2008, 80-81.
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history and—more generally—as a critical  response to a face-value acceptance of the
documents' purported message. I hope that, like the most inspired micro-histories, this
dissertation  will  help  rethink  broad  historical  problems  and  eventually  promote  their
analysis on a larger scale.
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Part I – The Chancery System
In the first part of this dissertation, I will delineate the fundamental characteristics of the
Sforza chancery under Francesco II. The questionnaire I am going to test on the evidence
includes the most basic issues to tackle in approaching a chancery: how was the chancery
structured? What was the size of the chancery? What was its internal hierarchy, and how
was  labour  divided?  And,  shifting  the  focus  from  the  infrastructural  features  of  the
chancery to its personnel: who were the chancery members? Where did they come from?
Is it possible to find a clear rationale behind their presence in the chancery?
The answers to these questions will have two constants. On the one hand, I will
continuously compare the emerging characteristics of Francesco II's chancery with those
of  the Sforza chancery during the  golden age.1 Indeed,  in  order  to  measure  both  the
ambitions and the limits of the Sforza restoration, it is important to highlight continuities
and discontinuities  in  a  diachronic framework.  on the other,  my analysis  will  always
follow the three phases I have identified in the history of Francesco as duke of Milan,
which are very different from each other. The first phase, from the recapturing of the
Duchy to the arrest of Girolamo Morone for the alleged conspiracy against Charles V
(April 1522–October 1525), was characterised by high ambitions in the face of a very
difficult  political  and military situation.  The second phase—the exiled years in south-
eastern Lombardy (Summer 1526–January 1530)—saw the inevitable downsizing of the
Sforza  political-administrative  apparatus.  The  final  phase,  from  the  re-investiture  of
Francesco  as  duke  of  Milan  to  his  sudden  death  (January  1530–October  1535),  was
marked by relative stability: however, this derived from the politically very cumbersome
protection of Charles V. How did the chancery's structure and men adapt to reflect these
changes?
As anticipated in the thesis structure, the reconstruction of the Sforza chancery
under Francesco II serves three purposes. The first is outlining the essential contours of
my  object  of  study:  in  discussing  the  chancery  structure  (Chapter  1)  and  networks
(Chapter 2) I present a series of concepts, elements and characters that are going to come
up repeatedly in the dissertation. 
The  second  purpose  is  carrying  out  a  documentary  history  of  the  Sforza
1 Regarding this  question,  it  is  also  useful  to  make  here  a  quick  preliminary note:  when I  mention
'Francesco II'  (usually at  the first  appearance in  a  paragraph),  'Francesco'  (usually from the second
appearance in a paragraph onwards), and (less frequently) 'the duke,' I am always referring to the person
of Francesco II Sforza; when I mention 'the Sforza,' I am always referring to the Sforza dynasty as a
whole.
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restoration—that  is,  analysing  the  organisation  of  the  Sforza  chancery as  a  means  to
improve our understanding of the political ambitions and limits of Francesco II. This part
of  the  inquiry  allows  me  to  engage  with  the  most  recent  historiography  on  early-
sixteenth-century Milan, which currently is re-evaluating the Italian-Wars decades as a
period of experimentation (rather than of mere trouble); but it also allows me to shed new
light on the period, insofar as scholars have systematically excluded Francesco from such
re-evaluation (see above, pp. 35-38). 
The third purpose, which relates most closely to the overriding argument of the
thesis,  is to question the idea of the chancery as a strictly bureaucratic office.  I  shall
achieve  this  by  switching  the  focus  from the  more  formal  and  rigid  features  of  the
chancery (structure, size, official hierarchy, analysed in Chapter 1) to the more informal
and  flexible  mechanisms  and  networks  (analysed  in  Chapter  2)  through  which  the
chancery actually functioned. As we shall see, chancery members interpreted their role in
ways that cannot be defined as clerical. They had a surprisingly complex relationship with
the duke and the Sforza court, and they owed their membership of the chancery to family
or  personal  ties  much more  than  to  technical  expertise  in  writing.  Can we afford  to
overlook this  framework of  Renaissance  written  political  culture,  so distant  from the
principles  of  bureaucracy,  when  we  hold  a  document  coming  from a  chancery?  My
starting  research  hypothesis  was  that  looking  at  what  happened  behind  and  around
chancery documents can offer a new and compelling perspective on Renaissance political
and institutional history. With these first two chapters, we already start to explore this
possibility.
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Chapter 1 – The Chancery Structure
1. The chancery structure
The structure of Francesco II's chancery is best reconstructed through the analysis of the
organisation  of  the  registers  it  produced,  the  Registri  delle  Missive and  the  Registri
Ducali. In order to detect the existence of self-standing chancery branches, it is necessary
to look at the signatures under each register entry. If one secretary tends to monopolise a
series  of  registers  with  a  clear  thematic  rationale,  and his  name does  not  appear  (or
seldom appears) in other series, then he is likely to have been the head of a chancery
branch. This is the method Franca Leverotti has used in order to identify the appearance
(or disappearance) of different branches before 1487, when a chancery member (Tristano
Calco) eventually compiled the first known organic description of the chancery, explicitly
listing its  four parts:  political  branch, beneficial  branch, judicial  branch, and financial
branch.2 For Francesco II's period, we do not have any such description of the chancery,
but we can adopt Leverotti's method.
1.1. Ambition: May 1522-October 1525
Francesco II first returned to Milan as duke on 4 April 1522, and in May began to re-
organise the institutional order of the Duchy. We have already seen (p. 31) that on 18 May
he issued the  Constitutio, a highly programmatic document in which he communicated
his political agenda and confirmed the institution of the Senate. There is no mention of
the chancery in the Constitutio, but a letter dating from 28 May testifies that Francesco
was already working on the organisation of his wordpower: he wrote to the Maestri delle
Entrate Straordinarie  (literally 'Masters of the Extraordinary Income,'  a magistracy in
charge of financial affairs) inviting them to obey the ‘confirmed and newly appointed’
Giovanni Giacomo Ferrufini, defined as ‘secretary for the matters concerning our income’
(secretario sopra le  cose de le  intrate  nostre).3 Therefore,  the Sforza chancery had a
financial branch. This fact is also confirmed by the existence of a register, bearing the
modern title 'Fiscal Affairs' (Affari Fiscali), in which the majority of the entries show the
signature of Ferrufini.4 
Moreover, the existence of a political branch—the heart of the Sforza chancery—
is immediately recognizable from the four extant Registri delle Missive covering the years
2 Leverotti 1994a, 310-321. Tristano Calco's description of the chancery was part of a wider account of
the entire Sforza administrative structure, that Calco had prepared for the use of a Venetian ambassador.
BAV, Vaticano Latino 3923, ll. 74-114 (for the part on the chancery ll. 81-88).
3 ASMi, Registri ducali, 210, l. 3.
4 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 26
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between  1522  and  1525  (nn.  220–223).  In  these  registers,  the  signature  of  secretary
Bartolomeo Rozzoni is to be found under almost all the acts recorded, whereas three other
secretaries—Giorgio  Gadio,  Giovanni  Stefano  Robbio,  and  Giovanni  Angelo  Ricci—
appear  more  occasionally.  The  case  of  register  221,  for  example,  is  emblematic:  the
signature of Rozzoni appears under hundreds of entries except only one (9 April 1525),
signed by Robbio. Hence, the political branch of the chancery was certainly directed by
Bartolomeo Rozzoni.
Finally, two registers belonging to the Registri Ducali series, covering the whole
Sforza restoration and preserved under the modern title 'Ecclesiastical benefices' (Benefizi
Ecclesiastici, 1522-1525)5 and 'Benefices' (Benefici, 1525-1535)6 are the key for detecting
the existence of a beneficial chancery. Indeed, the registers always bear continuous series
of signatures of one single secretary who clearly specialised in ecclesiastical benefices:
fixed  capital  assets  endowed  to  church  offices,  whose  distribution  was  crucial  for
maintaining a political clientele. Between 1522 and 1525 beneficial secretary was Giorgio
Gadio,  whose  signature  recurs  throughout  the  entire  register  entitled  Benefizi
Ecclesiastici.
A political branch directed by Bartolomeo Rozzoni, a beneficial branch directed
by Giorgio Gadio, and a financial branch directed by Giovanni Giacomo Ferrufini: the
similarity with the chancery structure of the Sforza golden age cannot be a coincidence
(figg.  1.1,  1.2, p.  53). When Francesco II structured his wordpower, he clearly chose
continuity with the past. Such choice not only was an administrative measure, but also a
strong political  statement:  Francesco signalled that  he wanted to  rule  as incisively as
Ludovico Sforza and his predecessors.
And  yet,  an  important  discontinuity  is  also  apparent:  the  judicial  branch
disappeared. Two elements allow to affirm it.  Firstly,  in the registers belonging to the
Sforza restoration, some affairs that should logically belong to the domain of a judicial
secretary (such as graces and safe-conducts) are to be found mixed with matters of other
kinds  (donations,  concessions,  appointment  to  offices)  under  the  control  of  political
secretary  Bartolomeo  Rozzoni.  Secondly,  I  was  unable  to  find  registers  showing  the
prevalence of the signatures of a fourth secretary besides Rozzoni, Gadio, or Ferrufini.
The  disappearance  of  the  judicial  branch  could  have  been  caused  by  the
combination of two factors. One is the confirmation, in the  Constitutio, of the French-
founded Senate of Milan as the most important assembly of the Duchy (see p. 31). Since
5 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 73.
6 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 84.
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Figg. 1.1, 1.2: The four-branch structure of the Sforza chancery during the golden age
(1455– 1499) and the three-branch structure of the April 1522–October 1525 period
the Senate was first and foremost a tribunal that dealt with the administration of justice,
its rising power could have eroded the prerogatives of the duke, making the establishment
of  a  judicial  branch  of  the  secret  chancery unnecessary.  The  other  factor  is  that  the
judicial branch normally managed a great share of the flow of petitions, which generated
relevant  income from the issue  of  documents  on request  (the  rescritti).  Francesco II,
always in financial need, could have decided to channel that money directly in his hands,
or at least to have as few intermediaries as possible. Not for nothing, according to Nadia
Covini, even during the golden age, primo secretario Cicco Simonetta took control of the
judicial  chancery between 1464 and 1468 (see  p.  34)  primarily  because  he aimed at
controlling its profits.7
To sum up, the documentary history of the first phase of the Sforza restoration
shows two interestingly opposing tendencies. On the one hand, Francesco II had been
remarkably determined to re-establish a chancery on the model of the 'heights'  of the
golden  age,  thus  showing  the  ambition  to  impose  his  wordpower  as  his  illustrious
predecessors  did.  On  the  other  hand,  Francesco  had  to  adapt  to  a  difficult  political
situation:  competition  from  the  Senate,  together  with  financial  difficulties,  probably
caused the disappearance of the judicial branch of the chancery. 
1.2. Emergency: Summer 1526-January 1530
As anticipated in the introduction (p. 31), things could have started to change after the
battle of Pavia (24 February 1525), as the end of the French presence on Lombard soil
seemed to inaugurate an age of stability.  However,  eight months later (October 1525)
Gran  Cancelliere  Girolamo  Morone  was  arrested  for  an  alleged  conspiracy  against
Charles  V,  and the  duke began his  exiled  years  (Summer 1526–January 1530).  What
happened to the Sforza chancery during this troubled period? 
Understandably,  the years  of  exile—which the duke mostly spent  between the
towns of Lodi and Cremona—are strongly characterised by a dearth of documentation. A
gap in the Registri delle Missive between October 1525 (the end of register n. 223) and
January 1529 (the inception of register n. 224) is especially problematic, because it is
impossible to follow the day-to-day activity of the chancery.  Establishing whether the
intervening registers have gone lost or just never existed is difficult, because different
elements point to opposite answers. Register n. 223 stops two days before the arrest of
Girolamo Morone (13 October 1525), which indicates that the chancery ceased to update
it as soon as Francesco II was besieged with his most faithful men in the castle of Milan.
7 Covini 2002a, 116.
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This fact is logical and inevitable, since Francesco was probably unable to send messages
regularly from his residence-prison. But did the chancery start new Registri delle Missive
when the duke eventually began his exile in South-eastern Lombardy (Summer 1526)?
On the one hand, we know that the chancery tended to stop transcribing letters in the
registers when the political situation was particularly critical—registers n. 221 and n. 222
show a parallel gap between October 1524 and February 1525, coinciding with the last
French invasion—and this could well have happened also between 1526 and 1530. On the
other hand, the beginning date of Registri delle Missive n. 224 (January 1529) does not
seem to correspond to any important event motivating the inception of a new register. In
other words, it looks as if register 224 followed up on another (or more) register(s), now
lost. 
What  is  sure  is  that  the  duke  and  his  entourage  operated  in  a  situation  of
emergency.  From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  quite  emblematic  that  Francesco  II's
headquarters in Lodi and in the small town of Soncino were the local Dominican and
Carmelite  convents  respectively:  monasteries  were  indeed  a  typical  'free  zone'  for
travellers,  pilgrims,  and  refugees.8 Moreover,  and  vice  versa,  the  fact  that  an  exiled
government chose Dominicans and Carmelites as protectors and providers of space from
which  to  govern  demonstrates  the  great  political  influence  (and  engagement)  of
mendicant orders. 
And yet, a form of governance certainly continued. An external source like the
Commemoriali registers of the Republic of Venice provides some precious hints on the
composition of Francesco II's inner circle during the exile. Francesco and the Venetians
notarised a series of deeds during this period, and the witnesses to these acts compose a
network of notables that was still around Francesco, both politically and physically. There
are  officers  (Girolamo  Brebbia,  Giovanni  Battista  Speciano,  Girolamo  Marinoni,
Giacomo  Filippo  Sacchi),  courtiers  (Massimiliano  Stampa,  Ludovico  Affaitati),
physicians (Francesco Appiani, Scipione Vegio), and bankers (Domenico Sauli).9
More importantly,  in  one act  dated  15  May 1528,  witnesses  Giacomo Filippo
Sacchi  and Giovanni  Battista  Speciano are  described as  'President  of  the Senate'  and
8 The Dominican convent of Lodi is defined as ‘the residence of the duke’ in I libri Commemoriali 1876–
1924, vol. 6 (1904), 200 (document n. 71); for the relationship between Francesco II and the Carmelites
of Soncino see Sacchi 2005, vol. 1, 124-133. On the systematic penetration of the secular world into the
sacred in the medieval and early modern world, see Hamilton and Spicer 2005, 10-14. On late-medieval
London friaries as catalysts for alien communities, see Colson 2010. On living in exile in Renaissance
Italy see Shaw 2000, especially Ch. 4, ‘Life in Exile.’
9 I libri Commemoriali 1876–1924 , vol. 6 (1904), 195 (doc. 58), 200 (doc. 71), 201 (doc. 75), 203 (doc. 
81).
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'Senator' respectively.10 This fact is very interesting, because the Spanish-imperial party
that was occupying Milan set up a new Senate in 1527; to my knowledge, historiography
has normally considered this last Senate as the only existing assembly, but neither Sacchi
nor Speciano belonged to it—and Sacchi did not figure as President of the Senate before
1526.11 Therefore, a 'shadow' pro-Sforza Senate was probably assisting the duke in Lodi
and Cremona, and it is no coincidence that both Sacchi and Speciano would continue
their  career after  Francesco II's  return,  respectively as President of the Senate and as
Capitano di Giustizia (literally 'Captain of Justice').
The chancery mirrored this political-administrative context—certainly critical and
informal, but also undoubtedly functioning. The political branch of the secret chancery
may have regressed to a small group of secretaries surrounding the duke—probably no
more  than three or  four  at  a  time —12but  it  was  nonetheless  able  to  cope with what
remained of internal affairs: indeed, the Sforzesco archive preserves a number of Registri
Ducali covering the timespan between 1526 and 1530, demonstrating how the chancery
kept making appointments to offices and ecclesiastical benefices, issued safe-conducts,
and so forth. Furthermore, the chancery managed to keep vital diplomatic contacts with
the anti-imperial  allies (Rome, Venice,  Paris) and, less easily,  with the imperial  court,
Spain, and London.13 
Unfortunately, the lack of Registri delle Missive makes it impossible to establish
whether  there  was  still  a  proper  hierarchy  of  clerks  and  coadjutors  (see  pp.  75-77)
working under the secretaries. The downsizing of the chancery also makes it difficult to
understand whether the political, beneficial, and financial branch were still divided. The
register of benefices of the period shows that one of the most prominent secretaries of the
political  branch,  Giovanni  Angelo Ricci,  regularly signed the acts  between November
1527 and October 1529, thus suggesting that the political branch had the management of
ecclesiastical affairs for a couple of years.14 From October 1529, the beneficial branch
became self-standing, because the name of the apostolic protonotary Giacomo Picenardi
is always to be found at the bottom of the registered documents, and he seldom took part
10 Ivi, 200 (doc. 71).
11 The document erecting the new 'Spanish' Senate was edited in Landus 1637, 153-160. For the full list of
its  members,  see  p.  155.  Between May 1522 and October 1525,  President  of  the Senate  had been
Francesco Marliani: ivi, 144-145.
12 ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  224  shows  that  four  secretaries  signed  documents  throughout  1529:
Bartolomeo Rozzoni, Giovanni Angelo Ricci, Camillo Ghilini.
13 ASMi,  Carteggio  Estero,  Roma,  135-138;  Venezia,  1275-77;  Francia,  560;  Alemagna,  590-591;
Aragona e Spagna, 655; Spagna, 1336; Inghilterra e Scozia, 568.
14 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 84, ll. 46-102.
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in the work of the political branch.15  As far as the financial branch of the chancery is
concerned, I was unable to find registers under the control of Giovanni Giacomo Ferrufini
(or of one likely to be his successor,) but it is impossible to tell whether this is due to
archival loss or to the actual disappearance of the branch (fig. 1.3, p. 58).
These archival limitations notwithstanding, one thing is certain: Francesco II may
have not been master of his own political fate, but his documentary posture demonstrates
that he continued to consider himself a ruler. The Sforza chancery did not implode, but
adapted to an emergency situation in the best possible way, waiting for better times. 
1.3. Re-positioning: January 1530–November 1535
Such better times came when Charles V issued the diploma that re-invested Francesco II
as duke of Milan, on 2 January 1530.16 However, the third, relatively stable phase of the
Sforza restoration actually started only fifteen months later. In March 1531, Francesco
ratified a full list of magistracies and office-holders (1 March),17 and was able to re-enter
the castle of Milan (15 March), which gradually became his princely residence.18
Very significantly, the value of this moment as a turning point is demonstrated by
a  documentary fact:  Francesco  II  marked  his  return  to  the  castle  of  Milan  with  the
decision of moving his most important writings there. This is testified by a letter to primo
secretario  Bartolomeo Rozzoni,  dated  14  March 1531 and bound in  a  manuscript  of
Milan's Ambrosiana Library:
We ship you some writings of ours in this sack, [and] you will  see that they are
described in the attached list. And given that it is inappropriate to move things like
these too often from one place to another, we think it advisable to find an appropriate
place to archive these and similar writings; and we think that an apt place, if you
agree with us, would be our usual old little Archive (solito vecchio Archivietto) in our
castle of Milan. Go have a look, and if you think it is appropriate, put it in order and
store there all these writings, and do the same with the important writings that will
deserve careful preservation in the future. And it would be useful to transcribe them,
and to make copie autentiche [copies with a legal value, authenticated by a notary] to
be stored in the chancery, so that they will be ready to use when needed.19
15 Ibid., ll.. 103-154.
16 The original document is preserved in ASMi, Cimeli, 3. Unfortunately, however, the Cimeli series was
excluded from consultation due to administrative reasons throughout my whole doctorate.
17 ASMi, Atti di governo, Uffici e Tribunali Regi, Parte Antica, 7, 1531 March 1.
18 Rossana Sacchi describes the refurbishment and decoration of the castle in detail: Sacchi 2005, vol. 1,
133-146.
19 BAMi, L 44 inf. (5), l. 40: ‘Vi mandamo in una saccozza alcune scritture nostre, de quali ne vederete li
titoli in l'inclusa lista. Et perché non sono cose da molto movere da loco a loco, ne pare sia buono a
ritrovare qualche loco idoneo ad essere a queste et similaltre scritture Archivio, come a noi pareria al
proposito quando ancora gli concorra il parer vostro, il solito et vecchio Archivietto è in la roccha nostra
de Milano. Qual veduto, et considerato essere a ciò idoneo, lo fareti redrizzare et poner in ordine, et in
esso reponere queste tutte scritture et successive le altre saranno de simil importanza et meritevole di
bona custodia. Ne parerà anche a proposito, anzi espediente che de esse se ne facciano far li transumpti,





These  lines  are  extraordinary  because  they  clearly  reveal  a  tight  connection
between a long-awaited return to political and institutional order, and the ordering of the
archive and the chancery (understood here as physical places.) It is worth noticing the
materiality  of  the  process  devised  in  the  letter:  writings  that  are  first  and  foremost
perceived as frail (they are not to be ‘moved too often from place to place’) are going to
be  carefully  preserved  (bona  custodia) in  a  safe  place;  the  writings  will  also  be
transcribed for the everyday use of the chancery, so that they will become at the same
time both historical and useful.
Furthermore, we know what were the writings that Francesco II was shipping to
Milan, because the above-mentioned list survives.20 Seventeen documents were listed in
alphabetical order, from A to S, and can be easily divided in three groups. Firstly, the five
documents from A to E pertain to the 1494 investiture of Ludovico Sforza as duke of
Milan made by emperor Maximilian I. Secondly, the eight documents from F to O21 range
from 1522 to 1530, and regard directly Francesco: among them a privilege of Charles V
annulling any donation involving estates of the Duchy of Milan which—given its date, 1
January 1522—was  evidently intended  to  invalidate  the  anti-Sforza  redistributions  of
lands and goods that occurred during the second French domination; a first investiture as
duke of Milan (30 October 1524); the new investiture as duke of Milan (2 January 1530);
a number of documents pertaining to the Congress of Bologna of 1530; and a copy of the
Treaty of Madrid (1526), by which France renounced claims in Italy. Finally, the four
documents  from P to S regard the  selling  of  the  domus Cancellariae  (‘Palace of  the
Chancery’), located in Rome, one of the most valuable estates belonging to the Sforza.22
The sense of  this  list  is  clear.  Throughout  all  the difficulties  of his  history as
troubled prince,  Francesco II  had accumulated a  portable  'treasure'  of  documents  that
provided support for his most basic claims. It included the ducal title granted to his family
in 1494; his old and new investitures as duke; two documents that disqualified any French
interference on his dominion; and the extremes of the new European status quo as  it
emerged from the Congress of Bologna. Now, he was moving this treasure to the castle of
Porta Giovia in order to constitute the core of a re-ordered archive. In turn, this archive
should have been a point of reference for the chancery, now steadily located in the castle.
These premises seemed to announce the revival of the ambitious political project
20 BAMi, L 44 inf. (5), ll. 41-42.
21 The order goes F, G, H, I, K, L, M, O.
22 On the management of, and the repeated attempts to sell, the domus Cancellariae, see Sacchi 2005, vol.
1, 113-123.
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that had characterised the first return of Francesco II back in 1522. But in fact, when seen
from the perspective of chancery organisation and of documentary production, the last
five years of the Sforza restoration are marked by a surprising decrease. Indeed, the only
register belonging to the Registri delle Missive in this last phase (register n. 225) suggests
that the volume of correspondence between the Sforza leadership and the periphery of the
dominion  diminished  drastically.  Firstly,  this  register  includes  the  correspondence
between the centre and all the peripheral officials, towns, and communities of the Duchy,
whereas it took two different and parallel series to manage internal affairs between 1522
and  1525  (see  below,  p.  130).  And  secondly,  register  n.  225  covers  five  years  of
correspondence, (1531–1535), whereas the register covering the widest timespan of the
1522–1525 period (n. 221) does not exceed two years and four months. One may argue
that other Registri delle Missive could have existed and have gone lost, but I maintain that
the unification of the two original series and the uniqueness of register n. 225 cannot be a
coincidence.  The  register  does  not  show  significant  gaps  in  its  chronological  or
geographic coverage:  the production and delivery of chancery documents  was simply
sporadic. 
The analysis of the other chancery branches confirms this trend. Firstly, there is no
evidence  to  suggest  that  a  self-standing  financial  branch  of  the  chancery  was  re-
established.  Indeed,  the  only extant  register  dealing  exclusively with  financial  affairs
contains the correspondence exchanged with Cremona for a reformation of the taxes to
pay on rural estates, but it was under the control of the Maestri delle Entrate Ordinarie
('Masters of the Ordinary Income'), a largely independent magistracy that did not include
members of the duke's inner circle.23 Secondly, the beneficial branch, which continued to
exist, was now a mixed institution, partially controlled by Francesco II and by the Holy
See;  the  head-secretaries  of  the  branch  (Giacomo  Picenardi  and  Melchione  Langhi)
belonged to the Roman curia—they were both Apostolic protonotaries.24 Given the crucial
political  importance  of  benefices,  the  'legalisation'  of  Papal  interferences  in  their
distribution must be considered a major setback for the Sforza.25 
Therefore, the chancery appears to have been both less active and less structured
than ten years before (fig. 1.4, p. 61). The political project that underlay the organisation
23 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 47.
24 Somaini 2012, 41; Ramacciotti Teani 1996.
25 On the importance of the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices for strengthening the bonds with Sforza
loyalists and for coopting new supporters, see Leverotti 1994a, 312. On ecclesiastical benefices in the
Duchy of Milan see Somaini 2012. On the strong disputes between Francesco II and the Roman curia




of the chancery seems to have changed too. As anticipated, between 1522 and 1525, the
chancery was intended to revive the function it served in the Sforza golden age, i.e. an
apparatus  through  which  the  Sforza  leadership  supervised  and directed  all  the  single
magistracies.  Between  1531  and  1535,  such  an  ambition  was  outdated.  Francesco  II
definitively  refused  to  restore  his  old  ducal  prerogatives;  rather,  he  aimed  at  re-
positioning himself  into  a  new political  landscape  characterised  by competition  from
different institutional bodies, each one with its own chancery. To this end, Francesco kept
a small and agile political chancery, but did not re-establish the judicial branch and the
financial branches, and gave up the sole control of the beneficial branch. These moves
gave way to the rise of the Senate and of the  Maestri delle Entrate—which dealt with
judicial and financial affairs respectively.26 It is no coincidence that both these institutions
were destined  to  long life:  as  late  as  in  the  early eighteenth century,  jurist  Giuseppe
Benaglio (1668–1735) still saw the Senate and the Maestri delle Entrate as the first and
the second Milanese institution for importance.27 The Economato Ducale-apostolico, too,
survived throughout the early modern age.
It would certainly be easy to label this process as a straightforward decline; yet, a
look forward to the first years of Milan under Charles V (1535–1559) demonstrates that
things are more complex than this.28 The secret chancery did not disappear with the death
of  the duke,  but  continued to exist  and to  maintain its  name (cancellaria secreta).  It
operated under the direction of the Gran Cancelliere, who supervised the activity of the
State magistracies and counseled the governor, the latter ruling on behalf of the emperor.29
From the point of view of its structure,  the secret chancery would lose the beneficial
branch and eventually become a single entity, thus finishing a long but inexorable process
of simplification. Therefore, following the evolution of the ducal chancery, especially in
the years between 1531 and 1535, ultimately allows us to witness the emergence of the
institutional balance that would inform the political dialectic of early modern Milan. This
is so true that when Franco Arese compiled a monumental repertoire of offices and office-
holders  of the State  of  Milan in the early modern age,  he included the last  phase of
Francesco II as duke as a foundational moment.30 
Generally  speaking,  this  section  on  the  chancery  structure  demonstrates  the
26 For the history of the Senate, see Petronio 1972. For a short history of the  Maestri delle Entrate see
Arese 1970, 70. 
27 Benaglio 1711, 1. The  Magistrato delle Entrate  was divided in two departments,  Entrate Ordinarie
(‘Ordinary income’) and Entrate Straordinarie (‘Extraordinary income’). 
28 See for example Chabod 1971a, 143-185; Lanzini 2011.
29 Arese 1970, 66.
30 Ibid.: 60-156.
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usefulness  of  tracing  the  documentary  history  of  institutions.  Indeed,  studying  the
organisation  of  political-administrative  writing  during  Francesco  II's  reign  enables
considerations that would otherwise be impossible to make. There is no other evidence
providing  such  a  thought-provoking  perspective  on  the  different  political  projects
underlying the three distinct phases of the Sforza restoration. 
2. The chancery size
Now that the evolution of the structure of the chancery has been delineated in all its steps,
it is appropriate to determine the chancery's size. Scholars normally spend little (if any)
effort on finding out how many people worked in a chancery at any given time. Yet this is
a  central  element  determining  government's  wordpower.  In  the  case  of  the  Sforza
restoration, we need to know how 'heavy' was the wordpower of Francesco II as he set
himself the ambitious goal of ruling the Duchy of Milan; furthermore, we also need to
know whether the weight  of Francesco's  wordpower changed throughout the different
phases of the Sforza restoration. 
As we shall  see in more detail  at  the end of Chapter  4,  maintaining chancery
personnel entailed both benefits and costs, and so did delivering ducal documents around
and outside the Sforza territory. As a result, the volume and efficiency of wordpower were
not  just  a  given,  but  an  economic  and  political  investment  worthy of  attention.  This
investment had serious consequences for governance, because one of the main challenges
of  pre-modern  statecraft  was  distance—i.e.  the  logistical  obstacles  undermining  the
authority's  presence  and  action  in  far  flung  territories;  a  continuous  and  efficient
deployment of chancery documents could counter distance's 'tyranny.'31 
Two premises are necessary before offering the figures on chancery size. The first
is  that  the  figures  will  inevitably be approximate,  since documents  providing lists  of
chancery members are scattered (see Introduction, sub-section 4.2), and, it is not always
clear whether they refer to the entire ducal chancery or only to some branches. Yet, cross-
checking data coming from different sources will  allow us to minimise the degree of
approximation,  and  to  detect  reliable  trends.  The  second  necessary  premise  (which
follows  below)  is  a  short  history of  the  Sforza  chancery size  during  the  golden age.
Indeed, determining the size of Francesco II's chancery logically makes sense only in a
comparative perspective.
31 Nearly seventy years ago, Fernand Braudel already spoke of the 'tyranny of distance' as a decisive factor
in statecraft: see Braudel 1995 (first edition 1949). The notion of 'tiranny of distance' later became the
key-concept in Geoffrey Blainey's history of Australia: Blainey 1967. 
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2.1. The chancery size from Francesco I to Ludovico 
The first ruolo available for the Sforza age dates from December 1450, and reveals that
the secret chancery of Francesco I around the time of his accession as duke of Milan
counted eighteen members: twelve between secretaries and clerks, plus six registratores
—literally 'those who fill in the registers.'32  This figure seems to have remained steady for
the first years of Francesco I's reign, because the signatures at the bottom of the first
version of the chancery regulations (1 October 1454) show exactly the same situation.33
According to Franca Leverotti, a first increase in the number of members occurred
during the 1460s, and when Francesco I died (1466) the secret chancery counted around
thirty people.34 Leverotti does not provide a reference for this claim, but two ruoli I could
find (dated 1472 and 1484) both list twenty-seven names, suggesting that the figure is
reliable, and that the chancery continued to stay in that order of magnitude during the
1470s and 1480s.35  
A second increase of the chancery size significantly emerged in the late 1480s,
after duke Ludovico foiled a conspiracy against his person and eliminated some of his
most dangerous internal enemies—including a chancery secretary, Aloisio da Terzago—
eventually becoming the unchallenged ruler of the Duchy of Milan.36 A ruolo dated 1489
lists 37 names, eight of whom are explicitly referred to as ‘lord Ludovico's chancery.’37
But it was during the 1490s that the chancery seems to have 'exploded:' The ruoli  from
1496,38 149739 and 149940 count 59, 44 and 50 names respectively, suggesting that the
chancery size was going to double that of the previous three decades. The variations are
evidently  very  noticeable,  even  in  the  short  term:  this  may  suggest  either  that  the
compilation of the ruoli was improvised—payments were often partial and irregular —or
that the chancery size was elastic and related to immediate needs, so that a number of
clerks worked only occasionally. 
In any case, the trend for the golden age is clear. Between 1450 and 1455, the
wordpower of warlord-turned-duke Francesco Sforza proved too 'light' to suit his new
administrative  and diplomatic  needs.  Therefore,  between 1455 and 1466,  Francesco I
nearly  doubled  the  size  of  the  chancery,  which  reached  around  thirty  members.  His
32 Leverotti 1994a, 311.
33 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 89.
34 Leverotti 1994a, 318.
35 ASMi, Atti di governo, Uffici e Tribunali Regi, Parte Antica, 86.
36 Corio 1978, vol. 2, 1475-1476.
37 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Uffici e Tribunale Regi, Parte Antica, 86.
38 Ivi.
39 Ivi.
40 Santoro 1939, 78-79.
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successor Galeazzo Maria did not increase this apparatus, because the political framework
in which he was operating substantially matched that of his father. By contrast, the status
of Ludovico was different. As regent, his degree of legitimacy in ruling the Duchy was
weak, and he had to superimpose groups of his most faithful followers on a pre-existing
administrative organisation that until 1494 still formally belonged to duke Gian Galeazzo
Sforza. As a result, the overall size of the chancery increased up to nearly 60 members.
2.2. The chancery size under Francesco II 
How big was the chancery of  Francesco II  during the first  phase,  between 1522 and
1525? Cross-checking data from the  ruoli,  the  Registri  delle Missive and the  Registri
Ducali  demonstrates that twenty-three people were active in the chancery.41 This cannot
be taken as the exact chancery size, since a turn-over must have occurred in four years.
Nevertheless, this number can be usefully compared with the size of the entire chancery
entourage of Massimiliano Sforza, who acted in a similar situation of political turmoil.
The result is surprising: Caterina Santoro calculated that in the same number of years
(four, between 1512 and 1515) Massimiliano had counted on at least thirty-nine chancery
members, nearly twice as many as his younger brother's.42 This fact is quite ambivalent:
was Massimiliano's chancery stronger and more efficient because of its bigger size, or
was chancery personnel more precarious—and therefore more numerous on a four-year
time-span —as a result of political instability? Reversing the point of view, the figures
nevertheless suggest that the socio-political arena of the Sforza court was still appealing
enough to attract men and competition at the time of Massimiliano; this was less true ten
years later under Francesco II.
More importantly,  evidence from the year  1525 offers the chance to grasp the
actual size of the secret chancery at a defined time. Indeed, the two ruoli available for the
first phase of the Sforza restoration date 14 September43 and 20 October 1525.44 They
differ from each other: the September ruolo lists eight names, only one of which does not
come up in the October  ruolo;45 in turn, the October  ruolo  lists eleven names, four of
which  are  new  and  can  not  be  found  in  the  September  ruolo.46 Since  the  timelag
41 For the full list, see p. 85.
42 Santoro 1968, 385-387.
43 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 223, l. 74, 1525 September 14.
44 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Uffici e Tribunali Regi, Parte Antica, 86.
45 [the  name appearing  only in  this  list  is  in  italics]  Bartolomeo  Rozzoni,  Giovanni  Stefano  Robbio,
Galeazzo  Capra,  Giovanni  Giacomo  Sironi,  Agostino  Parravicini,  Ascanio  Alfieri,  Evangelista
Imperiale, Giacomo Alfieri. 
46 [the names appearing only in this list  are in italics]  Giorgio Gadio,  Bartolomeo Rozzoni,  Giovanni
Angelo  Ricci,  Giovanni  Stefano  Robbio,  Galeazzo  Capra,  Camillo  Ghilini,  Agostino  Parravicini,
Giovanni Giacomo Sironi, Ascanio Alfieri, Evangelista Imperiale, Gerolamo Rozzoni. 
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separating the ruoli is of only thirty-seven days, it is legitimate putting them together to
obtain a base of twelve names. Then, browsing the Registri delle Missive n. 221 and n.
223—which both cover September and October 1525—we can collect three additional
names of clerks, reaching a total of fifteen chancery members.47  Because it is obtained on
the basis of four different sources, this looks like a very reliable figure. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  impossible to establish the size of the chancery during the
exiled years between 1526 and 1530, because we have neither  ruoli nor  Registri delle
Missive  at  our  disposal.  The impression is  that  the group of  the most  faithful  Sforza
secretaries sufficed to attend to both internal affairs and diplomacy. 
What is sure is that Francesco II did not take advantage of the relative political
stability of the years 1531–1535 to increase the weight of his wordpower beyond the
levels of the 1522–1525 period. Indeed, the five undated  ruoli from the 1530s all list
between fourteen and seventeen names.48 This fact perfectly matches what has already
emerged in  the  analysis  of  the  chancery structure,  which  was  not  refined,  but  rather
simplified during the last five years of the Sforza restoration. Francesco had abandoned
his original idea of a Sforza-controlled chancery catalysing all aspects of the governance
of the Duchy. As a consequence, the size of the chancery did not need an extension.
As  anticipated,  however,  it  is  the  comparison  between  Sforza  restoration  and
golden age that is particularly significant (fig. 1.5, p. 67). As a matter of fact, with its
circa fifteen members, the chancery of Francesco II always remained smaller than the one
of  his  grandfather  Francesco I  seventy-five years  before,  as  the latter  had just  begun
settling in  Milan.  It  is  true that  the extension of  the Duchy after  1522 was one-fifth
smaller than in 1499 (p. 27), but this alone cannot change the conclusion that Francesco
II,  especially  with  the  ambitious  political  project  that  marked  the  years  1522–1525,
attempted to control the entire Duchy of Milan with a remarkably limited wordpower.
This factor certainly posed tight limitations on the overall effectiveness of late-Sforza
governance.
As in the case of chancery structure, however, interpreting this as an example of
straightforward  decline  would  be  misleading,  especially  as  far  as  the  1530s  are
concerned. Indeed, the secret chancery would maintain the same size also under Charles
V:  this  shows  that  the  number  of  chancery  members  was  actually  functional  to  the
chancery's role in the emerging institutional balance of the State of Milan. Had the secret
47 Geronimo Bertone (signature Politianum), Giovanni Paolo de Scarli (Scaurum) and the unidentified 
Rocham.




chancery just been an 'holdover' from the age of the Sforza, dismantling it after Francesco
II's death—immediately or gradually—would have been easy. Instead, a new series of
registers opened under the Habsburg administration, the Registri dei Mandati—recording
the expenses of (and for) the central State offices—testifies how the chancery remained in
the region of fifteen members for many years to come.49
3. The chancery hierarchy
Aggregate figures hide a  variety of different roles in the chancery.  In delineating the
structure  of  the  chancery,  I  have  repeatedly  mentioned  the  presence  of  the  Gran
Cancelliere and of a number of secretaries; in addition, I have also hinted at the existence
of a proper chancery hierarchy with different ranks, at least during the years 1522-1525
and 1531-1535. In this section, I will look at this hierarchy in detail. On the one hand, I
will explain the typical tasks each rank of the hierarchy had in the process of creation of a
document. On the other hand, I will analyse whether chancery members, according to
their rank, played only a technical documentary role, or also a more complex one. From
top to bottom, the chancery hierarchy—as explicitly reported in the chancery  ruoli—
included the  Gran Cancelliere, the body of the secretaries (with a first secretary and a
chamber secretary), the chancery clerks, the coadjutors, and the ushers. One document I
found also alludes to the existence of a chancery chaplain (see below, sub-section 3.5).
3.1. The Gran Cancelliere
As anticipated in the general introduction (p. 31), the figure of the Gran Cancelliere was
first established in the  Constitutio of 1522, and it would maintain its centrality in the
institutional landscape of the State of Milan until the eighteenth century. During the reign
of Francesco II,  Gran Cancellieri  were Girolamo Morone (from 18 May 1522 to his
arrest on 15 October 1525) and Francesco Taverna, who was appointed in Summer 1533
and held the post until his death in 1560,50 well beyond the end of the Sforza dynasty. The
role of Gran Cancelliere remained vacant between October 1525 and Summer 1533.
The  Constitutio  is quite ambivalent in delineating the prerogatives of the  Gran
Cancelliere.  On the one hand, the text is  very specific,  stating that he would directly
inherit the functions that the primo secretario maintained during the Sforza golden age.51
49 ASMi, Archivio Ducale Spagnolo-Austriaco, Archivio Registri delle Cancellerie dello Stato, Serie XXII
– Mandati, for example 1-5. The names of the secret chancery members are mentioned (roughly yearly)
together with those of the officers of all the central magistracies based in Milan.
50 The exact date of the appointment is uncertain, because the related document has never been found. In
ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, the signatures of Taverna start in July 1533. For Taverna's death see
Arese 1970, 80.
51 Landus 1637, 145: ‘Maiores itaque nostri unum ante alios omnes a secretis virum deligere consueverunt
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The reason for the change of title from 'primo secretario'  to 'Gran Cancelliere'  is not
explained, but the (rather bold) ambition of equating the role of Morone to that of some
celebrated Chancellors of the early 1500s is quite evident— among them, Mercurino da
Gattinara for the emperor Charles V, Floremond Robertet for the king of France Francis I,
Thomas Wolsey for the king of England Henry VIII, Bernardo Cles for the archduke of
Austria Ferdinand I.52 
On the other hand, the Constitutio devotes only few lines to the determination of
the  Gran Cancelliere's functions, and the result is inevitably vague. He was required to
guarantee the conservation and the growth of the state, and ‘[he was required to] hold the
helm just like the most trustworthy mariner, so that [the state] would not be recklessly
crashed against storms and dangers.’53 Morone appreciated this image, so much so that a
ship was minted on the verso of a medal bearing his portrait, with the motto ET EMERSIT
(‘and it emerged’). This choice testified his deep bond with Francesco II,  because the
latter also had a medal minted with a ship and the motto INVITIS VENTIS (‘unshaken by
the storm’) when he was yet to become duke of Milan.54 
The  all-embracing  role  of  the  Gran  Cancelliere was  inherently  political;
furthermore, it logically foresaw the management of information and communication. To
stick to Morone's iconography, it is worth noticing that painter Andrea Solario (1470–
1524) portrayed him in the dynamic act of handing a letter with the word cito ('urgent') to
someone off the picture (fig. 1.6, p. 71);  furthermore, the scene suggests that Morone was
busy beginning to write another message, his left hand reaching for a blank sheet lying on
his desk. These details clearly highlight how the idea of decision making was strictly
connected to that of document handling and the effective delivery of correspondence.55
And indeed, on a  documentary plain,  the multi-levelled influence of the  Gran
Cancelliere was nearly ubiquitous,  and materially emerged in three ways.  Firstly,  the
signature of the  Gran Cancelliere can be found (preceded by a  vidit/visa, ‘checked’) at
the bottom-left corner of register entries, signalling that he had given the go-ahead to the
quem primum Secretarium nuncupabant (…). Nos itaque mutato Magistratus nomine, Supremum status
nostri Cancellarium appellare volumus (…).’
52 On Gattinara, see Headley 1983; on Robertet, see Mayer 1994; on Wolsey, see Gunn and Lindley 1991;
on Bernardo Cles, see pp. 155-156.
53 Landus  1637,  145:  ‘(...)  rei  arduas,  ac  difficillimas  ad  status  conservationem  amplificationemque
pertinentes  petractetm ac  tamquam fidilissimus  nauta  clavum teneat,  ne  procellis  insidiisve  incaute
mergatur.’
54 For Morone's medal, see Gaetani 1761, vol. 1, 160. For Francesco II's medal, see Sacchi 2005, vol. 1,
101.  This  medal  pre-dates  1522,  because Francesco  II  is  qualified only as  'duke  of  Bari,'  the  only
honorific title he had before becoming duke of Milan.
55 Brown 1987. For a quick discussion of Morone's portrait, originally attributed to Leonardo da Vinci, see
page 233.
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delivery  of  a  document  that  others  (the  duke  and/or  the  secretaries)  had  composed.
Secondly, the signature of the Gran Cancelliere can be found at the bottom-right corner
of original letters missive. In this case, the Gran Cancelliere acted as secretary, personally
composing or dictating the message that a clerk would have materially written. Finally,
when the  script  of  the  signature  clearly matches  the  script  of  the  main  text,  we can
conclude that the  Gran Cancelliere directly conducted the entire process of document-
making (fig. 1.7, p. 72).
Of the two Gran Cancellieri, Girolamo Morone is certainly the one who used the
highly discretionary power granted by the Constitutio in a more unscrupulous way, acting
as the actual  alter ego of Francesco II. The tight partnership between Morone and the
duke was so notorious that writer and satirist Pietro Aretino (1492–1556) satirized it in
one of his irreverent pamphlets.56 Aretino argued that Francesco would have retired in a
hermitage  to  redeem  himself  from  his  ‘hypocrite  ribaldries,’ and  there  would  have
appeared ‘the shadow of Girolamo Morone, holding in his hand the book in which, when
he was alive,  he transcribed the fraudulent deeds of his  excellency [the duke].’57 The
'book' symbolising the material bond between the duke and the Gran Cancelliere clearly
recalls a chancery register such as those I have just discussed.
To some extent, Morone's overtly political behaviour was certainly motivated by
the unstable context in which he operated between 1522 and 1525. By contrast, Francesco
Taverna had the chance to interpret his role in a much more 'institutional'  way in the
quieter years 1533–1535. He supervised the activity of the chancery thoroughly—even
before his appointment as Gran Cancelliere, as we have seen in the Taverna charter that
opens this thesis—but he can hardly be found acting as secretary, or writing documents
with  his  own  hand.  His  27-year-long  tenure  (first  under  the  Sforza,  then  under  the
imperial party, finally under the Spanish) is a testimony to his more careful conduct. Not
coincidentally, he was the first and only Italian Gran Cancelliere of early modern Milan
—the post being normally reserved to close 'foreign' representatives of the Spanish kings.
And yet, the only accident of his career is also very interesting, because it was due to
strictly documentary reasons. In 1555, Taverna was jailed with the accusation of having
materially added the names of four outlaws on a safe-conduct intended for other people.
He  was  later  acquitted,  but  the  episode  underscores  the  power  deriving  from  mere
56 Luzio 1900.
57 Ibid., 20.  Among other things, Aretino was probably referring to the political homicides Francesco II
had been accused of (see also Introduction, n. 53). 
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Fig. 1.6: Andrea Solario, Portrait of Girolamo Morone (© Fondazione Federico Zeri,
University of Bologna)
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Fig. 1.7: ASMi, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 20 December 1522.
Girolamo Morone wrote and signed this letter, which also bears the autograph
signature of Francesco II
physical proximity to records.58
3.2. The secretaries
Below the  Gran Cancelliere,  the  highest  rank in  the  chancery hierarchy was  that  of
secretary.  As  seen  above,  each  chancery  branch  (political,  beneficial,  financial)  was
directed by a different secretary. But the political chancery had more secretaries, with an
internal hierarchy. The head of the branch, Bartolomeo Rozzoni, was qualified as primo
secretario,  this  old  Sforza  chancery  title  marking  superiority  on  his  colleagues.59
Giovanni Angelo Ricci is often referred to as  secretario di camera60 (literally 'chamber
secretary'), which means that he worked as personal scribe of the duke. The others were
'simple' secretaries, and if they had specific assignments, these have not emerged from the
documentation.
Technically, the task of the ducal secretaries was translating the will of the duke
into the most appropriate documentary and rhetorical form. Secretaries composed the text
of the document: they organised it making use of the right formulas, choosing the titles to
address the recipient, and so forth. Secretaries could write the fair copy of what they had
composed, but they often delegated this duty to the lower-ranking chancery members, i.e.
the clerks and the coadjutors. The signature of the secretary who was—either directly or
indirectly—responsible for the writing of a document is to be found at the bottom-right
corner of both original documents and register entries (fig. 1.8, p. 74).
However,  as we have just seen with the trial  involving Francesco Taverna,  the
material handling of documents easily turned into a strong agency on decision making.
Historiography has  long been aware of  the  political  influence of  secretaries.61 In  this
sense,  the history of the Sforza chancery during the golden age was emblematic too:
Niccolò  Machiavelli—the  secretary-politician  par  excellence—considered  Cicco
Simonetta  one  of  the  few  secretaries  to  deserve  the  title  of  ‘most  excellent  mind’
(eccellentissimo cervello) mainly because of his strictly political skills.62
Francesco  II's  chancery  did  not  host  characters  as  famous  as  Simonetta  or
Machiavelli, but the body of the secretaries certainly functioned as a powerful inner circle
58 For Taverna's trial and, more generally, for details on his career, see Calvi 1882.
59 This title is reported in the chancery ruoli preserved in ASMi, Atti di Governo, Finanze, parte antica, 
857.
60 For example: ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, l. 40, 1532 May 12; ASMi, Registri Ducali, 194, c. 20,
1535 May 6.
61 Renaissance Florence represents  a particularly well-known case study,  with monographs devoted to
secretaries/clerks and their distinctively political activity:  see Brown 1977, Black 2002, Guidi  2009,
Klein 2013.
62 Simonetta 2004, 127.
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Fig. 1.8: ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1525 April 29. The signature of
secretary Giovanni Angelo Ricci (Ritius) is to be found under the autograph signature of
the duke
to the duke. The clearest sign of the political significance of the secretaries was their
systematic  employment  in  diplomatic  missions.  Of  the  six  secretaries  active  in  the
political branch of the secret chancery during the first and second phase of the Sforza
restoration (1522–1531), five were entrusted with ambassadorial duties around Italy and
Europe.  Galeazzo Capra was sent to Venice; Amico Taegio and Camillo Ghilini  were
active in Germany, and Ghilini also reached Charles V in Spain; Giovanni Angelo Ricci
repeatedly  travelled  to  the  Swiss  Grisons  that  bordered  with  the  Duchy  of  Milan;
Giovanni  Stefano  Robbio  (and  the  future  Gran Cancelliere Francesco Taverna)  were
employed in France.63
In addition, a document in the Rogiti Camerali—which preserves the files of the
notaries  who worked for the Duchy's  central  authorities—demonstrates  how the bond
between the duke and his secretaries could be very different from a simple master-servant
relationship. On 3 September 1532, Francesco II agreed to transfer 920 imperial  lire, 9
soldi and 6 dinari—quite a substantial sum—of tax revenues directly to primo secretario
Bartolomeo Rozzoni, in order to extinguish a debt he had contracted in 1525 to satisfy
some ‘most urgent needs’ of his.64 From the document, we understand that Rozzoni had
obtained two written receipts (confessioni) from the duke, so that the loan would be fully
refundable in  the future.  It  is  clear  that  aiding Francesco with financial  capital  made
Rozzoni an actual shareholder of ducal power, and not just a skilled rhetorician.
3.3. The chancery clerks and the coadjutors
Chancery clerks (cancellari) and coadjutors (coadiutori) represented the basic providers
of wordpower at its most elementary level. Their documentary role was mainly technical:
they physically wielded the pen and set in polished writing what others had composed. In
other words, clerks and coadjutors did not normally have any direct political impact on
chancery activities. 
In the chancery of Francesco II, a division between secretaries-as-influencers on
one side and clerks/coadjutors-as-executors on the other seems to have been actually in
force. On a documentary level, this is well testified by the fact that clerks and coadjutors
63 Capra in Venice: ASMi, Carteggio Estero, Venezia, 1310-1313; Taegio and Ghilini in Germany: ASMi,
Carteggio Estero, Alemagna, 590-591, 933, 1186-1192, 1327-1329; Ghilini in Spain: ASMi, Carteggio
Estero,  Spagna, 1336-1338; Ricci in Switzerland: ASMi, Carteggio Estero, Svizzera, 631-639; Robbio
and Taverna in France: ASMi, Carteggio Estero, France, 560-562.
64 The document I refer to is to be found in ASMi,  Rogiti camerali,  535, not. Giuliano Pessina, 1532
September 3. As for the magnitude of the money amount: according to Italian economic historian Carlo
Maria Cipolla, at the end of the fifteen century, the daily salary of a specialised mason (maestro da
muro) in Milan was 0,5/0,6 lire: Cipolla 1975, 64. In the same period, as Maria Paola Zanoboni notes,
elite artisans like goldsmiths and glass-makers earned between 24 and 27/28 lire monthly: see Zanoboni
2010 and 2010a; Ead. 2004.
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were not allowed to substitute secretaries in composing messages; or, if they did, they did
so only anonymously, because their signatures never appear at the bottom-right corner of
original documents. On a political level, it is worth noticing that clerks and coadjutors,
unlike secretaries, were never employed in diplomatic missions.65 For these reasons, even
though  they are  nearly ubiquitous  in  the  documentation,  clerks  and coadjutors  are—
paradoxically enough—the most elusive figures of the chancery hierarchy. We know of
their existence through the chancery  ruoli,  and because of the practice of noting their
names  at  the  bottom of  each  act  transcribed  in  the  Registri  delle  Missive—but  only
between 1523 and 1525, and only intermittently. 
And yet, browsing the  Registri delle Missive  and the  Registri Ducali, one soon
realises that clerks and coadjutors were no mere scribes. Their belonging to the chancery
did not just entail the writing of documents, but a surprisingly wide range of affairs. I will
offer just  four examples I  was able to find,  but  many more could emerge with more
research. On 8 October 1522, clerk Agostino Parravicini was owed an amount of money
because of some wine he supplied the court with.66 In the same year, on 20 November,
coadjutor Ascanio Alfieri was granted tax immunity together with his son Alessandro.67
On 3 June 1523, clerk Giovanni Paolo de Scarli (and his brother Giovanni Bartolomeo)
petitioned and obtained the management of the estates confiscated from a group of anti-
Sforza rebels (the re-distribution of the rebels' estates involved also secretaries.)68 Finally,
a register entry dated 8 April 1525 informs us that Giorgio Corio—a clerk of the financial
chancery (p. 85)—would receive money coming from tax collection for the entire year
1526 in order to recover a debt from the ducal  Camera (regarding ‘things given for the
court's use.’)69 This last document is particularly important, because it shows that not only
secretaries, but also chancery clerks could be actual shareholders of power. This argument
is very important for my thesis, and deserves further elaboration. For this reason, I will
soon come back to it in a separate sub-section (3.6).
Meanwhile, one last point to make about clerks and coadjutor is that the difference
between them is unclear. From their titles, we can imagine that coadjutors assisted clerks;
65 The  situation  was  different  during  the  fifteenth  century.  Franca  Leverotti,  in  reconstructing  the
biographies of the first diplomatic agents of Francesco I Sforza (the famigli cavalcanti) between 1450-
1466, has highlighted how the duke often chose his diplomats among chancery clerks. See Leverotti
1992, 105-256 for their biographies.
66 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 24, 1522 October 8
67 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 68, ll. 175-178, 1522 November 20.
68 The register entry concerning clerk Giovanni Paolo de Scarli is ASMi,  Registri delle Missive, 221, l.
131, 1523 June 3. As for secretaries:  ASMi, Registri Ducali,  210, l.  37, 1524 May 25 (beneficiary
Bartolomeo Rozzoni); ASMi, Registri Ducali, 210, l. 61, 1525 April 4 (beneficiary Giorgio Gadio).
69 ‘[R]obe date per uso de la corte’: ASMi, Registri Ducali, 26, l. 115.
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but in fact, I could not find any evidence of how this assistance functioned in practice.
The criterion was probably not that of work volume: clerk Galeazzo Capra is the most
recurrent  writer  in  Registri  delle  Missive n.  221 (May 1523–October  1525),  whereas
coadjutor Giovanni Giacomo Sironi is the most recurrent writer in Registri delle Missive
n. 222 (April 1524–July 1525). We can hypothesise that coadjutors had the task of filling
in the registers;  but this  is  just  an educated guess,  deriving from the fact  that  in  the
chancery  ruoli  the  rank  of  coadjutor  seems  to  have  gradually  substituted  that  of
registrator  between  the  1460s  and  1480s.  One  criteria  for  distinguishing  clerks  and
coadjutor was surely that of seniority,  because chancery members started their  cursus
honorum from below, advancing promotion after promotion. 
3.4. The ushers
The ushers (uschieri  or hostiari in the sources, the second term meaning 'porters') were
the  lowest  ranking  members  of  the  chancery  hierarchy.  A set  of  chancery  Ordines
compiled in  1456 explains their  role  in  detail.70 Ushers were attendants:  they did not
partake in the process of creation of a document, besides physically applying the ducal
seal to letters patent. Furthermore, they acted as warders filtering access to the chancery;
they assisted the scribes of every rank, making sure that the desks were equipped with the
necessary writing materials at all times; and they kept the chancery in order, providing
that the registers were always ready for consultation. 
Scholars have never devoted attention to ushers, probably because their role has
always seemed purely ancillary. However, some evidence from the Registri delle Missive
produced under Francesco II throws additional light on the tasks and the status of the
ushers, suggesting that their presence was less banal than previously expected. Indeed,
during the Sforza restoration,  ushers  were not  just  employed as  attendants  within the
chancery  walls,  but  also  as  emissaries  outside  it,  on  the  ground.  For  example,  in
December 1522, usher Agostino Gorgonzola was selected twice to bring orders of sure
importance to recipients around Milan.  In the first  case,  the usher brought to Filippo
Archinto the order of appearing before Gran Cancelliere Girolamo Morone, under threat
of a 1,000 ducats fine and the confiscation of all his possessions.71 In the second case,
Gorgonzola  brought  to  one  Antonio  Ascareto  (probably  a  Genoese)  a  document
sanctioning the latter's immediate ban from the Duchy, under threat of death.72 The result
70 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 92. For a fuller treatment of the Ordines, see Chapter 3, pp. 98-102.
71 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 76, 1522 December 11. Filippo Archinto (1500–1558), then in his
prime, would become a famous jurist, theologian, and diplomat. See Alberigo 1961.
72 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 91, 1522 December 29.
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of Gorgonzola's mission was annotated by an unidentified chancery member at the bottom
of the order itself. The ushers' social milieu is also a very interesting element to analyse,
but I discuss it at the end of the next chapter (pp. 120-121), where I focus on all the extra-
administrative aspects of the chancery.
3.5. The chancery chaplain
Finally, an isolated document dated 23 July 1522 reveals the existence of one Augustinian
friar, called Girolamo Morone (evidently a case of homonymy, and possibly a relation,
with the  Gran Cancelliere) who acted as 'chaplain of the secret chancery'  (capellanus
cancellariae nostrae secretae). Unfortunately, I did not come across other mentions of a
chancery chaplain during my research. In the document, friar Girolamo is granted the
income deriving from a chapel located in the Milanese church of San Gottardo.73 The
choice  of  this  location  is  very  interesting,  and  by no  means  accidental.  Indeed,  the
church's  full  name was (and still  is)  San Gottardo  in  Corte,  because the church was
strictly linked with the Corte dell'Arengo—the former seat of the Visconti court, and of
that of the Sforza until the mid-1470s. All the chancery members, for example, took an
oath of observance of the chancery regulations right in San Gottardo's sacristy.74 Hence,
there  seems to  have  been  a  long-standing  relationship  between the  chancery and the
church. This fact, too, has a social significance, and I will come back to this point in
Chapter 3.
3.6. Chancery members as shareholders of power
Besides the formal ways in which chancery members manifested their presence in the
documents according to  their  rank,  the  fundamental  thing that has emerged from this
overview of the chancery hierarchy is  the impossibility of confining each rank into a
strictly technical service. Frequenting the chancery was not a clerical 'job,' but constituted
an important socio-political asset which, in turn, could be achieved only holding adequate
socio-political  and financial  capital.  Membership  of  the  chancery set  up  a  privileged
channel between the Sforza and the whole court on one side, and the chancery member's
family (or clan) on the other. This was not only true for the  Gran Cancelliere  and the
body of the secretaries, but also for 'simple' clerks and coadjutors (and, to some extent,
even for the ushers, as we shall see later in the dissertation—see pp. 120-121) For this
73 ASMi, Sforzesco, Potenze Sovrane, 1471, 1522 July 23.
74 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 214, l. 115. Senatore 1998, 92. Senatore wrongly argues that San Gottardo was a
chapel located in the castle of Porta Giovia, but the chancery would move to the castle only under duke
Galeazzo Maria. On the political value of oath taking in historical perspective see Prodi 2002.
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reason, it is fair to consider chancery members as true shareholders of power rather than
as mere officers.
Scholarship sometimes acknowledges this fact: Nadia Covini, for example, in her
biography of  the noble Sforza chancery clerk Giovan Tommaso Piatti  (c.1430–1502),
points  out  that  Piatti's  employment  in  the  chancery  did  not  constitute  an  ‘everyday,
salaried,  properly bureaucratic  activity.’75 However,  considerations  like  these typically
remain marginal,  even though—if taken seriously—they are bound to re-calibrate our
interpretation of what being a chancery member meant, and how the chancery worked as
a whole.
Another thing I wish to highlight here is how drastically the perspective on the
chancery changes, when we shift from the analysis of abstract power structures to the
analysis  of  concrete  power  dynamics.  When  adopting  a  structure-based  approach,
chancery  members  resemble  pawns  moved  from  above,  by  a  reified  authority.  By
contrast,  when  we  look  at  how  the  chancery  practically  worked,  a  whole  range  of
political,  social  and material factors like those that have emerged above acquire great
relevance  for  the  understanding  of  our  object  of  study.  This  principle  will  be  very
important for the rest of the thesis.
3.7. A comparison with the golden age
It  is  appropriate  to  conclude  this  section  by quickly contextualising  the  hierarchy of
Francesco II's chancery in a  longue durée  perspective. The division of the chancery in
Gran  Cancelliere (or  primo  secretario,)  secretaries,  clerks,  coadjutors,  and  ushers
stabilised during the 1490s, and would resist substantially unchanged until the eighteenth
century.76 When Francesco Sforza became duke of Milan in 1450, his chancery did not
have  coadjutors,  but  registratores.77 However,  as  anticipated  (p.  77),  this  role  would
gradually disappear between the 1450s and the 1480s. Moreover, one of the clerks was
qualified as the 'seal-keeper' (quello che tene il sigillo), but I was unable to find such
specialisation under Francesco II.78
Few refinements of the chancery hierarchy occurred during the time of Ludovico,
when  a  treasurer—who  managed  the  money  coming  from  chancery  fees—and  two
archivists (custodes archivorum) appeared in the  ruoli.79 In Francesco II's chancery, the
75 Covini 2002, especially pp. 117-118.
76 See Lanzini 2011.
77 Leverotti 1994a, 311.
78 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, f. 103
79 Caterina Santoro edited the ruolo of the year 1499 in Santoro 1939, 76. 
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figure of the treasurer explicitly emerged only during the 1530s, in the person of clerk
Agostino Monti, who is qualified as such in three undated ruoli that pre-date 1535–37, as
they list secretaries Camillo Ghilini (d. 1535) and Galeazzo Capra (d. 1537). Monti would
later become secretary, and he would also obtain the title of archivist of the chancery
during the 1540s.80 I could not find any evidence of a proper archivist during the Sforza
restoration.  The  role  may  have  been  implicitly  assigned  to  one  or  more  chancery
members,  since  an  archive—as  we  have  seen—was  re-established  (and  possibly  re-
ordered) in the early 1530s.
What  changed  radically  overtime  was  the  balance  between  the  number  of
secretaries and the number of clerks and coadjutors. Between the 1460s and 1499, the
chancery had always had a clearly pyramidal hierarchy: one primo secretario coordinated
few secretaries, who in turn supervised the work of tens of scribes, the latter constituting
the great majority of the entire personnel. When the chancery size shrank from the forty-
fifty members of the 1490s to around fifteen in the 1520-30s, the decrease was not equal
in each rank. Indeed, under Francesco II, the number of secretaries remained high (six-
eight, plus the Gran Cancelliere), and matched or outnumbered the number of clerks and
coadjutors  (seven-nine).81 What  was  the  reason  of  this  discrepancy?  The  diminished
wordpower certainly caused the cut of the lower ranks of the chancery: maintaining many
clerks and coadjutors was pointless if they could not be put to work. By contrast, the
stability of the body of secretaries is very interesting, because it demonstrates that their
activity was considered crucial, and therefore unshrinkable. As we shall see in Chapter 3,
this same process had also an impact on the social profile of the chancery.
To conclude this  first chapter, let us recap the main points about the evolution of the
chancery  structure  and  size  during  the  three  phases  of  Francesco  II  as  duke,  and  in
comparison with the Sforza golden age.
Francesco II re-established the chancery few weeks after his return to Milan in
1522. The chancery had three branches: a political branch, a beneficial  branch, and a
financial branch. This first version of the chancery structure clearly recalled that of the
Sforza golden age: a political, beneficial and financial chancery branch had existed since
the times of Francesco I Sforza, in the 1450s. What Francesco II did not re-establish,
80 Muoni 1874, 29-30.
81 In  the  five  ruoli of  the  1530s,  the  balance  is  8  (Gran  Cancelliere and  secretaries)/9  (clerks  and
coadjutors), 9/6, 7/7, 9/9, 10/7.
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however, was a self-standing judicial chancery branch. I hypothesise that this happened
because the newly-founded Senate of Milan obtained the control of judicial affairs, and/or
because cash-strapped Francesco II wished to control directly the highly profitable flow
of petitions usually managed by the judicial chancery. Indeed, the political branch seems
to have absorbed the management of judicial affairs.
This organisation of political-administrative writing collapsed when Francesco II
was exiled by Charles V in South-eastern Lombardy, even though a pool of secretaries
continued to manage diplomatic relations and to administer the reduced territory under
Sforza  control.  In  1529,  the  beneficial  chancery  was  re-established,  but  only  in
cooperation with the Holy See.
Significantly, after having been re-invested as duke (January 1530), Francesco II
celebrated his return to Milan (March 1531) with a documentary effort: he planned to re-
organise the Sforza archive, located in the castle of Porta Giovia. However, when seen
from the point of view of chancery organisation, Francesco's last phase (March 1531–
November 1535) is clearly marked by political disengagement. He kept the political and
beneficial branch of the chancery, but did not re-establish the financial branch; the overall
production of ducal letters seems to have considerably decreased. 
As it is clear from this summary, following the evolution of the chancery structure
is an excellent way to understand the ambitions and limits of the Sforza restoration. More
specifically, the differences between the Sforza political project of the years 1522–1525
and that of the years 1531–1535 are evident, and they tell much of the timing and modes
of Milan's tranisition from the Sforza age to the Spanish domination.  During his first
phase as duke, Francesco II was still  convinced that the Duchy of Milan should have
gravitated around the Sforza influence, but when he came back to Milan after the exile
things had irremediably changed. Francesco probably realised that he did not have the
resources to act as an absolute prince, and re-positioned himself in a less ambitious (but
perhaps more solid) way. The chancery reflected this change in attitude, with the loss of
the financial branch and a decrease in correspondence with the peripheries of the Duchy.
Can this process be defined as a straightforward decline, like the scholarly lack of
interest for Francesco II implies? I do not think so. As explained above (pp. 36-37), it
seems to me that the Sforza restoration was a very interesting age of turmoil,  during
which Francesco showed a remarkable will to formulate political projects in spite of an
extremely difficult political and financial situation. Even his late re-positioning cannot be
dismissed as outright powerlessness. As a matter of fact, the essential traits of Francesco's
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chancery would remain unchanged in the decades following his death, demonstrating that
his interpretation of the emerging institutional landscape was sensible.
Among  these  traits,  I  have  devoted  a  separate  section  to  chancery  size.  The
chancery of Francesco II, with its circa fifteen members, was smaller than that of all his
predecessors—it was roughly half of the chancery of Francesco I and Galeazzo Maria
Sforza and less than one-third of the chancery of Ludovico Sforza. It is important to bear
this in mind, especially if we consider the ambitiousness of the chancery structure of the
years 1522–1525: Francesco II wished to rule like a Sforza duke of the golden age, but
his 'raw' wordpower was very limited. However, the size of the chancery is also one key
to  realise  that  Francesco's  late  re-positioning  was  absolutely  reasoned.  Indeed,  the
chancery  would  maintain  the  same  size  also  under  Charles  V,  thus  showing  its
functionality in the institutional balance of the Duchy.
Carrying out a documentary history of the Sforza restoration was necessary for
two reasons.  Firstly,  because I  had  the chance to  introduce  several  case-study-related
concepts I will be repeatedly referring to throughout the thesis. And secondly, because
documentary histories  demonstrate  that  chanceries  and political-administrative  writing
played a crucial role in the institutional balance of Renaissance states. Most importantly,
though, this  first  chapter introduces a key-element for re-framing Renaissance written
political culture (which is the overall purpose of this thesis:) chancery members, whatever
their rank, were not just mere officers or scribes, but true shareholders of power. Indeed, a
close  analysis  of  how  the  chancery  hierarchy  concretely  worked  has  shown  that
secretaries, clerks and coadjutors did not have a simply clerical relation with power, but
rather a surprisingly complex one. They show substantial political and economic ties with
the  duke.  This  fact  is  a  first  sign  of  the  inadequacy of  bureaucratic  models  for  the
interpretation  of  Renaissance  chanceries;  it  shows  that  a  structure-based  approach  to
chanceries, useful as it certainly is, ultimately overlooks some fundamental dynamics of
power.
If the choice of chancery members was not primarily dictated by their technical
expertise in document-making, but by the political and financial capital they brought to
court,  then  the  chancery worked as  a  network  (through  informal,  horizontal  webs  of
relationships) more than as an office (through a formal, vertical chain-of-command.) As a
consequence, it becomes important to replace ranks with names, and to analyse chancery
members in a social-historical perspective. What does the composition of the chancery




Chapter 2 - The Chancery Networks
The analysis of the chancery network during the Sforza restoration leads to identifying
two very different phases that—not coincidentally—parallel the evolution of the chancery
structure.  The first  phase covers the years between 1522 and 1525; the second phase
arches from 1531 to 1535. 
1. 1522–1525: the 'old boys network'
The twenty-three people who worked in the chancery between 1522 and 1525 can be seen
in  Chart  2.1  (p.  85).  The four  names  in  italics  are  those  I  was  not  able  to  identify.
Alexandrum  and  Vailatum appear in  Registri delle Missive n. 220 and n. 221 between
February  and  December  1523,  and  then  disappear.82 Rocham appears  only  rarely  in
Registri delle Missive n. 221 (ten entries), n. 222 (three entries), and n. 223 (eight entries).
The case of  Rodobium/Robium is  more complicated.  These two names coexist  in  the
registers, possibly suggesting that they indicated two different persons. The chancery had
a secretary named Giovanni Stefano Robbio: however, the sources refer to him both as
‘Giovanni  Stefano  de  Rodobio’83 and  ‘Iohannes  Stephanus  Robius.’84 Therefore,  one
between Rodobium and Robium could be the secretary and the other one an unidentified
character;  vice versa,  if  Rodobium  and  Robium  were the same person, then Giovanni
Stefano Robbio would be the most employed writer in the chancery. 
The presence of the great majority of the remaining chancery members—at least
fourteen out of nineteen—is directly motivated by a long-standing network gravitating
around  the  Sforza.  The  documents  themselves  acknowledge  this  fact  explicitly,  for
example in the case of financial secretary Ferrufini, who was appointed because of ‘the
unique  faith,  and the  attitude  that  he  and his  forefathers  had  towards  the  once  most
Illustrious  lord  duke  Ludovico.’85 Four  secretaries  (Bartolomeo  Rozzoni,  Giovanni
Giacomo Ferrufini, Giorgio Gadio, Giovanni Stefano Robbio) and two clerks (Bernardino
de Lomeno and Agostino Parravicini) were already active under duke Ludovico in the
1490s,86 and  then  again  under  Massimiliano  between  1512  and  1515.87 Hence,  there
existed a core of loyalists who tied their political fate to that of the Sforza; these loyalists
82 Alexandrum: ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, c. 160-275; Registri delle Missive, 221, c. 6-56, 1523
February 6–December 12; Vailatum: ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, c. 180-259 1523 February 21–
April 24. 
83 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 68, l. 195, 1522 December 10.
84 So it appears in the ruolo dated 20 October 1525.
85 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 210, l. 3.
86 Santoro 1939, 78-79.
87 Santoro 1968, 385-387.
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left their posts when the Sforza lost control of the Duchy to the French, but they were
readily reinstated in their place at every regime change, even after ten or twenty years.
For example, the French banned secretary Gadio from the territory of the Duchy between
1516 and 1522, and Francesco II issued a document to rehabilitate him as soon as he
recaptured his dominion.88
Moreover, eight members apparently were at their first chancery experience, but
they clearly owed their  appointment  to the connection between their  families and the
Sforza. Secretary Camillo Ghilini was the son of Giovanni Giacomo Ghilini,89 who was
regarded as the most powerful secretary under duke Ludovico.90 The ties between the
Ghilini family and the chancery of the dukes of Milan dated back to the times of Filippo
Maria Visconti.91 Secretary Giovanni Angelo Ricci was the nephew of Zannino Ricci,
ducal counsellor in the early fifteenth century.92 Secretary Amico Taegio belonged to a
family coming from the  town of  Novara,  which had extensively cooperated  with  the
Sforza throughout the second half of the fifteenth century.93 Coadjutor Ascanio Alfieri
was  son  of  Giacomo,94 who  had  been  chamber  secretary  to  duke  Galeazzo  Maria.95
Another coadjutor of the chancery of Francesco II, also named Giacomo Alfieri, is likely
to have been related to (possibly the son of) Ascanio. Coadjutor Girolamo Rozzoni was
the  nephew  of  the  primo  secretario,  Bartolomeo.96 Clerk  Evangelista  Imperiale  was
probably related to Girolamo Imperiale, active in the chancery in 1499.97 Finally, looser
past relationships could involve Gian Giacomo Sironi, possibly the grandson of Giacomo
Sironi,  close to  duchess  Bianca Maria  Sforza since  the 1440s,  and chancery clerk in
1470.98
It is no coincidence that two clerks came directly from the entourage of Girolamo
Morone. One of them was Girolamo Bertone, who had been so close to Morone as to look
after  the  latter's  family while  the  future  Gran Cancelliere was  escaping  from Milan,
following a rift in the relationship with the French after 1516.99 The other was Galeazzo
88 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 68, l. 81, 1522 September 18.
89 As reported in Argelati 1743, vol. 1, col. 680
90 Leverotti 2002, 230.
91 Covini 2015, 91-93. 
92 Sitoni  di  Scozia,  Theatrum genealogicum familiarium illustrium,  nobilium et  civium inclytae  urbis
Mediolani (MS in ASMi: 1705), l. 379.
93 Santoro 1948, 297.
94 ASMi, Registri ducali, 68, l. 175, 1522 November 20.
95 Santoro 1948, 54.
96 Verga 1893, 32.
97 Santoro 1939, 78-79.
98 Bassino and Frati 1971-1972-1973, 252-253.
99 Promis and Müller 1863, letters n. CCXVIII, CCXXV, and CCXXXII.
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Capra,  who  had  been  the  personal  secretary  of  Morone  before  becoming  the  most
appreciated intellectual in Francesco II's circle (on his intellectual activity, see pp. 125-
126).100
Hence,  what  emerges  is  an  'old  boys  network.'  The  choice  of  the  chancery
members between 1522 and 1525 had followed the same restoring attitude that had driven
the organisation of the chancery structure and hierarchy,  being strongly based on the
continuity with a tradition rooted in the second half of the fifteenth century. There are
only  three  clerks  who  cannot  be  immediately  connected  to  a  pre-existent  pattern  of
allegiance to the Sforza: Giorgio Corio, who worked in the financial chancery, Giovanni
Paolo de Scarli, and Paolo Verano—Scarli and Verano belonging to the political chancery.
Seen from the point of view of Francesco II, the resilience of a network like this
was certainly positive,  insofar  as  it  demonstrated  the unconditional  loyalism of  some
portions of  Lombard society. However, what stands out is also the sense of isolation
surrounding this group. We know that the return of the Sforza had been preceded by a
relentless work of persuasion—mostly directed by Morone—of the key-families of Milan
and  its  Duchy.101 However,  no  outsiders  or  newcomers  were  co-opted  in  the  ducal
chancery.  This was a clear  sign of the overall  skepticism towards the stability of the
Sforza restoration. No one seems to have been willing to compromise himself by joining
Francesco's inner circle, because the risk of failure was too high and the potential reward
too low. 
2. 1531–1535: new presences 
How was the chancery network composed in the last  phase of the Sforza restoration,
between  1531  and  1535?  Did  the  chancery  have  the  same,  strong  Sforza  bias  that
characterised it between 1522 and 1525? As anticipated in the general introduction, the
answers to these questions are to be found in the chancery ruoli dated between 1531 and
1537 preserved at the  Archivio di Stato of Milan.102 These ruoli have one main positive
feature: they are five. Hence, they offer reliable evidence of the great majority of the
people that partook in chancery activities between 1531 and 1535. However, the fact that
the  ruoli are undated is problematic, because it is impossible to establish whether four
chancery  members  (secretaries  Giacomo  Pierio  and  Giacomo  Valgrana,  clerks  A.  M.
Suardi and Aluisio Flamengo) were active in the chancery before Francesco II's death in
100 Capra 1539, VI.
101 Ibid., XI-XIV. 
102 ASMi, Atti di governo, Finanza, Parte Antica, 857.
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November 1535. All the others either belonged to the chancery since the early 1520s, or
are listed in ruoli containing the name of someone whose date of death is known, setting a
terminus ante quem. As it is clear from Chart 2.2 (p. 89), knowing the date of death of
Giacomo Picenardi (27 November 1531 ) has been especially useful;103 Girolamo Pescia
was active in the chancery before the end of 1535, because he is listed with Camillo
Ghilini, who died in the Summer of that year.104 From  this  list,  we  realise  that  the
chancery network of the 1530s had changed its nature. Half of the body of the chancery
members (thirteen out of twenty-five) was made of new entries, and their connection with
the Sforza is far less evident than before. Surnames like Bellabocca, Langhi, Pescia, and
Pierio  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  repertoires  of  office-holders  compiled  by  Caterina
Santoro, and families like Suardi and Medici had never had chancery members. The only
solid  connection  with  the  previous  periods  is  coadjutor  Bartolomeo  Gadio,  who  is
explicitly listed as ‘the nephew of sir Giorgio,’ former beneficial secretary. Therefore, the
exiled years of 1526–1530 caused a turn over within the chancery ranks. But what kind of
turn  over  was  this?  Following  the  tenuous  (if  existent)  archival  traces  of  all  the
newcomers would have been a long and potentially unfruitful task. Hence,  it  is  more
useful to focus on two specific names, whose presence is both surprising and revealing:
Peter Merbel and Giacomo Valgrana.
Peter  Merbel  was  not  Italian,  but  of  Germanic  origin.  An  absolute  novelty,
considering that until now we have dealt exclusively with characters coming either from
Milan or from its Duchy. Merbel is undoubtedly an interesting character. According to
Federico  Chabod,  he  is  likely  to  have  been  one  of  the  'hidden'  promoters  of  the
Reformation among the highest-ranking cadres of the State of Milan during the 1540s and
1550s, which also caused him the undesired attention of the Inquisition.105 Philosopher
and physician Lucillo Filalteo (d. 1578) mentioned Merbel as an expert in concocting
medical  remedies.106 In  addition,  he  was  in  correspondence  with  Erasmus,  whom he
informed  of  Francesco  II's  death  on  8  November  1535.107 Merbel's  cooptation  in  the
chancery probably happened in either 1530 or 1531. Did this German secretary physically
represent Charles V's control on the last phase of the Sforza restoration?
There is  no need to put  this  as a question for another  foreign presence in the
chancery,  that  of  the  Spanish  secretary  Giacomo  Valgrana.  Indeed,  in  this  case,  the
103 Forcella 1889–1893, vol . 1 (1889), 97, n. 136.
104 Picinelli 1670, 101.
105 Chabod 1971a, 332-333 and 336.
106 Filalteo 1565, 17.
107 Allen and Allen 1906–1958,  vol. 11 (1947), letter n. 3070.
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connection  with  Charles  V  is  explicit.  Valgrana  acted  as  personal  secretary  for  the
imperial general Antonio de Leyva, who would be governor of the State of Milan between
November 1535 and September 1536.108 But unfortunately, it is impossible to establish
whether Valgrana entered the secret chancery when Francesco II was still alive, because
the  only  terminus ante  quem of  the  ruolo in  which  he  appears  is  constituted  by the
presence of Galeazzo Capra, who died in 1537. But whenever it may have happened, the
quick cooptation of the Spanish secretary demonstrates how the secret chancery had been
targeted by the emperor and his men. Apropos this question,  it  is  worth noticing that
Filippo Argelati—an erudite eighteenth-century historian—in his catalogue of biographies
of  the  most  famous  Milanese  writers,  suggested  that  Antonio  de  Leyva  may  have
poisoned  secretary  Camillo  Ghilini  because  of  the  latter's  strong  Sforza  loyalism.109
Argelati does not bring any evidence to support such speculation, but again, the credit he
gave to this suspicion suggests that he thought that the chancery had actually been at the
centre of a political struggle during the early 1530s. This struggle resulted in a chancery
network less compact than 1522–1525, when the duke and Morone were free to reinstate
a  group of  Sforza  partisans  in  office.  Eventually,  the  great  majority  of  the  chancery
members of the 1530s would continue their career after the end of the Sforza dynasty,
probably because (unlike Ghilini?) they quietly transferred their allegiance to the new
rulers of the State.
To sum up, the analysis of the Sforza chancery network under Francesco II offers results
parallel to those emerging from the analysis of the chancery system (Chapter 1). On the
one hand, studying the evolution of the network of chancery members throws light on
political-institutional aspects of the Sforza restoration; on the other, and more generally,
the fact that networks were so important to the functioning of chanceries tells much about
the chanceries' very nature.
As far as political-institutional aspects are concerned, the fact that the chancery
network between 1522 and 1525 was strongly Sforza-biased confirms that Francesco II
initially attempted an actual restoration of the fifteenth-century status quo. A circle of
Sforza loyalists who had been ousted from power during the French dominations (1499–
1512  and  1515–1521)  was  ready  to  take  power  back  after  more  than  twenty  years.
Subsequently, during the years 1531–1535, the break-up of this tight-knit network was the
logical  consequence  of  Francesco's  re-positioning.  The  chancery  ceased  to  be  the
108 His name appears in a petition registered in ASMi, Registri Ducali, 194, l. 25,1535 June 13.
109 Argelati 1743, vol. 1, col. 680.
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stronghold of an independent Sforza party, and became open to newcomers and 'foreign'
presences that reflected the rising influence of German and Spanish characters linked to
Charles V.
As  far  as  the  chancery's  nature  is  concerned,  the  importance  of  networks
demonstrates that  chanceries  cannot  be conceived as offices of bureaucratic  kind,  but
were  in  fact  fluid  socio-political  hubs.  Being a  chancery member  did  not  depend on
technical expertise, but on a web of political connections and allegiances. I elaborate on
this point in the conclusion to Part I as a whole.
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Conclusion
In the introduction to this part of the thesis, I maintained that the reconstruction of the
chancery of Francesco II had three aims. The first was delineating the essential contours
of my object of study. The second aim was carrying out a documentary history of the
Sforza  restoration  that  would  allow  to  improve  the  understanding  of  Francesco's
ambitions and limits. The third and more general aim was beginning to problematise the
straightforward conception of the chancery as an office of bureaucratic kind. 
As far as the essential contours of Francesco II's chancery are concerned, we now
know all the chancery-related concepts, elements and characters that will come up in the
rest of the thesis. We know how the chancery was structured; we have a clear idea of how
big  (or,  in  Francesco's  case,  how  small)  the  chancery  was;  we  know  what  a  Gran
Cancelliere,  a  secretary,  a  clerk,  a  coadjutor  and  an  usher  were  and  did;  and  we
familiarised ourselves with the names and the socio-political background of the members
of the chancery.
As  for  the  usefulness  of  carrying  out  a  documentary  history  of  the  Sforza
restoration, what has emerged with great clarity is that the study of the Sforza chancery is
the key to re-evaluate the political conduct of Francesco II. The great receptivity of the
chancery to  the ever-changing political  situation demonstrates  that  the tag 'decline'  is
inadequate to frame Francesco's history as duke. The chancery indisputably struggled to
survive in an age of turmoil and underwent a clear downsizing if compared to that of the
Sforza golden age, but the rationale that can be detected behind the chancery's evolution
also shows that it remained an important political hub.
I will not re-state here the outlines of such re-evaluation. What I want to focus on
now is the historiographical contribution of my work. On the one hand, I join the stream
of publications that have recently revised the negative scholarly attitude towards early-
sixteenth-century Milan. As noted in the general introduction, Massimo Carlo Giannini
and Letizia Arcangeli have already demonstrated the necessity of interpreting the critical
1500–1535  period  through  constructive  key-words  like  'dialectic'110 and
'experimentation,'111 rather than through the anachronistic concept of 'crisis of the Italian
liberty'  utilized in all traditional scholarship and epitomised in the  Storia di Milano  of




On the other hand, though, I also add a new and more complex perspective on the
period.  In  fact,  while  Giannini  and  Arcangeli  have  focused  on the  attempts  of  local
institutions  and patriciates to  survive the crisis  of  the Italian Wars—attempts  that  are
natural,  and  somehow  unsurprising—I  have  shown  that  there  still  existed  a  Sforza
governmental  and  social  network  that  played  a  creative  political-institutional  role
throughout the 1520s and the 1530s. The existence of this Sforza network escaped the
teleological  perspective  that  saw the  decline  of  the  Sforza  dynasty  as  inevitable.  By
contrast, I have demonstrated that the political (and documentary) posture of Francesco II
and his loyalists, especially during the early 1530s, actively influenced the institutional
order of the Duchy of Milan in a long-lasting way.
However—and  I  come  to  the  third  of  the  aims  listed  above—the  study  of
Francesco  II's  chancery has  a  relevance  that  transcends  early-sixteenth-century Milan
insofar  as  it  begins  to  corroborate  my starting  research  hypothesis:  looking  at  what
concretely happened in chanceries and around chancery documents has the potential to re-
frame the notion of what a chancery was, and to give a new image (more nuanced and
participatory) to political and institutional history.
In Chapter 1, this has been evident in the passage from the analysis of chancery
structure  and  size  to  the  analysis  of  chancery  hierarchy.  As  soon  as  we  have  leave
abstractions  to  focus  on how the  chancery worked in  practice,  it  has  been clear  that
chancery  members  were  no  mere  scribes  providing  a  clerical  service,  but  true
shareholders of power. Being part of the chancery meant having political and economic
ties with the duke and with an entire network of Sforza followers. 'Network' has indeed
been the key-word of Chapter 2: looking at the background of chancery members allows
us to reinforce strongly the claim that the chancery was not only an office directed from
above through a  vertical  chain-of-command,  but  also a  fluid  social  and political  hub
where allegiance and family bonds mattered more than technical expertise. 
The main question, then, is what to make of these insights: should we dismiss
them, thus maintaining an abstract structure-based approach to chanceries, or should we
insist on analysing the significance of the concrete dynamics of what happened there?
The evidence I have found so far clearly invites switching the emphasis—unlike most
histories of chanceries—from abstract structures to practices.
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Part II – Chancery Practices
In Part I, I have begun a problematisation of the chancery by looking at its insiders: I
have  assessed  how  they  interpreted  their  role,  and  their  socio-political  background.
However, another crucial issue that emerged in the analysis of the Taverna charter—the
document I used to open this thesis—was the relationship between the chancery and its
outsiders.  Indeed,  the  most  surprising  thing  about  the  Taverna  charter  was  that  a
distinctively 'chancery document' was materially acted upon outside the chancery before
its completion, and handled by people who were not chancery members. (p. 11-14). 
This fact is, in a sense, 'shocking'—but also fascinating. Indeed, one of the most
basic convictions deriving from a bureaucratic conception of chanceries is that there must
be  a  clear  conceptual  and  material  separation  between  inside  and  outside.  In  a
bureaucratic written political culture, it is precisely that separation that gives authority to
a document, because the document comes from inside and is meant to shape the world
outside as a tool of government.  By contrast,  direct cooperation between officers and
outsiders  to  an  office  is  in  itself  an  infraction,  invalidating  the  whole  process  of
document-making. But has it always been the case? And was it the case of the Sforza
chancery?  Once we scope flaws  in  such a  fundamental  principle  of  bureaucracy,  we
should investigate if they were occasional or structural.
The relationship between chancery and outsiders, as shown again by the Taverna
charter, was based on practices. I have already offered a definition of practices in the
general introduction (p. 15), but it is worth resuming it here, because 'practice' will be the
key-notion  for  the  whole  Part  II.  Practices  are  behaviours:  informal  ways  of  doing
something that a community of participants (or part thereof) comes to consider acceptable
and share not because of formal codification, but through reiteration. In medieval and
early modern Italy, consuetudine (literally 'custom') was the term typically used to define
a practice. The most essential trait of practices is that they are alternative (and often in
opposition)  to  formal  frameworks  of  action  provided  by  structures  and  rules;  as  a
consequence, representations of the activities to which practices, structures and rules are
related usually tend to exclude practices and include structures and rules. 
In  Chapter  1  and  2,  we  have  already  encountered  something  that  could  be
compared to a tension between structures and practices. For example, we have seen that
while  chancery hierarchy (structure)  foresaw a top-down chain-of-command from the
highest chancery rank to the lowest, duke Francesco II could owe money to one of his
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subordinates,  secretary  Bartolomeo  Rozzoni;  or  that  the  fluid  social  network  that
determined who was going to become chancery member was as significant as (if not more
significant than) the rigid chancery organisation in functional branches. And yet, despite
these important insights, the chancery largely remains a 'black box:' an object of which
we grasp  the  contours  (structure,  size,  hierarchy,  networks  of  members)  but  that  has
largely unknown internal mechanisms. In the next two chapters, I will throw light on
these mechanisms by looking at proper chancery practices: informal (but accepted) ways
of frequenting the chancery and making documents.  What were these practices? How
essential were they to chancery functioning? Can they further change the idea of chancery
that we have begun problematising in Part I?
To answer these questions, a first thing to do is tackling new sources. Until now, I
have looked at sources produced by the chancery (the ruoli, the Registri delle Missive and
the  Registri Ducali).  However, we need sources  describing  the chancery to get a first
substantial sense of how it functioned. From this point of view, in the case of the Sforza
chancery,  two  sources  stand  out.  One  is  a  corpus  of  chancery  regulations  (Ordines)
compiled during the Sforza golden age. The other is a memoir describing the activities of
the chancery (bearing the modern title Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali,
henceforward Informazioni) which, as I shall explain, was probably written to reorganise
the chancery of Francesco II as he first returned to Milan in 1522. I have already given
some basic details about these sources (pp. 42-44), and I am going to further discuss them
(pp. 98-102 and 105-107). 
For the moment, what is important to highlight is that both the  Ordines  and the
Informazioni,  despite  having  often  been  read  as  proof  of  the  institutionalisation  and
bureaucratisation  of  the  Sforza  chancery,  in  fact reveal  a  great  deal  about  chancery
practices  and  their  pervasiveness.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Informazioni  do  so  overtly,
according  to  their  nature  of  pragmatic  memoir;  on  the  other  hand,  even  though  the
Ordines,  being  regulations,  clearly  aim  at  curbing  the  role  of  informal  practices  in
chancery functioning, I will show that it is possible to read them against the grain to
understand the mismatch between official rules and actual behaviours. 
In the case of both the Informazioni and the Ordines, then, we get the chance to
look in the chancery black box. The most important thing that emerges is that, in practice
(and unlike  in  theory,)  the chancery was not  a  place  of  separation—of insiders  from
outsiders, of document-making from decision-making, of administrative functions from
non-administrative functions—but rather a place of  integration, one where insiders and
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outsiders met, discussed, negotiated. This fact, if put at the centre of historical analysis,
has the potential of re-framing our understanding of Renaissance written political culture
in a new and compelling way. Therefore, Chapter 3 will be devoted to the analysis of a
range of social, political, and cultural practices undertaken in the chancery. 
Social  practices  in  the  chancery  are  best  grasped  through  the  Ordines.  More
specifically, this source will prove especially useful for reflecting on an apparently simple
problem  which,  however,  scholarship  has  left  unaddressed:  was  the  Sforza  'secret'
chancery actually secret? In other words: could outsiders physically access the chancery?
How systematically, and how easily? What kind of outsiders could do so: only those with
strong connections to the duke and his aides, or also more casual outsiders? What were
outsiders allowed to do in the chancery? I regard outsiders' accessibility to the chancery
as a 'social' question (even though it has clear political implications) because it generally
interrogates  how  disciplined  was  the  relationship  between  the  authorities  and  their
subjects.
In the second section of the chapter, the reading of the  Informazioni  will make
things  more  strictly  political.  Indeed,  the  Informazioni  describe  in  great  detail  the
inextricable intertwining between documentary and governmental practices. How directly
was the chancery involved in important political processes like decision-making? How
formal  and  regulated  was  the  relationship  between  chancery  members  and  political
influencers other than the duke? Who were these influencers? Answering these questions
will allow me to single out some essential traits of the act of making documents in the
Renaissance—traits that stand in sharp contrast with our contemporary idea of official
document-making.
more generally, what is very interesting about the  Informazioni  is how precisely
they identify information and communication as the elements that put the chancery at the
core  of  governmental  practices.  Since  I  am going to  use  the  terms  'information'  and
'communication'  extensively in  the  second section  of  the  chapter,  it  is  appropriate  to
quickly define them here. With the term 'information,' I mean the message—or the piece
of news or of knowledge—detached from the medium; with the term 'communication,' I
mean the modes (and acts) of transmission and sharing of information, which necessarily
happened  through  a  medium  and,  crucially,  constituted  an  activity  involving  human
interaction. In medieval and early modern Venice, the word  comunicazione  also had a
specific  institutional  meaning,  that  of indicating the passage of  information from one
governing  body  to  another.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  chancery  managed
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processes  of  comunicazione  among  Sforza  institutions  (or  among  individuals  with
authority in the Sforza orbit) even though these processes hardly followed fixed rules.1
Finally, in the third section of the chapter, I will rely on literature and on a variety
of other sources to remark that it would be very limiting to see the chancery exclusively
as  a  centre  of  production  of  official  documents.  Indeed,  chancery  members,  either
collectively or individually, undertook a series of (broadly defined) cultural practices that
made the chancery an autonomous and socially-varied community with a civic role in the
city of Milan, and a centre of scholarship that remained lively even during the turmoil of
the Sforza restoration. Should not this distinctive variety of functions have an impact on
the way we think the chancery?
To sum up, at the end of Chapter 3, a thorough analysis of practices will have
powerfully confirmed what we started to glimpse in Part I through the study of chancery
hierarchy and networks: the chancery not only was an instrument strictly commanded
from above  by a  well-delineated  authority,  but  also—and  consistently—a remarkably
porous hub, where the dukes' wordpower could become an unexpectedly collective asset.
However, applying the notion of practice to chancery studies not only serves to
demonstrate that the role of the chancery as an instrument of the authority was only one
piece of a much bigger picture; it also serves to realise that when the chancery did act as
such—as the spreader of the duke's wordpower—the act of deploying documents around
the  Sforza  Duchy  was  not  a  neutral  and  strictly  logistical  endeavour,  but  rather  a
meaningful  performance.  Therefore,  in  Chapter  4,  I  will  argue  that  the  great  effort
Francesco II put in communicating in writing with the peripheries of his dominion was
often more a symbolic (yet very important) practice of authority than a pragmatic exercise
of governance.
At the end of Part II, we will have achieved a new and more nuanced perspective
on what  a  chancery was  and  did.  In  Part  III,  I  will  then  investigate  the  relationship
between  the  complexity  of  chancery  practices  and  the  material  aspect  of  chancery
documents, or products.
1 See  Burke  1987, 3-24  (‘Introduction’),  and  especially  5-6;  on  the  definition  of  'information,'
'communication' and comunicazione see also De Vivo 2007, 2-3.
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Chapter 3 – Social, Political, and Cultural Practices in the Chancery
1. Social practices: the openness of the chancery
To begin analysing the internal mechanisms of the chancery, it is worth starting from the
most well-known source dealing with its functioning: the Ordines. The Ordines (literally
'Orders') consist of eight self-standing sets of regulations compiled between 1453 and
1475 under the direction of  primo secretario  Cicco Simonetta. Two sets of regulations
regard the secret chancery as a whole: the first is entitled Ordines primi et veteres ducalis
cancellarie secretae  ('First and Old  Ordines of the Ducal Secret Chancery,' 1453), the
second  is  entitled  Renovatio  et  additio  facta  in  ordinibus  cancellarie  ('Renewal  and
Extension  of  the  Chancery  Ordines,'  1465).  The  other  six  sets  of  regulations  regard
specific  chancery  ranks,  or  figures  whose  activity  was  strictly  related  to  that  of  the
chancery.  In  chronological  order,  we have  an  Ordo  for  registratores  (1455),  one  for
ushers (1456), one for mounted messengers (1461), one for judicial secretaries (1472),
one for the chancery of the Consiglio di Giustizia ('Council of Justice,' a Sforza council
active during the golden age, 1475) and one for the 'seal-keeper'  chancery clerk (date
unknown).2
Being regulations, the  Ordines  aimed at disciplining the work of the chancery.
They  did  so  in  a  methodical  way:  all  chancery  members  had  their  tasks  minutely
described, to the point that even lunch breaks and night shifts were duly regulated, and—
for example—it is written that the  registratores  should have had the horse ready at all
times  in  order  to  follow  the  duke  in  his  sudden  displacements.  Everything,  in  the
chancery, was set to run efficiently and strictly hierarchically, so that the sovereign could
exercise  his  wordpower at  any time.  In light  of  this,  historians  have  often  taken the
Ordines as proof that the Sforza chancery of the golden age had distinctively bureaucratic
traits.3
However,  treating  the  Ordines  as  a  reliable  reflection  of  reality  has  its  risks.
Indeed, there are passages in the  Ordines's text clearly indicating that Cicco Simonetta
had a strong ideal of chancery in mind, and wished to impose it. For example, one thing
that stands out is how Simonetta insists on comparing the chancery to an ecclesiastical
environment. He explicitly writes that clerks should have behaved and obeyed as monks,
and that the seat of the chancery should have been more disciplined than a  religio—a
2 In BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, the Ordines are to be found between f. 86 and f. 117. For the registratores
and the 'seal-keeper' clerk, see p. 79. For the Consiglio di Giustizia, see p. 112.
3 See Santoro 1968, 209-213. On lunch breaks and night shifts, see BTMi,  Cod. Triv.  1325, l. 89 (for
registratores), l. 92 (for ushers) . On the registratores's horses, l. 90.
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polysemantic term meaning both 'religion' and 'sacred space.'4 In this sense, the Ordines
not  only  work  as  mere  regulations,  but  also  as  an  ambitious  ideological  expression
propounding a system of political-cultural values. 
This claim can be supported with a material analysis of the  Ordines  as textual
objects. Indeed, unlike the great majority of Sforza registers, the three extant manuscripts
in which the Ordines are gathered are made of fine parchment, and written in an accurate
italic  script  with  coloured  letters  (fig.  3.1,  p.  100).5 Furthermore,  up  to  1478,  the
individual  or  collective  oaths  of  fidelity  taken  by  chancery  members  were  recorded
therein (fig. 3.2, p. 101). Therefore, the Ordines were objects of display with a ceremonial
function.  Not  only  their  contents,  but  also  their  physical  form  and  use  testify  their
essentially 'monumental' nature.
How can the Ordines serve the purpose of opening the chancery black box then?
From these remarks, it seems clear that they overwhelmingly deal with abstract rules and
representation rather  than informal  practices.  Francesco Senatore,  too,  argues that  the
Ordines  are of little use when it comes to grasping how writings were actually made,
handled and preserved.  According to him, scholars researching documentary practices
should look at  more pragmatic  chancery registers  and at  correspondences  rather  than
focusing on solemn regulations.6 And yet,  like  all  normative  sources—and especially
those belonging to the Ancien Régime—the  Ordines  can be fruitfully read against the
grain. In other words, we can try to read  them to get a sense of what violations they
wished to  prevent,  and how pervasive these  violations  were.  If  the  Ordines  insist  on
specific aspects of chancery discipline,  it  is  likely that the chancery lacked discipline
precisely in those aspects. 
In this perspective, the fact that one recurrent preoccupation of the  Ordines was
preventing aliens from physically accessing the chancery becomes extremely interesting.
It signals that chancery practices foresaw a systematic exchange between the chancery's
inside and outside, so that chancery rules tried to contain such exchange. As anticipated, I
consider this  as a broadly social  issue,  because it  regards the tone of the relationship
between authority and subjects. Some rules are particularly emblematic, and it is worth
analysing them in detail. They reveal the concrete ways in which the chancery, despite its
4 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, ff. 95-96: ‘Et primo quia mos est professis, et monacis, allisque regularibus qui
superiorem recognoscunt, ut precipue sub obedientia militent, seque absentare minime possint a locis
suis (…) qui locus [the chancery] omni observantissima religione prestantior esse debet.’
5 For the location of the manuscripts in which the Ordines are gathered, see p. 42. I use BTMi, Cod. Triv.
1325 when I need to cite passages from the Ordines. 
6 Senatore 1998, 87.
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Fig. 3.1: BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 95. The first two pages of the Renovatio, the sets of
regulations for the whole secret chancery, compiled in 1465
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Fig. 3.2: BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 89. Transcription of the oaths of fidelity sworn by
chancery members at the end of the Ordines primi et veteres
self-styled secrecy, in fact was a place open to outsiders with various degrees of 'outside-
ness.'
A first  common practice—perhaps the most venial—was bringing unauthorised
pueri  ('youngsters') to the chancery as assistants, to let them fulfil venial clerical tasks,
like transcribing the original documents in the registers. In theory, this was prohibited;7
however, we know that the chancery cursus honorum could easily start with some years
of unpaid apprenticeship. The distinction between an authorised trainee and an occasional
unskilled labourer was likely to be minimal.8 In an interesting letter to duke Ludovico
Sforza, Giacomo Cattaneo, newly-appointed secretary to the chancery of the Consiglio di
Giustizia, bitterly complained about the uncontrollable presence of garzoni (assistants) in
the chancery:
The only old bad habit that damages the dignity of this place [the chancery] is that all
the clerks–they are fifteen in total–keep at least one garzono in the chancery, while
they [the clerks] leave [their workplace] at their own pleasure, and let the  garzoni
write and transcribe letters (…) and this is shameful not only because clerks do not
do their job, but also because it generates great confusion, because letters are badly
written, and possibly there take place some inappropriate rackets (extorsioni).9
Cattaneo is remarkably precise in listing the problems associated with the practice
of keeping garzoni: it is first of all a question of principle, because clerks are paid to not-
do their job; secondly, it is a technical question: the quality of chancery letters worsens if
the  garzoni  write  them on  behalf  of  more  expert  clerks;  finally,  we  understand  that
garzoni demanded more money than they should for writing letters (in the final chapter, I
will focus on the circulation of money in the chancery.)
Keeping the focus on unauthorised presences, the attention turns to the Ordo for
ushers—who, as we have seen (pp. 77-78), were the designated chancery warders. Some
more substantial intrusions begin to emerge. Here, the rules show an interesting double
standard. At first, they enunciate a very drastic principle, in line with their general solemn
tone;  but  then  follows  a  long  list  of  exceptions,  from which  we  scope  the  informal
7 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 99: ‘et ideo admonentur singul ex dictis cancellariis et coadiutoribus quorum
sua putaverint interesse quod cum diligentia attendere debeant in habendo solertem et diligentem curam
registris ipsis, ac ad registrandum littera ipsos tangente suis propriis manibus, et non a pueris, vel alicuis
personis non salariatis.’
8 Leverotti 1994a, 328. Around mid-sixteenth century (1566), the  Ordo of the chancery of the Senate
explicitly foresaw that the lowest ranking members of the chancery–the scriptores–should have worked
for free: see Ordines excellentissimi Senatus 1743, 79. 
9 ASMi, Carteggio Estero, Venezia, 1315, 1491 November 2: ‘Solamente vederia derogare alla dignità de
questo loco una corruptela vechia, che tutti li Cancelleri quali sonno quindeci tenevano uno garzono
almancho  per  chadiuno in  cancellaria,  et  loro  se  ne  andaveno  pro  arbitrio  ad  solazo  et  lassiaveno
scrivere et transcrivere le lettere alli garzoni (…) donde ne nasceva grande confusione, et dessere le
lettere male scripte, et forso de qualche extorsione indebite ultra la indignita de la cosa che li cancelleri
non facesseno lofficio suo.’
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practices undermining the principle itself. One rule states that ushers were not to let ‘any
person to ascend to the desks and to write, or doing anything else, except the very writers
of the chancery.’ But ‘others,  who are familiar  [to the chancery]’ were authorised.  In
addition, ‘other people worth of reputation’ were also free to hold the quill, even if—we
understand—they were not familiar to the chancery.10 A second rule urged ushers not to
admit  ‘any person to the chancery;’ but once again,  exceptions included ‘the familiar
ones’ (indicating that the exception was in fact a rule) and ‘those summoned by the clerks
for  speaking  and  fulfilling  their  tasks’ (showing  that  consultation  with  outsiders  was
actually  contemplated.)11 Similarly,  in  the  Ordo  for  the  chancery of  the  Consiglio  di
Giustizia, one rule forbade clerks to ‘give long audiences’ to outsiders inside the chancery
(so  audiences  were  admitted  if  quick,)  and  suggested  the  same  clerks  to  meet  their
acquaintances  outside  the  chancery  hall  (again  implying  that  chancery  clerks  were
regularly in contact with the outside world while on duty.)12
However, it is in the second general Ordo for the secret chancery (the Renovatio)
that the already compromised ideal of the chancery as an isolated space clashes most
spectacularly  with  chancery  practices.  Indeed,  one  rule  recommended  clerks  and
coadjutors to behave properly, explaining the recommendation with a long and detailed
list  of  outsiders  who—surprisingly  enough—habitually  witnessed  chancery  activities.
‘[I]llustrious  princes,  and  notables,  barons,  several  ambassadors,  nobles,  merchants,
plebeians and ordinary people, clerics of every rank and condition, and other subjects of
our beloved most illustrious lord’ were given access to the chancery.13 The list, as it is
evident, was intended to cover a whole spectrum of Renaissance society, thus highlighting
that the chancery could be a very open and crowded place. Not only the elite, but also
ordinary people could physically come close to wordpower. The recurrent misbehaviour
that originated the need of drawing the list is also interesting, as it included ‘expressions
of indecent obscenity,’ as well as ‘degenerate customs,’ and the habit of handling books
and registers carelessly, touching them with ink-stained hands and throwing them to each
10 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 92: ‘Item che non lasseno assendere alcuna persona suso li banchi ad scrivere,
ne ad fare altra cosa se non li proprii scriptori de cancellaria, et li altri che sono soliti de venire (...) ma
accadendo che essi consueti o vero altre persone degne de reputatione volesseno scrivere,  li  lassino
scrivere liberamente.’
11 Ivi: ‘Item che essi uschieri non admettano alcuna persona alla cancellaria se non li consueti, et quelli che
fossero domandati per li cancelleri per volerli parlare et fare lexpeditione occurrente.’
12 Ibid, l. 116: ‘che in cancellaria non se dia longa audientia per li cancelleri, ma se dia de fora sotto la
sala.’ [emphasis added]
13 Ibid.,  l.  99:  ‘Illustri  principes,  et  proceres,  barones,  diversi  oratores,  nobiles,  mercatores,  plebei  et
populares, religiosi cuiuscumque gradus et condicionis, ceterique subditi prelibati Ill.mi domini nostri
declinare noscuntur (…).’
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other from desk to desk—and even through windows (fenestras).14 Therefore, chancery
insiders  definitely  not  always  were  the  obedient  and  committed  monks  they  were
expected to resemble. This is so true that the  Renovatio  foresaw a proper 'surveillance
system:' ushers and unidentified 'servants' were required to report any misbehavior they
witnessed among clerks and coadjutors.15
Hence, despite the effort of the Ordines effort to keep order, the chancery seems to
have been a very unruly and porous place. It is crucial to note that this situation had one
visible consequence directly in the sources: in the  Registri delle Missive, the signature
advenam (literally 'stranger') occasionally comes up to overtly signal that a letter—an
official letter, bearing the signature of the duke—was materially written by someone who
did  not formally belong to the chancery.16 Under Francesco II, I was able to find nine
transcriptions  of  letters  written  by chancery  outsiders,  all  dated  between  August  and
November  1525.17 Interestingly  enough,  four  of  them have  the  aim  of  forwarding  a
petition  to  a  specific  office,  urging  its  ready  consideration.  In  such  cases,  we  can
reasonably hypothesise that the petitioners were so well-connected to the chancery (or to
a single chancery member) that they were able to write their own letter of solicitation, and
then to get it authenticated, dispatched and registered.
Although Sforza scholars have long being familiar with the  Ordines, they have
always treated the above-mentioned passages in a substantially anecdotal way. Caterina
Santoro, for example, repeatedly cites chancery members' misbehaviour in her work, but
she does so only to quickly sketch vivid images of chancery environment, without going
any further.18 My position is different. I am convinced that this evidence from the Ordines
sheds light on a crucial question: the chancery, in addition to being ‘the assembly where
all the arcana [secret affairs] of the prince [were] managed,’19 was also a very permeable
place, with no clear-cut division from the outside world. This is only contradictory for
today's bureaucratic mindset; in the Renaissance, it was a fundamental feature of political
culture. The power of social practices allowed outsiders to physically access the chancery
14 Ivi:  ‘(...)  sicuti  sunt  indecentes  sermones oscenitate  referti,  et  degenerati  mores,  et  improbati  gestis
quibus in attractando impudica manus offendunt,  utque mala peoribus addant,  libros seu cancellarie
registros alter in alterum per fenestras et scabella inicientes (…).’
15 Ivi: ‘Mandatur quibusque servitoribus et cancellarie hostiariis quod (…) omnes et singulos ex predictis
inobservantes (…) referre et reportare debeant.’
16 Leverotti 1994a, 328. 
17 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 282, 1525 September 21; Registri delle Missive, 222, ll. 225-26,
1525 June 22; l. 242, 1525 June 16; l. 247, 1525 July 6; l. 255, 1525 July 11; Registri delle Missive 223,
l. 12, 1525 August 4; l. 81, 1525 September 17; l. 127, 1525 October 28; l. 129, 1525 November 1. 
18 Santoro 1948, XXIII; Ead. 1956, 525; Ead. 1968, 210.
19 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 99: ‘ubi omnia Illustrissimi domini nostri archana contractantur.’
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and tamper with its activities, even if official rules struggled to keep them away from a
supposedly  quasi-sacred  space.  Being  aware  of  this  is  fundamental  to  get  a  realistic
perspective on the chancery's functioning. more generally, these consideration match and
enrich the most recent scholarly perspective on other supposedly segregated spaces that
were in fact very permeable, like nunneries.20
To conclude this section, I wish to report one last passage from the Ordines to bear
in mind that having physical access to the chancery was neither the only nor necessarily
the most effective way of influencing political-administrative affairs. Indeed, one rule of
the Renovatio prohibited clerks and coadjutors to facilitate the authentication of outsiders'
motions, unlawfully acting as procuratores ('agents') or solicitatores ('advocates'), taking
charge of the interests of their acquaintances.21 Hence, simply knowing a low-ranking
chancery member could significantly increase the chances of obtaining a document on
request. Significantly, secretaries were not mentioned among the usual wrongdoers: this
suggests  that  their  role  as  agents  and  advocates  for  a  third  party  was  accepted  and
foreseen. Here, we can clearly grasp the great extent to which private affairs overlapped
with public ones, precisely because a proper distinction between 'private' and 'public' did
not exist.  This distinctively political  note calls for the assessment of a range of more
specifically political practices in the chancery.
2. Political practices: information and communication in the chancery
As  anticipated,  the  source  that  offers  the  best  insights  on  political  practices  in  the
chancery are the Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali. The Informazioni are
a memoir: an anonymous writer described the functioning of the Sforza chancery of the
golden age by summarising how its four main secretaries (in order of appearance, the
political, beneficial, financial, and judicial secretary) directed their branches. The fact that
secretaries  are  called  by  name  in  the  text  (Bartolomeo  Calco,  Giacomo  Antiquario,
Giovanni Giacomo Ferrufini, Giovanni da Bellinzona) allows us to determine that the
memoir  refers  to  the  years  between  1496  (when  Ferrufini  was  appointed  financial
secretary) and 1499 (the fall of Ludovico Sforza).22 
As  anticipated  in  the  general  introduction  (p.  44),  the  original  text  of  the
Informazioni was destroyed during the Second World War bombings that affected the
Trivulziana Library of Milan.  Nevertheless, the text has survived in two transcriptions,
20 See for example Laven 2002 and Ead. 2005, especially from p. 97 onwards.
21 Ibid, l. 97: ‘Item quia multi ex dictis scribis, cancellariis et coadiutoribus se exhibent et constituunt 
procuratores et solicitatores rerum privatarum personarum (…).’
22 The date of appointment of Ferrufini as financial secretary is in Santoro 1948, 52.
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taken in 1881 and 1939.23 The latter is incomplete: Caterina Santoro did not transcribe the
last  paragraph  of  the  original  memoir,  probably  because  it  did  not  deal  with  the
organisation of the chancery. However, as we shall soon see, the part omitted by Santoro
is important to grasp the memoir's original function.
The  Informazioni  are undated,  but a series of details  in the text prompt me to
claim that they were written under Francesco II. Firstly, a sure terminus a quo  is 1508,
because duke Ludovico Sforza is referred to as already deceased.24  Secondly,  there is a
reference  to  a  ‘notebook  (…)  which  is  in  the  possession  of  Giovanni  Giacomo
Ferrufini.’25 Since the writer uses the present tense, Ferrufini was in possession of the
notebook at the time the memoir was written.26 After 1508, Ferrufini was in charge of the
financial chancery (and therefore presumably in possession of the notebook) under both
Massimiliano (between 1512 and 1515) and Francesco II (between 1522 and 1525.) As a
result, we can start hypothesising that the memoir was written during one of these two
periods. But we can speculate further: why would one write a precise description of the
Sforza-golden-age chancery arrangements years after it ceased to exist? My answer is that
the  Informazioni probably served a pragmatic function. The last paragraph of their text
(fortunately transcribed by Porro Lambertenghi) makes this  hypothesis very plausible,
because the descriptive tone used by the writer turns prescriptive: we find expressions
like 
[b]y now, one judge should suffice for the needs of this office (…). In Milan, it is
appropriate having two fiscal lawyers and two fiscal prosecutors (…) In the other
cities and territories one lawyer must suffice.27  
The informed writer was recalling some arrangements of the golden-age Sforza
administration, adding his own suggestions on how to re-establish and re-adjust them.
And this was more to likely happen 22-25 years after the end of Ludovico's reign, under
Francesco II, rather than 12-15 years only—especially considering the strong 'restoring
attitude' of Francesco during his first phase as duke (pp. 51-54). Porro Lambertenghi and
Santoro, too, were of the opinion that the memoir was written between 1522 and 1525.28 
Therefore,  someone  within  Francesco  II's  entourage  was  re-organising  the
chancery,  and  wished  to  know  how  it  used  to  work  under  Ludovico.  This  fact  is
paramount for four reasons. Firstly, it clearly demonstrates that there existed a precise
23 Porro Lambertenghi 1881, 713-19; Santoro 1939, 39-43.
24 Santoro, 1939, 39.
25 Ivi [emphasis added].
26 I was unable to ascertain Ferrufini's date of death, but he was still alive in 1531, as he is mentioned in
ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, l. 25, 1531 August 28.
27 Porro Lambertenghi 1881, 718. [emphasis added]
28 Ibid.: 713; Santoro 1968, 211.
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will  of  continuity  between  the  chancery  of  1450–1499  and  that  of  1522–1525—
something that Sforza historiography has forgotten, its focus being constantly centred on
the  second  half  of  the  fifteenth  century.  Secondly,  the  Informazioni,  normally  read
exclusively as a source for the 1490s, are in fact also a source for the 1510s or the 1520s.
Thirdly, the fact that one of the most complete documents on the functioning of the 1450–
1499  chancery  was  generated  during  the  early-sixteenth-century  turmoil  shows  how
political crisis can work as a revealing factor, because the memoir would not have existed
without the troubles of Massimiliano and Francesco. Finally, the very need of writing the
Informazioni implies that the  Ordines alone were insufficient to reconstruct the actual
dynamics of the chancery:  this  is  yet another indication of how the  Ordines served a
symbolic (more than a practical) function.
However, the Informazioni are very important not only because of their date, but
also because of their contents. Scholarship has scarcely noticed it:  Caterina Santoro and
Franca Leverotti limit themselves to a rather superficial reading of the Informazioni, only
appreciating  the  way in  which  they  clearly  divide  the  chancery  in  four  recognisable
branches.29 But more than this, the  Informazioni offer a compelling perspective on the
chancery  as  a  complex  hub  in  constant  interaction  with  the  outside  world  through
information and communication practices. 
As far as interaction is concerned, it is very significant that the Informazioni show
a completely different attitude from the Ordines. Indeed, while the Ordines—a normative
text—do not tolerate interaction between the chancery and the outside world (or, as we
have  seen,  do  so  only reluctantly,)  the  Informazioni—a  much  more  pragmatic  text—
realistically consider interaction as the natural condition in which the chancery worked.
As  far  as  information  and  communication  practices  are  concerned,  the
Informazioni offer an interpretive model of chancery activities composed by three distinct
phases. The first phase was the reception of information. The author does not use the
word  informatione,  but a series  of equivalent terms or phrases like  noticia  and  aviso
('news'), cose de momento and cose de importantia ('matters of urgency/importance'). The
Informazioni do not treat the reception of information as a given, but they assume that the
ways in which information was inserted in the chancery system determined the different
possible patterns of its management. 
The management of information was indeed the second phase, and coincided with
communication  practices:  once  information  had  entered  the  chancery,  it  had  to  be
29 Santoro 1948, XXIV-XXV; Leverotti 1994a, 305-308.
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communicated and shared, thus becoming the object of decision-making. The author of
the Informazioni uses four words, substantives or verbs, for defining the communication
of  information:  scortinii  and  consulte  ('deliberations'  and 'consultations'),  tractare  ('to
deal with') and participatione/participare ('to participate/participating'). This last term is
especially important, because it is the closest to the Venetian term comunicazione (see p.
96),  and because  in  a sentence the author  explicitly distinguishes  letters produced  de
commissione ('under commission')  of one single person—in that  case the duke—from
letters produced con participatione ('with the participation') of more people.30 
It was only when the reception of information and the individual commissione or
collective participatione had unfolded that the chancery approached the third phase—the
only  one  covered  by  the  Ordines—i.e.  the  production  of  soon-to-be  authenticated
documents.  This  phase  had  its  proper  name,  repeatedly  used  in  the  memoir:  that  of
expeditione. The term comes from the Latin verb expedio, which translates 'to finish,' 'to
execute,'  'to deliver.'  Therefore,  expeditione  was the proper act of making a document,
sometimes objectified to signify 'the document' in itself, and I am going to use this term
for the rest of the chapter.
In the next four sub-sections, I am going to explore these three phases in detail. I
will show how following the perspective of the Informazioni  allows us to further refine
the idea that we started to grasp in the  Ordines: that of the chancery as a remarkably
dynamic place of integration.
2.1. The reception of information
For two of the four secretaries whose activity is described in the text—political secretary
Bartolomeo Calco and judicial secretary Giacomo da Bellinzona—the description of their
tasks starts with them taking in news from outside. As far as Calco is concerned, the
Informazioni could not be clearer. The first thing that we learn is that Calco had the ‘chief
task’ [cura principale] of opening the letters of all the deliveries, coming from whatever
prince,  lord,  or  anyone,  who had to  do with  the state.’31 Such practice (not  a  formal
assignment, since there is no trace of it in the Ordines),  far from being merely technical,
was absolutely political. Indeed, the Informazioni add that Calco was expected to ‘inform
the duke of those things that were of importance [de importantia], day and night.’32 This
passage implies that Calco had the important power of steering the flow of incoming




information in the direction that he saw fit. He could share the news he received with the
duke, but he could also conceal it: the decision depended on highly discretionary criteria.
Calco—and,  generally speaking,  whoever  was influential  enough to get  his  hands on
information  coming  to  the  chancery—was  able  to  shape  duke  Ludovico's  political
knowledge. The situation appears very different from the time of Francesco I Sforza, who
was particularly proud of styling himself as 'lord of the news' (signore di novelle) as he
wanted a strictly personal supervision on all incoming information.33
The work of judicial secretary Giacomo da Bellinzona, responsible for 'criminal
matters'  (le  cose  criminali),  was  also  strongly  connected  to  the  ability  of  gathering
information. As the  Informazioni point out, Bellinzona had the task of  ‘reporting to the
excellency of the duke any remarkable homicide or crime that was committed in  the
dominion,’ so that officials could quickly take care of the case.34
On both accounts, the author of the  Informazioni lucidly considers practices of
information  reception as  a  distinct  and self-standing phase that  often functioned as  a
starter  for  activities  in  and around the  chancery.  Hence,  the  chancery is  immediately
identified with the hub that attracted inputs and only later determined outputs.
2.2. Communication practices in and around the political chancery
Following the routes information took once inside the chancery means unveiling—as if
information  was a  sort  of  'historical  reagent'—the presence of  characters  that  seldom
appear in final chancery documents, but nevertheless prompted the making of documents
themselves. As seen above (pp. 102-104), the Ordines already hinted at the presence of
outsiders, suggesting that the chancery could become a socially-varied place of encounter.
However, the Informazioni describe what some outsiders did in a much more systematic
manner,  focusing  on their  direct  political  agency.  The  Informazioni show that  it  was
communication, with its overwhelmingly informal practices, that opened the chancery to
a vast array of influences.
We  left  political  secretary  Calco  in  the  act  of  receiving  information,  actively
selecting what news to his judgement was unimportant and what was of importance. In
this second case, information became the object of communication between the duke and
a group of people defined as 'counsellors.' The ultimate aim of communication was that of
devising a response, often in writing, which corresponded to the chancery  expeditione.
The  author  of  the  Informazioni clearly  has  the  idea  of  a  process  in  mind.  Drawing
33 Senatore 1998, 251-263.
34 Santoro 1939, 43.
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flowcharts (see below) is the best way of summarising the process's passages.
According to the  Informazioni,  there existed two distinct processes of political
communication  that  ended  with  an  expeditione,  each  one  with  a  number  of  internal
variants: one process depended on the duke, the other did not necessarily include him.
The first process started once Calco had opened the incoming letters and decided that they
contained ‘matters of importance:’ the secretary, 
night and day, made sure that the most illustrious duke was informed, and the duke
shared (participava) [the letters] with the counsellors, depending on how he thought
the occurrences  and cases  deserved to be treated;  and then,  once the appropriate
deliberations and consultations (scortinii et consulte) had been done, [the duke and
the  counselors]  settled  [the  affairs  the  letters  related  to]  through  the  necessary
expeditione,  or [the duke] ordered to the secretary what  was to be done,  with or
without the concourse of the counsellors.35
The second process began with a summoning of the counsellors. The summoning
took place ‘either in the duke's presence, or in the dedicated areas of the chanceries of the
said secretary.’ In the latter case ‘the expeditioni, ordered by the counsellors, were carried
out, depending on the nature and the circumstances of the cases.’36 
As shown in the flowcharts (figg. 3.3, 3.4, p. 111), communication was extremely
fluid. The first point worthy of attention is that the author of the Informazioni shows that
decision- and document-making could constitute one single operation. Indeed, the duke
and  the  counsellors  made  deliberations  through  (mediante)  the  expeditioni,  and  the
counsellors could convene directly in the chanceries (the plural form probably refers to
the different branches) which apparently had some dedicated areas for hosting meetings.
Knowing these concrete dynamics of power is of paramount importance, because they
demonstrate  how  the  chancery,  far  from being  the  isolated  office  represented  in  the
Ordines, was directly involved in political action.
The  second  point  worth  of  attention  is  the  very  tight,  yet  highly  informal
relationship  between  chancery  and  counsellors,  something  that—being  regulated  by
communication practices—the Ordines ignore altogether. Not only counsellors supervised
the expeditioni together with secretaries (which caused the overlapping of their respective
prerogatives) but they could do so inside the chancery and without the concourse of the
duke. Here, any separation between the chancery and outsiders is annulled.
This is all the more significant since 'the counsellors' constitute a vague category,
much  more  undefined  than  it  may  look  at  first  glance.  Even  assuming  that  the
Informazioni refer to the members of the two major Sforza councils of the golden age—
35 Ibid.: 39.




the  Consiglio  Segreto  ('Privy  Council')  and  the  Consiglio  di  Giustizia—would  not
actually  make  'the  counsellors'  a  proper  institutional  category.  Indeed, both  the
composition  and  the  competences  of  the  councils  were  extremely  contingent;37 the
sessions of the Consiglio Segreto were not regular, and from the scarce extant evidence at
our disposal we know that the number of participants varied greatly from one session to
another;38 the influence of each council depended on the specific relationship with the
dukes,  who  often  happened  to  create  restricted  circles  of  partisans  within  the  larger
councils to segregate opposition.39 In some cases, prominent members coming from other
polities—e.g. magistrates from the Swiss cities of Bern, Zurich and Luzern—were given
access to the Consiglio Segreto for reasons of opportunity.40 In light of the above, councils
are not to be interpreted as proper assemblies, but rather as fluid centres for lobbying
whose  members  were  able  to  influence  and  control  Sforza  policies.  The  fact  that
counsellors had a direct and continuous relationship with the chancery ultimately means
that document-making followed the very volatile relations of power in force in the Sforza
court. 
This  claim  can  be  supported  through  the  analysis  of  three  registers  (today
preserved among the  Registri delle Missive, and edited during the 1960s) recording the
meetings of a short-lived Sforza council, named Consiglio de Castello ('Castle Council'),
active between 1477 and 1479.41 The registers (which are the only extant serial source for
the activity of a Sforza council)  reveal the details of  the inextricable,  yet unregulated
intertwining  between  documentary  and  governmental  practices.  The  Consiglio  de
Castello, for example, was able to annul letters it previously commissioned by simply
issuing new ones  on  the  same affair.  Evidently,  sudden changes  in  policies  reflected
political pressures coming from inside or outside the council.42 Moreover, the fulfilment
of petitions was another issue in which political and documentary conflict coincided. The
Consiglio de Castello and the Consiglio Segreto often received the same petition, issued
opposite documents approving and rejecting it at the same time, and then had to debate on
which document was valid.43 Generally speaking, the impromptu character of document-
37 Covini 2007, 33 (31-40 for the whole analysis of the Sforza councils).
38 Bueno de Mesquita 1989, 140-141.
39 Covini 2007, 32-35.
40 Santoro 1968, 206.
41 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 131, 134, 143. Alfio Rosario Natale published them as Acta in Consilio
Secreto in Castello Portae Jovis Mediolani, mainly because they represent the only surviving and serial
source on the activity of a Sforza council. See Natale 1962–1969. 
42 Natale 1962–1969, vol. 1 (1962), 76. The deliberation begins: ‘[s]uper causa Gabrielis Migliavache.’
43 Ibid., 78. The register entry begins: ‘[s]uper controversia comitis Bartholomei Scotti.’  Ibid.,  81. The
register entry begins: ‘[s]uper supplicatione Nicolai de Cominis.’
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making is also testified by the fact that secretaries were summoned and admonished for
having issued controversial documents.44 
2.3. Communication practices in and around the financial chancery
The  Informazioni also  devote  space  to  communication  practices  in  and  around  the
financial branch of the chancery. Indeed, the complexities of money management put the
financial branch in contact with many different figures, and this happened following two
interestingly  opposing  necessities.  On  the  one  hand,  the  financial  branch  needed  to
control and track the movement of money carefully; as a result, it communicated—mostly
in writing—with clearly recognisable officers and institutions. On the other  hand, the
circulation of money and valuables could also demand secrecy. As a result, the financial
branch also substantially dealt with some elusive characters, who deliberately avoided
leaving written evidence behind.45
In the case of official communication, the Informazioni are remarkably precise in
describing  how  the  financial  branch  exchanged  information  and  paperwork  with  the
Maestri  delle  Entrate,  the  treasurers,  the  Referendari  (officers  in  charge  of  financial
affairs  in  the  peripheral  towns/areas  of  the  Duchy),  the  Deputati  al  Denaro  (another
financial  magistracy  that  existed  under  Ludovico),  the  Commissari  del  Sale  (literally
'Commissaries of the Salt,' the trade of salt being one major source of income from the
Sforza) and the dazieri (excisemen).46 Actually, it can be argued that the Informazioni are
too precise in their description. Indeed, they treat the accounting involving the payment of
salaries  and  the  funding  of  diplomacy  as  a  perfectly  ordered  process;  by  contrast,
scholarship  has  repeatedly  demonstrated  how  the  Sforza  system  of  payments  was
idiosyncratic—to say the least—and highly dependent on the ever-changing political and
economic contingency.47 In this respect, the Informazioni certainly look more prescriptive
than descriptive.
Things become more realistic in the account  of a peculiar  chancery procedure
devised for the distribution of cloths and textiles, which the Sforza used as a form of gift-
44 Ibid., 90. The register entry begins: ‘in facto exemptionis magnifici domini Luce de Grimaldis.’
45 For a comprehensive overview on the relationship between accounting and politics from ancient world
to the nineteenth century–with a focus on the late medieval and early modern world–see Soll 2014. Ch.
4 (‘The Mathematician, the Courtier, and the Emperor of the World’) deals with the difficult relationship
between courtly culture and good accounting. 
46 Santoro 1939, 40-43.
47 The work of Maria Paola Zanoboni is especially useful: she has highlighted the problems between the
Sforza and Florentine banker Pigello Portinari (Zanoboni 2009, 52-54 and 66-73); between the Sforza
and the Milanese goldsmiths (Ead. 2010a, 367-368); between the Sforza and the Milanese drapers (Ead.
1996, especially Ch. 5: ‘Il duca, gli artigiani, i mercanti.’)
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giving and payment (chancery ushers, for example, were sometimes paid in cloth.)48 In
this case, financial secretary Ferrufini had to work with two chancery clerks (Gottardo
Panigarola and Michele Scaffeta) specialised in expenses for valuable and fashionable
objects.49 Panigarola  and  Scaffeta  wrote  the  receipts  for  the  donations  of  cloths  and
textiles, which were then signed by Ferrufini; Ferrufini also sent a letter to the  dazieri,
ordering not to tax the outgoing (or incoming) goods, and promising a later payment.50
However,  the  Informazioni  also  describe  a  third  and  very  interesting  set  of
communication practices—one that a source like the  Ordines  could never mention (fig.
3.5, p. 116):
[w]hen the excellency of the duke, for some reason of his, wished to donate money
to someone, [he] orally [a bocca], or through his most trusted attendants [camereri],
ordered to the secretary [Ferrufini], that he commit to the extraordinary or ordinary
treasurer, to pay [the recipients of the money]; and this happened because it is not
appropriate for such commissions to pass through the hands of many [vadino per
mane di tanti], and in many cases errors happened, which damaged the excellency of
the duke.51 
Two elements make this passage very significant. Firstly, the passage suddenly
reveals the presence and the agency in the chancery of the camerieri. The camerieri were
courtiers,  intimate  attendants  to  the  duke.  In  the  words  of  Gregory  Lubkin,  they
‘constituted the core of the ducal household in many ways, and performed a variety of
crucial functions related to the duke's daily life.’52 These functions included dressing the
duke,  organising  his  lodgings,  entertaining him,  acting as  bodyguards  and as  envoys,
spying on the duke's  behalf,  meeting and escorting foreign dignitaries.53 Furthermore,
Lubkin already observed that the  camerieri also had a position of financial  trust,  and
noted that ‘the more closely to the duke's own person an expenditure was made, the more
likely it was to go outside the usual channels. Some very substantial sums were handled
by men whose only authority was intimacy with [the duke].’54 The Informazioni confirm
this claim. Even more importantly, they clearly demonstrate that there was an operative
exchange  between  the  chancery  and  figures  that  belonged  to  a  distinctively  courtly
culture: this contradicts the Ordines's attempts to portray the chancery as an impersonal
48 On gift-giving in general, see Komter 1996; for a famous case study, see Zemon Davis 2000. For the
payment of ushers in cloth, see ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 32, 1522 December 24. The Este
dukes of Ferrara, too, had a specific procedure (Ordinario, note the similarity with Ordo/Ordines) for
distributing clothes: see Guerzoni 1999, 370. 
49 We know that Panigarola held the post of ducal spenditore (literally 'spender') with the specific aim of
keeping the Sforza up to date with the Italian and European courtly trends. Barbieri 1938.
50 Santoro 1939, 42.
51 Ibid., 41.
52 Lubkin 1994, 56. For a full overview of the hierarchy and roles of the camerieri, see 132-137.
53 Ibid., 62, 146, 167-168, 214, 235, 322 n. 29.
54 Ibid., 98.
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bureaucratic office operated from above. 
The second element that makes the passage significant regards the way in which,
in some specific cases, the duke and the camerieri interacted with the financial branch of
the  chancery:  strictly  orally.  Indeed,  the  Informazioni draw  a  very  precise,  almost
'scientific'  opposition  of  written  and  oral  communication  in  the  chancery.  Instead  of
suggesting a hierarchical distinction between 'high' scribal culture and 'low' orality, the
Informazioni imply that each form of communication had its characteristics and usage.55
Written communication was necessary for some aspects of governance, but could also
become highly problematic because it functioned through material papers which could
circulate outside the communication circuit first intended by their author. This undesired
materiality of written communication is at the base of the 'counter-archival' practices that
make historical research more complicated today:  we have a fair  share of the written
evidence that was produced to be preserved; in addition, we can often get a sense of the
written evidence that was produced to be later discarded, through its accidental survival;
however, sources like the  Informazioni remind us that we should also take into account
that portion of communication that was specifically meant not to become evidence. Once
more, it is possible to refer to Lubkin, who observes that ‘the relations between Galeazzo
and his camerieri di camera are difficult to trace fully through written evidence. Because
these men stayed with the duke constantly, little of their interaction appeared in writing.
Because  their  interaction  was  often  of  an  intimate  and  personal  nature,  it  was
inappropriate or dangerous to record or discuss what had occurred.’56 
To sum up, the analysis of the practices of political communication as they emerge
from the Informazioni demonstrates three important points. Firstly, the distance between
decision- and document-making was often minimal—or even non-existent—in time as
well as in space, thus debunking the representation of the chancery as an isolated and
disciplined office that took orders from above following a clear hierarchy. Secondly, the
chancery was subject to multiple different influences, as secretaries and clerks worked in
direct, continuous and informal partnership with a wide range of outsiders, some of whom
are not  clearly identifiable  (the counsellors)  or  by  definition elusive (the  camerieri).
Thirdly, there was no clear-cut divide between a supposedly bureaucratic chancery culture
and  courtly  culture:  the  presence  of  camerieri  and  the  targeted  use  of  orality  for
55 Scholars are increasingly interested in studying the importance of speech and oral culture in the late
medieval and early modern world. See for example Love 2002, VV. AA. 2002, Cohen and Twomey
2015, Walker and Kerr 2015, Degl'Innocenti, Richardson and Sbordoni 2016.




conducting some specific kinds of businesses make it impossible to separate the chancery
from the wider cultural environment in which it was enmeshed. 
2.4. Chancery output: features of the expeditioni
Before concluding this section, it is worth focusing more specifically on the final phase of
chancery activity: that of the expeditione, in which documents were physically made and
sent. How did the framework of political practices outlined in the Informazioni—but also
that of social  practices transpiring from the  Ordines—affect the nature and quality of
document-making? I have singled out three key-features of the expeditioni.
The first is their potential extemporariness. Indeed, the fact that document-making
could not always be clearly separated from decision-making  determines that  what  we
frame as 'the chancery' could in fact be nothing more than a secretary (or a clerk) assisting
an influential outsider (like a counsellor or a well-connected petitioner) who, by force of
practice, had the authority to use ducal wordpower. Given our presentist bias, we tend to
automatically attach a strong 'institutional-ness' to official documents like those coming
from a chancery; and yet, as we have seen, the creation of documents often resulted from
unregulated processes.
From extemporariness derives another  relevant  feature of the  expeditioni:  their
fragmentation.  The  expeditioni belonged to  many different  flows  of  chancery output,
which— importantly—were often mutually independent from each other. All chancery
documents are 'ducal' insofar as they bear the marks of authority of the Sforza; however,
this does not necessarily mean that they can all be unproblematically ascribed to a single
and well-identifiable Sforza authority headed by the duke. Regarding this point, I have
drawn attention to the registers recording the meetings of the Consiglio de Castello (see
above, pp. 112-113) in order to highlight the plurality and contradictoriness of chancery
output. But also the author of the Informazioni explicitly acknowledges the existence of
multiple flows of documentation, as he points out that
the expeditioni passed through [Calco's] hands, when his excellence the duke was in
Milan; but finding himself outside [Milan] in his dominion, [the expeditioni passed
through the hand] of those chancery clerks and secretaries who followed the duke's
court; those secretaries were messer Giovanni Giacomo Ghilini and messer Agostino
Calco,  son of  the  said sir  Bartolomeo,  and some other clerks,  designated to ride
behind his excellence's court at all times.57
From this description, we understand that there were two main poles of Sforza
documentary  production:  one  was  a  residential  chancery  in  Milan,  the  other  was  an
itinerant chancery that followed the duke. 
57 Santoro1939, 40.
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The question of the itinerancy of part of the Sforza chancery leads to the third
feature  of  the  expeditioni:  their  'spatiality'—that  is,  their  being  tightly  related  to  the
physical location  where  the  chancery  was  to  be  found.  Since  the  expeditioni nearly
always depended on interaction,  being there was essential to have them done, and/or to
have them done in a certain way, setting in writing certain things. But seen from the
perspective of the duke and the Sforza leadership, the opposite was also true:  moving
away with part of the chancery was a simple but effective way to control the all-too-easy
physical accessibility to wordpower—an issue that the Ordines struggled to manage.
A very  clear  example  of  the  strict  relationship  between  documentation  and
location emerges from Este Ferrara. Marco Folin observes that duke Ercole d'Este and his
chief secretary, every end of December, moved from Ferrara to a countryside residence in
order to discuss and formalise the appointments of the salaried officers for the year to
come. This allowed them to to escape from the political pressures of the city. Folin points
out that the secretary (and not Ercole) was the key-character in this  process, and that
chroniclers bitterly criticised Ercole's disinterest for the decisions made. This claim is part
of Folin's general argument that the Este chancery accumulated a power of its own and
was largely independent from the person of the duke.58 It is an argument that we can
extend to late-Sforza Milan.
Given the very complicated relationship between the Sforza and Milanese society,
it is reasonable to imagine that the dukes knew where and when to move in order to carry
out the more delicate expeditioni.59 Unfortunately, I was unable to find cases in point like
the one of Ferrara (neither for Francesco II  nor for the Sforza in general,)  but future
scholarship should definitely consider this spatial and 'kinetic' side of document-making.
To conclude,  it  is  evident  that  the  combination  of  these  three  features  of  the
expeditioni  (extemporariness, fragmentation,  spatiality) decisively undermines opposite
principles of bureaucracy (like impersonality and neutrality) typically associated with the
endeavour of making official documents. It will be useful to have this in mind when, in
the third part of the thesis, I will carry out my material analysis of documentary evidence.
3. Cultural practices: the chancery beyond administration
As is clear from the analysis of the Ordines and the Informazioni, the evidence on social
and political practices undertaken in the chancery is crucial to understand that the latter
58 Folin 2004, 168.
59 For the overall inability of the Sforza to establish a constructive relationship with Milan and its elites,
see Chittolini 1990; on the same issue, fascinatingly seen from the point of view of architecture and
urbanism in Milan, see Boucheron 1998.
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was much more open and dynamic than its rigid structure and ideal representation imply.
However, if we wish to further realise the extent to which the chancery was different from
a  neutral  office,  we  can  also  step  back  from the  narrow perspective  of  politics  and
administration and ask a different question: was the chancery a centre dealing exclusively
with  the  making of  official  documents?  Until  now, we have  somehow taken this  for
granted. But did the chancery also play other roles? In other words: was the chancery a
hub  of  (broadly  intended)  cultural  practices  that  ultimately  extended  its  range  of
functions?
In the rest of this chapter, I will show that the Sforza chancery in general, and that
of Francesco II in particular, in addition to being a political-administrative centre, had two
crucial (and interconnected) sides: that of a self-standing community—that is, a socially-
varied group of people that did not perceive itself only in function of a master, the duke,
but  marked  its  autonomous  presence  in  the  city  of  Milan;  and  that  of  a  centre  of
scholarship. These sides were not optional, but truly essential to the medieval and early
modern concept of chancery,  so much so that they remained intact also in the critical
context of the Sforza restoration.
3.1. The chancery as a community
In  Chapter  1,  I  briefly  mentioned  a  document  testifying  that  an  Augustinian  friar,
Girolamo Morone,  acted  as  chancery  chaplain.  He  managed  the  income of  a  chapel
located in the Milanese church of San Gottardo in Corte starting from 13 July 1522. Since
I was discussing chancery hierarchy, I limited myself to stress the role of Morone; but in
looking for evidence of the extra-administrative role the chancery played in the city of
Milan, it is the place and the date of the document that are very significant.
I  have already observed (p.  78) that San Gottardo in Corte  had long been the
church most strictly connected to the Visconti-Sforza dynasty, as the lords of Milan kept
their seat of government (chancery included) in the nearby  Corte dell'Arengo; and that
during  the  1450s,  chancery  clerks  swore  their  oath  of  allegiance  in  San  Gottardo's
sacristy. However, the existence of a 'chancery chapel' in San Gottardo as late as 1522—
that is, around fifty years after the Sforza court had left the Corte dell'Arengo (mid-1470s)
to relocate in  the castle of Porta  Giovia—clearly indicates that  the bond between the
chancery and the church was not dictated only by a practical physical proximity. In other
words, the chancery did not remain bound to San Gottardo for mere spatial reasons, but
because it elected the church as its own worship-place of reference. This choice is very
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significant: it shows that the chancery and its members did not see themselves only in
function of the authority they served; rather, they existed as a self-standing body with a
proper identity and a community side, just like the many groups (clans, confraternities,
guilds)  which  defined  themselves  through—  and  competed  for—the  occupation  and
maintenance of civic sacred spaces.60 It is worth noticing, for example, that the right to
physically access the main shrine of the cathedral (the Duomo) was the crucial element
that  helped  define  the  very unstable  concept  of  nobility  in  fourteenth-  and fifteenth-
century Milan.61 The same chancery Ordines point in this 'community' direction, as they
overtly  define  the  chancery  as  consortium,  a  Latin  term  meaning  'society',  or
'fellowship'.62 Furthermore,  the  date  of  13  July 1522 comes  very early in  the  Sforza
restoration: the chaplain's appointment even precedes the earliest secretarial signatures I
could find at the bottom of ducal letters close (August 1522, p. 185). This suggests how
urgent the chancery considered its re-connection to a chapel—that is, its reintegration in
the urban fabric of  the city.
The strong link between the chancery and the city can be also grasped, somehow
unexpectedly, through evidence on the social profile of the ushers—which also confirms
how  underrated  their  role  has  been  (see  p.  77).  Indeed,  between  1522  and  1524,
Francesco II put pressure on two Milanese parishes (Sant'Andrea in Porta Nuova and San
Lorenzo in Porta Ticinese) to appoint ushers (Agostino Gorgonzola and Giovanni Pietro
Sacchi)  as  Anziani  (Elders)  of  the  parishes  themselves.63 Since  we  have  two  close
instances of the same operation, it is possible to hypothesise that Francesco and his aides
were interested in establishing such connection: they found it desirable to have people
acting as Elders in the chancery ranks. What was the Elders' role? In the words of Evelyn
Welch,  Elders  ‘ensured  the continuity of  neighbourhood rituals:’ they rang the parish
church bells and went from door to door to summon the parishioners when meetings were
about to begin; they contributed to the dissemination of new laws, duties and temporary
measures; they reported wrongdoers; they ensured medical and spiritual assistance for the
ill, and so forth.64 Therefore, the ushers, the figures more practically entrusted with the
separation of the chancery from the outside world as porters and warders, were clearly
seen fit for an highly sociable role. More than excluding outsiders from the chancery, the
60 See Arcangeli and others 2015. For a later period, see also Garrioch 2004. 
61 Besozzi, 1984; Del Tredici 2013, 279 onwards.
62 BTMi, Cod. Triv. 1325, l. 86.
63 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, c. 69, 1522 December 7; ASMi, Registri delle missive, 222, c. 47, 
1524 June 10.
64 Welch 1995, 38-43.
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ushers-Elders were evidently likely to bring the chancery in contact with the most basic
levels of society. Indeed, they may have been supposed to establishing that contact. Once
again,  the 'secret'  chancery functioned following principles  that have little to do with
secrecy.
Generally speaking, the chancery itself  was a  remarkably varied place,  from a
social and educational point of view. One sure sign of this situation is that the Ordines are
bi-lingual: in Latin for learned (and therefore well-off) coadjutors, clerks and secretaries;
in vernacular for ushers and mounted messengers (cavallari), who belonged to a lower
social  status. Another sign is  the recommendation for ushers (also to be found in the
Ordines) to treat their superiors reverently in order to avoid disputes.65 However, from a
social point of view, the most interesting aspect of the chancery was the potential clash
between social and political-administrative hierarchies. Who was more important between
a young noble clerk and a non-noble secretary? Marco Folin points out how ‘the ducal
[Este] chancery (…) during the fifteenth century, was the institution where the contrast
between social  milieu and actual political  power was sharpest.’66 A situation like this
often jeopardised the peaceful functioning of the chancery, and existed also in fifteenth-
century Milan: Nadia Covini has followed the conflict between Giovan Tommaso Piatti, a
noble coadjutor, and Cristoforo Cambiago, a non-noble clerk, who got in a fight for a
question of precedence; Cambiago argued that his ‘handling [the lord's] secrets’ made him
superior  to  Piatti,  who  disagreed  (brandishing  a  knife.)67 In  the  case  of  the  Sforza,
geographic  divides  also  had  great  weigh:  the  Milanese  tended  to  despise  the  non-
Milanese, and the tension between Lombards and non-Lombards—the latter owing their
presence to the cosmopolitan environment of the Sforza court—was often palpable.68 The
case of first secretary Cicco Simonetta is emblematic: from a geographical point of view,
he was a total outsider, as he came from the southern-Italian region of Calabria; socially,
he was of very humble origins, and was ennobled by duke Francesco I Sforza on the basis
of his faithful service. Despite all this, he accumulated wealth and influence and had very
little regard for locals; eventually, it was a distinctively Milanese party—led by Pietro
Pusterla,  his  family  being  one  of  the  oldest  and  noblest  in  the  city—that  asked and
obtained Simonetta's execution from Ludovico Sforza in 1480.69
65 BTMi,  Cod. Triv.  1325, l. 92: ‘Item che quando per li scriptori de cancellaria gli siano domandate le
cose necessarie nella cancellaria et per lo scrivere, siano obedienti et presti quanto se conviene, et gli
portano honore et reverentia come debito’.
66 Folin 2004, 159.
67 Covini 2002, 114-115.
68 Ibid., 116-117.
69 Simonetta 2004, 131, 161-164.
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The situation in the chancery at the time of Francesco II must have been different,
more  homogeneous  and  quieter  than  in  the  past.  Indeed,  as  anticipated  (p.  80),  the
downsizing of the chancery determined a cut in the number of coadjutors and clerks.
Since this personnel typically had a notarial milieu, it is no coincidence that I could find
only one notary-clerk between 1522 and 1535.70 Detecting the social standing of the other
chancery members is very difficult: on the one hand, we lack some basic biographic data
necessary to pursue the task; on the other hand, as mentioned above, social distinction in
Milan and its Duchy—for example, the division between noble and non-noble families—
was not sanctioned juridically, and changed continuously.71 Despite these limitations, two
elements are worth of attention. Firstly, secretaries and clerks are normally referred to as
Nobile when they appear in the documentation.72 This epithet should not be taken at face
value, but it nonetheless testifies that there was a sense of exclusivity in belonging to the
chancery, which was semantically associated to nobility. In addition, the use of the title
Nobile associated to a post—rather than to family or clan—anticipates a trend that in
Milan would emerge in the second half of the sixteenth century.73 Secondly, we know that
the political branch of the secret chancery hosted at least two clerics.74 This fact is unique
in the framework of the Sforza chancery before Francesco II: the only clerics to be found
in the chancery ranks usually acted as secretaries of the beneficial branch, as they dealt
with religious matters. Perhaps Francesco thought that clerics, already equipped with their
benefices, could weight less on ducal finances.
3.2. The chancery as a centre of scholarship
The chancery being a centre of writing, a fellowship of men skilled in politics and pen-in-
hand, and an institution that functioned in tight contact with a wider courtly environment,
the connection between chancery and scholarship is quite natural. This fact is well known
to historiography: in 2002, for example, Douglas G. Biow has indicated the association
70 His name is Agostino Monti. He is to be found in a list of notaries active in Milan during the sixteenth
century: ASMi, Inventory n. 12 (Elenco dei Notai Attivi a Milano nel secolo XVI), 47.
71 Del Tredici 2014.
72 For example secretary Giovanni Giacomo Ferrufini (ASMi,  Registri delle Missive,  225, c.  25, 1531
August 28),  clerk Paolo Verano (ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  222, ll.  40-41, 1524 June 5),  clerk
Gerolamo Bertone (ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 222, c. 71, 1524 August 6), clerk Giovanni Paolo de
Scarli (ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, c. 181, 1525 April 29), clerk Evangelista Imperiale (ASMi,
Registri delle Missive, 222, c. 139, 1525 April 6).
73 Del Tredici 2014.
74 On 29 November 1523, Francesco II urged the debtors of the Milanese parish of San Barnaba to pay
their dues to the provost, Amico Taegio, who acted as secretary in the chancery (ASMi, Registri delle
Missive, 221, ll. 53-54). On 5 June 1524, the chancery urged the managers of the San Matteo hospital of
Pavia to let clerk Paolo Verano take possession of a chapel belonging to the same hospital (ASMi,
Registri delle Missive, 222, l. 40). 
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between secretaries and humanism with great  clarity,  but  many historians  before him
focused on single case studies to make the same claim.75 In 1990, Robert-Henri Bautier
wrote what is perhaps the most complete overview on the subject. He highlighted how
chanceries propelled some of the most successful cultural trends throughout Europe from
(at least) the twelfth century, to the heights of late-fourteenth- and early-fifteenth century
Florence (with characters such as Coluccio Salutati,  Leonardo Bruni, Niccolò Niccoli,
Poggio Bracciolini), Rome (Enea Silvio Piccolomini) and Naples (Lorenzo Valla).76 
But besides these renowned centres, Bautier also devoted attention to golden-age
Sforza  Milan,  stating  that  the  Visconti-Sforza  chancery  constituted  one  of  the  most
important  northern-Italian  foyers  of  culture.77 The  'celebrity  gallery'  that  follows  is
impressive:  from the  Visconti  age,  Bautier  picks  chancery clerks  and secretaries  like
Pasquino de Capelli, Antonio Loschi, and Pier Candido Decembrio.78 From the Sforza
age, the selection includes both Cicco and Giovanni Simonetta, Bartolomeo and Tristano
Calco.  To  this  list  of  names,  one  may add  some  revealing  definitions  of  the  Sforza
chancery  surfacing  from  archival  documents  and  epistolaries.  In  1461  Francesco
Tranchedini, son of the well known ambassador Nicodemo, enthusiastically defined the
chancery as musarum domum et Phoebi sacellum, ('the home of the Muses and the shrine
of Apollo').79 The humanist Giorgio Valagussa wrote about the  ornatissima cancellaria
('most prized chancery') as a place where it was possible to discuss philosophy, history
and antiquity.80
What happened to this long-lasting tradition after the end of the Sforza golden
age? As usual, the interest of scholars suddenly stops with the year 1499. Yet, looking at a
period of crisis represents an optimal vantage point to measure the solidity of a cultural
legacy. Therefore, asking whether the Sforza chancery was still an active foyer of culture
under Francesco II means testing if chancery and scholarship were actually inextricable.
To begin with, the idea of an ornatissima chancery as musarum domum et Phoebi
sacellum  certainly remained in the mind of Francesco II's  Gran Cancelliere Girolamo
Morone.  Indeed,   in  a  letter  written  to  beneficial  secretary  (and  humanist)  Giacomo
Antiquario before the fall  of Ludovico Sforza, Morone wrote in elegant Latin that he
‘ardently desire[d]’ to join
75 Biow 2002, Gualdo 1990, Bentley 1987, Ryder 1976.
76 Bautier 1990.
77 Ibid., 51.
78 Bueno de Mesquita 1975, Viti 2006, Id. 1987.
79 Sverzellati 1998, 504.
80 Simonetta 2004, 137.
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‘that  most  elegant  academy  (academia) of  scribes,  also  known  as
chancery clerks, who are experts of the most secret affairs of the prince.
Such academy is famous for its style, [its members] usually spend even
the  nights  listening,  reading,  discussing  and  writing.  Such  academy,
besides showing incomparable erudition and excellence in any genre of
oratory, avoids any vanity, moral weakness and swerve, [such academy]
calls for adequate studies, virtuous actions and respectable habits.81
Despite  this  remarkable  rhetorical  effort,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that
Antiquario hired Morone. Nevertheless, the apologetic description is extremely important
because it unveils the ideal framework involving the Sforza chancery. If a reader knew
nothing about such institution, s/he would hardly recognise its political nature, except for
a vague reference to the management of the ‘secret affairs of the prince.’ Instead, Morone
offers one straightforward definition, pointing in an opposite direction: ‘that most elegant
academy (academia) of scribes.’ The key-word  academia may be translated as 'school',
but  it  is  also a tribute to the humanistic academies flourishing in Italy at  that time. 82
Therefore, the chancery is seen as a place for scholars and their disciples, rather than a
governmental office with decision makers and their functionaries, a site of learning and
dialogue  (like  Plato's  academy)  rather  than  administration.  More  importantly,  the
chancery is a place where practitioners do not only learn a technical expertise, but also
wider intellectual knowledge and moral values. Morone insists on this 'holistic' value of
the chancery as he leaves the practice of writing last  in  a list  that includes listening,
reading,  and discussing as integral  parts  of chancery activity.  The focus  on orality is
reaffirmed shortly after, as Morone notes that secretaries and clerks, mastering oratory,
are educated speakers—not just writers. Finally, it is worth noticing how Morone subtly
plays with the word  literae, which means both 'letter' (in the material sense of a letter)
and 'knowledge.'83
Knowing  Morone's  mindset  certainly  is  relevant  per  se,  but  the  point  is  also
understanding whether his ideal matched reality at the time he became Gran Cancelliere.
In other words, we have to check whether secretaries and clerks had biographies (and
bibliographies) to suggest that the chancery still had an academia side under Francesco II.
The answer to this question is absolutely in the affirmative. Four prominent secretaries
active  between  1522  and  1535  show  a  humanist  profile.  First  secretary  Bartolomeo
Rozzoni,  for example,  cooperated with no less than Demetrio Calcondila—one of the
most  celebrated  Greek  intellectuals  of  the  fifteenth  century—in  publishing  classical
81 Promis and Müller 1863, 11 [my translation].
82 See Chambers and Quiviger 1995, and now Testa 2015. 
83 See for  example  Sansovino  1568, s.  v.:  ‘Lettere (…) litere,  missive  & risponsive,  che  si  mandano
indietro & inanzi. Lettere per lo studio & la scienza usa il volgo.’
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incunabula.84 Camillo Ghilini translated in Latin an autobiographic memoir of Battista
Fregoso, doge of  Genoa between 1478 and 1483;  his  union of  classical  learning and
political culture proved successful to the point that the book was soon to be found in
Milanese libraries.85 Amico Taegio took advantage of his status of diplomatic agent to
nurture an international network that included the German jurist and humanist Christoph
von Scheurl,86 as well as Venetian and Neapolitan literates.87 In addition, Taegio appears
in the very popular novellas of Matteo Bandello (1480–1562) with the role of narrator, a
clear sign of his fame in intellectual circles.88 Finally, Galeazzo Capra, clerk until 1525
and  secretary  during  the  1530s,  authored  an  encomiastic  book  on  women  (Della
eccellenza et dignità delle donne)89 and one ambitious Anthropologia, i.e. a philosophical
dialogue on human nature, divided in three books.90
Furthermore, two chancery members (the same Capra and Agostino Parravicini)
not only wielded their pens to write documents on behalf of the duke, but also to transmit
a  memory of  the  epochal  events  they witnessed—in line  with chancellors-chroniclers
elsewhere in late medieval Italy.91 Parravicini worked on a manuscript chronicle of Milan
from 1499 to 1529, and was active in the chancery between the 1490s and 1525.92 Capra
wrote an account of the facts involving Francesco II and the recapturing of the Duchy of
Milan between 1522 and 1531. This book was so successful that it was printed in Milan,
Venice, Nurnberg, Antwerp, and Valencia when Capra was still alive (he died in 1537.)93
Capra's book, as the titles of the Venice editions suggest, belongs to the genre of the
Renaissance  commentarii. As Gary Ianziti remarked, this genre stood at the crossroads
between historiography, information, and propaganda.94 They were the chancery genre par
excellence:  the  commentarii were  written  inside  chanceries,  by  chancery  members,
because they had to be based on chancery materials to be authoritative.95 But what is
84 Verga 1893, 14. On Calcondila, see Petrucci 1973.
85 Gazzini  2012, 283;  Ghilini 1509.  The  book  was  successful  and  saw three  more  sixteenth-century
editions,  in  Paris  (Petrus  Vidoue,  1518),  Basel  (Bartolomaeum  Westhemerum,  1541)  and  Antwerp
(Ioannem Bellerum, 1565).  Paolo Giovio devoted an entry to Ghilini in his Elogi degli uomini illustri
(Giovio 2006, 371-372).
86 Freiherrn von Soden and Knaake 1867, ad indicem.
87 Taegio is praised in the fifth chant of Antonino Lenio's poem Oronte gigante (1531).
88 Bandello 1992, novella XXXI (pp. 303-306).
89 Capra 1525.
90 Capra 1533.
91 For a general overview, see Dale,  Williams Lewin, and Osheim 2009; see also Ianziti 2012; on the
above-mentioned Coluccio Salutati, see Tanzini 2014; on Naples, see De Caprio 2012 On Milan: Ianziti
1981, Belloni, 1980.
92 Argelati 1743, vol. 2, col. 1038. Unfortunately, this manuscript seems to have disappeared. 
93 Ricciardi 1976.
94 Ianziti 1983; Id. 1992. more generally, see also Id. 1988.
95 Ianziti 1983, 914.
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important  for  my  argument  is  that  the  production  of  commentarii in  Francesco  II's
chancery constitutes a very strong sign of continuity with the 1450–1499 period. Indeed,
Giovanni Simonetta's Rerum gestarum Francisci Sfortiae commentarii—dealing with the
history of Francesco I Sforza and  written between 1470 and 1476—had been one of the
most important examples of the genre.96 
Therefore, the chancery of Francesco II maintained that role of 'foyer of culture'
that  Bautier  acknowledged  for  the  Visconti-Sforza  age.  This  happened  despite  the
ongoing major political crisis, which demonstrates that the status of centre of scholarship
was indeed inherent in the chancery as a centre of writing. Between 1522 and 1535, the
chancery may have been less attractive than the 'most elegant academy of scribes' that
Morone enthusiastically described at  the time of duke Ludovico.  However,  clerks and
secretaries continued to alternate political tasks with literary efforts of various kind; or,
like Parravicini and Capra, they engaged in scribal activities that went beyond the strict
day-to-day work of the chancery, and aimed at leaving a long-lasting memory of what the
Sforza loyalists had endured during the Italian Wars.
With the chancery as a community and as a centre of scholarship, I conclude the overview
of chancery practices. In introducing Part II, I advanced the hypothesis that shifting the
focus from rigid structures to fluid practices could contribute to problematise our notion
of chancery. Let us now recap what groups of practices I have identified, and how they
enrich our perspective on chancery functioning.
Firstly,  an  against-the-grain  reading  of  the  Ordines  has  demonstrated  that  the
purported isolation, secrecy and sacredness of the chancery clashed with deeply-rooted
social  practices  that  in  reality physically opened the  chancery to  outsiders.  Unskilled
garzoni  informally  assisting  secretaries  and  clerks,  characters  who  where  'worth  of
reputation'  or  'familiar'  to  the  chancery,  casual  strangers  (not  only notables,  but  also
'plebeians:') a remarkably wide range of people could  tamper with chancery activities.
Very importantly, some outsiders were given the chance to hold the quill and write, thus
replacing official chancery members. The signatures advenam ('stranger') to be found on
chancery registers testify that such practice was broadly accepted.
Secondly, the memoir  Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali  draws
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  chancery,  far  from being merely a  secluded scriptorium
formalising decisions taken elsewhere (in time and space,) was constantly involved in
96 Ianziti 1981.
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political  practices  related to  information management  and communication.  Secretaries
were often the first to deal with sensitive information,  and decided whether or not to
communicate  it  (and  to  whom.)  Chancery  members  followed  processes  of  decision-
making closely, and they regularly—though very informally—worked in direct contact
with elusive figures (the 'counsellors,' the  camerieri) whose authority was tied to very
volatile relations of power. As we have seen, orality and the need  not  to leave written
evidence  marked  some  specific  parts  of  the  chancery's  activity.  In  light  of  all  these
dynamics, I have singled out three recurrent non-bureaucratic features of the expeditioni:
extemporariness, fragmentation, and 'spatiality'—i.e. their being strongly related to the
physical location of the chancery.
Finally, as we have seen in the last two sub-sections, the chancery was a hub for
broader cultural practices—the privileged connection with a chapel in the heart of Milan,
the cult of classical antiquity, the writing of literature and of history. According to the
Ordines and Gran Cancelliere Girolamo Morone, the chancery was also a socially-varied
consortium  (fellowship)  and  an  academia  (academy).  We  must  take  this  variety  of
functions into due account if the aim is achieving a reliable picture of the chancery. 
These  three  sets  of  practices,  diverse  as  they  are,  have  one  crucial  thing  in
common:  they  all  contradict  the  oversimplistic  notion  of  the  chancery  as  an  inert
instrument at the disposal of a reified (or restricted) authority. To the contrary, they show
that  the chancery functioned as  an  open platform of  integration.  The heart  of  Sforza
wordpower,  beyond its  most  ideal  representation,  was  propelled  by exchange and by
social, political and cultural interaction. 
127
Chapter 4 – The Practice of Centre-Periphery Correspondence
In a 2011 essay, Franca Leverotti defined the Sforza chancery in the fifteenth century as
‘structure, filter, transmission belt between the duke and his officials, the duke and his
subjects.’97 In light of the findings so far, it is safe to say that such a strictly top-down
definition is incomplete and limiting. Nevertheless, at its most basic level, the chancery
did act as a transmission belt producing and deploying the duke's wordpower from the
centre to the peripheries of his dominion. What was the chancery's function in such case?
What was the aim of the letters it sent?
At  first,  these  questions  may  sound  trivial:  the  chancery  was  a  tool  for
administration, and the letters it produced carried messages, orders, and requests, thus
making  governance  possible.  However,  having  problematised  the  notion  of  chancery
through the analysis of the practices that were undertaken within it, we should also assess
if  and  to  what  extent  the  exercise  of  wordpower—the  act  of  deploying  chancery
documents around the territory of the Duchy—can be considered in itself a practice: a
meaningful performance rather than a neutral  and logistical  endeavour only.  In recent
years, scholarship has started to adopt this perspective. For example Jean Boutier, Sandro
Landi and Olivier Rouchon have highlighted the need of considering correspondences not
only as carriers of information, but also as interesting objects of study in virtue of their
internal  mechanisms.98 In  the  field  of  Visconti-Sforza  studies,  Massimo  Della
Misericordia has argued that historians should not take the ‘dialogue’ between ‘the prince
and  the  social  and  territorial  bodies’ only  as  an  abstract  relationship,  but  also  as  a
significantly concrete  interaction based on the exchange of writings;  the latter  should
constitute ‘a new and specific interest for research on the territorial state.’99
The most complete sources for studying the relationship between Francesco II and
his dominion are the Registri delle Missive. As noted in the general introduction (pp. 41-
42), they record the transcriptions of the letters travelling from the centre of Sforza power
to officers, communities and individual subjects all around the Duchy. Scholars typically
have an 'extractive' attitude toward the  Registri delle Missive—that is, they use them to
draw useful bits of historical data. I have repeatedly used the registers in this way too, for
example for unveiling the political-economic relationships between chancery members
97 Leverotti 2011, 43: ‘struttura, filtro, cinghia di trasmissione, tramite il duca e i suoi ufficiali, e tra il duca
e la popolazione.’ 
98 Boutier, Landi, and Rouchon 2008, 7-8.
99 Della Misericordia 2004, 148 [my translation].   
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and the duke (pp. 74-76).100 However, what has yet to be conducted is a broad critique of
the Registri delle Missive as evidence of how and with what ends, ambitions and limits
the chancery deployed ducal documents. Can a comprehensive analysis of the  Registri
delle Missive  help us reach a different and compelling perspective on the exercise of
wordpower? The answer to this question can be obtained from the combination of four
different (though mutually connected) series of considerations, which I order from the
more speculative to the more substantial. 
The first series of considerations regards the organisation and composition of the
Registri delle Missive. I will argue that the registers not only served an administrative
function—recording outgoing letters and making them available for future reference—but
also a representational one; they were objects, documents/monuments materialising the
idea that the Sforza actually controlled their dominion.
The second series of considerations regards the language of the registers' entries
(and  therefore  the  language  of  ducal  letters  themselves.)  I  will  highlight  that  such
language, far from being only pragmatic, relentlessly aimed at projecting the image of the
duke's  unchallenged authority,  even when—as I  will  show—the circumstances clearly
betrayed  the  duke's  powerlessness.  As  a  consequence,  I  will  assert  that  the  primary
objective  of  the  correspondence  flowing  from  the  centre  to  the  periphery  was  not
necessarily an effective exercise of  governance,  but  a  means to establish a  minimum
(rhetorical) degree of jurisdiction.
This last claim leads to the third series of considerations, which regards a peculiar
trait of politics by correspondence as it emerges from the language used in the registers:
the  difference  between  'accepting'  (acceptare)  and  'obeying'  (obedire)  or  'executing'
(exequire) orders coming from the Sforza authorities. I will maintain that such difference
—inconceivable  in  today's  political  culture—further  demonstrates  that  the  act  of
spreading the ducal written word had its own self-contained significance.
Finally, to make the last series of considerations, I will look at another source: a
general Sforza balance sheet of the year 1525 showing in detail what expenses Francesco
II  sustained  for  ruling.  As  we  shall  see,  wordpower-related  expenses  are  among  the
highest. Considering how inefficient Sforza correspondence was, I will be able to affirm
that Francesco invested great amounts of money for staging the performance of document
delivery, rather than for obtaining concrete political results out of the performance itself. 
In  light  of  all  this,  my  conclusion  will  be  that  the  deployment  of  chancery
100 For the opposition between an 'extractive' and an 'ethnographic' (i.e. more comprehensive) attitude to
archival series, see Stoler 2002, 90.
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documents  around  the  Duchy  of  Milan,  well  before  being  a  strictly  functional
administrative technique, was first and foremost a practice essential for making power
visible. It is important to bear this representational side of wordpower in mind for the
material analysis of chancery documents that will characterise Part III.
1. The Registri delle Missive beyond their administrative function
Since this  chapter  is  largely based on the analysis  of the  Registri  delle  Missive,  it  is
appropriate to start by describing their organisation. In dealing with the evolution of the
chancery of Francesco II (p. 60), I have already mentioned that outgoing letters were
transcribed in two parallel series of registers during the years 1522–1525, before being
united in one single series from 1531 onwards. 
Let us focus on the 1522–1525 period then, the most ambitious of Francesco II's
history as duke. Letters were transcribed in one or the other series of registers depending
on destination. One series gathers letters (Registri delle Missive n. 220, n. 222, and n.
223) to Milan, Como, the Gera d'Adda, Lodi, and Pavia; the other series (of which only
register n. 221 has survived) gathers letters to Cremona, Novara, Tortona, Alessandria,
and Asti. If these towns are located on a map (as seen in fig. 4.1, p. 131) the rationale of
the division immediately becomes clear. The series divide the Sforza dominion in two
well-defined regions: one includes Milan and the northern, eastern, and southern parts of
the dominion, the other includes its western and south-western parts. There is only one,
evident  exception  to  this  scheme:  the town of  Cremona,  despite  being located  in  the
South-East  of  the  Duchy,  is  in  the  group of  western  and south-western  towns.  After
Milan,  Cremona was the most important town of the Duchy,  and it  is  likely that  the
chancery found it potentially confusing to record the affairs relating to both centres in the
same series of registers.101
This last choice certainly is a sign of the administrative function of the  Registri
delle Missive, which served to track past contacts with officers, communities and subjects
belonging to specific areas. But was functionality the registers'  sole raison d'être? The
registers are archives of letters and, as Randolph Head puts it, pre-modern archives not
only  worked  on  the  functional  level,  but  also  on  the  conceptual  and  on  the
symbolic/representational.  On  the  conceptual  level,  archival  sources  represent  ‘the
dominant  power’s  self-interpretation  and  self-mirroring.’  On  the
symbolic/representational  level,  archives  as  material  objects  can  materially  ‘stand  for




Fig. 4.1: Map of the Duchy of Milan with the names of its main towns and
areas. Letters to the towns/areas with their names underlined (Milan,
Como, Gera D'Adda, Lodi, Pavia) are transcribed in one series of the
Registri delle Missive (nn. 220, 222, 223); letters to the other towns
(Novara, Tortona, Alessandria, Asti) are transcribed in another series
(register n. 221)
their polities for the power of their rulers.’102 Can we see the composition of the Registri
delle  Missive—and  the  activity  that  necessarily  preceded  it,  i.e.  the  production  and
delivery  of  ducal  letters—as  important  conceptual  and  symbolic/representational
practices, instead of as strictly functional ones only? My answer is in the affirmative, for
at least two reasons.
Firstly,  we  have  already  seen  that  in  March  1531,  as  soon  as  Francesco  II
understood that his five-year exile was finally coming to an end, one of his first decisions
was to re-order what he affectionately defined as ‘old little archive’ (il solito et vecchio
Archivietto, p. 57). In other words, Francesco overtly attached a symbolic value to record-
keeping, which represented legitimacy and  long-craved stability.
Secondly, and more specifically, it can be argued that the  Registri delle Missive
are  more  than  just  the  sum  of  the  letters  they  contain:  they  have  their  own
'monumentality.'  The  registers  physically  bind  together  the  day-to-day  work  of  the
chancery, and serialise it in voluminous books. In so doing, they automatically tend to
look perfectly linear. They obliterate the accidents, idiosyncrasies and any breakdown in
dialogue between the Sforza leadership and its subjects, thus rendering an overall sense of
control.  We  can  imagine  that  owning  registers  recording  the  political-administrative
relationship with a given territory lent an objectified (and therefore very strong) support
to the claim of owning that territory itself. When Francesco II took power in 1522, there
were probably no less than 150 copybooks materially signifying that his forebears had
ruled on the dominion he was inheriting.103 In this perspective, it seems clear that keeping
registers up-to-date and adding new ones to the series not only was a pragmatic matter of
administration, but also a highly symbolic practice of authority.
2. The 'language of governance' of the Registri delle Missive
Another characteristic that contributes significantly to the monumentality of the Registri
delle Missive  is  their  language.  Reading the registers serially means realising that the
chancery relentlessly used the same, solemn tone for addressing its interlocutors. As the
case  may be,  such  solemn tone  propounds  the  duke's  authoritativeness,  resoluteness,
magnanimity,  paternalism;  reproduced in  hundreds  and hundreds  of  entries,  it  clearly
102 Head 2003, 749-751.
103 GGAS, vol. 2, 928-929. Today, the registers belonging to the Registri delle Missive are 252 in total, but
the series has come to incorporate many registers that are not chancery copybooks at all (for example
copybooks originally belonging to ambassadors, three personal journals of Cicco Simonetta, the reports
of the meetings of the  Consiglio de Castello  I have analysed in Chapter 3.) The general inventory of
Milan's State Archives counts 187 registers actually gathering the transcriptions of outgoing chancery
letters. Hence, my estimate of 150 chancery copybooks is conservative.
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casts  the  idea  of  a  deep  territorial  control  on  the  part  of  the  duke  and  the  Sforza
leadership. 
However, we should be careful not to accept the tone of ducal letters at face value.
Indeed,  the  language  used  in  the  dialogue  between  the  Sforza  authorities  and  their
subjects did not always mirror the actual relations of power between them. On the one
hand, as Nadia Covini puts it, those who wrote to the duke adopted a standard ‘language
of obedience and submission:’ a language that, while simulating deference, can also (and
more subtly) express ‘resistance, defiance, tensions.’104 on the other, I would consequently
add, Francesco II and the chancery adopted a symmetrical 'language of governance:' one
that, while maintaining a standard degree of authoritativeness, can also betray anxieties
and a certain powerlessness. 
The use of the language of governance appears to have been almost unconditional:
the chancery's solemn tone remained undeterred even when—at a closer examination—
the circumstances evidently show that Francesco II was completely unable to impose his
authority on subject officers and communities. To give an idea of the striking mismatch
between rhetoric and reality transpiring from some letters,  I have selected three cases
coming directly from the Registri delle Missive and involving the town of Novara and the
villages of Bassignana and Cannobio (fig. 4.2, p. 134).
Novara is a town 70 kilometres west of Milan. Strategically positioned between
the  Sesia  and  the  Ticino  rivers,  throughout  the  Italian  Wars it  was  among  the  first
landmarks to be targeted any time the French wished to penetrate in the Duchy. As a
consequence, the French repeatedly brought and abandoned their goods there during their
occupations and sudden retreats. Francesco II and his aides knew it, and wished to get
hold of that patrimony; in order to do so, they had some proclamations published urging
the population to notify any ‘gold, silver, and stuff of the French,’ with the promise of a
punishment for those who refused. On 6 July 1524, however, the secret chancery wrote to
the Commissario delle Tasse ('Tax Commissary') of Novara, stating that the duke decided
to concede three extra days to denounce the money and the goods of the French. Behind
this decision, it is clearly possible to speculate on the existence of a form of resistance:
few people (or nobody) in Novara wanted to hand over those assets; if not due to actual
anti-Sforza feeling, at least because the population knew that the French might come back
soon.105 Therefore, the duke had to insist. The letter reads:
104 Covini 2008, 21.
105 Regime changes in Novara were so common between 1521 and 1525, that the Sforza happened to
invite  the whole community to  change side and welcome the French,  in order  to  avoid bloodshed.
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ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 48, 1523 September 10.
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Fig. 4.2: Map of the Duchy of Milan with the town of
Novara and the villages of Cannobbio and Bassignana
Even though we should have reasonably allowed to be punished those who did not
notify the gold, the silver and the things of the French, and other enemies of ours, by
the  time  and in the  modes  the  proclamations  disposed in  that  city;  nevertheless,
because we want it to happen more peacefully, we say that we are happy to issue a
proclamation that extends for three days the orders contained in the previous ones
(…) and we order that you proceed against the disobedient without any pardoning
(…).106 
In this case, the language of governance aimed at turning Francesco II's manifest
powerlessness into a form of leniency. Since the first proclamation had been ignored, the
chancery wrote that Francesco was extending the deadline for the hand-over of the goods
of the French with the aim of avoiding unnecessary disturbance. It is highly unlikely that
a  three-day  postponement  of  the  hand-over  would  have  changed  the  situation.
Nevertheless, Francesco remained quiet: the Commissario delle Tasse seems to have at
least correctly published the proclamations.
Things  were  different—and  I  come  to  the  second  example—when  peripheral
officers directly refused to mediate between the Sforza leadership and the community
they  oversaw.  This  represented  a  more  serious,  institutionalised  level  of  resistance
requiring a much firmer answer. Yet, once again, the language of governance foresaw a
controlled approach: subtly intimating, but also implying a sense of authority—the same
authority that  the centre  was evidently lacking. On 21 September 1524, the chancery
wrote to the Pretore of Bassignana—a little village near Alessandria, on the right bank of
the Po river (an area known as Oltrepò): 
We  are  warned  by  sir  Giovanni  de  Cani,  our  Commissario  contra  Rebelli
[Commissary against  the  Rebels]  in  the  Oltrepò,  that  you  do  not  want  either  to
publish his  proclamations,  or  to  do  anything  about  this  business  [the  chasing of
rebels to the Sforza], as if our interest was not at stake here; we dislike [to hear] this,
and therefore we say to you, that under the threat of our disgrace, you shall not only
publish the proclamations,  and share  the  intelligence and the clues  that  you will
gather,  in  any way,  against  the  said  Rebels  or  suspects,  even if  they come from
Bassignana, but [you shall] also do what the said Commissario will research you to
do; and should you fail to deliver, we will react in such way, that you will be sorry.107 
Failure to publish proclamations had legal implications, because laws were valid
only if made public. In Venice and its Terraferma, for example, impeding the publication
of proclamations was a common expedient to avoid the observance of orders coming
from the government.  Actually,  such expedient was considered so juridically effective
that the Venetian government itself adopted it in 1606, when it materially forbade the
106 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 132, 1524 June 6 [emphasis added]: for the full transcription of
this document, see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 1.
107 ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  221,  l.  162,  1524  September  21  [emphasis  added]:  for  the  full
transcription of this document, see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 2.
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publication of Pope Paul V's Interdict in the attempt to avoid its effects.108 In our case
here,  the  problem was  that  the  Sforza  Pretore was  more  loyal  to  locals  than  to  the
authority who had appointed him to his post. The letter itself suggests it: the fact that the
rebels came from Bassignana should not have stopped the Pretore from denouncing them.
Despite this open infidelity, the chancery only menaced consequences, instead of taking
action directly. The question was tackled rhetorically, but in practice Francesco II and the
Sforza leadership acknowledged all their limits.
The last example I wish to present is the one that better reveals the distance that
could exist between rhetoric and reality; and, at the same time, it shows very well the
complex  relationship  between  Francesco  II,  his  peripheral  officers,  and  subject
communities.  The  chancery wrote  two letters:  the  first  to  Anchise  Visconti  (13  May
1524), the Governatore of lake Maggiore, and the second to ‘the Commune and the men’
of Cannobio (24 May 1524), a village lying on the northern bank of the same lake.109
Both the major lakes north of Milan, lake Maggiore and lake Como, together with the
isolated valleys around them, were among the most uncontrollable areas of the Duchy; in
addition, they were under constant political and military pressure as they bordered with
the Swiss Cantons. For these reasons, the representatives of ducal power tended to rule
independently, and the tension with the central authorities was often high. 
In the first letter, the duke informed Anchise Visconti that the men of Cannobio
had sent some agents to Milan to testify their loyalty to the Sforza; the agents said that
any previous demonstration of favour towards the French and their supporters had been
staged only forcedly, whereas the good disposition of Cannobio towards the duke had
never been in question. But this fact notwithstanding, the agents complained that Visconti
threatened the village, as he announced that he would have soon sent an army to punish
its  population.  This  situation  throws  light  on  the  unsolvable  ambiguities  in  the
relationship between centre and periphery: could the Sforza leadership ever be sure of the
side Cannobio actually chose during the war with the French? The chancery probably
lacked information, and—as in any community—it was likely that there was a pro-Sforza
and a pro-French faction, although the division had to do with local contrasts more than
108 De Vivo 2012, 268-272. An Interdict  is  an ecclesiastical  censure that  prohibits the performance of
certain rites in a given city or area.
109 The chancery had a vast (and sometimes vague) vocabulary to identify the subject communities and
their  representatives.  Villages–or  group  of  villages,  variously  grouped  in  ‘lands’ (terre,)  ‘parishes’
(parrochie  and pievi,) ‘valleys’ (valli)–were administrated by the ‘Commune’ (comune,) the ‘Consuls’
(consuli,) and the ‘men’ (homini.) For example, in ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 222, l. 68, 1524 June
27,  the  chancery  described  the  interlocutors  in  the  periphery  as  ‘our  officials,  and  the  Consuls,
Communes, and men of the dominion.’
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with large-scale politics. And why was the Governatore so determined to use force? Was
he acting on behalf of his superior, Francesco II, or pursuing his own personal ambitions?
We know the answer to this last question: later in the registers, it emerges that Anchise
Visconti would soon make himself an anti-Sforza rebel.110 But, for the moment, the duke
asked him to refrain from any violence, and ordered that every ‘land and valley’ under the
control of the Governatore should send four of their ‘most prominent members’ (primati)
to Milan to swear an oath of fidelity. This was a political act, but the impression is also
that the Sforza wanted to survey an area of which little was known at court.
Was the duke's order executed? The Registri delle Missive only record a meeting
with the  primati of  Cannobio,  and this  suggests that the majority of the communities
around  lake  Maggiore  ignored  the  summoning,  and  that  Visconti  certainly  was  not
zealous in his role as designated mediator. Yet, the description of the only meeting that
took place is very interesting. It is appropriate to report some passages of the letter that
the chancery sent to Cannobio:
We were very surprised, that you [the Commune and the men of Cannobio] have sent
us agents so unwilling to reach an agreement and to aid us for this urgent need of
ours, even though our intention is to give the money back; and eventually, because of
our  goodness  and  clemency,  we  have  come  to  terms  with  their  [the  agents']
obstination, so that, even though we hoped to have an aid of at least 1,000 ducats
from you,  we  settled  for  500  (…)  you  have  your  receipt  (…)  so  that  you  will
undoubtedly have your  money back.  Our good disposition towards you made us
satisfied with the said amount; in the same way, with good cheer, we accepted the
oath of fidelity sworn by your ambassadors (…) and even though necessity forced
you to stage some manifestation in favour of our enemies and rebels, your souls did
not abandon the loyalty and devotion for us, and we exhort you to persist, because
you will find that we will always be a good and just prince for you.111
Therefore, the aim of summoning the communities of lake Maggiore was not only
to establish a new  status quo in the area through the swearing of a series of oaths of
fidelity. Rather, as testified by the structure of the last letter, the duke had attracted his
subjects to court also  to extort a sum of money and to satisfy his urgent financial needs.
However, once in Milan, the ambassadors of Cannobio were able to resist the pressure,
and  bargained  on  the  amount  of  their  loan.  Here,  even  the  use  of  the  language  of
governance could hardly hide the embarrassment. Francesco II asked for one thousand
ducats, but all he could obtain was five hundred. Therefore, it was written that he had
mercifully accepted that sum, out of his goodness and clemency. Only after the business
was settled, the oath of fidelity was sworn, and Francesco could welcome again Cannobio
110 ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  221,  ll.  197-198,  1525 May 13:  a  letter  to  the  Pretore of  Pallanza
mentions ‘Anchise Visconti, who has now rebelled against us.’
111 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 121-122, 1524 May 24 [emphasis added]: for the full transcription
of this document, see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 3.
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under his protection. The ambassadors accepted the role-play, but carefully managed to
bring home a written receipt of the loan, to keep it in their records and claim the money
back in the future. 
Let us now step back from these examples and return to the main question of the
chapter: what was the primary function of Sforza wordpower, if seen in the light of the
relentless and unconditional use of the language of governance? It seems clear that on
many occasions, the act of delivering letters in the peripheries of the Duchy of Milan was
not a means to convey messages or negotiate: the act was the message, and often the only
statement of authority Francesco II was able to accomplish to establish a minimum degree
of jurisdiction. Making such statement in a language of governance projecting, simulating
power was all the chancery could do.
To better understand this argument, we should try to imagine the act of delivering
letters in practice: a Sforza envoy—as we shall soon see, usually a mounted messenger—
would have physically had access to a given area of the Duchy; he would have met a
Sforza officer, or a prominent member of the community that he had reached; he would
have given the officer (or the prominent member of the community) an object, a letter
carrying the language of  governance;  he would have come back to  the  Sforza court,
unharmed, after crossing other areas of the Duchy. Even assuming that the subjects would
simply  ignore  the  letter,  does  not  this  chain  of  events  evidently  represent  an  act  of
authority? Depending on the immediate circumstances, the Sforza leadership could have
made more or less (or nothing) out of its formal control of a subject town or territory:
whatever the case, keeping continuous contact with a subject town or territory was the
most  basic  way  to  make  present  or  future  relations  possible.  In  this  context,  the
undeterred  use  of  the  language  of  governance  had its  own logic.  It  laid  the  rhetoric
groundwork for domination,  and—to connect these remarks with those I  made in the
previous section—it also gave an important contribution to the symbolic/representational
side of the Registri delle Missive.112
The fact that the delivery of an order was considered at least as important as (if
not  more  important  than)  its  observance  is  further  suggested  by  the  very  different
treatment that Francesco II reserved to the  Commissario delle Tasse  of Novara and the
Pretore  of  Bassignana  in  the  examples  discussed  above.  On  the  one  hand,  the
Commissario delle Tasse, who appears to have duly published a proclamation, was treated
112 The notion that the written word had a very concrete creative potential in pre-modern Europe is widely
accepted  in  historiography.  For  Italy,  see  Gamberini,  Genet,  and  Zorzi  2011,  Francesconi  2011,
Lazzarini 2011. For other areas of Europe, see Watts 2009, 376-425;  Britnell 2007.
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with indulgence, even though the proclamation was ignored by the population of Novara.
On the other hand, the Pretore of Bassignana was severely scolded because he refused to
publish  proclamations.  However,  another  and  more  compelling  element  signals  the
utmost importance of the act of delivering ducal letters.
3. The difference between 'accepting' and 'obeying' or 'executing' a ducal letter
A number of entries of the Registri delle Missive make a peculiar distinction with regard
to the reception of the letters they sent. Apparently, they could tolerate subjects ignoring
their orders; by contrast, they did not tolerate subjects rejecting the letters containing the
orders  themselves—even  less  so  if  subjects  gave  clear  signs  of  confrontation  at  the
moment  of  the  message's  refusal.  The  chancery  had  a  vocabulary  to  define  such
distinction: letters first and foremost had to be 'accepted' (acceptare), and then, possibly
—but not necessarily—'obeyed' (obedire) or 'executed' (exequire). 
As it is evident, the distinction between accepting and obeying or executing an
order  does  not  make  sense  in  contemporary  political-administrative  culture:  today,
directives  from the  authorities  are  either  executed  or  not  executed;  'accepting'  them
avoiding execution does not constitute an admissible choice: it equals non-execution (for
example  in  the  case  of  the  payment  of  a  bill  or  a  fine.)  Therefore,  I  think  that  the
distinction between accepting and obeying/executing ducal letters strongly reinforces the
argument that the spread of wordpower in itself was a statement of authority, a practice
meaningful in itself. Let us display and discuss some significant documentary evidence
with three examples involving the villages of Bascapè (25 kilometres to the South-East of
Milan), Casalbeltrame (15 kilometres to the West of Novara) and Rosate (25 kilometres to
the South-West of Milan) (fig. 4.3, p. 140).
In the first case, on 29 December 1523, Francesco II wrote to two important men-
at-arms of his, Sforzino Sforza (his cousin) and Paolo Lonato (a prominent Sforza officer,
later appointed as castellan of Cremona) who were fighting the French, then still raiding
the Duchy:
the day before yesterday, our  Magnifico Supremo Cancellario wrote on our behalf,
that you should have not molested the village of Bascapé, because it is so close to
Melegnano,  where  our  enemies  [the  French]  find  themselves,  that,  if  they  [the
inhabitants of Bascapé] paid their contribution [to the Sforza party],  [the French]
could attack them sacking or burning the village (…). Now, we understand that you
not only did disobey the said letter, but have kept the messengers that brought it to
you.  This has caused us a great  sorrow; therefore,  we order that  as soon as you
receive the present letter, you release the two messengers (…) and that you won't let
anyone molest the said village of Bascapè (…).113 
113 ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  221,  l.  71-72,  1523  December  29   [emphasis  added]:  for  the  full
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transcription of this document, see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 4.
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Fig. 4.3: Map of the Duchy of Milan with the town of Novara and
the villages of Casalbeltrame, Rosate, and Bascapè
There are two elements worth highlighting here. Firstly, in writing that his men-at-
arms 'not only'  disobeyed the orders, but also kept the messengers who brought them,
Francesco II is suggesting that the dismissal of the first letter was an affront as much as
the  simple  disobedience  to  orders.  Secondly,  the  men-at-arms  kept  Francesco's
messengers as a sign of provocation, which implies that they considered the sending of
messengers as an act of authority that they could effectively counter.
One may object that the episode of Bascapé took place in a war zone,  and is
therefore to be considered exceptional. The second case, however, happened in times of
peace, and nevertheless shows similar dynamics. On 2 August 1525, the chancery wrote
to  the  vice-Referendario  of  Novara,  who  was  having  a  dispute  with  the  village  of
Casalbeltrame:
The  agents  of  the  community  of  Casalbeltrame  referred  to  us  that,  after  they
presented  to  you  a  letter  of  our  Magnifico Gran Cancellero,  you  have  not  only
refused to execute the said letter, but you have jailed the one who brought the letter
to you; this is so daring of you, that we are very much surprised (…).114 
 We do not know the object of the dispute, but it is possible to imagine that the
agents  of  Casalbeltrame  went  to  the  Sforza  court  to  complain  about  the  vexations
(probably  of  financial  nature)  of  the  vice-Referendario, and  obtained  a  favourable
response from Girolamo Morone. Morone personally wrote a  letter  in defence of the
community of Casalbeltrame, and Casalbeltrame then forwarded the message to the vice-
Referendario, who  clearly  signalled  his  disagreement  by  jailing  the  messenger.  The
reaction of the Sforza leadership is revealing: the chancery scolded the officer without
even mentioning the circumstances that antagonised him to Casalbeltrame. Rather, the
infraction consisted in having dismissed Morone's letter overtly: the problem was not the
dismissal per se, but the dismissal being blatant. In this case, when the letter says that the
vice-Referendario  'not  only'  refused  to  obey  Morone's  order,  but  dared  to  jail  the
messenger, it seems to indicate that the non-execution of the order could have been a
viable option,  as long as the order was received quietly.  By contrast,  challenging the
authority of the Sforza leadership to deliver messages successfully required an immediate
reaction.
Finally,  the  third  case  is  the  most  significant,  because  it  clearly  connects  the
delivery of letters with a statement of authority. The letter in question was not transcribed
in  the  Registri  delle  Missive,  but  in  a  register  later  labelled  as  'Miscellaneous'  and
114 ASMi,  Registri  delle  Missive,  221  ll.  248-249,  1525  August  2:  ‘Li  agenti  per  la  comunita  de
Casalebeltramo ni hano exposto che havendovi presentato lettere dil Magnifico nostro Gran Cancellero
non solo non haveti voluto exequire dicte lettere, ma haveti facto incarcerare quello che vi presentoe
dicte lettere, cosa qual ni ha dato grande admiratione che da voi sii tanto ardito (…).’ [emphasis added]
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belonging to the years of Francesco II's exile. On 29 September 1527, the chancery wrote
to  the  canons and the Chapter  of  the church of  Santo Stefano in Rosate  to  urge the
appointment of one Giovanni Antonio Rozzoni as provost. The appointment had already
been agreed, but did not take place, because
being that land of ours in the power of the French, you not only refused to make such
election, but also to accept our letter, for the fear of them enemies; but you promised
that you would not have missed the chance to satisfy our will, once that the said land
would have returned under our control (…) now that we understand, with not small
sorrow, that you have made another election; we thought it was right to exhort you to
revoke it with this present letter of ours (…).115
Giovanni Antonio Rozzoni was the nephew of Bartolomeo Rozzoni, the head of
the political chancery; it is for this reason that the Sforza leadership requested Giovanni
Antonio's election so decisively.116 Yet the canons and the Chapter of Rosate 'not only'
avoided to to make the election, but also refused to accept the letter from Francesco II.
Indeed,  the French controlled Rosate,  and the clerics were apparently sure that being
found in possession of fresh Sforza letters could have been dangerous. Therefore, the sole
fact  of  receiving  and  keeping  paperwork  from  a  given  authority  was  seen  as  a
compromising sign of allegiance. If we see this fact from the opposite perspective, that of
the  authority—Francesco II—we can investigate  the manifest  connection  between the
simple act of delivering of letters and the creation of a space of jurisdiction. 
To conclude, it is important to mention that the distinction between accepting and
obeying/executing  letters  coming from the  authorities  was in  force  also  elsewhere  in
Europe. Arndt Brendecke has shown that in late medieval and early modern Spain the
simple reception of an order was defined with the verb obedezer (literally 'to obey,' in this
context 'to acknowledge'), whereas its actual execution was defined with the verb cumplir
('fulfilling'). Officially, the distinction existed because peripheral officers of the Spanish
king should have been able to only acknowledging orders, before actually fulfilling them
once (and if) they had verified that the orders were compatible with local legislation. In
practice, however, the same peripheral officers took advantage of the distinction between
obedezer  and  cumplir  to  enact  forms  of  resistance  to  the  central  authorities  without
risking  open  confrontation.117 The  case  of  early-sixteenth-century  Milan  is  absolutely
analogous. Through the distinction between accepting and obeying/executing letters, the
duke and his chancery created a convenient middle-ground that allowed them to impose a
115 ASMi,  Registri Ducali, 141, l. 18, 1527 September 28 [emphasis added]: for the full transcription of
this document, see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 5.
116 Federico Del Tredici has pointed out how the parish of Rosate traditionally hosted some strongly pro-
Sforza canons, together with other centres (Gorgonzola, Decimo, Segrate.) Del Tredici, 2012, 56.
117 Brendecke 2012, 118-121.
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minimum (though fundamental) degree of jurisdiction by simply delivering letters around
the Duchy. This is ultimately why the spread of wordpower, before being a functional
instrument enabling negotiation and coercion, was a practice of authority with its own
significance.  more  generally,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  a  strand  of  studies  on  late
medieval and early modern Venice has focused on the weakness of the central authorities'
control over the peripheries of the Terraferma.118
4. The cost of wordpower: a Sforza balance sheet of 1525
A further and final proof that the distribution of documents around the Sforza dominion
was an important practice is the great economic investment Francesco II made on the
documents'  production  and  delivery.  Indeed,  even  though—as  we  have  seen  in  the
previous sections—the epistolary contacts with the peripheries were often much more
symbolic than politically and administratively efficient, Francesco did not hesitate to fund
them abundantly.  If  we take  into  account  his  permanent  financial  precariousness,  we
realise how essential  he considered the act of 'flooding'  the Duchy of Milan with his
written word.
The figures relating to Francesco II's investment in wordpower are to be found in
a balance sheet entitled 'Summary of all the expense for the ducal dominion of Milan,'
transcribed in register n. 26 of the Registri Ducali; the last line of the document, stating
the total cost of governing the Duchy of Milan—312,509 lire, henceforward l—makes it
clear that the expense is that for ‘the whole year 1525.’119 It is not clear whether the
figures represent a budget plan for the upcoming year or the final balance for the ending
year—the  first  option  is  more  plausible,  because  Francesco  finished  the  year  1525
besieged in the castle of Porta Giovia—but this  is  irrelevant to  my analysis.  What is
important is that the balance sheet shows which expenses were wordpower-related, their
relative  weight  in  the  construction  of  wordpower  as  a  whole,  and—even  more
interestingly—the total financial weight of wordpower in the context of all the expenses
Francesco made to govern. As in the case of chancery size, the figures inevitably have a
degree of approximation,  but this  does not  change the big picture emerging from the
balance sheet.
There  are  three  entries  in  the  balance  sheet  that  are  undoubtedly wordpower-
related:  in  order  of  appearance,  ‘the  mounted  messengers,  considering  ordinary  and
118 Povolo 1981, Id. 1997, Grubb 1988, Viggiano 1993.
119 ASMi, Registri Ducali, 26, l. 123: ‘Summario de tutta la spesa del ducal dominio di Milano,’ ‘Monta la
spesa per tutto l'anno 1525 312,509l.’
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extraordinary expenses for the whole year;’ ‘the stationers, for the supply of paper and
other commodities for the offices;’ and the entry for ‘the ducal secret chancery and [the
chancery] of the income,’ which refers to the salaries of chancery members.120 There are
other entries that certainly hide a quota relatable to wordpower (for example, the total
expenses  for  single  magistracies  sometimes  explicitly  include  those  for  their
chanceries;)121 and, in turn, the amount paid to stationers certainly includes the expenses
for paper that was not used for wordpower, in the sense that not all paper travelled (in the
form of letters or other paperwork) around the Duchy of Milan. Yet, isolating these entries
allows  us  to  realise  the  three  main  items  of  expenditure  entailed  in  the  making  and
delivery of documents: the materials the document was made of and those used to write it
(paper/parchment, ink, quills, and so forth;) those who wrote the documents, i.e. chancery
members and their salaries; and those who took the documents to destination, i.e.  the
mounted messengers. Hence, any time the Sforza leadership wished to make its presence
tangible through paperwork, it had to take a three-fold financial effort into account.
How onerous was this financial effort? The numbers associated with the entries
provide a reliable order of magnitude: in 1525, the ducal  Camera  paid (or expected to
pay)  3,000l to  stationers  for  writing  materials;  9,026l for  the  salaries  of  secret-  and
financial-chancery members; and 32,000l for the ordinary and extraordinary messenger
service. This last figure is certainly the most impressive: it  shows that the delivery of
letters to the peripheries of the Duchy was the principal financial burden of wordpower. It
cost more than ten times the materials of letters and letter-writing; and even considering
that not all the paperwork carried by the mounted messengers originated in the secret and
financial chancery, it nonetheless cost more than three times the salaries of the writers
working in the most important centre of documentary production under Sforza control.  
However, these figures become truly revealing only when compared with the rest
of  the  voices  of  expenditure  listed  in  the  balance  sheet.  The  32,000l investment  in
mounted messengers was the second largest item of expenditure  overall. It was second
only to the money spent for the Italian pensioners (Pensionarii Italiani, 34,365l)—various
figures who received a sum of money from the Sforza Camera in exchange for political
support, or at least for non-hostility. Still, delivering Sforza documents cost more than all
the Senators (22,800l), more than all the German pensioners (24,875l), and more than all
the salaried officers of Pavia, including the lecturers of its renowned university (29,456l),
120 Ivi:  ‘officiali  de  li  cavalarii  computato  ordinario  et  extraordinario  de  tuto  l'anno;’ ‘cartarii  per  el
fornimento del palpere et altre cose per li offitii;’ ‘cancellarie ducale secreta et de le intrate.’
121 Ivi, for example: ‘the Magistrati Ordinari with the clerks (…) working for them.’ [my translation]
144
of Cremona (the second most important important city of the Duchy , 24,013l), and even
of Milan (the capital, 26,518l). In this perspective, it is clear that Francesco II regarded
the circulation of the ducal written word as a fundamental endeavour. Furthermore, also
the expenses for the salaries of chancery members and writing materials are significant.
The chancery,  with its cost of 9,026l,  ranked as the third most expensive institutional
body out of sixteen listed, far behind the Senate (22,800l) but comparable to the Maestri
delle Entrate Ordinarie (11,200l). And the money paid to stationers, 3,000l, equalled the
expenditure  for  the  maintenance  of  an  important  office  like  the  treasury  (3,234l).
Generally  speaking,  the  three  wordpower-related  items  of  expenditure  combined
accounted for 44,025l, and represented one-seventh of the total balance of the year. This
means that for every seven lire the duke spent with the aim of ruling the Duchy, one was
used for making and circulating documents.
Figures like these would already be very interesting if we were dealing with a rich
Renaissance prince ruling a peaceful dominion; they would highlight the great importance
that the said prince placed on well-working political communication with his subjects.
But in the case of Francesco II, the context makes the figures even more outstanding. We
have a severely cash-strapped duke, struggling to rule a war-torn dominion, who spent
one-seventh of his very limited (and therefore very precious) substances in making and
delivering documents which carried implausible  narratives of power (the 'language of
governance,') and orders that (as seen in the previous section) the duke did not necessarily
expect  to  be executed,  and only hoped that  they would be accepted without  signs of
confrontation.  This  choice  would  be  puzzling  if  we  did  not  assume  that  the  act  of
spreading  wordpower  was  a  very  important  political  practice,  independently  of  its
concrete administrative results.
To recap and conclude this chapter, it is appropriate to go back to the two questions posed
at its beginning: what was the role of the chancery when it acted as an instrument of
Francesco II and the Sforza authorities? What was the goal of the letters the chancery
sent? The questions, at first glance, looked trivial. However, in the attempt of considering
the  work  of  the  chancery  as  a  practice  meaningful  in  itself—instead  of  as  a  neutral
political-administrative only—I was able  to identify four elements  suggesting that  the
making  and  deployment  of  ducal  documents,  far  from  being  a  merely  functional
endeavour, had a crucial symbolic (or representational) side.
Firstly,  by adopting a  comprehensive approach of the  Registri  delle  Missive,  I
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have argued that their compilation and constant updating were dictated not only by the
pragmatic need of tracking the correspondence with various subjects around the Duchy of
Milan, but also by the will to objectify the idea that the Sforza had a deeply-rooted claim
on the control of certain territories. In this sense, the Registri delle Missive are much more
than  the  sum of  their  single  entries:  they  are,  in  themselves,  monuments  to  Sforza
authority. 
Secondly, I have observed that the language of governance relentlessly reproduced
in  the  registers—and  therefore  relentlessly  deployed  'on  the  ground'  in  the
correspondence  with  the  Duchy's  peripheries—was  not  always  primarily  aimed  at
recounting the reality of current affairs, but rather at projecting the image of Francesco
II's authority. This happened in all cases, even when (as I have shown) hiding Francesco's
powerlessness  was  practically  impossible.  For  this  reason,  I  have  asserted  that  the
delivery of documents was a largely symbolic activity, a minimum statement of authority
consisting in the very act of physically reaching a distant subject with a material object
(the letter) carrying a solemn language.
Thirdly, I have corroborated this last assertion drawing attention to the distinction
that Francesco II and his chancery made between 'accepting' and 'obeying' or 'executing'
their letters. If in the Duchy of Milan (as elsewhere in Europe) the mere acceptance of a
letter was considered a meaningful sign of allegiance to the authority, then it becomes
clear that—seen from the opposite perspective—the delivery of letters was regarded as an
important act of power. This is so true that Francesco seems to have often tolerated de-
facto disobedience, whereas he reacted more firmly when subjects refused to receive his
letters.
Finally, in order to link facts to figures, I have used a Sforza balance sheet to
demonstrate that despite the functional inefficiency of the correspondence with subjects
in his dominion, Francesco II was nonetheless willing to invest much of his very limited
financial resources in the making and circulating of documents. This is a last, substantial




At the beginning of my thesis, I hypothesised that the analysis of the processes happening
around chancery documents  could deliver  valuable historical  insights.  By asking who
partook in the endeavour of document-making and how, and if and how the very meaning
of documents is transformed once we are aware of the background of their production and
use—so the hypothesis went—we might achieve a much more nuanced and participatory
perspective on Renaissance political and institutional history. I have used the notion of
'practice' (defined at p. 15, and again at p. 94) as a key to explore this hypothesis, in the
attempt to go beyond classic studies focusing solely on chancery structures. 
In  Chapter  3,  I  have  investigated  how social,  political,  and  cultural  practices
undertaken in the chancery affected its functioning. The results of my inquiry highlight
two  major  points.  Firstly,  the  assessment  of  cultural  practices  demonstrates  that  the
chancery  not  only  was  a  centre  of  documentary  production,  but  also  acted  as  an
autonomous community in the city of Milan, and as a centre of scholarship with a strong
literary output. We should take this variety of functions into due consideration if we aim
at thinking the chancery in cultural-historical terms. Secondly—and more importantly for
the purposes of this dissertation—the assessment of social and political practices reveals
the great extent to which the self-styled 'secret' chancery was in fact systematically open
to continuous interaction with a wide range of outsiders. Various figures (counsellors and
camerieri) worked in direct and informal contact with chancery members and had nearly-
unlimited physical access to chancery premises; furthermore, more casual strangers seem
to have had surprisingly good chances of partaking in chancery activities too. 
In Chapter 4, as we have just seen, I have re-framed as an endeavour that was not
merely  logistical  and  functional,  but  had  its  own significance,  the  act  of  keeping  in
regular  contact  with the peripheries  of the Duchy of  Milan.  My argument is  that  the
delivery of chancery documents not only served strictly administrative purposes, but also
was in itself a crucially important practice of authority that allowed sovereigns to make
their  power visible:  either  in  the archive  (where  a  duke like Francesco II  could take
advantage of, and augment, the sheer number of registers objectifying the Sforza's rule
over their dominions) or in the territory of the Duchy (where having a letter 'accepted' by
subjects meant establishing a minimum degree of jurisdiction.)
Therefore, the focus on chancery practices sheds light on two essential aspects of
wordpower that cannot emerge from an analysis centred on chancery structures and rules.
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The first aspect is that wordpower, despite being officially an asset exclusively owned by
the duke and his inner circle, could, in fact, become a very shared and collective resource.
Indeed, as we have seen, the chancery did not separate insiders from outsiders, but rather
integrated them. As a result, a very wide variety of relations of power could bring to the
making of a chancery document:  not only top-down, but also bottom-up. The second
aspect is that wordpower, in addition to its most obvious political-administrative function,
had  great  symbolic  and  representational significance.  Chancery  documents  not  only
served as means through which the Sforza leadership managed political-administrative
affairs, but also as the material embodiment of authority. The act of writing a letter was
often more important than the letter's contents.
The collective and representational character of wordpower as it emerges from the
study of chancery practices definitively undermines the notion of Renaissance chancery
as  a  bureaucratic  institution—an  office  marked  by  a  clear  hierarchy  of  authority,
adherence to fixed rules and procedures, and rigorous separation between insiders and
outsiders—that I already started to put into question in Part I. The findings so far add up
to a richer picture: firstly, the chancery not only was a centre of documentary production,
but also acted as a fellowship (consortium) and as an academy (academia); secondly, the
chancery not only provided a documentary output, but was also a dynamic hub managing
sensitive information and operating at the core of political communication; thirdly, the
chancery was not an isolated, monastic-like scriptorium, but a systematically open place
of social encounter; finally, the chancery, even when it actually acted as an instrument of
authority, did so pursuing aims that were often more symbolic than pragmatic. Thus, the
documentary  interface  between  the  authorities  and  their  subjects  was  marked  by
distinctively non-bureaucratic traits, that included elements of social relations and cultural
symbolism. 
What is crucial to highlight, to conclude this second part of the thesis, is that from
a  different   conception  of  Renaissance  written political  culture  necessarily  derives  a
different conception of  political culture  tout-court: a different conception of authority.
While the focus on chancery structures, rules and representations propounds the classic
image  of  a  strictly  top-down,  coercive  authority  exerted  by the  sovereign  on  mostly
passive  subjects,  the  focus  on  chancery  practices  tells  a  different  story,  one  where
authority is  seldom imposed from above,  and is  often  constructed  through exchange,
negotiation,  compromise.  The  challenge  of  the  third  part  of  the  thesis  will  be  to
demonstrate that a material analysis of chancery documents is able to corroborate this
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interactive idea of authority.
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Part III – Chancery Products
Chancery products representing the documentary interaction between the authorities and
their  subjects  (or  other  authorities)  can  be  divided in  two broad categories.  The first
category  is  composed  by  letters  close  (or  letters  missive,)  which  were  used  in
correspondence  and  could  foresee  a  communication  exchange—the  recipient  could
respond to the letter. The second category is composed by the seigneurial documents par
excellence, letters patent, whose issue established juridical acts (donations, concessions,
appointments to offices, safe-conducts, and so forth) and envisaged no reply.
At first sight, there seems to be an evident mismatch between the fluidity of the
processes of creation of letters close and letters patent one side, and the formal fixity of
letters  close  and  letters  patents  as  finished  products  on  the  other.  On  the  one  hand,
processes of document-making were extremely receptive to political and social tensions.
As  highlighted  in  Chapter  3  (pp.  117-118),  the  expeditioni  were  often  extemporary,
fragmented  (in  the  sense  that  they  came  from  different  and  mutually  independent
branches of the Sforza chancery) and spatial (in the sense that they were highly dependent
on where chancery members found themselves, and on who was with them.) On the other
hand, as we have already begun to see in Chapter 4 (pp. 132-139), official documents all
relentlessly purport the sovereign—in our case Francesco II—as the documents' sole and
undisputed author. This is so true that the standard diplomatic definitions of letter missive
(p. 47, n. 67) and letter patent (p. 16) both insist on the individuality of the author, seen as
an unmistakably well-defined entity.
But  are  chancery  products  actually  so  impermeable  to  the  socio-political
complexities of their making process? Did the diverse and informal chancery practices
discussed so far leave material trace in the documents? Or, to set an even more ambitious
aim:  can  a  material  analysis  of  chancery  documents  enhance  our  understanding  of
chancery practices? 
As  anticipated  in  the  general  introduction,  the  discipline  that  we  have  at  our
disposal to study documents from a strictly formal point view—diplomatics—is unfit to
answer these questions.  Indeed,  diplomatics  minutely analyses  all  the formal  ways in
which  authority  is  represented  on  documents,  but  does  not  question  whether  the
representation of authority matches the reality of its  construction.  Diplomatics studies
documents in a political and social vacuum: its main objective is establishing if they are
formally correct and authentic. 
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My objective is exactly the opposite: I wish to study the materiality of documents
as a means to reveal (and not to discard) the socio-political complexities of the processes
of document-making, thus unveiling new layers of meaning conveyed by the documents
themselves.  I  have  defined  this  approach  as  'new'  diplomatics,  because  it  is  less
descriptive and more interpretive than 'classic' diplomatics, and combines many concepts
and the vocabulary of classic diplomatics with other fields of study. On the one hand, I
will engage with the insights coming from the material analysis of textual objects other
than chancery documents. on the other, I will engage with the key-concepts of material
culture insofar as I will use objects as evidence for my arguments.
Firstly, the insights coming from the material analysis of textual objects other than
chancery documents  are  crucial  to  realise that  textual  authorship is  often much more
complex and plural than the texts' strict contents would suggest. Indeed, in the last few
years,  scholars  have  come to  detect  forms  of  collaborative  and  'social'  authorship  in
almost every kind of text—such as literary ones, public proclamations, private letters.1
Why have  not  chancery  documents  undergone  an  equally  thorough  critique  of  their
authorship in the light of material analyses? It is as if, with a presentist bias, scholars
considered chancery documents as 'too official,' 'too authoritative' to be compared with
the rest of medieval and early modern texts and their fluidity. Historians sometimes do
acknowledge that the sovereign behind the documents is often a persona ficta, a fictitious,
plural person hiding an entire apparatus.2 However, this important acknowledgement is
just declared, but not supported by adequate reflection. Indeed, the sovereign-as-persona-
ficta  would be unproblematic only so long as his apparatus showed a clear distinction
between  insiders  and  outsiders,  regulated  norms  of  access,  and  stable  procedures  of
decision making. But when these conditions are absent—and, as we have seen, they were
for the Sforza governance in general, and for the period of Francesco II in particular—the
interpretation of the  persona ficta becomes much more complex. I will address exactly
this problem: through a material analysis of chancery documents, I analyse the extent to
which the sovereign's  persona ficta  could be owned and manoeuvred by third parties,
independently from the real person to which it theoretically corresponded.
Secondly, and more generally, my engagement with material culture rests on the
conviction  that  the  form  of  documents-as-objects  really  matters.  While  classic
diplomatics has the aim of focusing on formal analogies between documents in order to
assign them to clear-cut typologies, new diplomatics has a different approach: it focuses
1 See bibliographic references at n. 24, p. 23.
2 The expression persona ficta is used in Covini 2008, 21. See also Gamberini 2005a, 46-47.
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on differences—on the unique forms displayed by documents, and on the meaning that
such forms encapsulate.3 As Ulinka Rublack puts it in a recent article entitled Matter in
the Material Renaissance, ‘the Renaissance (...) was a made world and a world in the
making,’ where ‘[m]any items could not be bought ready-made.’ As a consequence, ad-
hoc  choices  and  customisations  are  not  to  be  dismissed  as  exceptions,  but  had  a
distinctive significance, and  modern scholars need to attempt to regain it.4 What is true of
objects of consumption was also true of documentary objects, letters close and patents,
issued  by  the  highest  authority  in  a  state  for  communicating  with  subjects  and
correspondents.
In light of all the above, I will divide my material analysis of documents in two
chapters, one dedicated to letters close (Chapter 5) and one to letters patent (Chapter 6).
In the chapter on letters close, given the necessity to study the original products made and
dispatched by the chancery of Francesco II, I will temporarily abandon the archives of
Milan and move to the State Archives of Mantua and Trent, where two very substantial
series of Sforza letters are preserved. These letters invariably offer one basic narrative:
Francesco, in person, addressed some members of the Gonzaga family (the ruling dynasty
of  Mantua)  and the  prince-bishop of  Trent  Bernardo Cles.  However,  what  stands  out
about the two archival series is the great formal variety of the documents they contain. Is
it possible to find a solid connection between the physical aspect of the letters and their
contents, or the situation that originated them? Did the letters all have the same value and
meaning in the eyes of their senders and their recipients, independently from their form?
Most importantly, though, formal variety clearly signals that the making of documents
followed  a  multi-staged  process,  nearly  always  collaborative.  How  deeply  did  such
process affect the authorship of the letters?
In the chapter  on letters  patent,  I  will  come back to  the Milanese archives to
analyse  the  charters  preserved  in  two  collections:  one  at  the  State  Archives,  named
Diplomi  e  Dispacci  Sovrani  ('Sovereign  Diplomas  and  Dispatches') and  one  at  the
Archivio Storico Civico  (Municipal Historical Archives), named  Cimeli  ('Memorabilia').
The special modes of preservation these documents underwent suggest that past historians
and archivists regarded letters patent as precious emblems of sovereign authority. And
indeed, this is exactly the image that these charters convey as finished products with their
outstanding  size,  fine  writing  materials,  huge  seals,  and  decorations.  But  should  we
3 In parallel, for example, with Bernard Cerquiglini's new philology, which concentrates on variants rather
then the 'Ur-text.' See Cerquiglini 1999.
4 Rublack 2013, 45-46.
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accept this image uncritically? If we had the chance to study the assembly process of
letters patent in detail, would their narrative of unchallenged ducal authority hold? Would
letters patent resemble more an imposing monument, or a complex socio-political jigsaw?
In concluding this part of the thesis, I will ask whether the material analysis of
chancery documents  substantiates  the  nuanced and participatory notion  of  authority I
have been developing through the analysis of how chanceries functioned. Furthermore, I
will also ask whether the very idea of what chancery documents are and do changes once
we are aware of the elasticity of their authorship and the meaning of their forms. 
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Chapter 5 – Letters Close
1. Sources and background: Francesco II, the Gonzaga and Bernardo Cles
The largest collection of letters close produced by the chancery of Francesco II—426
letters in total —comes from the Gonzaga Archive (Archivio Gonzaga),  housed at the
State Archives of Mantua.5 The archive holds a series called 'Foreign Correspondence'
(Corrispondenza Estera) with documentation coming from the Duchy of Milan (Milano),
which  in  turn has  a  sub-series  called  'Letters  of  the  Lords  of  Milan  to  the Gonzaga'
(Lettere dei Signori di Milano ai Gonzaga). Those of Francesco are preserved in three
folders  (nn.  1616-1618)  and  cover  the  years  1514-1535.6 The  current  order  of  the
Archivio Gonzaga does not correspond to the original one, but results from an arbitrary
thematic rearrangement of the documentation that took place during the second half of the
eighteenth century.7 
The correspondence between the Sforza and the Gonzaga is abundant for at least
three reasons. The first is administrative: the Duchy of Milan and the marquisate (then
Duchy) of Mantua bordered along the Oglio river in today's south-eastern Lombardy, and
cooperated intensely to keep order in the area—which generated a continuous exchange
of information. The second reason is political: during the Italian Wars, Milan and Mantua
were often allied on the imperial side, and the fortunes of the Gonzaga were strongly
bound to their relationship with the Habsburg, just like those of Francesco II.8 Finally, the
Sforza and the Gonzaga were related. Marchioness Isabella d'Este-Gonzaga (1474–1539),
one of the most famous women of the Italian Renaissance, was Francesco's aunt (the
sister of his mother Beatrice) and this represented a strong connection between the two
families.9 Such connection was embodied by Giorgio Andreasi (1467–1549), a prominent
and skilled Mantuan courtier whom Isabella placed at the side of Francesco as early as
1513, and quickly became one of the most trusted men of the Sforza party. Past and recent
scholarship does not specify the capacity in which Andreasi assisted Francesco until the
5 Divided per year: 2 (1514), 1 (1515), 1 (1516), 2 (1517), 1 (1518), 10 (1519), 9 (1520), 6 (1521), 67
(1522),  91 (1523),  18 (1524),  27 (1525),  3 (1526),  37 (1527),  35 (1528),  17 (1529),  19 (1530),  23
(1531), 17 (1532), 13 (1533), 17 (1534), 10 (1535).
6 ASMn,  Archivio Gonzaga,  Dipartimento  di  Affari  Esteri,  Milano,  Lettere  dei  Signori  di  Milano ai
Gonzaga, 1616-1618 (henceforward ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano).
7 GGAS, vol. 2, 767-768.
8 One of Matteo Bandello's novellas focuses on the vicissitudes of pro-Sforza exiles in Mantua between
1515 and 1521, defining the city as their ‘most trustworthy harbour and safe shelter.’ Bandello 1992,
novella XXVIIII (citation at p. 280). 
9 On Isabella d'Este, see Cockram 2013, Bonoldi 2015, Furlotti and Rebecchini 2008. The IDEA (Isabella
D'Este Archive) Project, coordinated by Dr Deanna Shemek of the University of California Santa Cruz,
is currently digitising a sheer number of Isabella's letters. URL: http://isabelladeste.ucsc.edu/.
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recapturing of the Duchy of Milan, but a letter of 1514 reveals that Andreasi was his
secretary; then, after 1522, Andreasi served as Senator and as Sforza broker at the Papal
court in Rome (1530–1535).10
The second corpus of letters analysed in this chapter was addressed to Bernardo
Cles (1485–1539), prince-bishop of Trent and Cardinal from 1530. Today, these letters are
to  be  found at  the  State  Archives of  Trent  in  the  archive  known as  Corrispondenza
Clesiana—which represents what remains of Cles's huge epistolary—in file n. 10 of a
folder  named  'Letters  from Sovereigns  and  Princes'  (Lettere  di  Sovrani  e  Principi).11
Despite  being  much  smaller  than  the  collection  of  letters  preserved  in  the  Archivio
Gonzaga—42 letters  written  in  the  course  of  17  years,  between 1518 and 1535—the
correspondence in Trent constitutes one of the most relevant testimonies of the events
involving  Francesco  II  throughout  his  life.  In  order  to  understand  the  reason  of  its
importance,  it  is  necessary to provide a short  profile of Cles,  and to explain why he
became a key-figure for Francesco.
Bernardo  Cles  was  one  of  the  most  important  personalities  in  European  high
politics between his accession as bishop of Trent (1514) and his death in 1539. During
these twenty-five years, Cles became a pivotal character in the court of the Habsburg,
acting as Supreme Chancellor to Archduke of Austria Ferdinand I from 1528. As scholars
now agree, he was a successful politician and prelate, as well as a learned humanist and
patron of the arts.12  
The special  relationship between Cles and Francesco II dates back to the very
beginning of the 1500s, when a portion of the Sforza party sought refuge in imperial
Tyrol after the fall of duke Ludovico. Massimiliano Sforza—then the designated duke—
was directed to Innsbruck to join Emperor Maximilian of Habsburg, whereas Cles was
10 ASMn,  Lettere  dei  Signori  di  Milano,  1616,  Milan,  1514  June  22:  ‘Having  commissioned  to  the
Reverend Sir Giorgio Andreasio, my secretary (...)’ (‘Havendo io commisso al Reverendo Monsignor
Giorgio Andreasio, mio secretario (...)’). For a biography of Andreasi, see Raponi 1961. For Andreasi's
activity as ambassador in Rome, see Oldini 1989.
11 The overall consistency of the Corrispondenza is estimated to more than 4.000 letters, divided in two
series (I-II) and 20  mazzi (folders: series I has 15 folders, series II has 5 folders), each folder further
divided in files. The majority of the folders pertains to the administrative and political career of Cles: for
example, folder 1 gathers the letters from emperor Maximilian I and some imperial military captains;
folders 2 and 3 gather the letters from Ferdinand I of Habsburg; folder 4 pertains to the ecclesiastical
side of Cles's contacts, with letters from popes, cardinals and prelates; folder 5 preserves the letters from
sovereigns and princes, and so forth. The last three folders of series I (nn. 11, 12 and 13) gather the
letters from privati (private people) and list some 150 senders. The division of the Corrispondenza in
recipients does not correspond to its original order, but was arranged between 1831 and 1860, when the
documentation was preserved in Innsbruck: I owe this information to Dr Katia Occhi of the Istituto
Storico  Italo-germanico  of  Trent,  whom  I  wish  to  thank.  For  the  complete  inventory,  see
http://151.12.58.234/asTrent/indici/pdf/INDICE_N_75.pdf (last accessed date 4 June 2015). The letters
of Francesco II are to be found in ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10.
12 Prodi 1987. For a biography, see Rill 1982.
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given  custody  of  Francesco.  After  the  end  of  the  short-lived  reign  of  Massimiliano
(September  1515),  Francesco  soon  fixed  his  headquarters  in  Trent  again  (1516)  and
waited there until he recaptured the Duchy of Milan in April 1522. During these years,
Cles was the future duke's mentor, offering not only material and military backing, but
also educational guidance, and a political support that would continue well beyond the
exile.13 The aid received during this precarious period understandably originated the sense
of devotion Francesco felt for Cles, which is effectively condensed in a statement dated 4
July 1522. Here,  in a very confidential  letter,  Francesco—newly restored in his ducal
dignity—emphatically responded to  the  prince-bishop's  congratulations  on recapturing
the Duchy; he offered his services and wrote that Cles should have rather congratulated
himself, because ‘beyond being the bishop of Trent,’ he was also ‘the duke of Milan.’14 
In  the  next  thirteen  years,  between  1522  and  1535,  a  privileged  axis  would
continue to exist between Milan and Trent, which included mutual political aid, material
assistance in case of famines and shortage of basic necessities,15 the exchange of trusted
men and sensitive information,16 and a reciprocal influence in artistic patronage.17 This
connection  would  outlast  both  Francesco and  Cles,  and it  is  no  coincidence  that  the
latter's successor as prince-bishop, Cardinal Cristoforo Madruzzo, would later become
Governor of Milan under Charles V between 1556 and 1557.18
Francesco II's letters in the  Archivio Gonzaga have not undergone any historical
analysis,  even  though  scholars  have  generally  devoted  great  attention  to  the
correspondence between Milan and Mantua.19 This is probably due to the general lack of
interest for the figure of Francesco. Also, a good share of the correspondence between
Milan and Mantua relates to administrative affairs involving south-eastern Lombardy, not
a very alluring subject.  The situation is only slightly different for the correspondence
13 According to Rossana Sacchi, Cles could have been responsible for the duke's humanistic education.
Sacchi 2005, vol. 1, 26. 
14 ASTn,  Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, 1522 July 4: ‘quella se debe (…) ley congratularssi cum se
stessa per che ultra che vescovo di Trento le anche duca de Milano.’
15 See for example ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, XIV, Copybook n. 7, l. 13, 1532 February 2.
16 The cleric Giacomo Bannisio, canon of the Duomo of Trent, was Francesco's agent in Rome during the
1520s: Rill  1963; Nikolaus von Trauttmansdorf, a Tyrolean man of arms, was appointed castellan of
Trezzo  in  Lombardy  (ASTn,  Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  V,  10,  Monza,  1522  July  4).  Vice  versa,
Francesco II obtained from Cles the appointment of one Giovanni Grassi, member of the exiled Sforza
household, as  Capitano del Ponte  (a minor administrative office–ASTn,  Corrispondenza Clesiana, V,
10, Trent, 1518 March 7); Andrea Borgo and Paolo da Lodi, two former Sforza chancery clerks, were
co-opted  in  the  imperial  ranks  and  were  in  close  and  continuous  contact  with  Cles  (see  ASTn,
Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  VIII,  1-4;  on  Andrea  Borgo  see  Rill  1971).  As  for  the  exchange  of
information, the correspondence of the 1530s mainly consists of  avvisi  exchanged between Francesco
II's and Cles's chanceries.
17 Sacchi 2005, vol. 1, 159-161 (especially p. 159 n. 151), pp. 270-271. 
18 Becker, ‘Madruzzo, Cristoforo’ (2006).
19 Leverotti 1999–[2003].
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between Francesco and Bernardo Cles. In 1966, the letters attracted the attention of a
Trent-based expert of the Corrispondenza Clesiana, Renato Tisot, who devoted an article
to the epistolary exchange between Milan and Trent.20 This specific interest is easy to
explain: Tisot was working on a monograph on Cles based on the evidence offered by the
Corrispondenza,  and  Francesco  is  clearly  one  of  the  best  represented  figures  in  the
epistolary.21 Of the twenty-one files contained in the folder 'Letters of Sovereigns and
Princes,' the one with the forty-two letters coming from the duke is the most consistent.
Only  the  Gonzaga  bear  comparison  with  the  duke's  presence,  with  thirty-nine  letters
covering  a  similar  timespan,  1516-1533.22  As  anticipated,  Cles,  Francesco  and  the
Gonzaga  shared  their  strong  allegiance  to  the  Habsburg,  and  the  two  sets  of  letters
corroborate the existence of an alliance system.
2. Francesco II's correspondence in the Archivio Gonzaga and the Corrispondenza 
Clesiana: forms, contents, meanings
In analysing the correspondence between Francesco II and Bernardo Cles, Tisot judges
the  historical  value  of  the  documents  mainly  by  their  contents.  To  him,  the
correspondence  is  useful  only  insofar  as  it  provides  new details  to  the  événementiel
history  of  the  communicants.  My  approach  to  Francesco's  letters  is  different.  I  am
interested not only in the letters' contents, but in their formal material aspects, and—more
specifically—in  the  discordance  between  two elements.  On the  one  hand,  the  letters'
preservation  in  two series  called  'Letters  of  the  Lords  of  Milan  to  the  Gonzaga'  and
'Letters of Sovereigns and Princes' imply a very straightforward idea of their authorship.
According  to  the  archivists  that  ordered  them,  the  letters  signed  with  the  name  of
Francesco II  Sforza are  letters  of Francesco II  Sforza:  this  is  undoubtedly their  most
logical  and practical  arrangement.  On the  other  hand,  though,  the  form of  the  letters
within these series  varies greatly.  We find different  handwritings,  different signatures,
different incipits in addressing the same recipients, different kinds of mise-en-page, and
so forth.23 The  majority  of  the  letters  are  written  by secretaries,  and  only signed  by
Francesco. A handful are autographs and difficult to read, because of the handwriting and
20 Tisot 1966.
21 Id.1969.
22 ASTn,  Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  V,  11  (letters  from  the  marquises  Francesco  II  and  Federico  II
Gonzaga, and from the marchioness Isabella Gonzaga) and 15 (letters from Ludovico Gonzaga, Count
of Sabbioneta, a man of arms who also served Charles V.)
23 Beal 2008, 255:  ‘Mise-en-page  (the  French  expression  means  'putting-on-the-page')  is  the  physical
arrangement of the text–e.g. features such as indentation, columns, spaces between paragraphs, etc.–but
not the selection of words themselves.’
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the  grammatical  and  syntactic  errors.24 Indeed,  the  contrast  between  the  educated
secretarial calligraphies and Francesco's untidy handwriting is perhaps the most apparent
graphic feature of the correspondences, not only in Trent but also in Mantua. What does
this contrast tell us?
The evidence of the Archivio Gonzaga and of the Corrispondenza Clesiana offers
a great chance to analyse the rationale behind the form of Renaissance letters close, and
the complexities of their seemingly obvious authorship. The starting research question is:
what  kind of  considerations  do the  letters  allow when tested  on  material  and formal
features, their combination and evolution over time? We can count on two sufficiently
serial correspondences: the one with Mantua is the most substantial quantitatively; the
one with Trent mirrors the very multifaceted relationship between Francesco II and Cles
—protege and protector, disciple and educator, but also duke and prince-bishop and ally
to ally—and is therefore outstanding qualitatively. In addition, it is possible to compare
and  contrast  them:  as  we  shall  soon see,  cross-checking  data  from the  two  archives
provides many revealing insights.
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the meaningful forms of letters
close as they emerge from the Archivio Gonzaga and the Corrispondenza Clesiana. How
many formal typologies of letters close are to be found in the two archives, and how
codified were they? What was the relationship between the form and the content of the
letters?  What  does  the  graphic  form of  the  letters  tell  us  about  the  sharing  and  re-
appropriation of Francesco II's authorship? To what extent could the shared version of
Francesco's authorship be independent from Francesco himself? What elements of the
letters did Francesco micromanage to signify his personal presence in the documents?
Did he relate in the same way with the Gonzaga and with Cles, or did he adopt different
graphic strategies as well as language registers? The answers to these questions will serve
as a window to the remarkable flexibility of Renaissance official chancery documents.
Let  us  begin  from the  form of  the  letters.  The  Sforza  letters  in  the  Archivio
Gonzaga and  in  the  Corrispondenza  Clesiana  can  be  divided  into  four  different
typologies.  As  shown  in  Chart  5.1  (p.  160),  they  differ  in  handwriting  style  (or
combination of different styles) signatures, mise-en-page; the use of the personal pronoun
also varies between 'I' and 'we.' I label these typologies, so that I can refer to each one
quickly for the rest of the chapter: chancery letters, autograph letters, mixed letters, and
holographs.  Before starting to analyse them, a quick premise is necessary:  I  am fully
24 Tisot acknowledges these facts in Tisot 1966, 106.
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aware that the study of other physical features—such as paper and ink types—could have
further refined our understanding of the meaningful materiality of the letters. However,
developing the necessary expertise to analyse paper and ink seriously would have added
too much additional work for an already dense PhD project. As far as seals are concerned,
they differ slightly in size—one has a diameter of 15 millimetres, one of 28 millimetres,
one of 35 millimetres—but always show the same Sforza coat-of-arms as representative
picture, and I was unable to detect a significant pattern in their usage. As a consequence,
they will not be mentioned in my analysis.
Firstly,  chancery  letters  (fig.  5.1,  p.  161)  normally  show  one  handwriting,  or
seldom two (one for the main text  and one for the signature,)  but  neither belongs to
Francesco II.  Their mise-en-page is tidy (with clear margins and paragraphs,) and the
personal  pronoun used is  'we,'  apart  from some rare  exceptions.  Secondly,  autograph
letters (fig. 5.2, p. 162) represent by far the most recurrent typology. They bear two or
three different handwritings, because a secretary or a chancery clerk wrote the main text,
and there are two signatures: one belongs to the secretary, the other to Francesco—hence
the adjective 'autograph'—who could also pen some quick valedictory words, such as a
closing  farewell  statement.  The personal  pronoun used  is  'we.'  Thirdly,  In  the  mixed
letters (fig. 5.3, p. 163), we normally find a spectacular contrast between the educated
chancery hand that writes the main text, and Francesco's personal message written in a
very cursive,  hasty handwriting.  In  these  letters,  we find  only one  signature,  that  of
Francesco. The personal pronoun used is 'we.' Finally, in the holographs (fig. 5.4, p. 164),
Francesco materially wielded the pen and wrote the entire letter to the Gonzaga or to Cles
personally; he is also the only signatory. The mise-en-page of the holographs is much less
tidy than  that  of  the  other  three  typologies:  the  margins  are  less  clear,  or  even non-
existent, and so are the interior intervals of the text. The personal pronoun used is 'I.'25 
One first  consideration to  make is  that  all  these four typologies coexist  in the
Archivio  Gonzaga,  whereas  there  is  only  one  chancery  letter  in  the  Corrispondenza
Clesiana. This fact suggests that the status of the addressee dictated the choice of letter's
typology, but I will elaborate on this point later in the chapter (4.1).
What is important to highlight now, however, is the clear relation between the
form of the letters and their content, or the situation that generated them. Firstly, the range
of  contents  of  chancery and autograph letters  is  practically the  same:  they deal  with
political-administrative matters. As anticipated, in the case of the Gonzaga they usually




Fig. 5.1: Example of chancery letter (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano,
1617, Pavia, 1522 September 12) 
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Fig. 5.2: Example of autograph letter (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1616,
Trent, 1521 December 15)
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Fig. 5.3: Example of mixed letter (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618, Milan,
1531 May 10)
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Fig. 5.4: Example of holograph (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Monza,
1522 July 4)
regard the situation in south-eastern Lombardy; letters of credentials are also frequent,
and testify how Milan and Mantua formed an integrated diplomatic system. In the case of
Trent, autograph letters normally regard the relationship between the Sforza party and the
Habsburg court, where Cles was Francesco II's most important supporter and mediator. In
both archives, many documents are letters of presentation for the  viva voce, i.e. a man
whose  task  was  to  report  a  message  orally.26 The  primary  aim  of  this  mode  of
communication was to guarantee secrecy, as the author of the memoir Informazioni sulle
incombenze dei segretari ducali pointed out (pp. 114-115). But in the case of contacts
with other courts, this solution also symbolised regard for the recipient, and it was a way
to  bolster  connections  and showcase supporters.  Indeed,  the  letter  bearers  were often
gentilhomini  (literally  'gentlemen,'  nobles)  or  the  camerieri we  have  already  seen
engaging with these kind of assignments within the chancery walls.27 The regular use of
the  viva voce works  as a  reminder  for  the continuous exchange between writing and
orality. 
Secondly, mixed letters can be seen as dynamic artefacts, as is demonstrated by
the  alternation  of  two different  handwritings.  They were  created  to  become standard
chancery or autograph letters, but some unexpected or exceptional circumstances caused
Francesco to directly intervene on paper, writing with his own hand.
Finally,  Francesco  usually  opted  for  holographs  in  two  situations.  Firstly,  he
wielded the pen and wrote a letter  in its entirety when he wished to substantiate and
reinforce another message, either oral or written, that was going to travel to Mantua or
Trent (for some examples, see pp. 196-197 and 200-201). Secondly, he wrote with his
own  hand  when  the  continuous  epistolary  bond  with  Mantua  or  Trent  had  been
interrupted for some time, and he felt compelled to resume it. In effect, the debito ('debt')
of writing—strictly connected to the status of the correspondents—was a very important
hierarchical element that characterised letter exchanges, and Francesco evidently felt he
was the lesser correspondent in relation to both the Gonzaga and Cles.28 This is so true
that  the  duke  opened  four  out  of  the  six  extant  holographs  he  addressed  to  Cles
26 Senatore 2009, 14; See also Id. 2007, 117. For the exchange between verbal and non-verbal expressivity
in the context of late medieval and early modern diplomacy, see Lazzarini 2009.
27 There are many examples, especially in the Archivio Gonzaga: on 24 August 1517 (ASMn, Lettere dei
Signori di Milano, 1616) Francesco's amatissimo (‘most beloved’) gentilhomo Muzio de Preda traveled
to Mantua; on 23 August 1523 (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617) it was the turn of Giovanni
del Maino, nostro parente dilectissimo (‘our most dear relative’); on 24 March 1532 (ASMn, Lettere dei
Signori  di  Milano,  1617)  camerero    Francesco  Crivelli  reached  the  Gonzaga.  See  also ASTn,
Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1525 April 23: Francesco II sends cameriere aulico Scipione
Atellani to Cles.
28 As in marital relationships, in which the duty of writing felt on wives. Ferrari 2010, 21.
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mentioning his  debito  of writing,  even though—lacking many of  Cles's  letters  in  the
Sforzesco archive—we cannot know for sure whether Francesco's debito was always real
and substantial, or rather used as a formulaic expression of reverence.29 In any case, one
letter (written on 5 September 1521, when Francesco was still a precarious exile based in
Trent,  but also wandering between many towns of the Sacred Roman Empire) clearly
shows the great importance attached to this element:
I came to know about the arrival at home [Trent] of Your most Reverend Lordship
through a letter of  monsignor Pietro Martire Stampa. This made me happy: firstly,
because I understand that Your most Reverend Lordship came back home safely;
and secondly, because I'm now able to pay off my debito visiting you through my
letter, which I long failed to do only because I did not know what to write, since I
resided  at  [the  imperial]  court  in  the  conditions  I'm  sure  Your  most  Reverend
Lordship is aware of. (...) but I am sure you will deign yourself to forgive me.30
We shall see the importance of Francesco's autograph statements and holographs
below (4.2, 4.3). For the moment, it suffices to note the strong connection between the
form and the function of the letters.
3. Sharing Francesco II's authorship: letters close as processes
Another crucial connection to explore is the one between the form of the documents and
the process that led to their creation. As Christian Jouhaud and Alain Viala argue in their
volume  on scribal  and printed  publication,  as  soon  as  a  complex  textual  object  (the
product) is  correctly  seen  as  the  final  result  of  a  series  of  actions  (the  process),
establishing who prompted the creation of such object suddenly becomes less obvious
than it looked at first glance.31 
Let us consider autograph letters—the most recurrent letter typology in both the
Archivio Gonzaga  and the  Corrispondenza Clesiana—and the succession of operations
through which they were practically created. The original letters close often derived from
a draft, which—as the abundant evidence in the Sforzesco archive in Milan demonstrates
—was typically penned by a secretary (fig. 5.5, p. 167). Then, a scribe (either a chancery
clerk or the same secretary) wrote down the letter in fair copy. It was only at this point
29 Bernardo Cles's letters (fifty in total) preserved in the Sforzesco archive span from 16 March 1531 to 8
October 1535 (ASMi,  Diplomatico,  Autografi,  Ecclesiastici, 25-29); letters before 1531 are therefore
gone lost. Francesco's holograph in the Corrispondenza Clesiana mentioning the debito of writing were
written before March 1531, and precisely between 1518 and 1525: ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V,
10, Trent, 1518 April 21; Feldkirch, 1521 September 5; Milan, 1522 July 4; Milan, 1525 May 21.
30 ‘Per lettere de Monsignor Petro Martir Stampa ho inteso la zonta de Vostra Signoria Reverendissima li
in casa sua, il che mi he stato de somo apiazer, prima per haver inteso Vostra Signoria Reverendissima
esser azonta sana, si hanche per poter alchuna volta far parte del debito mio in visitarla cum mie lettere ,
il che per molto tempo ho homesso et non per altra causa che per non saper che scriverli stando io in
corte  dil  modo  sono  stato,  como  so  sa  Vostra  Signoria  Reverendissima,  (...)  quella  se  degnara
perdonarmi.’ [emphasis added]
31 Jouhaud and Viala 2003, 9-10.
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Fig. 5.5: Example of Sforza chancery draft
that Francesco II entered in the process 'visibly:' apparently, he revised the letter, signed
it, and handed it back to the secretary, who normally completed it with his own signature.
The secretary (or a clerk) would then fold the letter, seal it, and finally write the address
on its outside. This break up of the letter as process clearly shows that Francesco played a
very contained role in the creation of the documents that bore his name. 
The  situation  is  quite  similar  for  mixed  letters.  By  adding  full  autograph
statements underneath a chancery-hand main text, Francesco II certainly augmented the
sense of his actual presence behind the document. However, with his intervention, he did
not change the substance of the letter, but could only reinforce it. 
Even the holographs, despite being entirely written with the hand of Francesco II,
were not always completely free from chancery mediation. Indeed, the addresses on the
outside of the letters were often written by chancery hands, suggesting that secretaries
controlled and handled their master's personal messages and were responsible for their
correct delivery.
Ultimately, the basic narrative of letters close—Francesco II personally addressing
his  interlocutor—proves  to  be  rather  simplistic  with  respect  to  the  reality  of  their
production: the role of the chancery in the letter-writing process was no mere clerical
service. As we saw in Chapter 3, the chancery had a power of its own, and it generated
many fragmented flows of writings, largely independent from each other. In light of this,
the  minor  role  the  duke often  played in  the  process  of  making a  document  is  not  a
technical detail: it is a crucial political issue. The varying forms of letters close signal that
sovereign authorship, despite being nominally personal, was open for collective sharing,
and that it  was possible to treat a more or less vast  array of questions under the all-
purpose coverage of the duke's institutional identity. This is so true that there is evidence
of Sforza chancery clerks using the expression 'staying under someone else's signature.'32
Such a situation is especially problematic in the case of chancery letters, documents that
do not feature any sign of Francesco's presence. Given the centrifugal chancery practices
that  emerged  from  the  chancery  Ordines  and  the  memoir  Informazioni  sopra  le
incombenze dei segretari  ducali  in Chapter  3,  how can we ever take for granted that
Francesco had had the tiniest share of influence on letters that do not show material proof
of  his  intervention?  Apropos  this  issue,  it  is  worth  mentioning that  Tudor  poet  John
Skelton (c.1460–1529) satirised Henry VIII by claiming that the king by all means wrote
32 Covini 2002,  116-117: Giacomo Antiquario announced he would abandon the beneficial chancery if
forced to ‘stay under Cristoforo Cambiago's signatura.’
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letters, only without his own knowledge.33 
On  the  other  hand,  precisely  because  Francesco  II  knew  that  the  declared
authorship  of  the  letters  bearing  his  name  was  insufficient  to  guarantee  his  actual
presence 'behind the paper,' he also had a wide range of formal solutions at his disposal to
demonstrate  a  more  or  less  weighty  influence  on  the  making  of  the  final  chancery
product. In this sense, Francesco enacted a sophisticated material re-appropriation of his
own epistolary authorship directly on the body of the letters. In so doing, he showed that
his  handwriting  not  only  was  a  medium  conveying  a  message,  but  rather  was  the
message,  a  graphic  representation  of  his  very self.  This  matches  the  representational
character of wordpower I have underscored in the analysis of the delivery of chancery
documents (Chapter 4).
A further question is how far these material traits affected the understanding of
these letters by their recipients at the time. It is a question of 'period eye,' the concept first
devised  by  art  historian  Michael  Baxandall  to  indicate  the  need  of  analysing  the
understanding of an artefact at the time of its creation.34 The equivalent of Baxandall's
method for textual criticism is reception theory, but generally the latter limits itself to the
analysis of the contents of documents. What we see here is that—as with works of art—
the period understanding of a letter was determined by its form as much as its content. In
the next section, I wish to discuss two cogent cases of shared authorship emerging from
the  Archivio Gonzaga and from the  Corrispondenza Clesiana that help answering these
questions. Then, in section 4, I will explore Francesco II's tactics of re-appropriation of
his own authorship.
3.1. Two cogent cases of authorship sharing from Mantua and Trent
The first case involves two letters preserved in Mantua, dated 26 June and 2 August 1522
respectively.35 From the  point  of  view  of  their  form,  both  documents  belong  to  the
typology of chancery letters. A neat chancery hand wrote the main text and signed the
letter with the name of the duke, and a secretary named ‘Iulius’ put his signature at the
bottom-right  corner  of  the  letter  (figg.  5.6,  5.7,  pp.  171-172—as  we  shall  see  the
secretary's identity is very important). We cannot be sure that Francesco II supervised the
making of this document, because he did not make any sign on paper. Yet, as always, the
letter is written as if Francesco himself was addressing an individual recipient, with the
33 Cited  in  Lehrer  1997,  87:  Skelton  ventriloquised  Cardinal  Thomas  Wolsey saying ‘the  kynge doth
wryte, / And writeth he wottith nat what." 
34 Baxandall 1972.
35 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Milan, 1522 June 26; Milan, 1522 1 August. 
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first plural pronoun 'we' defining the subject. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  their  content,  the  two  letters  combined  offer  a
substantial  example  of  the  political-administrative  cooperation  between  Milan  and
Mantua in their bordering territories. If we are to conform to the letters' narrative, with the
first Francesco II informed the marquis of Mantua, Federico II (26 June) that a robbery
had  been  committed  in  Calvatone,  a  village  on  the  river  Oglio.  According  to  ‘the
Commune and the men’ of Calvatone, a captain of the Gonzaga had attacked the village
with a group of soldiers, damaging the river-port and some mills, and stealing valuables.
Therefore, in the second letter Francesco asked the marquis to operate for the restitution
of  the plunder.  He based his  request  on the long-standing mutual  assistance between
Sforza  and  Gonzaga  in  fighting  abuses,  and  (in  his  words)  on  their  blood  relation
(consanguineita)  and  reciprocal  good  will  (benevolentia).  From  the  second  letter  (2
August) we understand that the marquis of Mantua had responded to Francesco's letter,
and  that  the  latter  had  also  spoken to  the  Gonzaga  ambassador  in  Milan.  Francesco
wished to  open a  joint  enquiry.  Two men,  one  chosen by Milan  and one  chosen by
Mantua, should have gone to Calvatone to investigate the truth (verita) on the matter.
Once again, cooperation should have taken place in the name of mutual good will, of the
blood relation and of the fraternity (fraternita) that united the two dynasties. 
Who  was  the  author  of  these  two  letters?  The  answer  to  this  question  looks
obvious,  especially  because  the  personal  (or  family)  ties  that  bound the  duke to  the
marquis work as the rhetorical foundation of both. However, there are two elements that
put Francesco II's authorship into serious question. Firstly, at a closer look, it is clear that
the  first  letter  is  nothing  more  than  Calvatone  inhabitants'  version  of  events,  only
translated  into  a  state-of-the-art  chancery  form—which  confirms  my  more  general
argument  that  the  chancery often worked on the  basis  of  inputs  it  received from the
outside  world. The  fact  that  Milan  was  writing  to  Mantua  because  Calvatone  had
signalled some complaints is explicitly stated at the beginning of the first letter.36 The
Gonzaga were well aware of this and evidently refused to accept that narrative of the
misdeed, as we know from the second letter.
Secondly, and more importantly, it was not the Sforza secret chancery that issued
the letters, but the chancery of the Senate of Milan—something which would escape our
notice if we simply accepted the letter's narrative, or if we looked at the letter's modern
36 ‘Et pero havendone novamente significato el commune et homini nostri de Calvatone cremonese che al




Fig. 5.6: Senate-chancery letter close (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Milan,
1522 June 27) with the signature of the duke written by a secretarial hand and the
signature  of secretary Giulio Cattaneo (Iulius) at the bottom-right corner of the letter
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Fig. 5.7: Senate-chancery letter close (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di
Milano, 1617, Milan, 1522 August 2) with the signature of the duke written
by a secretarial hand and the signature of secretary Giulio Cattaneo (Iulius)
at the bottom-right corner of the letter
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Fig. 5.8: Senate-chancery letter close (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1616,
Milan, 1518 August 22). The letter was written during the second French Domination,
and bears the signature of the French Vice-chancellor; secretary Giulio Cattaneo
signed it at the bottom-right corner with the usual Iulius
archival location in a series called 'Letters of the Lords of Milan to the Gonzaga.' We
know this  because the  signature  ‘Iulius’ stands  for  Giulio  Cattaneo,  one  of  the  most
prominent  secretaries  of  the  Senate,  active  also  under  the  French  between  1499  and
1522.37 In fact, the same series accidentally preserves another letter signed ‘Iulius,’ dated
22 August 1518—that is, during the second French domination of the Milanese, when
Francesco II was still in exile—a letter that Cattaneo wrote on behalf of the Senate and its
president,  the  Vice-chancellor  (fig.  5.8,  p.  173).38 This  fact  is  of  crucial  importance,
because the Senate—as I will explain more extensively in Chapter 7 (pp. 283-284)—was
substantially independent from ducal control, and Francesco was very unlikely to avail
himself of its chancery for making a document. In addition, the contents of the two letters
confirm the attribution,  because they pertain to  judicial  affairs,  and the Senate was a
tribunal.  Therefore,  the  Senate  wrote  its  letters  close  not  only  using  the  name  of
Francesco II, but also his personal rhetorical motives, even though Francesco himself did
not play any role in them. So, what unmistakably looked like a personal letter, in fact
came from a separate institution. This demonstrates the remarkable extent to which ducal
authorship could work as a shared device.
To detect  another  significant  case of authorship sharing,  it  is  helpful  to  cross-
check data  from the  Archivio Gonzaga  and from the  Corrispondenza Clesiana.  On 6
February 1522, Francesco II (then still in exile) wrote from the German town of Worms to
Bernardo Cles in Trent. This time we cannot doubt Francesco's presence behind the letter,
because it is a holograph written in the first singular person (fig. 5.9, p. 176). The duke
used his own hand to personally apologise for some ‘disturbing and evil  things’ that
happened  in  (or  around)  Trent  during  his  absence.39  Two  members  of  Francesco's
household  committed  a  homicide,  and  were  subsequently  captured  by  Cles's  men.
Francesco wrote to Cles urging him to do justice against his retainers, adding half-ironic
half-embarrassed:
I will no longer dare to come to serve you in Trent because of the good behaviour of
my [men]. Ultimately we are the worst men in the world, and I am the first and even
the most worst (el piu pezor), and I resolve to go and reside in a place where I and
my men will give no dissatisfaction.40 
Words like these could have never been written through secretarial mediation, and
the letter works as a beautiful demonstration of Francesco's extreme subjection to Cles,
37 Di Tullio and Fois 2014, ad indicem. Leverotti 2002, ad indicem.
38 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1616, Milan, 1518 August 22.
39 ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Worms, 1522 February 6: ‘cose fastidiose et male’
40 Ivi:‘io  non  ardiro  venir  piu  a  tenir  servitu  a  Vostra  Signoria  Reverndissima  in  Trento  per  li  boni
deportamenti de li mey, et in fine nuy siamo li pezori homeni al mondo, et io per el primo sono el piu
pezor et mi delibero de andar a star in locho che ne mi ne li mey diano sempre qualche despiazer.’
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and of the connection between the form and the content of the holographs. However, this
letter is also particularly interesting if put in relation to the evidence in Mantua. Indeed, at
first sight, we are in the presence of a peculiar case of 'ducal ubiquity.' While Francesco
wielded the pen in Worms to reach Cles in Trent (6 February), he was also writing 650
kilometres away, from Trent to Mantua: two autograph letters of the  Archivio Gonzaga
bearing the autograph signature of Francesco II were dispatched from Trent on 4 and 8
February respectively (figg. 5.10, 5.11, pp. 177-178). Something clearly does not add up:
Francesco could not possibly travel the circa 1,300 kilometres of the Trent-Worms-Trent
route in five days. Hence, we must conclude that Francesco's secretaries in Trent wrote on
his behalf even when he was somewhere else. What is remarkable, similarly to the case of
the  letters  close  of  the  Senate,  is  the  extent  to  which  the  secretaries  simulated  their
master's authorship. Both letters are written as if Francesco himself was writing (in the
first person plural,) and in the case of the 4 February letter, the 'fictitious Francesco' not
only shared information,  but also claimed to have met a Gonzaga agent,  and to have
committed  him an  oral  message  for  Isabella  d'Este.41 The  fact  that  the  letters  show
Francesco's  autograph signature testifies  that  the secretaries  were allowed to use pre-
signed papers—a problem that is going to emerge again in the next chapter (pp. 240-242)
—or  to  imitate  Francesco's  handwriting.  Imitating  the  sovereign's  hand was  common
practice  in  state-chanceries  since  at  least  the  fifteenth  century,  and  it  felt  within  the
prerogatives of the most prominent clerks.42 A famous scene of William Shakespeare's
Twelfth  Night  (written  1601–1602)  describes  the  trick  of  Maria,  who  imitates  the
handwriting of  her  mistress,  countess  Olivia,  to  successfully deceit  Olivia's  would-be
lover,  Malvolio,  despite  his  careful  'palaeographic  analysis:'  "By my life,  this  is  my
Ladies hand: these bee her very C's, her U's, and her T's, and thus makes shee her great
P's. It is in contempt of question her hand.’43 Malvolio's attitude may work as evidence of
early modern readers' attentiveness towards the authenticity of the letters they received.
Ultimately, both examples—the one of the Senate letters and the one of Francesco
II's apparent ubiquity—prove that the personal ducal authorship devised in chancery and
autograph letters represented a formal construction. The fact that secretaries wrote letters
41 ASMn,  Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618, Trent, 1522 February 4: ‘Illustrissima et Excellentissima
Domina Anita et tamquam Mater Honorandissima. Questa notte e gionto Messer Capino, il quale ne ha
portato dalla  Corte Cesarea molte lettere (…). Ma di  quanto li  dira a nome nostro quella pregamo
prestarli fede come sapemo faria a noi stessi (…).’
42 Docquier 2012, 399; see also Frankel 1992, 30. Many studies, referring to various different contexts,
hint at the possibility of imitating someone else's handwriting: Jenkinson 1926, 156; Ganz 1997, 282;
Daybell 2009, 649; 
43 Shakespeare 1994, 146 (2.5, 82-85).
175
176
Fig. 5.9: ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Worms, 1522 February 6
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Fig. 5.10: Autograph letter dispatched from Trent on 4 February 1522, when
Francesco II was in Worms (see fig. 5.9) (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano,
1617, Trent, 1522 February 4)
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Fig. 5.11: Autograph letter dispatched from Trent on 8 February 1522, when
Francesco II was in Worms (see fig. 9) (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano,
1617, Trent, 1522 February 8)
as if they were the duke in the duke's absence may sound deceitful to us, but it is clear
that they were allowed to do so. After all, getting away with such a fraud would have
been  nearly  impossible.  As  for  the  Senate,  it  certainly  did  not  need  to  mislead  its
interlocutors  by pretending to  be  Francesco.  The point  is  that  the  duke's  institutional
identity was open to sharing, potentially available for others to use: having authority in
the Sforza orbit naturally gave access to the Sforza's authorship. 
In 2005, Deanna Shemek came to some similar conclusions while investigating
the culture of letter-writing of Isabella d'Este and her entourage. Shemek noticed that if
we gave strict  interpretation to the authorship of the marchioness's  letters,  we should
believe that Isabella distributed ecclesiastical benefices around the Mantuan territory at
the  age  of  three,  which  is  obviously implausible.44 Hence,  Shemek  proposed  a  clear
distinction between a modern and a pre-modern concept of authorship:
Isabella  projected  herself  not  as  an  'author'  but  as  an  authority  (…).  Insofar  as
epistolary authorship (like privacy, personal space, and family relations) was a more
extended concept in the sixteenth century, we must consider her correspondence to
be hers. At the same time, we do well to recall that every letter written by a sixteenth-
century noble 'spoke' in a plural voice that encompassed a number of personae (...).
The voice we can know as Isabella's may be nothing more than a web of relations
that,  via  the  secretary-patron  relation  and  a  diachronic  process  of  formation,
stabilizes as an identifiable speaking subject in letters written over a long arch of
time.  This  fact,  however,  calls  not  for  complete  abandonment  of  the  notion  of
authorship in her regard, but for a modified and dynamic understanding of authorship
regarding all such mediated texts.45 
Two brief  considerations  can  be  added  on  the  basis  of  Francesco  II's  letters.
Firstly, as I have demonstrated, authors who were also authorities (like both Francesco
and Isabella)  not only  projected themselves  as authorities,  but  were also projected as
authorities by others. The latter included the duke's secretaries, of course, but also other
institutions which were in much less direct relations with the duke (like the Senate,) and,
we can imagine, all those who could convince these people and institution to  mediate on
their behalf (like, as seen above, someone in the community of Calvatone.) According to
Shemek, this was the web of relations that ultimately composed the speaking subject's
plural voice. However, in the case of Francesco, it would be more appropriate to conclude
that multiple agents carried out an active process of plural occupation of the voice of
authority. 
The second consideration regards exactly the voice of authority itself. As I pointed
out above, chancery hands writing on behalf of the duke normally used the first plural
44 Shemek 2003, 87-88 [original emphasis].
45 Ibid.: 90-91.
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person 'we' to define the subject. Today, this device is known as 'royal we,' or majestic
plural, and signifies the concept of majesty. I would not push myself to challenging this
definition,  but  I  would  at  least  suggest  that  the  intended  recipients  of  the  letters
understood the first plural person also more literally, embodying an actual plurality of
authors. In receiving a letter of an author-authority speaking in the first plural person, the
recipient would know that s/he was primarily dealing with the authority, and not with the
author.
With the last consideration we are back to the question of the 'period eye' (above,
p. 169). Did recipients see all the letters close bearing the signature of Francesco II in the
same  way?  Probably  not.  Giora  Sternberg's  study  of  letter  writing  and  status
manifestation in early modern France has demonstrated how early modern letter readers
were able to de-code the signs marked on paper to verify whether they were appropriate,
respectful,  or  irreverent.46 Similarly,  since  they  were  immersed  in  a  world  where
authorship  was  extended,  shared,  and  inherently  ambivalent—singular  or  plural,
sometimes both—recipients were also trained to understand whether the letter in their
hands was coming from its declared author, or if it originated from a much more complex
jigsaw of power relations. As a matter of fact, autograph letters did not guarantee the
personal  involvement  of  the  duke  in  their  creation,  their  rhetoric  and  signature
notwithstanding. As for chancery letters imitating Francesco II's authorship, they could
even come from institutions that Francesco did not directly control, like the Senate of
Milan. Once again, I wish to remark that this state of things matches (and derives from)
the general openness of the chancery I have been highlighting while analysing chancery
practices. Documentary production took place in very fluid situations, and documentary
products both reflected and channelled the chancery's fluid, open-ended nature.
4. Strategies of autography
The extension and sharing of epistolary authorship posed a problem for the author whose
voice became plural.  The problem was appropriating  and personalising  that  voice,  in
order  to  signal  to  the  recipient  that  s/he,  the  author,  was  actually  supervising  or
participating in the making of the letter. From this point of view, the use of autography
represented  a  highly  strategic  asset.  As  anticipated  in  presenting  mixed  letters  and
holographs, some exceptional situations seemed to push the duke to write with his own
hand.  But how codified were these graphic solutions? The answer to  this  question is
relevant, because it helps to establish Renaissance writers' level of awareness of (and of
46 Sternberg 2009.
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care  for)  the  forms  they adopted.  To what  extent  did  Francesco II  micromanage  the
graphic manifestation of himself in his correspondence? And to what extent was such
micromanagement tailored for the recipient? The evidence in Mantua and Trent offers the
chance of verifying whether the duke treated the Gonzaga and Cles equally or differently. 
As we have seen, the duke could use his own hand for signatures, for adding some
statements  under  chancery-hand  texts,  or  for  writing  entire  letters.  Each  intervention
unfolded a set of different meanings. In the following pages, I will explore them.
4.1. Signatures in autograph letters
In order to understand the meaning that the signature encapsulated, the best thing to do is
look  at  the  two  extremes  of  the  correspondence  with  the  Gonzaga  and  Cles,  their
beginning and their very end.
Starting from the end is more appropriate, because the Corrispondenza Clesiana
finishes with a direct mention of the role of the signature. On 27 October 1535, Francesco
II addressed a letter to Cles for the last time in his life. Indeed, Francesco would die soon
after, between 1 and 2 November, as someone—Cles himself, or one of his secretaries—
noted on the outside of the letter, under the address: obiit dux quatriduum post a data
istarum litterarum  (‘the duke died four days after the date of this letter.’) (fig. 5.12, p.
183) The message contained in this last letter is very simple: Francesco apologised for not
having written sooner to Trent, but nothing of importance had occurred in Milan and no
relevant news came to the chancery. In addition, he was ill:
It has been some days that we have not written to Your most Reverend Lordship,
both because we did not come to know anything of importance, and because of some
ailment to our eye, with a little humidity, which later descended to the hands, and this
much disturbed us. We are recovering at the moment, and we are confident that Our
Lord God will grant us with the healing soon; but we are not free [from the disease]
yet, and for this reason, the physicians having suggested that we avoid fatiguing the
hands, may Your most  Reverend Lordship not  be offended–but would you please
excuse us–if our letter will not be signed with our hand. 
We send to Your most Reverend Lordship the summaries enclosed, containing the
few [news] that we have by now, and that are worth of your consideration (…).47
In the Renaissance and early modern world, illness was often advanced as a good reason
47 ‘Sono qualchi giorni che no[n] havemo scritto à Vostra Signoria Reverendissima si per non essere stato
à nostra cognitione cosa degna di adviso, com'anche per certa Indispositione sopragiontani a un'occhio,
con uno poco d'humidita, che doppoi ni è descesa in le mani, quale ni ha travagliato assai, et anchora
che di presente si troviamo con assai bono miglioramento, et con speranza che Nostro Signore Dio ci
debba fare gratia in breve di la pristina convalescentia, Nondimeno non ne siamo anchora liberi, et per
questo rispetto essendoni laudato da questi Physici l'abstenirni d'affaticare le mani, Vostra Signoria
Reverendissima non prendera admiratione, ma ni hara per excusati, se le lettere nostre non seranno
sottoscritte  di  nostra  mano.  Mandiamo  a  Vostra  Signoria  Reverendissima  li  qui  alligati  summarii
continenti quello poco, che per hora si trova a nostra notitia degno di sua intelligenzia (…).’ [emphasis
added]
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for the inability to write.48 This is a sign of how the act of writing was a demanding
operation,  not  only  intellectually  but  also  technically  and  physically.  In  the  case  of
Francesco, the physicians believed that a simple signature could fatigue his hands. 
But the especially important detail here is that the Francesco II felt  obliged to
apologise and to explain why he was failing to sign the letter with his own hand (fig.
5.13, p. 184), thus delivering a chancery letter to Trent instead of an autograph letter.
Francesco evidently felt that Cles would notice and attach importance to such a detail,
even though the message was absolutely impersonal, and certainly did not require him to
remark his personal involvement behind it. 
The  point  is  that  Francesco  II  was  aware  of  violating  a  practice  that  he  had
observed  for  seventeen  years.  Indeed,  all  his  letters  in  the  Corrispondenza  Clesiana
shows his own autograph signature, with no exception. It had been an intentional choice,
one that we could easily overlook today, but that aimed at highlighting his special regard
for Cles. By contrast,  as we have seen, the correspondence with Mantua shows many
letters that did not bear Francesco's autograph signature. The last letter to the Gonzaga
dates  17 October  1535,  and was probably written when the  illness  of  Francesco had
already begun. The letter was signed by a secretary, but this did not cause any apology.
Therefore,  the  signature  was  a  device  Francesco  commanded  depending  on  the
relationship with the recipient. In the case of Cles, he wished to leave a mark on every
outgoing letter, or at least made sure his secretaries used pre-signed papers to contact
Trent. By contrast, in the case of the Gonzaga, he was less attentive to this custom.
Going back to the 1510s, comparing the first years of the correspondence with
Trent and Mantua is also quite revealing. Gino Benzoni notes that Francesco II started
signing his letters as dux Mediolani regularly from 1516 onwards, and this is true as far as
the  letters  to  the  Gonzaga  are  concerned.  The  first  letter  to  show  the  formula  dux
Mediolani  in  Mantua's  State  Archives  dates  11 October  1516,  even though such title
would remain only virtual for almost six years.49 On the contrary,  in writing to Cles,
Francesco appears to have been much more cautious in boasting his title. It was only from
1521 that he would start to define himself as duke of Milan, whereas throughout 1518 and
1519 (there is no evidence for 1520) he alternated bonus servitor Franciscus Sforza and
ad vita servitor Franciscus Sforza. This initial understatement was probably motivated by
a  mix  of  humility  and familiarity  towards  Cles:  name and surname would  suffice  to
address him. As for servitor, this is a common diminishing epithet that also the Gonzaga
48 Sternberg 2009, 73.
49 Benzoni 1998, 16. ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1616, Trent, 1516 October 11.
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Fig. 5.12: Detail of the back of Francesco II's last letter to Bernardo Cles (ASTn,
Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1535 October 27). Under the address, the
note ‘the duke died four days after the date of this letter’
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Fig. 5.13: Francesco II's last letter to Bernardo Cles, the only one in the
Corrispondenza Clesiana not bearing Francesco's autograph signature (ASTn,
Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1535 October 27)
utilized in their letters to Trent. The use of ad vita, instead, represents a little mystery (fig.
5.14, p. 186). Francesco writes it often in the correspondence with Cles, but the formula
is  wrong,  because  the  Latin  preposition  'ad'  would  require  the  use  of  the  accusative
'vitam.' As we know, Francesco was surrounded by learned secretaries and clerks: how
could such a visible mistake consistently pass unnoticed? Might it be that he considered
his clumsy Latin as an element that would strengthen his intimacy with Cles? I will come
back to this point at the end of this chapter.
The  micromanagement  of  autography  could  also  determine  variations  of  the
signature that seem to have had the same mechanisms in both correspondences. Indeed,
Francesco  II  tended  to  simplify  his  signature  at  the  bottom  of  mixed  letters  and
holographs—that is, when he wrote extensively with his own hand. He signed simply as
servitor Franciscus two mixed letters to Mantua dated 10 May and 16 September 1531;
and he signed as obsequentissimus servitor Franciscus a holograph dated 2 May 1534.50
In Trent, he signed a first holograph (4 July 1522) as ad vita servitor Franciscus, partly
because there was no space left in the bifolium (fig. 5.15, p. 187). But even when plenty
of space was available, he modified his standard signature and avoided the ducal title: on
21 May 1525, writing another holograph, he signed only as  Francesco Sforza;  on the
same day, a second letter to Cles with an autograph statement bears the signature servitor
Franciscus, with no further specifications; similarly, on 12 October 1533, the writing of
an autograph statement simply attracted an obsequentissimus servitor Franciscus.
Finally,  it  is  useful  to  pay some attention  to  the  signatures  of  the  secretaries,
because their presence interacted with that of Francesco II. The names of the secretaries
at the bottom-right corner of ducal letters first appear in the Archivio Gonzaga in August
1522 (fig.  5.16,  p.  188).  This  date  is  very important,  because  it  represents  the  most
accurate  terminus a quo  for the existence of an institutionalised secret chancery. Such
innovation soon found a graphic representation: in autograph letters, Francesco ceased to
pen  the  title  dux Mediolani with  his  own hand,  and the  task  was  taken over  by the
secretary  that  signed  underneath  the  duke  (fig.  5.17,  p.  189).  These  new  solutions
acknowledged the ongoing pluralisation of the duke's authorship: as Gamberini notes for
the Visconti age, the appearance of secretarial signatures was a ‘small but extraordinary’
novelty,  which  ‘allowed  the  recipient  to  know  who  was  hiding  behind  the  generic
intitulation (…) of seigneurial  litterae.’51 And while Francesco still wrote the name that
defined his personal identity when he revised a letter, the title that indicated his extended,
50 The three documents are in ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618.
51 Gamberini 2005a, 46.
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Fig. 5.14: An example of letter bearing the incorrect formula ad vita servitor (ASTn,
Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Trent, 1518 April 21)
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Fig. 5.15: Holograph bearing the simplified signature Franciscus at the bottom-right
corner of the letter (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, 1522 July 4). It is worth
noticing that, as in fig. 4, Francesco II uses the wrong Latin formula ad vita servitor
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Fig. 5.16: ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Pavia, 1522 August 13. The
earliest example of a letter of Francesco II bearing a secretarial signature (Ritius)
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Fig. 5.17: Autograph letter (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1522
December 20) in which a secretarial hand (probably that of Girolamo Morone) penned the
title duca di Milano (duke of Milan) on behalf of Francesco II, who used to write it
himself before the institutionalisation of his chancery
institutional identity was now physically marked by someone else. As Shemek remarks,
‘a  web of  relations  (...)  via  the  secretary-patron  relation  and a  diachronic  process  of
formation, stabilizes as an identifiable speaking subject in letters written over a long arch
of time.’52
4.2. Autograph statements in mixed letters
The second, more visible level of authorship re-appropriation was the addition of a full
autograph statement  underneath  the main chancery-hand text  of  a  letter.  If  autograph
signatures were a graphic sign of respect that did not necessarily prove Francesco II's
direct involvement in the making of a document—because, as we have seen, the duke
signed blank papers, and some of the secretaries may have been able to imitate his hand
—autograph  statements  almost  certainly  demonstrated  that  the  duke  handled  a  given
letter.
Autograph statements are inherently ambivalent. To some extent, it  is certainly
possible to interpret them as outbursts of Francesco's individualism. Yet, they functioned
in a more regulated way than it may look at first glance. This is first of all testified by the
fact  that  chancery  clerks  duly  transcribed  autograph  statements  in  the  Registri  delle
Missive, introducing them explicitly with notes such as  manu principis  (‘[written with
the]  hand  of  the  prince,’  sometimes  abbreviated  in  M.  P.),  additio  manu  principis
(‘addition [written] by the hand of the prince’)  hoc verba scripta sunt manu principis
(‘these words were written with the hand of the prince’), or  infrascripta fuerant manu
illustrissimi  duci (‘the  following  [words]  were  [written  by  the  hand]  of  the  most
illustrious  duke.’)53 These  notes  are  particularly  interesting  because  they  serve  two
functions at a time, one symbolic and one technical. Firstly, the symbolic function was to
solemnise the direct interventions of the duke in the documentation, as it is suggested by
the choice of using Latin. If the sovereign decided to write with his own hand, the fact
deserved  recording  because  it  was  considered  exceptional.  Secondly,  the  technical
function was one of control. The interventions of the duke were to be recorded to prevent
anyone  from  scribbling  something  on  a  chancery  letter  after  it  was  completed  and
delivered, pretending that the addition was a valid part of the message.
Moreover, the autograph statements show their function also if analysed within the
letters to which they belong. Indeed, whenever Francesco II wrote a full statement he
52 Shemek 2003, 90.
53 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 222, l. 150, 1525 April 12; ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 273, 1523
May 12; ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 222, l. 68, 1524 July 21
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always  remained  the  only  signatory,  whereas  the  secretarial  signatures  that  would
normally find place at the bottom-right corner of the last written side disappeared.54 From
the point of view of authorship, it was as if the duke had the power to stop and reverse the
transition from his personal to his institutional epistolary identity (fig. 5.3, p. 163). He
was able to exercise a sign of authority—both in a figurative and in a material sense—
over the Sforza apparatus. A mixed letter to Federico II Gonzaga (4 January 1522) shows
that this  was a protocol,  and not an improvised solution (fig.  5.18, p.  193).55 Here, a
chancery hand began to write the main text of the letter; at some point, Francesco stepped
in with his own hand; then, he gave the letter back to the secretary, who penned the date
and a short closing formula; finally, Francesco signed the letter, but the secretary—who
was evidently following the elaborated process—refrained from doing the same.
In presenting mixed letters,  I have already hinted at  the fact that Francesco II
typically used autograph statements under exceptional or unexpected circumstances; he
did so to stress his authority, but the need of stressing authority often indicates a lack
thereof. On 10 June 1531, for example, Francesco used his hand to complete a letter to a
peripheral officer with a very blunt ‘swear to God, I will make sure you will be hanged if
you don't obey the Senate as much as myself.’56 It is worth noticing that the letter in
question is perfectly formulaic: it orders the officer to let a petitioner obtain a quota of
wheat, but it does so without implying any particular tension. The outstanding mismatch
between  the  standard  administrative  letter  and the  exceptional  statement  of  the  duke
therefore  works  as  a  further  caveat  against  accepting  at  face  value  the  'language  of
governance'  of  the  Registri  delle  Missive discussed  in  Chapter  4.  In  similar  fashion,
writing to some trusted agents, Francesco could add a statement with his own hand to
bypass the diplomatic tone of the chancery and get straight to the point. Therefore, he was
very clear with his ambassador in Rome, the above-mentioned Giorgio Andreasi, while
negotiating the appointment of some clerical benefices: 
Everyone is allowed to appoint not only the clerics of his own state, but also the
consistory [cardinals], and the bishops. To me, being lesser than my neighbours and
less  submissive  to  His  Holiness  than  my  neighbours,  they  want  to  grant  [the
appointment of the] canons of Binasco. I don't want it. And I prefer being insulted by
others than insulting myself [by accepting it].57
54 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, b. 1617, Trent, 1522 January 4; b. 1618, Milan, 1531 May 10;
Milan, 1531 September 16; ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1525 May 25; Mantua, 1532
October 12.
55 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Trent, 1522 January 4.
56 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, 1. 33, 1531 June 10: ‘Iuro a Dio che vi faro appiccare se non obediti
piu al mio Senato che a me proprio.’ Due to the lack of further evidence, I am not able to explain why
the duke mentions the Senate on this occasion.
57 Reported  in  Oldrini  1989, 315 [my translation].  Binasco  is  a  small  town in the  outskirt  of  Milan.
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The correspondence in the Archivio Gonzaga and in the Corrispondenza Clesiana
shows that also apologies and thanksgiving made a good match for autography. From this
point  of  view,  the  most  interesting  mixed letter  is  the  one  already partially analysed
above,  dated  4  January  1522  and  addressed  to  the  marquis  of  Mantua.  Apparently,
Francesco II had inadvertently opened a letter for the Gonzaga coming from the Habsburg
court.58 A secretary began to write a rather standardised letter of apology, but Francesco
intervened with some more heartfelt words:
I beg your Excellence to deign yourself to forgive this mistake, because I reckon I
much erred, and do believe it was an involuntary mistake, and I humbly recommend
myself to your good grace, I did not read it [the letter].59
The  verb  'to  supplicate'  (supplicare)  is  particularly  important  here,  because
Francesco seems to clearly detach his autograph statement from the chancery-hand text in
order to imitate the bipartite structure of petitions (supplicationi), which were divided in
narratio  (the  narration  of  the  circumstances  that  pushed  the  petitioner  to  write  the
petition) and supplicatio (the part containing the proper plea to the authority).
The  distance  between  autograph  statement  and  chancery-hand  text  is  less
pronounced in two other mixed letters of apology, both preserved in Trent. In the first
case, (fig. 5.19, p. 194) the duke had to repair a misunderstanding with Cles. A messenger
from the prince-bishop, one ‘sir Andrea,’ had come to the Duchy of Milan with the order
of recruiting soldiers to suppress the peasant uprising that was affecting the county of
Tyrol, including the territories around Trent as part of the wider German Peasants' War. 60
Apparently, Andrea was told that Francesco II was staying at the castle of Pizzighettone—
on the Adda river, the border with the Venetian territory—and went there, but Francesco
was in fact in Milan, seventy kilometres far. The accident delayed the messenger's urgent
mission, and it was necessary to explain that the delay had not been due to carelessness.
As  in  the  case  of  Mantua,  the  chancery  prepared  the  apologies,  but  Francesco  was
anxious to demonstrate that he was not treating the matter routinely. For this reason, he
chose  to  insert  the  autograph  statement.  The  sentence  reads:  ‘Your  most  Reverend
Lordship  rest  assured  that  I'm on  your  side,  as  much  as  I  am on  my own [side].  I
recommend myself to your good grace.’61 The second case, dated 12 October 1533 (fig.
Francesco is mentioning it ironically, as a term of comparison.
58 Trent, located in the Brenner valley, laid on one of the major routes between Austria and the Padan 
Plain.
59 ‘Io supplico vostra Excellentia si degni perdonarme questo herore per che conosco haver molto errato, et
non lo attribuischa che ad erore non voluntario et in sua bona gratia humilmente mi racomando io non lo
letta.’
60 Politi 1995.
61 ‘Vostra Signoria Reverendissima si tenga per certissimo che sono per lei como per me stesso, et in sua
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bona gratia me racomando.’
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Fig. 5.18: Mixed letter (ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Trent, 1522
January 4) clearly showing the collaborative process of letter writing: a secretary
began to write the letter's main text, but Francesco II stepped in the process
writing an autograph statement. The secretary then wrote the date, but did not add
his own signature underneath Francesco II's one
194
Fig. 5.19: Mixed letter (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan, 1525
May 21)
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Fig. 5.20: Mixed letter (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, 1532 October 12).
It is worth noticing how Francesco II crosses the page containing the main text of
the letter with his own script
5.20, p. 195), signals the same anxiety. Francesco was in Mantua, where a Diet was held,
and he explained to Cles that ‘the troubles of [the Duchy of Milan]’ and his ‘poverty’ had
prevented him (Francesco) to meet and revere Charles V before that occasion. In addition,
Francesco promised to inform Cles about the outcome of the meeting, because he was
‘much indebted’ with Cles, even though he doubted he could ever repay him.62 Therefore,
he probably felt obliged to add a note with his own hand: ‘May Your most Reverend
Lordship remember that I am a most obedient servant of yours, and I always am, [and I]
humbly recommend myself to you.’63 
As for thanksgiving, the example comes from the Archivio Gonzaga. Francesco II
had received a precious inkpot from marquis Federico II—a gift implying that the act of
writing did have a distinct symbolic significance—and wrote back to Mantua to express
his  gratitude.  As  usual,  a  standardised  letter  of  thanks  from the  chancery must  have
looked inadequate to Francesco, who wrote a very showy note occupying the lower half
of the page to repeat his appreciation (fig. 5.3, p. 163).
Besides the specific circumstances that originated them, all these cases have one
important feature in common: the autograph statements did not add new content to the
message they integrated,  but just  restated something that  had already been written in
secretarial hand. Being graphically bigger and stylistically more informal than the main
texts,  the  aim  of  the  statements  was  adding  a  great  deal  of  emotional  strength  and
conviction to them. What mattered was primarily their performance: the  act of writing
had precedence over what was written. A mixed letter to Mantua dated 16 September
1531  is  a  perfect  example  for  this  point.  The  letter,  written  by the  Sforza  chancery,
authorized its bearer (Senator Pietro Paolo Arrigoni) to bring an oral message to Mantua.
Such letters  of  authorisation  often  consisted  only of  standard  formulas,  and  this  one
would have made no exception. However, the duke added a peculiar autograph statement:
In addition to  what  I  have commissioned,  the  present  bearer  should say to  your
Excellence on my behalf that I was obligated to annoy you with this bad writing of
mine,  to  thank  you  very  very  much  (molto  molto)  for  the  great  humanity  and
demonstration  of  love,  which  I  will  keep  together  the  others  I  have;  shall  your
Excellence deign himself to always command me, I will obey; myself and what is
mine is yours, and so it will always be; and I very much recommend myself to your
Excellence.64
62 ‘Io da le ruine del stato et poverta mia non ho potuto piu presto incontrare et fare reverentia a sua
Maesta Cesarea (…). De tutto quello succedera Vostra Signoria Reverendissima sera avisata,  con la
quale mi trovo in tanto obligo che a me sera difficile poterlo pagare.’
63 ‘Vostra Signoria Reverendissima si ricordi che li sonno obedientissimo servitor, et sempre sonno, et a lei
humilmente mi racomando.’
64 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618, Milan, 1531 September 16: ‘Ultra quanto ho comisso dica
in nome mio el presente lator a vostra Excellentia sono sforzato fastidirla cum questo mio mal scriver in
molto molto ringratiar di tanta humanita et dimonstratione di amor et lo ponero apresso li altri li tengo;
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On the face of it,  this passage is nonsense.  Francesco  wrote to the marquis of
Mantua  a  message  that  he  also  wished  to  be  communicated  orally by  Arrigoni,
apologising for  the  bad handwriting  he should have  logically avoided using.  Yet,  the
intention of the duke was clearly that of physically leaving a sign on paper to manifest his
presence, and he therefore tried to connect his message to the rest of the chancery letter,
eventually creating a sort of written paradox. The recipient of the letter would have not
focused  on  the  strict  content  of  the  message,  but  on  its  appearance,  and  the  act  it
represented.  It  is  worth bearing this  argument  in mind in moving now to Francesco's
holographs. 
4.3. Holographs
The analysis of the ten holographs preserved in Mantua and Trent (four in the Archivio
Gonzaga,  six  in  the  Corrispondenza  Clesiana,)65 like  the  analysis  of  the  autograph
statements, should start from their supposed spontaneity. In comparing and contrasting
chancery/autograph letters and holographs, I pointed out that the former show a state-of-
the-art handwriting, a tidy mise-en-page and a detached style, whereas the latter bear the
much less educated handwriting of Francesco II, a haphazard mise-en-page and a heartfelt
style.  Given these characteristics, one may conclude that chancery and autograph letters
observed strict formal conventions, while holographs did not. Yet, as Francesco Senatore
points out, there were no such things as 'spontaneous' and 'free' letters in the medieval and
early modern world. The modern concept of private and intimate letter is a by-product of
the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, what Petrucci defines as ‘bourgeois letter.’66 On
the contrary, a distinct characteristic of Ancien Régime writers is their constant awareness
of the forms they were adopting.67 Paradoxically, spontaneity made no exception: it had
its rules too. Not for nothing, Francesco II was a contemporary of Baldassarre Castiglione
(1478–1529),  the  humanist  who coined a  term—sprezzatura—to define  the  ability  of
performing  spontaneousness  or,  as  Douglas  Biow  puts  it,  of  being  ‘inconspicuously
conspicuous.’68 
vostra Excellentia sempre dignara comandarme et io la obediro; et mi et cose mie sono sue et sempre
sara; et a vostra Excellentia multo me racomando.’
65 The holographs in Mantua: ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Feldkirch, 1521 June 1; Trent,
1522 February 15; Pavia, 1522 August 12; b. 1618, Milan, 1534 May 2. The holographs in Trent: ASTn,
Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  V,  10,  Trent,  1518  April  21;  Trent,  1519  March  31;  Feldkirch,  1521
September 5; Worms, 1522 February 6; Milan, 1522 July 4; Milan, 1525 March 21.
66 Senatore 2009, 3. Petrucci 2008, 124-127.
67 Ibid.,  pp.  251-254.  Senatore  maintains  that  the  awareness  of  formalities  is  demonstrated  by  the
immediate  acknowledgement  of  infractions  and  innovations,  and  by  the  ability  of  forging  (or  of
recognizing the forgery of) chancery letters.
68 Biow 2008. See also Burke 1995.
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Hence, the differences between chancery/autograph letters and holographs can be
very  codified  and  systematic.  Besides  writing  and  mise-en-page,  the  most  visible
difference lies in the greeting to the recipient (in diplomatics, the salutatio). In chancery
and autograph letters to Mantua,  the greeting to marquis Federico II Gonzaga always
qualifies him as  Signor or  Princeps ('Sir'/ 'Prince'), as Cugino or Consobrine ('Cousin'),
and as Fratello or Frater ('Brother'). In the holographs, the greeting can be shortened to
Signor only. The situation is similar in Trent. In chancery and autograph letters, Bernardo
Cles  is  addressed  to  as  Princeps and  as  Pater  ('Father'),  sometimes  also  as  Domine
('Lord'),  whereas  he  is  only  Domine in  the  holographs.  Moreover,  in  discussing
signatures, I have already noticed how Francesco II chose to drop his surname Sforza and
his title dux Mediolani only when he wrote extensively with his own hand on the letter, as
in  the  case  of  the  holographs.  Finally,  despite  their  colloquial  appearance,  some
expressions were strongly formulaic. One formula touched upon the very aspect of the
letter, confirming its 'formal informality.' Indeed, in wielding the pen personally, the duke
apologised for fastidir (‘annoying’) his recipient with his mal scrivere (‘bad writing’)—it
happened in one holograph to Trent (4 July 1522) and in one holograph to Mantua (2 May
1534),69 as well as in the autograph statement I have just discussed above. 
This  system  of  recurring  features  (personal  handwriting,  studiedly  haphazard
mise-en-page, shortened greeting formulae and signatures, formulaic expressions,) point
to a surprising parallel  with late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth century France.  As
shown by Giora Sternberg,  the  billet  emerged as  a  successful  documentary typology,
because it provided the relaxation of the cumbersome—and highly hierarchical—formal
injunctions of early modern letter-writing.70 Just like Francesco II's personal letters, the
billet involved the  systematic  simplification  of  mise-en-page,  greeting,  and signature.
Logically,  the  billet's  informality quickly underwent  formalisation:  it  became a viable
alternative to standard letters, but its social use was just as calculated.
Francesco II himself reveals how choosing to write a holograph was a weighted
strategy. A letter to his aunt Isabella d'Este begins with this reasoning:
My most Illustrious and Most Excellent Lady, most respectable aunt and mother. I
have recently received one [letter] from your Excellence, which caused great joy;
and I am sorry that it was written with the hand of your Excellence, because you
should not have done it at your inconvenience; I will always be satisfied with a letter
69 ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Milan,1522 July 4: ‘(...) non ho voluto lassar venir questa posta
qual  io  mando  a  la  Corte  Cesarea  senza  questa  mia  mal  scripta  per  piu  fastidir  Vostra  Signoria
Reverendissima (…)’ [emphasis added]; ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618, Milan, 1534 March
2: ‘Non la fastidiro col mio mal scrivere (…).’
70 Sternberg 2009, 74-78
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signed with your own hand.71
Here,  Francesco  clearly  identifies  two  of  the  four  formal  typologies  I  have
detected in his letters to Mantua and Trent: holographs and autograph letters. Delivering a
letter  signed  with  the  signatory's  own  hand  was  a  matter  of  respect;  writing  a  full
holograph was a much more significant sign of attachment, because it represented a long
and fatiguing task.  And indeed,  it  is  no coincidence that Francesco in turn replied to
Isabella  using  his  own  hand:  the  consideration  she  showed  had  to  be—literally—
corresponded. Francesco's polite message about Isabella's resorting in future to secretaries
suggests that he was couching his relation to her as one of filial (and political?) deference.
Paradoxically, because the act of writing with one's own hand by itself equipped a
letter with strong significance, holographs seldom deal with substantial business; rather,
they express a wide range of compliments and apologies—a field in which form mattered
as much as (or even more than) content.  Just  like the autograph statements of mixed
letters, the holographs' primary aim was not conveying a message: the writing  was the
message. Therefore, of the ten holographs preserved in the Archivio Gonzaga and in the
Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  only  two  actually  focused  on  specific  questions.  The  first
holograph is the one just cited above. Francesco II was compelled to write to Isabella
with  his  own  hand  to  reciprocate  her  regard.  He  discussed  a  mediation  for  the
marchioness he was attempting at the Habsburg court—something that he would have
probably delegated to a chancery hand, had he received a standard autograph letter from
Mantua. The second holograph is the one I have analysed in discussing the most cogent
cases of authorship sharing (above, pp. 174-179): Francesco wrote to Cles with his own
hand from Worms to apologise for the homicide committed in Trent by some men of his
entourage.  But  these  two  episodes  aside,  the  other  eight  holographs  are  fairly
insubstantial:  they contain compliments,  apologies,  affirmations of affinity,  obedience,
deference.72  
71 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, 1522 August 12: ‘Illustrissima et Excellentissima Domina
mia,  Cia  et  matre  observandissima.  Ali  zorni  passati  hebe  una  de  Vostra  Excellentia  che  mi  fu
gratissima, et me rincresse che fusse di propria mane di Vostra Excellentia, perche ley non debe pilgiar
tanto fastidio; a me sempre bastara la lettera sua per sotoscripta di mano sua propria.’
72 A brief overview of the holographs to Cles helps clarifying this point. On 21 April 1518, Francesco
apologised for having delayed the answer to the prince-bishop, expressed his devotion to him, and
quickly recommended a lady Barbara. On 31 March 1519, the duke thanked Cles for his letter and the
shipping of some asparagus, expressed his devotion, and apologized for the poor quality of his Latin. On
5 September 1521, the letter began with the apologies for a delay in the answer, then Francesco thanked
Cles for his good offices at the Habsburg court, expressed his devotion, and generically asked for further
mediation at court. On 4 July 1522, the duke apologized for the delay in the answer, wished he could
have seen Cles in person, thanked Cles for the congratulatory letter on the victory in the battle of the
Bicocca, professed his obedience, promised to host Cles as soon as the political situation settled, and
asked for mediation at the Habsburg court. Finally, on 21 May 1525, Francesco expressed his sorrow for
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Hence, contents and handwriting combined to give the letters their meaning. In
introducing the holographs at the beginning of this chapter, I observed that Francesco II
usually performed them in two situations: when he resumed the interrupted epistolary
bond with  his  correspondent,  and when another  message  (either  oral  or  written)  was
already going to travel to  Mantua or Trent.  In both cases,  we could say,  the primary
function of holographs was not informational, but rather representational: the documents
were first and foremost a testimony of Francesco's presence. 
Therefore,  when Francesco  II  reopened  the  communication  channel  with  Cles
after a period of silence, he wrote with his own hand and implied that this did not happen
for a pragmatic reason, but just for the above-mentioned debt (debito) of writing. On 21
April 1518, for example, he wrote:
I delayed my answer until now, because I thought I would send a man of mine there
at the imperial court; and since I could not send him, I thought I would not have
satisfied my debito [of writing] if I further waited in replying to the letter of your
Most Reverend Lordship, and I confess I made a mistake, and I beg you to forgive
me; I did not do it either out of negligence or for any other cause, because I consider
your most Reverend Lordship as my most Reverend and most Illustrious Lord.73
With this  anxiety,  Francesco could  never  have  resorted  to  a  simple  autograph
letter. The fact that a holograph was meant to actually surrogate the presence of the writer
—one of the main functions of the letter as a genre since the times of Cicero and Seneca
—74is also suggested by a letter to Federico II Gonzaga (1 June 1521), which Francesco
wrote personally after the cancellation of a meeting between the two, due to the ongoing
military operations of the early 1520s:
‘I thought I would see your Excellence sooner than misfortune willed (…). Since I
do not think there will be a chance of being together as soon as I desire, I wish this
[letter] of mine to represent my desire of visiting you, and I wish to thank you for the
great love you always demonstrate to me (…).75 
The holograph as a device to materialise Francesco II's presence was perfect for
accompanying chancery letters that did not physically feature his unequivocal personal
intervention, or for strengthening his intervention if required. In this last respect, the case
of 21 May 1525 in the Corrispondenza Clesiana is emblematic. The chancery dispatched
the peasant revolt that threatened Trent, and offered his help.
73 ‘(...) ho tardato per fin hora ad responder vedendo mandar un mio li a la Corte Cesarea, et per qualche
causa non havendolo io possuto mandar, me he parsso manchar del debito mio a star tanto ad risponder
a la lettera de Vostra Signoria Reverendissima, et conffesso haver errato, pregandola ad perdonarmi non
he processo per negligentia ne per niuna altra causa per che io tengo Vostra Signoria Reverendissima in
locho de mio Signor Reverendissimo et Illustrissimo.’
74 Ganz 1997, 282.
75 ‘Io pensavo piu presto che la mala sorte ha voluto poter vedere vostra Excellentia (…) non vedendo
occasione che cusi presto como saria el desiderio mio si possiamo trovar insieme, volio che questa mia
facci parte del desiderio mio che de visitar vostra Excellentia, et ringratiarla del grandissimo amor la
me demonstra in omne cosa (…).’ [emphasis added]
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a mixed letter to Trent to apologise for the misunderstanding that delayed the mission of
Cles's messenger in search of aid to sedate the peasant uprising in Trent's territory (p.
192). Francesco had already acted upon the document, writing an autograph statement to
show his actual concern for the situation. However, surprisingly enough, he must have
thought that even the addition of his own script at the bottom of the letter was insufficient
to  justify  himself,  and  eventually  resolved  to  write  a  separate  holograph  of  excuses.
Francesco wrote that he had learned that the peasants were advancing, and that he worried
as much as if the uprising was taking place in his own dominion. For this reason, he wrote
that  he was ‘very,  very grieved’ (multo multo mi duole),  and invited  Cles  to  use his
resources as if they belonged to Cles himself. This message added nothing substantial to
the  mixed  letter  it  travelled  with:  its  function  was  only  to  represent  the  personal
involvement of Francesco more dramatically. 
In the case of a  viva voce bringing an oral message to its intended recipient, the
holograph similarly played little informational role, because the substantial part of the
same message was evidently in the mouth of the  viva voce  himself. Yet, the holograph
could be crucial for embodying the presence and the will of the sender. The  Archivio
Gonzaga preserves two letters of this kind, dated 15 February 1522 and 2 May 1534.76
The  latter  is  particularly  interesting.  Francesco  II  convinced  the  Gonzaga  resident
ambassador in Milan to leave his post and to bring an oral message to marquis Federico II
in Mantua.  Such decision was quite unusual and drastic,  and Francesco apologised in
advance: ‘I am compelled to ask you to forgive me if I was presumptuous in doing this to
your Excellence, and [I ask you to] forgive [the ambassador] if he made a mistake in
doing me this service.’77 What justified the urgency was a favour Francesco was seeking
from the Gonzaga, so important that it would ‘greatly please the emperor, as well as Italy
as  a  whole.’78 Unfortunately,  however,  such  favour  was  part  of  the  oral  message  to
Federico,  so  it  is  impossible  to  know  what  it  was. As  is  clear,  the  situation  was
exceptional in every regard, and Francesco devised a holograph to reflect it (fig. 5.21, p.
203). The duke adopted a very cursive script and there is practically no trace of mise-en-
page, but the greeting and the signature are duly shortened, showing that the writer was
thinking  carefully  about  the  forms  he  was  choosing.  The  handwriting  was  so  rough
readable that a secretary had to 'de-cipher' it, evidently to make it readable to its intended
76 ASMn, Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1617, Trent, 1522 February 15; b. 1618, Milan, 1534 May 2.
77 ‘(...) sono constretto pregarla mi perdoni se ho usato troppa presuntione in pigliar tanta sceurta di vostra
Excellentia, et a lui se lhavera errato in farmi questo piacere.’
78 ‘(...) l'imperatore ne sentira grandissimo piacere, il simile tutta Italia.’
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recipient. The transcription is still to be found together with the holograph (fig. 5.22, p.
204). 
This holograph introduces the last point I would like to tackle before concluding
the chapter, the actual readability of the Francesco II's writing performances, a question
that deserves a critical approach.
4.4. Presentation Italic and informal Italic: the readability of the duke's 
handwriting in context
Of the four typologies of letters close that I have listed at the beginning of the chapter,
three—  chancery  letters,  autograph  letters,  and  mixed  letters—do  not  show  any
significant internal difference. Their formal features remain stable, independently from
their object and from the circumstances in which they were written. The same cannot be
said for holographs. Indeed, even though they were all written by the duke in person, the
holographs do not form a unitary group, and can be very different from each other. 
The group of the ten holographs could be loosely divided in two sub-sets: there
are seven 'formal' holographs (for a specimen, see fig. 5.23, p. 205), and three 'informal'
holographs (for a specimen, see fig. 5.24, p. 206). There is undoubtedly a very nuanced
middle ground between these two extremes, and the attribution of one document to one
sub-set or another is not always easy (for a 'hybrid' case, see fig. 5.25, p. 207). Yet, there
are also elements that legitimate a clear division. For example, the differences between
the handwritings of the letters belonging to each subset are so evident that, at first glance,
one could even doubt they came from the same hand. However, several details suggest
that all the letters were written by Francesco II at varying levels of speed and cursivity.79
The similarities are thorough in individual letter-forms, such as the 'G's and the 'X's; in
the use of the capital 'B' for some words in the middle of a sentence (with the lower bowl
always left open); in the abbreviated sign for 'per', and in the shape of the 'C' in words like
corte (court) and  Cesare (Caesar) (figg. 5.26–5.45, p. 208).80 Therefore, Francesco was
able to perform two different scripts; to borrow the terminology of Sara Jayne Steen—
who has worked on the letters of Lady Arbella Stuart (1575–1615) and other English
noblewomen—the duke could choose between a presentation italic hand and an informal
italic hand.81 However, as we shall soon see, the graphic informality of the second hand
79 Beal 2008,104: ‘Script is described as 'cursive' (…) when it shows signs of having been written rapidly
with,  for  instance,  the  characters  hurriedly  formed,  minimal  separate  strokes  and  pen-lifts,  linked
lettering, loops, and often a pronounced slope to the right.’
80 I  wish  to  thank Professor  Marc  Smith  (École  Nationale  des  Chartes,  Paris)  and  Dr  David  Rundle
(University of Essex) who helped me corroborate the hypothesis that all the holographs were written
with the hand of Francesco II.
81 Steen 2001, 57.
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Fig. 5.21: Holograph in which Francesco II adopted an especially cursive script (ASMn,
Lettere dei Signori di Milano, 1618, Milan, 1534 May 2)
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Fig. 5.22: Late transcription (probably carried out in the seventeenth or eighteenth
century) of the holograph seen in the previous page (fig. 5.21)
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Fig. 5.23: Example of formal holograph (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, Trent,
1518 April 21)
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Fig. 5.24: Example of informal holograph (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10,
Milan, 1525 May 21)
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Fig. 5.25: Example of 'hybrid' holograph (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10,
Feldkirch, 1521 September 5)
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Figg. 5.26-5.45: Details of single letters/marks coming from five different letters,
demonstrating that they were all holographs written by the same hand—that of Francesco
II. From left to right, the letters belong to ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V, 10, (i)
Trent, 1519 March 31 ('formal' holograph); (ii) Trent, 1518 April 19 ('formal' holograph);
(iii) Feldkirch, 1521 September 5 ('hybrid' holograph); (iv) Milan, 1525 May 21
('informal' holograph); (v) Monza, 1522 July 4 ('informal' holograph). There is a series of
'G's in the first line; of 'X's in the second line; of capital 'B's with the lower bowl left open
in the third line; of abbreviated signs for 'per' in the fourth line; of words containing the
letters 'co' (corte, cose) in the fourth line
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Fig. 5.46: Latin holograph of Francesco II (ASTn, Corrispondenza Clesiana, V,
10, Trent, 1519 March 31)
was administered so strategically that it can be considered very formal as well.
Moreover, it is possible to look at the elements proper of the billet style to claim
that  the more formal  documents  were written without  employing a  secretary.  Indeed,
many letters have the salutation formulae and the signatures shortened, and Francesco II
always uses the first  singular  person. What distinguishes the formal  and the informal
subset is also the accuracy of the letters' mise-en-page. The writing of formal holographs
was organised in some clearly delimited thematic paragraphs, and the margins recalled
those  of  proper  chancery/autograph letters  (again,  see fig.  5.23,  p.  205).  By contrast,
informal holographs show neither clear margins, nor interior intervals and paragraphs,
and the text inevitably had a less coherent flow (fig. 5.24, p. 206). What motivated these
evident differences in the aspect of the documents? Arguably, the quality and readability
of the holographs was strictly connected to their dual function as medium and message.
I  maintained  above  (p.  199)  that  holographs  seldom  dealt  with  substantial
business, because their performance was more significant than their content. Yet, however
insubstantial his messages may have been, Francesco II had nonetheless to make himself
understood, and wrote in a readable manner, executing 'formal' holographs. The necessity
of  being  comprehensible  strongly  diminished  when  the  holographs  integrated  other
messages (either written or oral) travelling to Mantua and Trent. In these last cases, the
letters really became little more than a graphic manifestation of Francesco's presence, and
their extreme informality was functional, because it represented emotionality, conviction,
contact.  Therefore,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  three  holographs  belonging  to  the
'informal' group were all delivered together with other messages. Once again, a situation
that seems to be the result of inexperience and precipitation reveals itself as a calculated
formal strategy.
Francesco II's awareness in terms of formal strategies does not only emerge when
he deliberately used his self-defined 'bad' script (mal scripta, mal scrivere), but also when
he decided to boast his most beautiful version of letter-writing. A holograph addressed to
Cles on 31 March 1519 is a case in point for discussing this question. Young Francesco,
then  still  an  exile  sheltered  in  Trent,  wrote  with  his  own  hand  to  Cles.  In  the  first
paragraph,  Francesco  gave  ‘immortal  thanks’  (gratias  immortales)  for  a  batch  of
asparagus Cles sent him as gift; in the second paragraph, he thanked Cles for the news
received from the court of Ferdinand I of Habsburg; then, he recommended himself to
Cles. Hence, as usual, the message was of little relevance. However, Francesco curiously
decided to write it in Latin. What is interesting here is how this choice had an impact on
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the  holograph's  form,  which  automatically  became  as  polished  as  Francesco  could
accomplish (fig. 5.46, p. 209). The handwriting is remarkably legible for his standards,
and the mise-en-page is also very accurate: we find a clear left margin, plus four well
defined paragraphs, each one with the first line protruding to the left, which allows the
initial letter to be capitalised. This refined graphics is evidently well studied, but there is a
problem: the duke's Latin is rather crude, and—as anticipated earlier in the chapter—the
letter is one of those ending with the incorrect formula ad vita servitor, with the missing
final  'm'  in  the  word  vita.  What  was  the  point  of  making  such  an  effort  to  write
beautifully,  if  the  writer  was  unable  to  support  his  attention  to  detail  with  decent
grammar? Francesco was perfectly conscious of this contradiction. Indeed, he concluded
the letter with a peculiar statement: ‘if the head of the Persian was broken because of this
writing do not impute it to me, but to the University of Wien, which raised such a learned
man (…).’82 Although I  can  only guess  the  meaning of  the  metaphor  that  opens this
affirmation, it is clear that Francesco was being ironic about his own Latin.83 Therefore,
the clash between graphic accurateness and grammatical clumsiness was in fact a desired
effect; possibly, it was a way to joke about a history of personal scholastic unfulfillment
that Cles would have known well because of his past role as mentor to Francesco. This
hypothesis  matches  the  argument  of  historian  of  pedagogy Monica  Ferrari,  who  has
shown that letter-writing became a pillar of courtly education during the fifteenth century,
and that the Sforza court was at the forefront of this trend; writing  manu propria and
composing letters in Latin—as well as learning the notion of debito of writing—were all
fundamental steps in a princely pedagogic program.84 The mention of Wien is also very
interesting, because no biography of Francesco suggests that he was there with Cles and
had contacts  with Wien's  university.  But besides  this,  the holograph works  as a  final
example  of  how  a  'banal'  message  could  be  formally  manipulated  to  become
exceptionally meaningful as a reaffirmation of close connection. 
This chapter began with two series—'Letters of the Lords of Milan to the Gonzaga' in the
Archivio Gonzaga and 'Letters of Sovereign and Princes' in the Corrispondenza Clesiana
—whose  name  propounds  a  very  individualised  and  never-changing  idea  of  letters
82 ASTn,  Corrispondenza  Clesiana,  V,  10,  Trent,  1519 March  31:  ‘Si  forssan  caput  Perssiani  fuisset
fractum in his scribentis no mihi imputet, sed gemnasium Wenn[ensis], qui tale hominem doctum edidit,
et iterum me Reverendissime Domine Vostre comendo.’
83 I checked one of the most consulted collections of classical proverbs and figures of speech (Otto 1890)
in order to find useful clues, but with no results.
84 Ferrari and Piseri 2015, especially 431-434. See also Ferrari 2000, Ead. 2009.
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authorship; and with a scholar (Renato Tisot)  who showed little consideration for the
varying forms of the correspondence between Francesco II  and Bernardo Cles,  being
preoccupied only by its contents. Together they formed an unrealistically static scenario,
especially considering the complexity of chancery practices that has emerged throughout
the second part of this thesis. My research question, then, was whether carrying out a
material  analysis  of  the  letters  could  help  fashion  a  more  coherent  and  convincing
interpretation of them. We can now conclude in the affirmative. A critique of the different
formal features of the two correspondences, based on the approach of what I have defined
as 'new' diplomatics, has disclosed a meaningful and detailed taxonomy of Sforza letters
close—  one  that  should  affect  the  way  in  which  we  read  and  interpret  the  letters
themselves.
I have identified four different typologies of letters close in the Archivio Gonzaga
and in the  Corrispondenza Clesiana:  chancery letters, autograph letters, mixed letters,
and holographs. Each typology results from the continuous tension between two opposing
trends:  a  trend  of  authorship  sharing,  resulting  in  the  collective  occupation  of  ducal
identity  through  chancery  mediation;  and  a  trend  of  authorship  re-appropriation,
consisting in a range of very codified strategies of autography through which Francesco II
channelled his personal presence in the letters bearing his name. 
The analysis of authorship sharing has a strong political value, and a huge impact
on  the  very  status  of  chancery  and  autograph  letters.  Indeed,  if  we  look  at  these
documents in light of the process that brought to their creation, we realise that Francesco
II's contribution was minimal (if any,) and that the chancery could manage state affairs in
a  highly  discretionary  way.  In  addition,  two  cogent  cases  of  authorship  negotiation
surfacing from Mantua and Trent make the collectivisation of chancery and autograph
letters both deeper and absolutely systematic.  In the first  case,  we have seen that the
Senate chancery wrote letters adopting the ducal authorship and simulating Francesco's
personal rhetorical motives, even though the Senate had its own jurisdiction, separate
from (and, as we shall see in Chapter 7, sometimes conflicting with) that of the Sforza. In
the second case, we have seen that Francesco's chancery dispatched letters from Trent not
only imitating his authorship, but also bearing his autograph signature, even though the
duke was elsewhere. For these reasons, we must conclude that Francesco's authorship was
extended to include a plurality of voices, despite the apparent individuality of the letters.
The  analysis  of  autography  strategies,  for  its  part,  helps  explore  the  strong
representational character of the written word, and the outstanding form-awareness of
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early modern letter writers. Francesco II knew that his actual presence behind the letters
bearing his own name was not considered automatic: the 'period eye' of sixteenth-century
recipients must have been well  trained to recognise which letters were collective and
which were individual. For this reason, Francesco could count on a system of autograph
interventions to signal a more or less strong involvement in the making of a letter. The
simplest layer of personalisation was the autograph signature. This device was probably
more symbolic than functional, but it was nonetheless an important sign of respect, as
Francesco himself overtly pointed out in his dramatic last letter to Cles (p. 181) and in
asking Isabella d'Este to just sign her letters to him, without writing them in full with her
own  hand  (pp.  198-199).  The  second  and  third  layer  of  personalisation  were  the
autograph statement in mixed letters and the holograph. We have seen many reasons for
their use, but I wish to highlight here two additional points that have emerged. The first is
that mixed letters and holographs, despite their apparent spontaneity, were as formal and
codified as chancery and autograph letters, even though they adhered to a different kind
of code. We have seen how autograph statements always determined the disappearance of
secretarial  signatures,  and  how  holographs  followed  a  set  of  rules  that  caused  the
simplification  of  the  protocol  and  of  the  ducal  signature,  with  the  addition  of  some
recurrent formulaic expressions. The second point is that the meaning of both autograph
statements  and  holographs  stood  as  much  in  the  act  of  writing  as  in  their  contents.
Francesco  wrote  with  his  own  hand  because  he  wished  to  manifest  his  presence
graphically. His letters constituted a kind of performance
Finally, beyond improving our understanding of the documents themselves, the
material reading of Francesco II's letters enriches our knowledge and interpretation of the
relationship between the correspondents. As far as the Sforza-Gonzaga  axis is concerned,
we  have  appreciated  how  the  epistolary persona  ficta  of  the  duke  channelled  a
widespread  diplomatic  and  administrative  web  of  exchanges  between  Milanese  and
Mantuan institutions, communities, and notables. Moreover, we have seen how Francesco
—when  in  control  of  his  epistolary  self—made  a  great  effort  to  nurture  an  intense
relationship  with  his  aunt  Isabella  d'Este,  whose  presence  at  the  Gonzaga  court  he
regarded at least as influential as that of her son, marquis Federico II. This attitude of
Francesco confirms Isabella's reputation as one of the most powerful women of the Italian
Renaissance. Generally speaking, the 'graphic deference' Francesco repeatedly reserved to
Isabella and Federico—by means of holographs and autograph statements—signals that
he  realistically considered  himself  as  the lesser  part  in  the political  alliance with  the
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Gonzaga, and acted accordingly.  However,  all  this does not bear comparison with the
almost maniacal epistolary care Francesco devoted to his former mentor and protector
Bernardo  Cles.  Until  now,  scholars  have  inferred  the  unique  relationship  between
Francesco and Cles from the contents and the tone of their correspondence—something
that, as we have seen (especially in Chapter 4), can be largely misleading. My material
analysis of the letters, by contrast, provides a more solid ground to claim that Francesco
actually saw Cles as a key-figure in his life—so much so that the duke  never  failed to
dispatch to Trent letters bearing at least one autograph mark, until the very last moments
of his life. 
Now, it is time to turn to Sforza letters patent, and to verify whether we can apply
a similar method of analysis to this further documentary typology.
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Chapter 6 – Letters patent
1. De-contextualised documents: modern archives of letters patent
Unlike letters close, letters patent were dispositive documents: their issue established a
juridical act. Obtaining, holding or producing letters patent was the most effective way to
support a vast array of claims. Should not the production of letters patent be even more
disputed than that of letters close then? Can we expect this disputed production to put the
declared authorship of letters patent into question?
Yet, historians and archivists generally treat letters patent unproblematically, as
the  most  imperative  expression  of  sovereign  authority.  This  happens  for  two  strictly
connected reasons. Firstly,  because historians readily accept the basic narrative of the
final content of letters as a political reality. In a letter patent, an author/authority (in the
case of this thesis, duke Francesco II) invariably grants/authorises/orders something (the
object  of  the  juridical  act)  to  someone  (the  recipient),  thus  showing  his  power.  And
secondly, because historians accept the final form of the letters patent, which matches the
idea of authority conveyed by their content. Indeed, letters patent normally bear all the
marks of authority, as they show huge signatures and seals, coat-of-arms, an outstanding
size, fine writing materials.
This formal factor may seem secondary, but it is precisely the material aspect of
letters patent that has often gave rise to a special regard for their preservation. Between
the late-eighteenth- and the early-twentieth century, for example, letters patent were often
selected for transfer into some special archival collections. In the Italian State Archives,
these  collections  were  typically named  fondi  diplomatici  —'archives  of  diplomas,'  for
example in Florence,  Lucca, Perugia,  Pisa.85 In Milan's State Archives,  as seen in the
general introduction (pp. 39-40), the arbitrary creation of special collections was common
practice throughout the nineteenth century. The huge  Diplomatico archive is a result of
such effort. It is composed of a number of series, which mostly gather loose documents
selected from pre-existing archives using different criteria.86 
One  of  the  series  of  the  Diplomatico is  named  Diplomi  e  Dispacci  Sovrani
('Sovereign Diplomas and Dispatches,'  henceforward  DDS)  and gathers  a selection of
individually-filed documents, most of them letters patent, sorted in series by geographic
provenance (Germany, Spain, Milan, Mantua, Tuscany, and Venice) and further classified
85 Florence:  GGAS, vol. 2, 32-38; Lucca:  Ibid., 584-587; Perugia:  GGAS, vol. 3 (1986), 484-485; Pisa:
Ibid., 646-649.
86 For the full list of series of the Diplomatico, see GGAS, vol. 2, 893.
215
by author—the sovereign whose name opens the document. Hence, the researcher who
wishes to see some of the most spectacular Sforza letters patent has to request a folder of
the Milano series from the DDS, and is then seated at a special isolated table to examine
the  evidence.  In  this  way,  the  archival  and  historical  de-contextualisation  of  the
documents is particularly pronounced. Textual objects that were produced and used in
dynamic  situations  are  now  presented  as  a  perfectly  ordered  series  of  documentary
specimens.
The modes of sampling and classification of letters patent employed to create the
Diplomatico strongly  influence  the  kind  of  research  that  may  be  conducted  on  the
evidence it preserves. On one hand, these modes imply the letters patent' solemnisation,
which has often promoted their edition.87 The edition of letters patent (and of documents
in general) is valid and useful for some scholarly purposes, especially when it comes with
an accurate index of names, places, and things. However, the edition of documents is also
very  limiting  insofar  as  it  tends  to  propose  the  positivist  equation  document=text,
according to  which  it  is  possible  to  effectively  render the  meaning of  a  charter  in  a
transcription and in a summary containing the author, the recipient and the object of a
juridical act. However, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, some important
layers of meaning were conveyed through the physical and paratextual features of the
documents: editions fail consider these decisive complexities.
On the other hand, the same modes of sampling and preservation of letters patent
have encouraged their diplomatic analysis: I have already discussed advantages and limits
of diplomatics as a tool of scholarly inquiry (pp. 16-17, and again pp. 150-151). I have
pointed  out  that  classic  diplomatics  rightly  considers  the  authority  emanating  from
documents as originating from the juxtaposition of many different elements, each one
encapsulating  meaning;  but  I  have  also  stressed  the  need  to  reflect  critically  on  the
activity and process that led to that juxtaposition, something diplomatics does not take
into account—in line with its strictly descriptive nature.
2. Re-contextualising documents: the 'make up' and the 'making ' of Sforza letters 
patent
To begin such critical reflection, we need to go back to Jacques Le Goff's definition of
document as montaggio, an Italian word I have translated with 'assemblage.' As discussed
in the introduction (p. 23-25), Le Goff used the word assemblage to indicate documents
87 Not  for  nothing,  a  series  of  the  Diplomatico  was called  Museo Diplomatico.  For  editions,  see  for
example the series of 21 volumes entitled Pergamene milanesi dei secoli XII-XIII, mostly drawn from
the Diplomatico, published between 1984 and 2008 by the Università Statale of Milan
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as finished products,  as well  as the process of construction that led to their  creation.
Conceiving documents as both a product and a process is the key to carry out a material
analysis of letters patent overcoming the limits of classic diplomatics. Firstly, I will focus
on documents as assemblages in the sense that I will approach the finished letters patent
as documents/monuments, i.e. as textual objects that aim at conveying a precise image of
themselves and their authors—the image Le Goff defines as travestimento ('camouflage')
and apparenza ingannevole ('deceptive appearance').88 Secondly, I will try to de-construct
the assemblage that led to the letters patent' production, in order to verify whether the
conditions in which the 'documents/monuments' were created actually match the image of
authority they aim at conveying. This approach—more interpretive than descriptive, and
sensitive  to  the  political,  social  and  material  reality  of  document-making—represents
what I have defined as new diplomatics. 
In this context, continuing to use the term 'assemblage' to define the document-as-
product and the document-as-process would be confusing, and it is better to separate the
two aspects. For this reason, I will define the final aspect of letters patent as their 'make-
up,' and the process of their production as their 'making-of.' The aim of this chapter is to
analyse  both  make-up  and  making-of  of  a  corpus  of  letters  patent  produced  by  the
chancery of Francesco II.89 
Section 3 analyses the make-up of letters patent. First, I will ask what kind of
implicit political discourse they aim at conveying, and how. What makes them looking so
authoritative? In addition, I will highlight how the uniformity of the juridical value of
letters patent conflicts with the great variety of their forms. How should we interpret this
mismatch? 
Turning to the making of letters patent in section 4, I will take advantage of a
unique  opportunity  offered  by  folder  n.  13  of  the  DDS. The  folder  preserves  eight
incomplete letters patent, which Francesco II's chancery began to produce but did not
finish. The preservation of incomplete documents in a 'showcase' series such as the DDS
deserves some general considerations (4.1). But more importantly, these letters patent—
like the one I have begun this thesis with, the Taverna charter (pp. 11-14)—allow us to
88 Le Goff 1978, 46.
89 The corpus corresponds to folder n. 13 of the Milano sub-series in the DDS–thirty-six documents–but I
will  also  use  21one  document  coming  from  a  similar  collection  preserved  in  Milan's  Municipal
Historical Archives, called Cimeli  ('Memorabilia'). Since the documents I am going to refer to always
belong to the same folder of their series/fond,  I will use only the name of the series/fond to which they
belong plus their file number in order to identify them. For example: ASMi,  Diplomatico,  Diplomi e
Dispacci Sovrani, Milano, folder 13, file 83 is abbreviated in DDS 83; ASCMi, Cimeli, folder 11, file 60
is abbreviated in Cimeli 60.
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grasp  the  background of  documentary production,  thus  enabling  an  interesting  set  of
questions. Does the  corroboratio—the clause that announces the actions that have been
taken to validate the document—always describe the actual process of authentication of
letters patent)? What was the real value of the elements that signified ducal authority,
such as Francesco's signature and his seal? Was there a standard procedure for creating a
document, or was such procedure unregulated? What was the role of illumination, the
element that more than anything else transformed letters patent in striking emblems of
authority?  The answers to all these questions will help change our perspective on the
compact and authoritative nature of letters patent we have started from.
3. The make-up of Sforza letters patent
3.1. letters patent as 'documents-monuments'
Historians and archivists have accepted the basic narrative encapsulated in the content as
well as in the form of letters patent. It is a narrative of unchallenged, top-down authority.
These documents 'speak' as if their sole author was the duke, acting out of his will and
power. Even the standard definition of letter patent in the Vocabulaire International de la
Diplomatique has accepted this point, highlighting that a letter patent was produced to
record ‘a decision made [by an authority] (...) following its own will.’ (see above, p. 16).
Using Le Goff's illuminating vocabulary,  we can say that historians and archivists are
passive before the make-up of these documents/monuments.
If the objective is to de-construct the monumentality of the documents, then it is
first of all important to understand how this monumentality was constructed. In order to
do so, we have to turn to the diplomatics of letters patent. Their authoritativeness was the
result of an assemblage of features—the document's make-up—which, in the vocabulary
of diplomatics, are defined as 'internal' when they relate directly to its textual contents,
and as 'external' when they are purely material and (supposedly) independent from them
(for more information, see also Glossary 1, p. 326).90 
Let us begin by looking at the internal diplomatic features of letters patent. The
ensemble  of  their  textual  contents  is  called  tenor,  and  consists  of  protocol,  text,  and
eschatocol.  Firstly,  the protocol is the opening part  of the letter  patent.  It  has a clear
intitulation  unmistakably  identifying  Francesco  II  as  the  author  of  the  juridical  act
(intitulatio). The name of the duke is often written in capital letters, and is bigger than the
rest  of  the  tenor's  words,  so  that  it  clearly  stands  out  as  one  of  the  most  important
90 VID, 51 and 45.
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elements of the document. 
Secondly, in the  text, the language used is nearly always Latin, the language of
authority  par  excellence.  There  is  only  one  exception  in  my  corpus,  a  letter  patent
granting a Genoese merchant the right to export corn outside the Duchy of Milan (DDS
85). The monumentality of Latin is particularly imposing if the documents were issued
following a petition written in vernacular: indeed, the petition was often transcribed into
the text, thus creating a visually sharp linguistic contrast with the solemn Latin formulae
surrounding it. Moreover, the fundamental statement manifesting the will of the authority
and originating the juridical act  (dispositive clause,  or  dispositio) is always expressed
through first-person verbs (ordinamus,  decernimus,  statuimus, and so forth) suggesting
the strong individual agency of the duke—as in the case of chancery and autograph letters
close. Such personalisation is furthered by a final statement of the text describing the
actions  taken  to  authenticate  the  document:  such  statement  (called  clause  of
corroboration,  or  corroboratio)  invariably  identifies  Francesco  II  as  the  one  who
personally ordered the creation of the letter patent (jussio), as well as its registration and
sealing.
Finally, it was in the last part of the document, the eschatocol, that the chancery
put the strongest effort to accomplish an effect of authoritativeness. Here, we begin to
pass from the internal to the external documentary features. A large portion of the letter
patent—typically from one third to half of its total surface—was normally left blank to
host the huge signature and the seal of the duke, clearly directing the attention of present
and future readers to these symbols of ducal authority (fig. 6.1, p. 221). By contrast, the
other  clerical  signatures—those of  the  Gran Cancelliere and of one secretary—found
place  on  the  bottom-left  and  bottom-right  corner  of  the  document  respectively,  as
marginal features. The seal could be impressed on the document's surface, or pendant. In
the  latter  case,  it  was  a  spectacular  device  that  alone  turned  the  letter  patent  into  a
monument (fig. 6.2, p. 222).
As is clear from this description, an arsenal of textual elements was purposefully
arranged to express a simple and direct political declaration transcending the particular
object of the single letter patent: the duke is the only source of power, the duke acts out of
his own exclusive will. Additional external features could physically design the idea of
authority. Illumination, for example, when present, made letters patent something to look
at, and not only to read. Size and writing material—the two most basic characteristic of
the  document-as-object—were  also  significant.  letters  patent  are  often  of  outstanding
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size, and they are made of precious parchment, or of high-quality paper, later known in
Milan as carta da patente (‘letter-patent paper.’)91 
3.2. Non-standard monuments
Once it is clear that letters patent were explicitly meant to become documents/monuments
from the moment of their creation, we can overcome  our passivity  in response to their
make-up, thus starting to scrutinise their form. From this point of view, one first element
to approach critically is the lack of standardisation of the evidence preserved in the Sforza
corpus. Indeed, the aspect of the letters patent varies greatly,  although they all define
themselves  as  litterae,  and  although  they  all  ultimately  served  the  same  function—
sanctioning a juridical act. 
To realise the remarkable formal variety of Sforza letters patent, it is first of all
necessary to analyse their aspect when they present themselves in their lowest and highest
scale of solemnity. In order to do so, I have identified two models of letters patent, and I
have labelled them as 'simple letter patent' and as 'diploma' respectively—the use of the
term 'diploma' being suggested from the name of the DDS collection (Diplomi e Dispacci
Sovrani). On the one hand, the least solemn simple letters patent are made of paper; their
size tends to be standardised, and to coincide with that of the bifoliums used for letters
close, but the text is arranged horizontally, following the long side of the page; the signs
of authentication used are the autograph signature of the duke, his impressed seal and the
signatures of the  Gran Cancelliere and of one secretary.  Simple letters patent are not
illuminated (fig. 6.3, p. 223). On the other hand, the most solemn diplomas are made of
parchment;  their  size  is  bigger  than  those  of  the  diplomatic  bifoliums,  and  varies
considerably  from  charter  to  charter;  like  simple  letters  patent,  diplomas  bear  the
autograph signature of Francesco, but the seal is pendant; a  plica (turn up) is typically
made at their bottom, to reinforce the parchment to which the seal is tied; the signatures
of  the  secretaries  are  therefore  normally  hidden  under  the  plica;  diplomas  may  be
illuminated (fig. 6.4, p. 224).
Although  roughly  one-fourth  of  the  documents  in  the  corpus  I  am analysing
represent simple letters patent, and there are six charters that can be defined as diplomas,
what emerges from the corpus is precisely that the great majority of the documents do not
correspond to  the two models  outlined above.  Documents  showing the authenticating
elements of  simple letters patent (autograph signature of the duke and impressed seal)
91 See  for  example  the  late-sixteenth-century  orders  of  purchase  to  stationers  contained  in  ASMi,
Diplomatico, Miscellanea Storica, 66, 1580 July 26.
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Fig. 6.1: DDS 69, with a large space left blank for hosting the eschatocol
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Fig. 6.2: Brass box containing the pendant seal of Cimeli 60, decorated with the Sforza
coat-of-arms sided by the emblem of the buckets and burning logs
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Fig. 6.3: Typical example of 'simple letter patent' (DDS 5)
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Fig. 6.4: Typical example of 'diploma' (DDS 70). Unfortunately, the pendant seal is lost
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Fig. 6.5: Example of 'hybrid' letter patent (Cimeli 18). The charter has an impressed seal
(typical feature of simple letters patent,) but is made of parchment and illuminated
(typical features of diplomas) 
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Fig. 6.6: Another example of 'hybrid' letter patent (DDS 8), with the typical features of a
diploma (parchment, illumination, plica), but featuring impressed seal instead of a
pendant one.
can often be found in parchment, instead of paper, and of a bigger size than a letter close,
or even with a little miniature (fig. 6.5, p. 225); conversely, documents with the aspect of
a diploma (outstanding size, with plica, illuminated,) rather than a pendant seal, can bear
an impressed one (fig. 6.6, p. 226). Therefore, the features strictly defining simple letters
patent  and diplomas  are  only two:  if  documents  are  made of  paper,  they have  to  be
considered  simple  letters  patent,  because  they  will  necessarily  lack  illumination  and
pendant seal; if documents have a pendant seal, they have to be considered diplomas, and
will be necessarily made of parchment. All the other combinations of features result in
'hybrid' documents, which represent the rule (and not the exception,) and form a nuanced
middle ground between the two models.
To my knowledge, this evident variety has never been object of specific reflection.
However,  analysing it  is fundamental.  Indeed, the very fact that the chancery did not
standardise  its  production  and  rank  it  into  a  simple  hierarchy  of  few  well-defined
archetypes demonstrates that the making of letters patent was characterised by a series of
careful choices on the material forms to adopt, which in turn implies that those forms
were highly meaningful, and cannot be dismissed as secondary and unimportant. As a
consequence,  letters  patent  are  brought  into  Renaissance  material  culture  as physical
objects, and not only as abstract texts. They become part of a ‘material world’ that, as
Ulinka Rublack points out,  
can only properly be understood through an engagement with 'actual products': 'how
they were designed and made' and 'what they were used for'. This is all the more
important  since  many  Renaissance  artefacts  gained  their  significance  and
attractiveness by drawing attention to the features of their matter and to the crafting
skills involved in their creation.92
In other words, an overall view on Sforza chancery production, combined with
material-culture theory, clearly suggests that we should not limit ourselves to reading the
textual content of documents—especially letters patent, the 'most conspicuously material'
documents  of  all.  We  must  consider  their  making  and  their  handling  in  order  to
understand them fully. In addition, the physical aspect of documents clearly changed with
the socio-political context of their creation, and the forms that material-culture studies
treat as meaningful here obtain a distinctively political significance. The make-up of a
letter patent was dependent on the kind of juridical act it recorded, and, crucially, on the
standing of the recipient, and on the relationship in force between him/her and the letter's
author.93 In  this  sense,  letters  patent  represented  an  object  whose  design  was  not
92 Rublack 2013, 43.
93 An interesting example to corroborate this argument is that of the Italian jesuit missionary Alessandro
Valignano (1539–1609), who carefully described the material features of the papal letters he wanted to
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commanded only by the duke and his chancery, but also by the recipient. I analyse three
specific examples of such situation in this chapter (pp. 254-256); more generally, as we
shall  see,  investigating  the  procedures  involving  the  illumination  of  letters  patent  is
especially useful to understand their inherently dynamic and 'social' nature.
Considering the context and recipient of a letter patent—and not only their official
author—as substantial factors in its making is a first step in de-constructing the studiedly
authoritative image of these documents. If the power of Francesco II was as undisputed as
letters patent tried to convey with their internal and external features, then why were the
same letters patent so changeable in their material form? As in the case of letters close,
taking  the  authorship  and  the  narrative  of  letters  patent  at  face  value  is  misleading.
Following  Le  Goff's  recommendation,  we  should  make  an  effort  to  disassemble  the
construction of these documents. In this way, the focus shifts from the make-up of letters
patent to their making of.
4. The making of Sforza letters patent
4.1.  Eight  unfinished  Sforza  letters  patent:  a  key  to  'unlock'
documents/monuments
The importance of interpreting documents in terms of process rather than final form has
been one of the mainstays of this thesis. As far as letters close are concerned, the task was
relatively easy: with the possible exception of the duke's signature, the content of the
letters close was written from top to bottom (then the address on the outside of the letter)
and the alternation of different scripts shows who acted upon the letter at any given stage.
By contrast,  letters  patent  are  much more  difficult  to  de-construct:  their  monumental
make-up is very compact. The text is written by one hand only, without any correction or
addition—except for the date, which could be added by a different hand —and there is no
intuitive  order  of  apposition  for  all  the  other  authenticating  or  decorative  parts:
illumination, ducal and secretarial signatures, ducal seal, notes of registration could all
precede or succeed each other.
Fortunately,  however, the  DDS series offers a key to 'unlock' these documents,
because it preserves eight undated and unregistered documents (DDS 83, 85, 86, 88-92,
figg. 6.7-6.14, pp. 230-237). The chancery could not dispatch any act as important as a
letter  patent  without  the  place  and  date  of  issue,  and  registration  notes  for  future
be delivered to the Japanese Emperor and his provincial governors. Valignano wanted the letters to the
Emperor to be much more magnificent to those directed to the governors, in order to respectfully reflect




Fig. 6.7: Unfinished letter patent 1 – Supplicanter Nobis (DDS 83)
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Fig. 6.8: Unfinished letter patent 2 – Volendo Noi (DDS 85)
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Fig. 6.9: Unfinished letter patent 3 – Petentibus Humiliter (DDS 86)
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Fig. 6.10: Unfinished letter patent 4 – Cum Publica (DDS 88)
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Fig. 6.11: Unfinished letter patent 5 – Non Parvam (DDS 89)
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Fig. 6.12: Unfinished letter patent 6 – Nomine Hippoliti (DDS 90)
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Fig. 6.13 – Unfinished letter patent 7 – A Magnifica (DDS 91)
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Fig. 6.14: Unfinished letter patent 8 – Cum Nuper (DDS 92)
reference:  therefore,  these  documents  are  unfinished.  The  chancery started  producing
them, but the process stopped at some point. The reason of this interruption is unknown,
except from one case, when a sentence to be added in the text was noted at the bottom of
a letter patent, and this clearly caused the need to remake it (fig. 6.14, p. 237). 
Originally,  these documents  were probably supposed to  be discarded,  but  they
somehow survived—this fact is by no means surprising. What is surprising is that they
were included in a 'showcase' collection like the DDS, and that they were catalogued in
the inventory without any warning as to their peculiarity. This confirms that the general
aspect of letters patent was (and still  is)  able to divert  attention from details  that  are
crucial to their full comprehension. The narrative formally conveyed by the documents
make-up looks more relevant than their strictly juridical value, which in this case is null.
In a sense,  these are documents/monuments at  their  finest,  because their  'camouflage'
wins over any other contextual consideration. 
Nineteenth-  or  early-twentieth  century archivists  inserted  the  unfinished letters
patent among the finished ones because the former, just like the latter, carried solemn
documentary features—for example, the intitulatio in capital letters, or Francesco's huge
autograph  signature,  and  the  ducal  seal.  But  since  such  authoritative  elements  were
apposed into the document before the document was finished, it means they were not
necessarily decisive for the juridical validation of the document. After the problem of the
lack  of  standardisation,  the  make-up  of  letters  patent  thus  shows  another  point  of
weakness, and it is appropriate to turn now to the single unfinished documents in detail to
know more.  
Chart 6.1 at p. 229 lists the undated letters patent, two starting words of their text
to identify them more conveniently, and their typology (as described above). For each
document,  I  have  noted  what  features  existed  or  were  missing  when  its  production
stopped. The analysis of the unfinished documents has led to the identification of seven
substantial documentary features I will focus on in the following pages. Five of them—
from the top to the bottom of the document: the initial 'F' of 'Franciscus,' the corroboratio,
Francesco's signature, the seal, the secretaries' signatures—could either be included in or
missing  from the  document.  The remaining two—date  and notes  of  registration—are
always missing. Cross-checking the combination of existing and missing features in each
unfinished letter  patent will  allow me to detect a series of meaningful patterns in the
process of documentary production,  and to better  understand the actual authenticating
value of each feature. This, in turn, will enable an informed reflection on the authorship
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and on the very nature of letters patent, independently from their constructed make-up.
4.2. The narrative of the corroboratio and the reality of document making
In  analysing  unfinished  letters  patent  that  allow  to  glimpse  the  procedures  of  their
production, the first element to look at is certainly their  corroboratio—the declaration
how the charter had been authenticated. Indeed, in the corroboratio, the document 'speaks
of itself' by narrating the most significant stages that marked its own making. Therefore,
we have the chance to answer two simple but important questions: is the  corroboratio
always trustworthy? And if not, in what sense does it mislead, or even lie?
The standard  corroboratio for the documents produced in the secret chancery of
Francesco II translates: ‘As a testimony/warrant for such things [the contents enunciated
in  the  text],  we  [the  duke]  order  to  make  the  present  [letter],  to  register  it,  and  to
impress/append our seal to it.’94 What is to be stressed immediately is that this statement
is not only merely technical, but also strongly performative and political. According to the
corroboratio, the duke in person directed the whole procedure of document making. He
originated  the  procedure  with  the  jussio (the  order  of  creating  the  document,)  he
confirmed its validity with the order of registering the document, and he concluded it with
the order of apposing his seal. This three-stage operation represents the climax of ducal
authority,  and  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  personal authentication  of  the  duke—as
represented  by  the  seal—came  after  (and  therefore  prevailed  over)  the  bureaucratic
authentication of the registration notes. Hence, as pointed out earlier, the corroboratio is
one of the internal features that contribute to monumentalise the document.
Now,  let  us  focus  on  the  eight  unfinished  documents  to  verify  whether  the
corroboratio actually described the process of document-making as it unfolded. In three
cases—Supplicanter  Nobis,  Petentibus  Humiliter,  Nomine  Hippoliti—making  the
comparison  is  impossible,  because  the  corroboratio is  just  missing.  Actually,  the
impossibility of comparing narration and practice of document making is significant: it
signals that the clause could not have been considered a pure formality. A scribe wrote
protocol and  text, setting all the terms of the act, but avoided describing the mode of
validation until the eschatocol was materially carried out. 
However, two other cases demonstrate that the corroboratio could also be written
automatically,  before  the  eschatocol  signs  of  validation  (date  and  registration  notes,
signatures and seal) had all been carried out. Indeed, Cum Nuper has the clause, but the
94 ‘In  quorum  testimonium/fidem  presentes  fieri  iussimus,  ac  registrari,  nostrique  sigilli
appensione/impressione muniri.’
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rest of the eschatocol is missing, whereas  Non Parvam has the clause and Francesco's
signature, but lacks his seal, secretarial signatures, date and registration notes. Therefore,
the ambitious  corroboratio did not always actually describe what had happened during
the  making  of  the  document.  Rather,  it  was  a  formulaic  passage  that  fictionalised
Francesco II's authority independently from procedure.
In the three remaining cases, the rhetorical deception of the corroboratio emerging
from the comparison with the unfinished letters patent is at the same time subtler and
more  thought-provoking.  Cum  Publica  lacks  only  date  and  registration  notes,  while
Volendo Noi  and  A Magnifica  lack secretarial signatures, date and registration notes. It
means that as a matter of fact, the elements of ducal identity (signature and seal) were
deployed before the letters patent were validated. This fact overturns the whole narration
of the  corroboratio. The process of document making did not culminate in the duke's
order of apposing the seal on the letter patent, but in the bureaucratic procedures that
followed, despite the fact that the  corroboratio purposefully described those procedures
as preceding the final and decisive intervention of Francesco II in person. This calls for a
closer  scrutiny of  the  value  of  Francesco's  signature  and  seal,  the  two elements  that
graphically monopolise the eschatocol.
4.3. The ducal signature: a validating feature?
In  the  letters  patent  produced  by Francesco  II's  chancery,  the  signature  of  the  duke
normally has a huge size, and it occupies a vast portion of the eschatocol. In other words,
its presence seems to have the importance and the function that is usually reserved for
signatures—that is, demonstrating that its author has actually viewed and approved the
signed document. However, strangely enough, the corroboratio nearly always ignores the
presence  of  the  duke's  signature.  The  clause  describes  registration  and  sealing  as
fundamental steps of document-making, but generally overlooks the only autograph sign
of the author on the document that bears his intitulatio. The same omission seems to have
occurred under Francesco's predecessors.95
Furthermore,  six out of eight unfinished letters patent show the signature,  thus
suggesting that it came early in the process of documentation. Documents such as  Non
Parvam (fig. 6.11, p. 234) and Nomine Hippoliti (fig. 6.12, p. 235) are quite emblematic;
here,  the  eschatocol  was  left  empty—Nomine  Hippoliti  does  not  even  have  the
corroboratio—but the signature was nonetheless in its place.
95 Folder n. 9 of the DDS preserves letters patent issued under Ludovico Sforza: only five out of many tens
are signed; and of the five signed letters patent, only one mentions the signature in the corroboratio. 
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The absence of the signature from the corroboratio and the regular presence of the
signature in early-aborted documents suggests that  pre-signed blank papers and charters
were available in the secret chancery.96 Some evidence, scattered but substantial, makes
this hypothesis highly plausible. In analysing letters close, for example, I already pointed
out how documents bearing the autograph signature of the duke were dispatched from
Trent when Francesco was in Worms. In addition, we know that Sforza diplomats were
given blank papers bearing only the ducal signature when they began a mission; indeed,
in  the  Sforzesco archive,  two  undated  documents  listing  the  equipment  of  travelling
agents mention ‘twenty signed papers’ (viginti folia signata) and, more explicitly, ‘twenty
papers  signed  by  the  hand  of  the  duke’ (XX  folii  sottoscripti  de  mano  del  duca).97
Diplomats were probably authorised to use these materials to make official agreements
directly on the site of their operations.
Furthermore, in a letter dated 16 December 1531 and transcribed in the  Registri
delle  Missive,  the  chancery  forbade  the  Maestri  delle  Entrate  Ordinarie  to  forward
mandates of payments to the treasurer, specifying that the prohibition was valid even if
the mandates bore the signature of Francesco II: only the presence of the signature of first
secretary  Bartolomeo  Rozzoni  would  validate  the  mandate.   Evidently,  this  overt
diminishment of the ducal signature would be hardly conceivable if we did not admit that
the mandates of payment referred to were pre-signed. This entry of the  Registri delle
Missive  confirms  the  fragmentation  of  documentary  flows  in  the  chancery  already
highlighted in Chapter 3 (e.g. pp. 112-113), and how their opening—or, in this case, their
closure—depended on volatile internal relations of power. The same letter also shows the
importance of a strictly documentary matter like this, because Francesco decided to add
an  autograph  statement  to  the  letter,  reading  ‘we want  you  to  duly observe  the  said
[order].’98 It can hardly be a coincidence that another missive prescribing changes in the
internal balance of the chancery—Rozzoni should have substituted Ricci in signing some
mandates while the latter was employed in other tasks—was equally reinforced by an
96 Pre-signed documents were common in early modern offices, and facilitated abuses. In late-seventeenth
century, for example, the complex system of passes England and Algiers agreed upon to identify ships
and mariners was seriously undermined by the proliferation of pre-signed passports. See Vitkus 2001,
Appendix n. 7, 369-370–cited in Eliav-Feldon 2012, 207.
97 ASMi,  Sforzesco,  Potenze  Sovrane,  Atti  e  Scritture  Camerali, 1626,  undated:  ‘Expetidio  Magnifici
Equitis  Domini  Marchesini  Stange  Romam  et  Neapolim  profecturi’,  and  ‘Expeditione  per  el
Reverendissimo et Illustrissimo signore vicecan.’ The mention of Marchesino Stanga–a Sforza secretary
at the time of duke Ludovico–suggests that these expeditiones were written during the 1490s.
98 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, ll. 36-37, 1531 December 16: ‘Il soprascripto volemo lo servati senza
alcuna difficulta.’
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autograph ‘this is our express will.’99
Finally,  and somehow paradoxically,  the very relative value of the signature is
confirmed  by  the  fact  that  there  actually  are  some  isolated  cases  in  which  the
corroboratio does signal the signature's  presence. In my corpus, this is true of two letters
patent belonging to the solemn subset of the diplomas. One is unfinished (A Magnifica),
and the mention of the signature was inserted at the beginning of the corroboratio: ‘As a
testimony for such things, we [the duke] order to make the present [letter] signed with our
own hand, to register it (…).’100 The other diploma dates 29 July 1531, and the mention
was inserted at the end of the clause: ‘we order (...) to register it, to seal it, and we sign it
with our own hand.’101 The fact that these mentions are to be found in two diplomas,
rather than in simple letters patent, may suggest that in some exceptional cases the duke
actually signed the documents as part of the documents' validation, and the clause duly
reported this practice. But in the majority of cases, when the mention of the signature is
missing, we should then conclude that its presence was definitely more symbolic than
functional. 
Therefore,  after  the  corroboratio,  another  documentary  feature  that  decisively
contributes  to  the  authoritativeness  of  the  document  make-up  proves  to  be  largely
accessory when put to the test. And this time we are not talking about a clause, but about
the  signature,  the  validating  mark  par  excellence,  representing  the  author  as  both
individual and authority. As we have seen, it was an element of writing that Francesco II
was very keen to micro-manage in letters close.
4.4. The ducal seal: a powerful tool for collective use
The other sign of ducal authority that occupies the space of the eschatocol is the seal. The
seal is always mentioned in the  corroboratio, which also specifies if it is impressed or
pendant.  Unlike  the  signature,  the  seal  must  be  considered  a  very  powerful  tool.  In
Chapter 3, for example, we have already encountered a chancery clerk defined as 'seal-
keeper' (quello che tene il sigillo), who was subjected to a specific Ordo of regulations.
To remain within Cicco Simonetta's chancery Ordines, the implicit anxiety with which the
management of the seal is described confirms its great importance:
Item the ushers must not seal any letter before showing it to the seal-keeper and to
the treasurer of the chancery, or to those who are authorised  [to do so] following the
rules of the said chancery; and after [the letters] are sealed they [the ushers] have to
give them back, handing them to the one who wrote it, or to the treasures, or to the
99 Ibid., l. 40, 1532 May 12: ‘Questa è l'expressa nostra volunta.’
100 ‘In quorum testimonium praesentes manu nostra manu nostra subsignatas fieri, ac registrari iussimus’
101 ‘(...) registrari, sigillari iussimus, manuque propria subscripsimus’
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said authorised people; and these latter have to hand and distribute them to whom it
will concern, or to the master of the mounted messengers (…) and them ushers must
not give away any letter without express license of the said treasure, or of the above-
mentioned authorised people.102
Here, the Ordines struggled to devise a rigid procedure for monitoring the sealing
of documents and the handling of the sealed documents awaiting dispatch. The seal was
important  both as a symbol and as a  material  object:  its  physical handling ensured a
remarkable share of  power.  With respect  to  this,  the most  emblematic  episode of the
Sforza age occurred during the 1490s, when the Consiglio di Giustizia fiercely opposed
duke Ludovico's decision to transfer the seal from the hands of the counsellors to those of
a newly-appointed secretary of the council's chancery, Nicolò Gambarelli. Gambarelli, on
his part,  had gone so far as to indicate the possession of the seal as a non-negotiable
condition for accepting the appointment.103
These facts certainly remove all doubt regarding the authority attached to the seal,
but they  also open another question: who controlled the seal, using (or abusing) such
authority? Once again, we face a relevant mismatch between the rhetoric of documentary
internal/external features on one side, and the reality of document-making on the other.
What the ducal seal 'tells of itself,' in the final make-up of letters patent, is that it was the
seal of the duke. It bore his name and coat of arms, it materialised its peremptory will. In
practice, however, the seal was by all means a collective asset. It represented the duke,
but it was independent from his person. 
The collective use of the ducal seal is no original discovery: as early as in 1943,
Giacomo Bascapé noticed that even the signet-ring104 the dukes used to validate the most
important documents—named corniola secreta ('secret carnelian,' carnelian being a semi-
precious gemstone used for the purpose of sealing documents since antiquity,) an object
so personal that Ludovico Sforza had it minted with the likeness of his dead wife Beatrice
d'Este—could  be  overtly  handed  over  to  secretaries  with  the  simple  request  of  not
misusing  it.105 Yet,  scholars  overlook the  profound consequences  this  fact  has  on the
102 BTMi,  Cod. Triv.  1325, f. 92: ‘Item che [gli uschieri] non debbano sigillare lettera alcuna che prima
non la faciano vedere a quello che tene el sigillo, et lo thesaurero de la cancellaria, o vero alli deputati
secundo li ordini dessa cancellaria; et postquem siano sigillate le debiano restituere, et dare ad quello le
havesse scripte, o vero al tesorero o vero alli deputati ut supra, li quali habiano loro ad dare et distribuire
a cui le spectarano, o vero le debiano dare al officiale di cavallari (…) et che per niente essi uschieri non
se debiano impazare de  darne  veruna senza expressa  licentia  del  dicto tesorero,  o  vero  deputati  ut
supra.’
103 Covini 2007, 36-37.
104 Beal 2008, 384: ‘'signet' means a small seal, usually fixed into a finger-ring, or signet-ring, used to
stamp an impression in hot wax.’ 
105 Bascapé  1942-1943,  14.  Ludovico  wanted  the  documents  issued  under  the  corniola  secreta  to  be
transcribed in a dedicated register. There is evidence of the use of the corniola also under Francesco II
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, l. 40, 1532 May 22).
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nature of sovereign power, especially because they fail to contextualise it in the bigger
picture  of  document-making  that  I  have  been  putting  together:  seals  were  tools  for
collective use, demonstrating less the authority of the duke than the sharing of power by
chancery members. 
4.5. The preeminence of secretarial signatures over the ducal signature, and the 
many procedures of document making
In order to complete the above-mentioned picture, something has yet to be said about
secretarial signatures, the different procedures through which all the necessary validating
elements were placed on letters patent, and letters patent' illumination. The analysis of
secretarial signatures highlights another relevant mismatch between the make-up and the
making of letters patent. The signatures of the  Gran Cancelliere (when acting—that is,
between 1522 and 1525 and between 1533 and 1535) and of one of the secretaries (nearly
always the primo secretario) are never mentioned in the corroboratio, as if they played
only an auxiliary role in the authentication of the document. In addition,  interestingly
enough, the omission of secretarial signatures from the corroboratio could find a material
representation in the most solemn documents. Indeed, in the documents that I labelled as
diplomas, the plica normally hides secretarial signatures, so that the reader's attention is
automatically  directed  to  the  duke's  huge  signature  and  to  the  seal.  This  effect  was
obtained  on purpose, because in some cases, the  plica hiding the secretarial signatures
was made even when its presence was not technically justified by the apposition of the
pendant seal—which caused the need to reinforce the parchment where the seal was tied
(see for example A Magnifica, fig. 6.13, p. 236).
This symbolic preeminence of the ducal signature over secretarial signatures in the
make-up of  letters  patent  does  not  match  the  balance  emerging  from the  documents'
making. The organisation of Sforza registers, for example, demonstrates that secretarial
signatures  had  an  actual  authenticating  value.  Indeed,  the  signatures  of  the  Gran
Cancelliere and of the secretaries are always to be found at the bottom of each entry, with
no exception, whereas the signature of the duke is often absent—a clue of its possible
accessoriness. The analysis of the unfinished letters patent points to the same direction. In
four  out  of  eight  cases  (Supplicanter  Nobis,  Cum  Publica,  Non  Parvam,  Nomine
Hippoliti), the ducal signature appears and secretarial signatures do not, suggesting that
the latter  had power over the first.  Two other  unfinished documents  (Volendo Noi,  A
Magnifica) bear both ducal and secretarial signatures.
But even the only case in which secretaries signed before the duke—Petentibus
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Humiliter  (fig. 6.9, p. 232)—is instructive, because it shows that letters patent in their
making resembled a complex socio-political jigsaw rather than a celebratory monument
to  the  authority  of  the  sovereign.  As  I  repeatedly  pointed  out,  the  assemblage  of  a
document did not follow stable procedures, but resulted from an extemporary series of
actions  and 'counter-actions'  in  which  timing  and 'spatiality'  (being  there  at  the  right
moment) were crucial.
Had  Petentibus Humiliter  been completed, the juridical act it established would
formally consist in the go-ahead given by Francesco II to the transfer of the rectorship of
a countryside parish from the current rector, Leonardo de Capitedomus, to a Milanese
cleric,  Annibale  Tagliabue.  As  usual,  in  the  finished  letter  patent,  the  operation  is
presented as if it has been fully directed by Francesco himself: we find his name in the
intitulatio and some clear orders in the dispositio, such as ‘we mercifully order’ (benigne
duximus) and ‘we decide to consent’ (decernimus nobis placere). However, as stated at
the  beginning,  the  document  originated  from  a  joint  petition  of  the  outgoing  and
incoming rectors, who had already agreed on the succession and merely sought official
approval. And, more importantly, the form of the unfinished document suggests that the
beneficial  chancery probably arranged everything without  the  concourse of  the  duke.
Indeed,  the  letter  bears  only the  secretarial  signatures  of  Gran Cancelliere Girolamo
Morone and ecclesiastical secretary Giorgio Gadio, without any sign of ducal authority.
Therefore,  in this  case,  the jussio certainly had not come from Francesco. We should
rather see the letter patent from the opposite perspective: that of the petitioners. They
probably drafted the documents themselves, obtained a first approval from Morone and
Gadio, and were just one signature away (that of Francesco) from getting their motion
successfully authenticated through the chancery.
Besides its specific history,  Petentibus Humiliter demonstrates that the document
make-up represented the end of a process that could have followed different procedures,
different influences and interferences, different tensions. The question of the authorship
of documents returns, and is possibly more problematic than it is for letters close. As we
have seen in the previous chapter, the authorship of letters close was open to sharing, but
the duke could at least count on an elaborated range of autography strategies to highlight
his actual agency on paper, and to make the letters more or less personal. By contrast, in
the  making  of  letters  patent,  there  was  practically  no  difference  between  documents
issued actually following the will or the involvement of Francesco II, and documents in
which the chancery had appropriated ducal identity independently from his person.
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4.6. Illumination (or lack thereof) and the reception of letters patent
The last documentary feature to analyse is illumination. Illumination represents, by all
means,  a documentary element of its  own kind,  because it  did not  have any legal or
authenticating  function.  For  this  reason,  it  is  completely  overlooked  by  classic
diplomatics,  which evidently deems it  as superfluous,  and ultimately irrelevant  to  the
understanding of a document's meaning. But is it actually the case? After all, illumination
is the element that contributes more effectively to the monumentality of a letter patent,
because adding iconography to a textual object meant changing its most inherent function
from informational  to  representational.  When  decorated,  a  letter  patent  ceases  to  be
simply a  text  to  be  read,  and first  and foremost  becomes  an  object  to  look  at.  New
diplomatics has to consider this fundamental fact and its consequences—last year, Jessica
Berenbeim  has  published  an  important  book-length  study  on  the  importance  of  the
decoration of medieval cartularies and charters.106
In the corpus of documents I am analysing, three letters patent are illuminated.
Two of them belong to the DDS, and date 18 January 1523 (DDS 7, fig. 6.6, p. 226) and
29 September 1533 (DDS 70, fig. 6.4, p. 224); the third one belongs to the Cimeli, and
dates  18  October  1526 (Cimeli 18,  fig   6.5,  p.  225).   These  documents  record  very
different juridical acts:  the first  one is  a safe-conduct,  granted to  physician Ottaviano
Brambilla de Villa; the second one is the confirmation of all the privileges and immunities
previously  granted  to  the  Dominican  friars  of  Santa  Maria  delle  Grazie,  a  Milanese
church and convent; the third one is the appointment of Girolamo Brebbia as General
Treasurer to the Sforza.
The choice of iconographic themes for letters patent was often highly strategic, a
way to condense complex messages. The two charters belonging to the  DDS have the
entire name Franciscus illuminated, with the initial ‘F’  decorated with abstract motives .
Moreover, both charters show the coat-of-arms of Francesco II, with the Visconti-Sforza
viper  and the  imperial  eagle,  the  latter  signifying  that  the  Sforza  derived their  ducal
dignity from the Sacred Roman Empire (figg. 6.15, 6.16, pp. 247).107 The coat-of arms is
sided by the emblem of the buckets and burning logs, originally a Visconti device, which
was  later  extensively  used  under  Galeazzo  Maria  Sforza.  Of  the  many emblems  the
Sforza adopted throughout their history as dukes, the one with the buckets and burning
logs was definitely Francesco's favourite, as it appeared also in printed proclamations on
106 Berenbeim 2015.
107 For the origins and the history of Visconti-Sforza viper, see Zaninetta 2013, 141-208. For the success of
the imperial eagle, see Leydi 1999.
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Figg. 6.15, 6.16: Miniatures of DDS 7 (right) and DDS 70 (left)
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Fig. 6.17: Printed proclamation showing a Sforza coat-of-arms sided by the emblem
of the buckets and burning logs (ASMi, Sforzesco, Potenze Sovrane, Atti Ducali.
Gride, 1504, 1525 July 10)
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Figg. 6.18, 6.19: A charter issued by the chancery of Francesco I (ASMi,
Diplomatico, Diplomi e Dispacci Sovrani, Milano, 4, 1452 February 10) and one
issued by the chancery of Francesco II (Cimeli 18), both with the 'F' of Franciscus
shaped as a dragon
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Fig. 6.20: Pierpont Morgan Library, MS M 434, f. 1r. A miniature depicting
Ludovico Sforza in the act of delivering a donation letter patent in the hands of the
prior of Santa Maria delle Grazie
the walls of Milan.108 (fig. 6.17, p. 248) The emblem symbolised merciless determination
(the  burning logs)  together  with  the  necessary ability to  temper  it  when needed (the
buckets  full  of  water.)  The  motto  ardo et  extinguo  ('I  light,  and  I  extinguish')  often
accompanied the emblem, and probably signified that sense of self-determination that
Francesco wished for himself. In addition, the illuminated letter patent of the Cimeli has
the initial ‘F’ of Franciscus shaped as a dragon (fig. 6.18, p. 249). Here, the inspiration
clearly came from the charters of grandfather Francesco I Sforza (fig. 6.19, p. 249), an
illustrious model that could be recalled easily and effectively.  The latter,  in turn,  had
strongly relied  on the  symbolic  continuity between his  initial  'F'  and that  of  the  last
Visconti duke, Filippo Maria, in the many symbolic attempts to stress the Sforza's (far
from solid) right of succession to the previous dynasty.109
At first  sight,  these  miniatures  and their  iconography look  like  fully  authority-
commanded  features,  synthetic  and  imperative  expressions  of  power  stressing  their
author's unchallenged political will. Yet, illumination could also become a field of subtle
iconographic competition between different characters, as demonstrated by DDS 70 (figg.
6.4, p. 224, and 6.17, 248). As anticipated, the document consists in the confirmation of a
series of past privileges and immunities to the Dominicans of Santa Maria delle Grazie.
This church, famous for hosting Leonardo da Vinci's fresco The Last Supper, represented
the most prestigious Milanese landmark for the Sforza: during the 1490s, duke Ludovico
concentrated there a great share of the efforts he made to glorify himself and his dynasty,
and also to turn Milan into a first-rate city of art.110 For these reasons, confirming the
bond that existed between the ruling family—now represented by Francesco II—and the
Dominicans was an event that deserved proper documentary representation. This is so
true that a cartulary (compiled between 1499 and 1541, and now preserved at New York's
Pierpont Morgan Library,) containing the transcription of a series of documents in favour
of  Santa  Maria  delle  Grazie,  has  its  first page  illuminated  with  an  image  depicting
Ludovico in the act of delivering a donation letter patent in the hands of the prior of the
convent (fig. 6.20, p. 250).
So how was the renovated bond between Francesco II and the Dominicans to be
represented? In this case, the design of the diploma's decoration certainly resulted from
negotiation between multiple actors, rather than from the exclusive desires of Francesco
108 ASMi, Sforzesco, Potenze Sovrane, Atti Ducali. Gride, 1504, 1525 July 10. For a recap on the Sforza
iconography and iconology, usefully centered on Francesco II, see Albertario 2001.
109 Senatore 1998, 91.
110 Romani 1998, Marani, Cecchi, and Mulazzani 1986..
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Figg. 6.21-6.24 (clockwise): DDS 8, 16, 47 and Cimeli 60, all showing a blank space
where the illuminated 'F' of Franciscus should have found place
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Fig. 6.25: An example of letter patent in which the initial 'F' of Franciscus was
left non-illuminated, but the blank space was later filled with a simple 'F.'
II. Indeed, the Sforza coat-of-arms is not alone. In the upper part of the diploma, to the
left,  we find the typical black and white shield of the Dominican order.  To the right,
another  coat-of-arms,  with  the  letters  'F'  and  'T'  on  the  sides,  is  the  mark  of  Gran
Cancelliere Francesco Taverna,  and is significantly surmounted by the imperial eagle,
proudly signalling  Taverna's  recent  nomination  as  Count  Palatine,  a  title  awarded by
emperor  Charles  V in 1531.  The centrality of  the Sforza arms implies  Francesco II's
formal  hierarchical  preeminence.  And yet,  the  arms  of  the  Dominicans  and  those  of
Taverna are  as big as the Sforza's. On the one hand, the friars probably did not want to be
documented as mere passive subjects of a merciful decision coming from above. With
their arms illuminated on parchment, the diploma became theirs as much as the duke's.
On  the  other  hand,  the  presence  of  the  illuminated  arms  of  Taverna  highlights  the
spectacular rise of a skilled homo novus who, as we know from the charter I presented at
the beginning of the general introduction (p. 11-14), had had a great influence on the
documentary  production  of  the  Sforza  chancery  even  before  becoming  Gran
Cancelliere.111 The  symbolic  exploit  of  this  diploma suggests  that  Taverna  wanted  to
associate his status with that of the duke.
However,  besides  this  fascinating  case  of  competing  coat-of-arms,  the  most
significant characteristic of the miniatures in the DDS and in the Cimeli is their recurrent
absence. Indeed, in four letters patent, the space for the illuminated 'F' of Franciscus was
just left blank (DDS 8, 16, 47, Cimeli 60, figg. 6.21-6.24, p. 252). These documents were
clearly dispatched without being decorated, because they bear all the necessary signs of
authentication: signatures, seal, date and registration notes are in place. The reason of the
lack of miniatures probably had to do with the costs of the illumination:112 the chancery
could not afford to decorate all the acts it produced. Yet, such policy of non-illuminating
some letters patent was also deeply contradictory. Indeed, on the one hand, the chancery
set up a document/monument, whose make-up was primarily intended to convey an idea
of authority. On the other hand, the making of letters patent never achieved completion,
and the missing part—the miniature—was the crucial feature that turned the document
into a monument.
Hence, the chancery could issue non-illuminated documents and leave the option
111 Senator and ambassador to the Sforza throughout the 1520s, Taverna was nominated count palatine by
Charles V in 1531. In July 1533, Francesco II appointed him as Gran Cancelliere, a post that he would
hold for  27  years.  He is  the  only Italian  Gran Cancelliere  of  early modern  Milan,  the  post  being
normally reserved to close 'foreign' representatives of the Spanish kings. In 1536, Charles V granted
Taverna the imperial fief of Landriano.
112 For a detailed study on the costs of miniatures in late-fifteenth century, see Melograni 2005.
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of decorating them the to their recipients, who could solemnise them to their liking and at
their  expense.  This  is  absolutely  relevant,  because  it  opens  the  way  to  assess  the
documents from the point of view of their reception, something that seldom leaves visible
marks  on  paper  or  parchment.  Furthermore,  the  idea  that  documents  created  and
authenticated in the chancery could be completed outside it, in a workshop, following the
will  of  their  recipients,  introduces  the  possibility  that  recipients  themselves  were
participants in the production of the charter, and could actively contribute to its meaning.
With its clear-cut classifications, classic diplomatics ignores, indeed rejects this
potential mix between the author and the recipient of a document.113 But in fact, it is clear
that  recipients  decided  to  decorate  charters  because  they  wished  to  turn  their  mere
juridical  value  into  something  more  symbolically  meaningful,  suitable  not  only  for
archival preservation, but for self-representation, display or circulation.114 And indeed, the
small literature on the Visconti-Sforza illuminated charters does mention two interesting
cases of families or individuals that seem to have enacted a systematic programme of
charters  decoration  as  a  means  to  promote  themselves.  The  first  case  involves  the
Borromeo family at the beginning of its political ascent in the first half of the fifteenth
century.  According to  Giulia  Bologna,  the Borromeos chose one of  their  own trusted
illuminators,  Giovanni da Vaprio,  to decorate at  least  four charters between 1437 and
1445.115 The second case sees a nobleman, Giovanni del Maino, richly decorating seven
charters throughout the second half of the fifteenth century.116 It is worth pointing out that
del Maino was so keen to turn some rather mundane legal documents into personalised
and treasured possessions that he illuminated documents that were not originally meant to
bear any decoration.117 Indeed, in three letters patent, the miniaturist had to erase the non-
illuminated name of the charter's author in the intitulatio to replace it with its decorated
version.  This  physical,  almost  violent  operation  is  not  merely  technical,  because  it
materially represents the symbolic-political agenda of the charter's recipient prevailing
over that of its author; a sign that the recipient did not consider the diploma as a sacred,
untouchable relic of the authority that was issuing it, but rather as a dynamic object that
113 In the early 1970s–few years before Le Goff's ‘Documento/monumento’–Italian diplomatics scholar
Alessandro Pratesi still defined as ‘nonsense’ the idea of a contextual exchange of roles between the
author and the recipient of a document. Pratesi 1992, 89-93.
114 For a recent study on the act of displaying (art) objects, see Furlotti 2015.
115 Bologna 1971, 188.
116 Ceruti 2013.
117 With  the  expression  'treasured  possessions,'  I  wish  to  echo  the  title  of  a  book  (deriving  from an
exhibition held at Cambrige's Fitzwilliams Museum in 2015) that explores the significance of choosing,
acquiring, and–as in del Maino's case–personalising and treasuring objects in a historical perspective.
See Avery, Calaresu and Laven 2015.
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could 'light-heartedly' be acted upon from below.118
In  this  context,  the  opposite  decision  of  not decorating  a  charter  becomes
meaningful in its own right. It means that the recipient was content with the juridical act
formalised in the charter, and declined to foster the monumentalisation of the document
any further,  despite  the  possibility left  open by the authority that  produced the  letter
patent.  In  exchange for  the sustenance of the costs  of  the miniature,  the chancery of
Francesco II offered the recipients the chance to direct the illumination of the charters,
with the creation of a document-monument that symbolically benefited both Francesco
and the recipient. However, several recipients probably concluded that spending money to
solemnise a charter issued by a weak prince like Francesco was an investment marked by
high risk and low reward.  As a consequence,  many of them received the charter and
probably thought that, at least, adding a non-illuminated ‘F’ was advisable to fill in the
blank—a frequent solution in the DDS (fig. 6.25, p. 253). Other recipients, instead, just
kept the charter for future reference, and did not even care about completing what was a
very evident omission. 
Whatever the case, all the episodes described in this sub-section underscore the
same contradiction. On the one hand, illumination, when analysed in the final make-up of
chancery  diplomas,  seems  the  most  incontrovertibly  authoritative  of  all  documentary
features. On the other hand, when considered in the concrete unfolding of the diplomas'
making, illumination was in fact often negotiated with, or directly commanded by, the
recipients of the diplomas.  They could either use illumination for pursuing  their own
iconographic programmes of symbolic-political promotion, or they could avoid using it,
thus implicitly showing little regard for Francesco II's status and authority. This works as
one last and instructive proof of the difference between the meaning of documents-as-
products (or monuments) and that of documents-as-processes. Since the entire chapter has
been based on this product-process dichotomy, let us now conclude with a summary of
the mismatches that have emerged from its analysis.
First of all, on the one hand, through the analysis of the final make-up of letters patent, I
have drawn attention to the fact that every single diplomatic feature they display is aimed
at affirming that Francesco II  exercised his unchallenged authority following his own
precise will. This is what turns letters patent in documents/monuments: the essential and
powerful political message they conveyed independently from the specific juridical act
118 BTMi,  Pergamene Miniate, 33 and 35; AOMMi,  Diplomi, 1549. I owe this precious hint to Enrico
Ceruti, whom I wish to thank.
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they were establishing.
On  the  other  hand,  though,  I  have  started  scrutinising  the  plausibility  of  the
monumentality of letters patent by asking a simple question: if letters patent as finished
products were so peremptory in affirming the undisputed authority of Francesco II, then
why did they come in so many different forms and shapes? If Francesco's chancery was
unable to serialise its production and rank its own documents in a fixed hierarchy, then
the  type  of  juridical  act  and—more  importantly—the  standing  of  the  documents'
recipients evidently influenced the documents' design. It is crucial to stress that this  in
itself is a point of weakness in the purported monolithic monumentality of letters patent,
and  realising  it  is  also  a  first  general  step  towards  the  de-construction  of  their
authoritative aspect. To further this de-construction, I have taken the single documentary
elements that make the greatest contribution to the solemnisation of letters patent, and I
have assessed whether the 'monumentalising' effect they create in the documents' make-
up matches their actual role as seen from the perspective of the documents' making of.
Eight unfinished letters patent have allowed me to observe the succession of stages in the
process of documentary production.
The first element I have focused on is the corroboratio, the clause through which
letters patent 'speak of themselves' insofar as the actions taken for authenticating them are
described.   According to  the  corroboratio,  Francesco II  followed the production of a
given document from start to finish. Firstly,  he gave the order  (jussio) of creating the
document; secondly, he ordered to take the required bureaucratic actions to register it and
make it available for future reference; finally, he ordered to seal the document with the
mark of his own authority, thus concluding the process imperatively. Therefore, seen in
the final make-up of letters patent, the  corroboratio  delineates a climax celebrating the
undisputed power of Francesco. By contrast, the situation is very different if we observe
the use of the corroboratio in the letters patent that were yet to be completed. On the one
hand, two letters patent show that the  corroboratio  could be written before any of the
actions to authenticate the documents were taken; this reveals its merely formulaic nature,
lacking  any  actual  political  value.  On  the  other  hand,  in  three  other  cases,  the
corroboratio is in place, and so are the ducal signature and seal, but the documents were
not yet valid, because they lacked secretarial signatures and notes of registration. This
means that it  was  these last  elements  that actually validated a document,  and not the
marks of the authority representing Francesco. This fact clearly downgrades the actual
significance of the corroboratio as a political statement.
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The second element I have focused on is the ducal signature. Francesco's signature
shows a clear graphic centrality in the final make-up of letters patent, and also represents
his  only  autograph  mark  on  this  kind  of  documents.  As  a  consequence,  its  absolute
importance and authenticating value seems obvious. But was it? The ducal signature is
almost never mentioned in the  corroboratio, even though it is nearly always present in
early-aborted documents. This combination of factors, together with additional interesting
evidence surfacing from the Sforzesco archive (see p. 241), has prompted me to advance
the hypothesis—already emerged in dealing with letters close—that  pre-signed papers
regularly circulated in the chancery. This deprives the signature of its primary function—
that of testifying that the putative author of the document actually saw and approved it.
Furthermore, the fact that the  corroboratio  does seldom mention the signature suggests
that when it does not do so, the signature was decisively more symbolic than functional.
The third element I have focused on is the ducal seal, which undoubtedly was a
very  powerful  tool,  but—despite  bearing  the  name  and  coat-of-arms  of  the  duke—
underwent a very collective use. Indeed, as we have seen, the secret chancery had a 'seal-
keeper'  clerk subject to a specific set of regulations, and the  Ordines  clearly betray a
strong anxiety about the handling of the seal, whose physical possession could trigger
tensions between the dukes, their counsellors and chancery secretaries. Even the corniola
secreta—the signet-ring that the Sforza dukes theoretically kept with them at all times to
seal the most important documents—could easily be lent to some of the most prominent
secretaries.  Therefore,  the ducal seal certainly cannot  be considered as a mark of the
duke's personal authorship on the documents bearing his name.
The fourth element I have focused on are secretarial signatures. Their role looks
marginal  in  the  final  make-up  of  the  document:  indeed,  the  signatures  are  never
mentioned in the corroboratio, and they are often even physically hidden under the plica
made at the bottom of letters patent. However, once again, the analysis of the making of
letters patent contradicts this exterior appearance. Firstly, secretarial signatures, unlike the
ducal signature, are always duly reported in the registers in which letters patent were
transcribed—thus  implying  that  the  presence  of  secretarial  signatures  was  necessary,
while that of the ducal signature could be accessory.  And secondly,  unfinished letters
patent typically bear the ducal signature  but not secretarial  signatures, a circumstance
implying that it was the latter that held an actual validating value. But even when the
opposite occurred, and we have unfinished letters patent bearing secretarial signature and
lacking  the  ducal  signature,  we  nonetheless  obtain  precious  material  evidence  of
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something we had already grasped in Chapter 3: the making of documents resembled a
jigsaw,  an  often  extemporary  process  following  mostly  unregulated  patterns,  highly
dependent on specific circumstances. 
The final element I have examined has been illumination, the documentary feature
that seems beyond doubt the most self-celebratory of the ducal authority. I have debunked
this  misleading  appearance  by  showing  that  the  Sforza  chancery  often  issued  non-
illuminated diplomas, and left the possibility of decorating them to their recipients. The
latter  either  accepted  to  do  so  following  their  own  agendas  of  symbolic-political
promotion, or refused to do so, thus implicitly lessening the prestige of the duke who had
issued the diploma. In any case,  illumination ended up being the opposite of what it
looked first glance: not the culmination of the sovereign's celebration, but the epitome of
his necessity to negotiate his authority with subjects. 
To  sum  up:  the  corroboratio  narrating  Francesco  II's  solid  command  of  the
process  of  document-making  is  essentially  false;  the  actual  validating  value  of
Francesco's signature is highly relative, with only rare exceptions; the ducal seal, which
bears the name and the emblem of Francesco, was used collectively, even in its most
private  version  (the  corniola  secreta);  secretarial  signatures,  despite  their  apparent
marginality,  were  in  fact  more  important  than  the  ducal  signature  for  authenticating
documents; letters patent could be constructed following multiple procedures, and not a
stable and hierarchical one; and finally, illumination, far from representing the celebration
of  unchallenged  ducal  power,  was  the  emblem of  the  complexity of  the  relationship
between Francesco and his subjects. All these elements considered, what remains of the
original  message  of  the  document/monument?  Its  de-construction,  recommended  by
Jacques Le Goff, has proven truly revealing. Francesco, omnipresent in the make-up of
documents, almost disappears in their making. This does not necessarily mean that he was
not there at all; it  means that his authority was a factor among many others, for how
important his influence may have been. 
With this overview on the contradictions between the make-up and the making of
letters  patent  terminates  my material  analysis  of  Francesco  II's  chancery  documents.
Since it has been a very micro analysis, focusing on minute details of letters close and
letters  patent,  it  is  now  appropriate  to  conclude  Part  III  with  a  series  broader
considerations reconnecting us to the macro problems and hypotheses of this dissertation. 
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Conclusion
At the end of the thorough investigation of chancery practices carried out in Part II, I
came to the conclusion that Sforza wordpower—the power of producing and spreading
the  written  word  of  the  duke—presented  two  fundamental  characteristics  that  are
undetectable  with  a  standard  analysis  of  the  chancery's  abstract  structures  and  rules.
Firstly, the use of wordpower was not only a prerogative of Francesco II and his inner
circle, but also a collective and social resource. Secondly, wordpower, even when it was
actually  managed  by  Francesco  and  the  Sforza  leadership,  was  not  only  a  merely
political-administrative  functional  asset,  but  it  primarily  had  a  strong  symbolic  and
representational value. 
The  objective  of  the  third  part  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  find  a  substantial
reflection of the collective and representational character of wordpower in the physical
aspects of chancery products. Even more ambitiously, I hypothesised that an interpretive
material analysis of chancery products—which I labelled 'new diplomatics'—could allow
us  to  refine  the  understanding  of  the  fluidity  of  chancery  practices.  More  than  an
'objective,'  I  defined  this  task  as  a  'challenge;'  because  at  first  sight,  the  principal
characteristic of chancery products is their formal impermeability to the socio-political
processes  and  tensions  surrounding  their  making.  I  think  that  I  have  overcome  the
challenge: I have been able to demonstrate that such impermeability is only apparent.
Indeed, chancery products—more specifically, in my case studies, letters close and letters
patent produced in the chancery of Francesco II Sforza—do bear visible traces of the
complexity and plurality of their making, and the message they convey with their form
and materiality is often more important than that of their contents.
To  begin  with,  the  question  of  the  collective  character  of  wordpower,  which
translates  into  the  question  of  documentary authorship.  On the one hand,  the official
authorship of chancery products invariably looks strictly individualised—'Francesco II in
person addresses his recipient,' 'Francesco II in person grants/authorises/orders something
to  someone.'  On  the  other  hand,  scrutinising  the  form  of  chancery  products  means
realising that their individualised authorship was in fact remarkably elastic and plural. 
Firstly,  regarding  letters  close,  I  have  showed  the  great  extent  to  which  the
individual  authorship  of  Francesco  II  could  be  open  to  sharing,  and  be  largely
independent from his person. Thanks to the analysis of a number of micro case studies, I
was  able  to  establish  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  letters  that  do  not  bear  at  least  one
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substantial statement written with the hand of Francesco  do not guarantee his presence
behind their making. 
Secondly,  through the  peculiar occasion offered by the survival of a corpus of
unfinished letters  patent,  I  have  questioned  the  actual  authenticating  value  of  two
documentary features theoretically highlighting Francesco II's control of the process of
document-making—the  corroboratio  and the ducal signature. Furthermore, I have also
underscored that the ducal seal, despite symbolically representing Francesco, was in fact a
tool  of  collective  use  at  the  disposal  of  the  chancery as  a  whole;  and I  have  drawn
attention to the fact that illumination was a device often commanded by the recipients of
letters patent, even though, in their final make-up, it looks like the one that celebrates the
unchallenged  authority  of  the  sender  (Francesco  II)  more  peremptorily.  Generally
speaking, I have highlighted that letters patent could be assembled following different
procedures, depending on highly contingent circumstances. As a consequence of these
facts,  I  have  concluded  that  the  authorship  of  letters  patent  could  be  outstandingly
collaborative,  and that  Francesco could often have little  (or even nothing)  to do with
documents bearing his name.
Mentioning  Francesco  II's  name,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  role  of  the  ducal
signature  is  one  important  element  for  which  the  material  analysis  of  documents
augments  our  knowledge  of  chancery practices.  Indeed,  by studying  the  multi-staged
process  that  both letters  close and letters  patent  underwent  during their  making,  it  is
possible to establish with certainty that only seldom the signature of Francesco played a
functional role in the documents where it appeared—that is, the function of proving that
Francesco himself had seen and approved the document he was signing. To the contrary,
the role of the ducal signature was very often symbolic. If written in a secretarial hand,
the signature signified that the document in question was coming from a rather undefined
Sforza orbit, characterised by a very extended conception of ducal authorship—which, for
example, could include the Senate, an institution Francesco did not control directly. If
written  by  the  hand  of  Francesco,  we  have  seen  (in  the  epistolary  relationship  with
Bernardo Cles and Isabella d'Este) that the signature stood for a very important sign of
respect; however, it could also easily belong to a pre-signed paper (or parchment,) and
thus did work as a meaningful symbol of its 'proprietor,' but with little (or any) actual
pragmatic function.
The largely symbolic character of the ducal signature introduces the issue of how
the representational character of wordpower is reflected in the materiality of chancery
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products. As far as letters close are concerned,  I have explored such issue by analysing
the surprisingly detailed strategies through which Francesco II micromanaged his use of
autography. He had three 'degrees of autography' to choose from: autograph signatures,
substantial  autograph  statements,  and  full  holographs.  I  have  demonstrated  that  his
choices were not casual (as they may look at first glance,) but followed regular patterns of
behaviour, dictated by precise circumstances. What is crucial, however, is that Francesco's
autograph interventions—holographs and statements—in all their calculated variety, have
one major thing in common: they tend not to put/add substantial contents in/to the letters
in which they are performed, but nearly always express very basic and simple concepts,
often redundantly. Therefore, Francesco—and, presumably, his correspondents—regarded
the performance of the act of writing with one's own hand as in itself meaningful. When
autography was used extensively, a letter close, well before conveying a message, had the
aim of representing its author, as if it were a 'textual self-portrait.'
As for the representational character of letters patent, the recap can only be very
concise, because I have just offered a detailed summary of Chapter 6 (pp. 256-259). The
whole  chapter has  had the  aim of  de-constructing  the  formal  monumentality through
which  letters  patent,  regardless  of  the  juridical  act  they  establish  through  their  strict
contents, aim at conveying the idea of an absolute and unchallenged ducal authority from
which all power emanates. From top to bottom of a letter patent, illumination, intitulatio,
dispositio,  corroboratio,  ducal  signature  and  seal,  plica  hiding  secretarial  signatures,
outstanding size and precious writing material are all assembled together to impose this
idea.
Let  us  now  put  together  all  these  considerations  on  the  collective  and
representational character of letters close and letters patent: what is the reality of chancery
documents that ultimately emerges? We have started from a very inflexible and compact
conception  of  chancery  documents,  seen  as  rigid  instruments  expressing  the  will  of
authority—the  conception  shared  by  classic  diplomatics  and  traditional  political
historians—and we have come to a totally different conception. Whether characterised by
a more or less individual or collective authorship, and by a more or less pragmatic or
representational  function,  chancery  documents  (just  like  the  chancery  itself)  assert
themselves  as  very  ductile  platforms,  suitable  for  a  remarkable  range  of  textual
operations. These, in turn, remarkably extend the range of meanings that documents are
able to codify and express—the conception of new diplomatics.
As it is evident, a more dynamic notion of official chancery documents implies,
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almost necessarily, an equally more dynamic notion of authority. The analysis of chancery
products,  just  as  the  reconstruction  of  chancery  practices,  demonstrate  that  from  a
different  conception  of  Renaissance  written political  culture  derives  a  different
conception of political culture tout-court. A piece of the starting hypothesis of my thesis
stated that the traces that the processes happening around chancery documents left on the
documents'  material  body  could  have  unfolded  a  more  nuanced  and  participatory
perspective on Renaissance political and institutional history: with Chapter 5 and 6, I am
convinced that this hypothesis is effectively corroborated.
It is now time to abandon the overwhelmingly internal perspective through which
I have studied the chancery and its documents, and analyse them from the outside. This is
the last (and necessary) effort to contextualise its status, function and meaning properly.
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Chapter 7 – The Chancery from Outside: Documentary Interaction
1. From the documentary strategies of the chancery to the documentary tactics of its
outsiders
One of the key-approaches of this thesis has been assessing  the chancery in relation to its
outsiders as a means to achieve a more complete understanding of the chancery's social
and political role—and that of its documents. Three examples, taken from the previous
chapters, can suffice. Firstly, in Chapter 3, the realisation of the systematic inclusion of
outsiders in the social and political practices undertaken in the chancery has played a
pivotal role in the development of the idea (crucial to my whole argument) that Sforza
wordpower, despite theoretically being an asset exclusively owned by Francesco II and
his close entourage, could in fact become a very collective resource. Secondly, in Chapter
4,  I  have  drawn attention  to  the  fact  that  subjects  (whether  officers,  communities  or
individuals)  played  an  active  role  in  the  reception  of  documents  coming  from  the
chancery, so much so that the Sforza authorities made a distinction between the act of
obeying/executing  (obedire  or  exequire)  their  letters,  the  act  of  simply  accepting
(acceptare)  them without  taking  further  actions,  and the  hostile  act  of  non-accepting
letters. Finally, in the last chapter, in dealing with the decoration of letters patent, we have
seen how recipients were able to transform documents issued by the ducal chancery into
objects promoting their own socio-political agenda, instead of that of their official author,
Francesco II.
These  examples  show  how  the  agency  of  outsiders  could  affect  chancery
activities.  If  the  chancery,  when it  was  directly commanded by Francesco II  and the
Sforza leadership, undertook documentary strategies to achieve its own objectives from
the  inside  out  (or  top-down,)  subjects  had  the  ability  to  respond  with  symmetrical
documentary counter-strategies  to  achieve their  from the  outside,  or  bottom-up.  Such
documentary interaction is the last theme I wish to explore to conclude  this thesis. The
theme stands apart from the rest of my study, because it brings us to see the chancery
from the perspective of outsiders, whereas until now we have either dealt with outsiders
acting within the chancery (Chapter 3), or with the chancery's  and government's own
perspective on outsiders (Chapter 4). But the theme constitutes an integral part of my
study,  because  the  modes  and  outcomes  of  the  documentary  interaction  between  the
chancery  and  its  subjects  and  interlocutors  clearly  further  problematise  the  status  of
chancery documents, the role of the chancery itself, and the nature of Sforza authority. 
In order to quickly give an idea of the opposition between the Sforza chancery and
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its subjects and interlocutors, in the previous paragraph I have spoken of the encounter
between documentary 'strategies' and 'counter-strategies.' However, in the course of the
chapter, I will use another and more significant dichotomy: the one between 'strategies'
and 'tactics.'   Both terms are used in the domain of the history of practices to define
behaviours,  but  while  'strategy'  defines  the  behaviours  of  the  dominant  and  tends  to
express a view from above, 'tactic' defines the behaviours of the dominated and tends to
express a view from below—or, to adapt the term to our case, a view from outside the
main centre of power.1 The aim of this chapter will be to focus on the documentary tactics
enacted  by outsiders,  to  suggest—in line  with  the  rest  of  the  thesis—that  the  divide
between insiders and outsiders to the chancery was much less clear-cut than one might
expect; and that the production, control and management of documentation was a field in
which this divide was especially put into question.
Documentary  interaction  as  seen  from  the  perspective  of  chancery  outsiders
followed  a  full  range  of  tactics  of  engagement,  from  the  more  peaceful  (based  on
constructive cooperation with the chancery) to the more confrontational (based on open
challenge to the written orders delivered by the Sforza leadership.)  I  will  group such
range  of  tactics  under  three  headings—'negotiation,'  'resistance'  and  'competition'—
discussing for each one the most compelling evidence I found, further divided in specific
issues.
As  far  as  tactics  of  negotiation  are  concerned,  I  will  first  of  all  (2.1)  look at
petitions.  Taken  individually,  petitions  narrate  of  submissive  subjects  entrusting
themselves to the lord's grace to solve exceptional issues. But were petitions really an
exceptional  means  to  orientate  Sforza  governance,  and  is  their  submissive  language
trustworthy? In addition (2.2), I will remark that the fulfilment of petitions—as well as
the production of a  vast  array of documents—foresaw the payment  of  chancery fees.
What effect did the existence of a 'documentary market' have on the interaction between
chancery insiders and outsiders?
Regarding  tactics  of  resistance,  I  will  analyse  (3.1 and  3.2)  a  number  of
meaningful episodes (drawn from the Registri delle Missive) to ask whether outsiders of
every rank felt intimidated by the Sforza authority exercising wordpower, or if they were
willing (and had the ability) to confront the chancery right on the field of writings. 
1 The notion of strategy to define the behaviour of the dominant was elaborated by French sociologist
Pierre  Bourdieu (1930–2002);  another  sociologist,  Michel  de Certeau  (1925–1986)  put  forward the
notion of tactics in deliberate opposition to Bourdieu as a means to take the behaviour of the dominated
seriously.  Indeed,  before  de  Certeau,  the  behaviours  of  the  dominated  were  often  dismissed  as
overwhelmingly unconscious, and 'habitus' was the term used to define them. See Burke 2008, 80-81.
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Halfway between negotiation and resistance, the Sforza chancery coexisted with
other institutions producing and deploying their documents as a practice of authority. In
the fourth section of the chapter, I will describe the competition between Francesco II and
the Senate of Milan as seen from a documentary vantage point. Indeed, the Senate's key-
prerogative to reject or confirm the most arbitrary decisions of Francesco interestingly
played out on the very body of ducal letters patent (4.1). In case of both rejection (4.2)
and  confirmation  (4.3)  of  ducal  decisions,  the  Senate  had  procedures  devised  to
materially remark its rising importance directly on paper (or parchment.) What do these
procedures suggest about the balance of power between Francesco and the Senate, and
what  do they reveal  about  the actual  value of letters patent  as emblems of the ducal
authority (something that we have already scrutinised in Chapter 6)?
Finally (4), I examine a spectacular case of documentary forgery as an instance of
'appropriation.' What does the outsiders' ability of imitating documents and practices of
power tell us about their attitude towards the authority? And, vice versa, what does the
reaction  of  Francesco  II  against  the  counterfeiters  tell  us  about  the  attitude  of  the
authority towards such skilful imitation?
2. Negotiation
2.1. Re-thinking the role of petitions
When analysing the memoir  Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali  and the
political  chancery  practices  it  revealed,  I  highlighted  how  the  author  of  the  memoir
considered the reception of information as an important aspect of the secretaries' work
(pp. 108-109).  He identified the chancery as a receptive hub, a centre whose output is
largely  determined  by  previous  input  from  the  outside.  If  receptivity  is  taken  as  a
parameter for understanding the functioning of a chancery, then the role of petitions in
early modern  governance  deserves  a  specific  analysis.  Petitions  represented  the  most
widespread instrument through which subjects made contact with the authorities.
Petitions  are  letters  which  single  individuals,  or  organised  groups,  sent  to  the
authorities requesting graces,  favours,  privileges,  or  calling attention to  injustices and
abuses.  These  documents  gave  rise  to  administrative  acts  that  led  to  proceedings  in
tribunals,  magistracies,  and chanceries.2 Cecilia  Nubola and Andreas  Würgler  make a
distinction between 'petitions'  and 'gravamina'  on one side (collective and institutional
writings  addressed  to  the  authority  in  specific  moments  of  political  negotiation)  and
2 This definition is modelled on the one provided in Nubola 2001, 35-36.
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'supplications'  on  the  other  (typically  resulting  from individual  initiative  in  ordinary
times.3) Francesco II's chancery used the Latin term prex ('plea') and the vernacular word
supplicatione ('supplication')  to  identify  petitions,  a  language  meant  to  emphasise
obedience  and  sumbission.  Because  that  is  a  misleading  image  (as  I  have  already
discussed at p. 133 discussing the 'language of obedience' defined by Covini), I will adopt
the more neutral term 'petition,' widely accepted by historians writing in English on the
subject. 
Petitions have long been a  well-known source among historians.  They are the
most abundant (sometimes, the only) source signaling the existence and agency of socio-
political groups that do not belong to the tiny elite producing medieval and early modern
documents.4 Moreover, as Harriet Rudolph notes, petitions are a prominent example of
‘symbolic interaction,’ i.e. ‘the reciprocal exchange of actions between the members of a
society,  carried out  within a  communicative process  conducted on the base of shared
symbols, rituals, and interpretive models.’5 For these reasons they can be studied from a
variety  of  angles:  the  history  of  justice,  social  history,  religious  history,  but  also
anthropology, linguistics, and political philosophy.6 
During the last  thirty years,  two major realisations have changed the scholarly
perspective on petitions, from a unilateral concession the authority graciously granted to
subjects to a much more complex tactic the subjects had at  their  disposal in order to
dialectically influence decision-making.7 The first realisation is that petitions, despite the
apparent exceptional nature of the favours they sought, were in fact one of the most long-
lasting and widespread pillars of Ancien Regime governance. We can take mid-fourteenth
century  Bologna  as  an  early example:  here,  almost  the  entire  political-administrative
activity of the city seems to have been based on the sole management of petitions under
the lordship of Taddeo Pepoli  (1337–1347);8 much later,  in the eighteenth century,  as
Cecilia Nubola reports, an anonymous account of the organisation of administration of
the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza still suggested that ‘those who think to do away with
3 Nubola and Würgler 2002a, 7-8.
4 Würgler 2001, p. 11 for the expression ‘tiny elite.’
5 Rudolph 2002, 548 [my translation]. For this definition, Rudolph refers to Blumer 1996, 1. 
6 Nubola and Würgler, 2002a, 7-8 and bibliography cited there.
7 Ibid., 10. Zaret 2000, 81-100. ‘No communicative practice for sending messages from the periphery to
the center had greater legitimacy than petitioning’ (p. 81); ‘Contemporaries held strong views on the
right to petition. (…) Invocation of tradition lays at the core of contemporary thinking on the right of
subjects to express grievance 'in a petitionary way' and of the duty of officials to receive petitions.’ (pp.
86-87).
8 Vallerani 2009, 419-422.
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petitions would overthrow the entire system of the State.’9 
Moreover,  language of  obedience  and submission  that  permeates  petitions  has
been  shown  to  be  largely  fictitious  and  instrumental.  Just  like  in  the  language  of
governance  I  have  analysed  in  the  Registri  delle  Missive  (pp.  132-139),  and  in  the
simulation of Francesco II's authorship carried out by his secretaries and by the Senate
(pp. 169-179), such language responded to strictly tactical needs that had little to do with
the actual position of the writer(s). Hence, as Rudolph puts it, ‘submitting a supplication
entailed  more  forms  of  action  than  the  term itself  would  suggest—to  supplicate,  to
implore.  In  supplications  one  did  not  just  ask  or  implore;  one  haggled,  negotiated,
solicited, threatened.’10 With respect to this, David Zaret interestingly argues that using a
language of self-diminishment long remained the only means available to subjects for
entering  a  ‘restricted  model  of  political  communication  that  derived  from  organic-
patriarchal worldviews,’ but this was not in contradiction with their right to petition.11
Natalie Zemon Davis, in her seminal work on pardon tales in sixteenth-century France,
has famously extended the idea of fictionality to the whole narrative that is to be found in
petitions.12
This growing deconstruction of the rhetoric of petitions has had a strong impact on
our interpretation of pre-modern statecraft. Anglophone historiography in particular has
included petitions among the cornerstones of a  more inclusive view on early modern
politics, considering them as an instrument of ‘public access’ to power at the ‘origins of
democratic  culture.’13 Yet,  the  acknowledgement  of  a  mature  negotiating  potential  of
petitions has been confined to seventeenth-century England (mostly in connection with
the  Civil  War,)14 with  only few exceptions  that  do  not  venture  earlier  than  the  mid-
sixteenth century.15 
However, it is important to stress that such evolution was possible mainly because
the use of petitions had been functioning already, and for a long time, as a tactic that de-
9 Nubola 2001, 35. 
10 Rudolph 2002, 518. For similar statements, see Nubola and  Würgler 2002a, 10; Vallerani 2009, 430-
431.
11 Zaret 2009, 182.
12 Zemon Davis 1987.
13 Dean, 2002; Zaret 2000.
14 Fletcher 1981, Ch. 6; Ashton, 1994, Ch. 4; Walter 2001.
15 Kümin and Würgler 1997 and, more specifically, Hoyle 2002. Zaret specifically considers the 1640s as
the real turning point in the history of petitioning. According to him, it was during this decade that
petitions abandoned their traditional deferential language, became overtly critical towards the law and
public  authority  in  general,  and  began  to  circulate  in  print–thus  entering  public  ceremonial  and
contributing to the rise of a proper public opinion. Zaret 1996. Cited and summarised in Knights 2005,
114. On the connection between petitioning and public ceremonial, see Id. 1993.
268
facto collectivised the exercise of power,  albeit  covertly.  From this point of view, the
chancery of Francesco II represents a very interesting case study to grasp how petitions
made Sforza governance consistently participatory as early as at  the beginning of the
sixteenth century. What I wish to carry out here, then, is a comprehensive assessment of
the volume and management of petitions during the reign of Francesco. What do they tell
us about the relationship between authorities and subjects, and more specifically about the
role of the chancery, i.e. the place that materially received and dealt with petition? And
what do petitions tell us about the ways in which subjects viewed the chancery and more
generally Sforza government? 
One first element that stands out is how frequently petitions are mentioned in the
Registri delle Missive. Indeed, letters emanating from the centre (Francesco II and his
entourage) to the periphery (peripheral officers, subject communities, individual subjects)
often responded to petitions. Around half of the registered letters mention petitions (see
Chart  7.1,  p  270).  This  means  that,  in  practice,  around half  of  the  registered  Sforza
governance  was  driven  or  at  least  initiated  by  subjects  who  wrote  to  the  authority
requesting—and obtaining—further political action via the chancery. 
Therefore, subjects (individuals or groups thereof) did not see the chancery only
as a 'transmission belt'  processing requests coming from above (the sovereign and his
circle,) but also as a centre of mediation taking care of affairs coming from below. This
resulted  in  what  we  can  describe  as  a  veritable  tactical  partnership,  one  which  was
embodied in the Registri Ducali, because many of the entries are nothing more than the
re-phrasing of petitions into authenticated chancery documents. As seen above (p. 219),
letters patent often incorporate the entire text of a petition, only adding the sovereign's
intitulatio, a very short introduction (for example: ‘We have received a supplication from
the  Magnifica  Countess Beatrice Stanga,  reading: [petition text],’)16 and the necessary
formulae and solemnities. Technically called rescritti  ('rescripts'), these documents were
extremely  diffuse.  They could  concern  any kind  of  act,  from the  more  routine  (safe
conducts, minor dispensations) to the more exceptional (major concessions and graces).
Rescripts show how the chancery had a markedly social profile (working bottom-up) that
added up to the authority-commanded one,  controlled by the duke and his secretaries
(working top-down.) As in the investigation of social practices in the chancery, we face





It is worth noticing that in Milan, the proximity between society and chancery
found a significant spatial expression in the urban fabric. Indeed, the 'petitioning society'17
and  the  'rescripting  chancery'  were  close  by.  Until  the  mid-1470s,  the  chancery  was
housed at  the  Corte dell'Arengo, facing on the Cathedral  square (Piazza del  Duomo),
itself a  documentary  centre,  with  an army of  professional  scriptores  supplicationum
('supplications writers') ready to profit from the need of the Milanese (including illiterate
people) to get their motions authenticated.18 Regarding this point, I would speculate that
the same Milanese probably never really accepted the choice (eventually made under
duke Galeazzo Maria, but prepared since the times of his father Francesco I) of moving
the Sforza court from the  Corte   to the isolated castle of Porta Giovia, located at the
north-western edge of the city. Not for nothing, one of the few mentions of the Sforza in
Machiavelli's Prince is to blame duke Francesco I for the transformation of the castle into
a  haughty princely residence attracting more  contempt than reverence.19 The physical
distancing of the Sforza from the heart of Milan was not only a symbolic message of
distrust for the city, but also a concrete obstacle to the sharing of power and wealth the
population  demanded  from  the  dynasty.20 Petitioning,  too,  probably  became  a  less
immediate and more difficult tactic after the dukes' displacement in Porta Giovia. For the
period of Francesco II we lack robust data, but it is easy to imagine that the chancery
came back somewhere in the Corte dell'Arengo between 1522 and 1525, as the castle of
Porta Giovia was unavailable—initially under French control (until April 1523), and then
too ruined by years of wars and sieges to host the seat of Sforza government. After March
1531, the chancery must have re-settled in the castle together with the whole Sforza court.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the negotiation between chancery and society
arising from the management of petitions was not simply an undesired concession that the
authority accorded to their subjects. If, on the one hand, subjects considered petitioning as
a unique chance to secure the Sforza's  support in their  claims, on the other  hand the
Sforza authorities needed, and were eager, to get involved. Indeed, beyond the rhetoric of
the documents, involvement was not just a matter of mercy and generosity, but a vital
political opportunity. Petitions implied the acknowledgement of his legitimacy, and they
opened spaces for manoeuvre that would have otherwise been out of reach, either for
17 ‘A Petitioning Society’ is the title of a chapter of Patterson 1993, 55-76.
18 Grossi 1996. On the practice of delegated writing in the pre-modern age, see Petrucci 1989;  Hebrard
1995; Bouza 2001, Ch. 2; Caldelli 1996. More recently, scholars have also discovered the relevance of
delegated writing in the modern age: see Lyons 2014.
19 Machiavelli 1988, 75-76.
20 On the idea  of  redistributive economy,  very important  in  the  medieval  and  early world world,  see
Guerzoni 1999, especially 334-355.
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political reasons (without a petition, Francesco II would have been unable to intervene in
a given affair) or for informational reasons (Francesco II may not even have known about
the affair in the first place.) Therefore, by establishing itself as a hub for petitions, the
chancery gained a  continuous flow of  incoming information that  certainly helped the
Sforza leadership to get a sense of their own dominion. Scholarship has observed this
mechanism also in other regimes, such as early-modern- and modern England and India,
where  the  state  used  local  (and  often  unofficial)  intermediaries  to  gather  useful
information.21 Going back to early-sixteenth-century Milan, it was through the reception
of petitions that the chancery came to know the existence of previously unknown pro-
Sforza factions in remote valleys around Lake Como. These factions wrote to Francesco
to claim a fairer treatment in the face of the fact that Sforza officers sent from Milan were
threatening  entire  villages  with  retaliation,  regardless  of  their  inhabitants'  behaviour
during the conflict with the French.22
2.2. The market of documents
If the benefits of a partnership between authority and subjects in the form of a well-run
petition system were mutual and political, the chancery also had a cogent reason to be
accessible despite its asserted secrecy: money. The 'soft power'  of influence,  network,
patronage certainly was fundamental to petition successfully and to obtain rescripts—as
the  Ordines forbidding  clerks  and  coadjutors  to  act  as  mediators  on  behalf  of  their
acquaintances demonstrate very well (see p. 105). However, it is important to always bear
in mind the basic fact that the fulfilment of petitions (and document-making in general)
was often a payment service, and money constituted the petitioners’ 'hard power' to bid
for paperwork—a very convincing tactical weapon. 
Outsiders knew that documents may have always been on sale. Indeed, secretaries,
clerks and coadjutors were entitled to a share of chancery profits, and this made them
directly interested in negotiating with petitioners and other interlocutors, as well as in
chasing those who 'forgot' to pay their dues—like the newly-appointed lecturers of the
University of  Pavia,  who apparently refused  to  make contact  with  the chancery after
collecting  their  privileges  in  1523.23 Secretary  Giovanni  Simonetta,  in  his  Rerum
gestarum Francisci Sfortiae commentarii, claims that chancery personnel competed for
managing the system of petitions, one of the most remunerative activities available;24 and
21 Higgs 2004, 36-58; Bayly, Empire and Information 1996.
22 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 31, 1522 October 18 and 23.
23 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, ll. 255-256, 1523 April 18.
24 Covini 2002a, 116, n. 19.
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as we have seen (p. 54) in 1464 Cicco Simonetta temporarily dismantled the judicial
branch of the chancery at  the death of its first secretary,  Angelo da Rieti,  because he
wished to control the flow of money that came with petitions. And indeed, the entries of
the registers in the hands of da Rieti are typically annotated with the amounts paid by the
recipients of the rescripts .25   
Generally  speaking,  in  marketing  documents,  the  distinction  between  regular
payments, friendly tips and unlawful bribes was likely to be minimal. As Kathryn Burns
puts it while dealing with Seville's Casa de la Contrataciòn—the 'House of Trade,' built
in  the  sixteenth  century  to  house  the  production  and  preservation  of  administrative
writings related to Spanish transatlantic commerce—what we define as 'corruption' was in
fact an accepted part of business; Peter Burke, too, has asked whether 'corruption' is ‘a
label  used  by  members  of  so-called  bureaucratic  societies  to  dismiss  other  ways  of
organi[s]ing political life,’ citing a study of Linda L. Peck on early Stuart England that
does not treat corruption as an infraction to rules, but rather as a specific trait of pre-
modern  political  culture.26 The  fact  that  money  circulated  informally  in  the  Sforza
chancery is testified by the Ordo for the ushers. As in the case of the norms analysed in
Chapter 3, we find a theoretical principle followed by exceptions that allow us to glimpse
what happened in practice. As a rule, ushers were forbidden to demand an extra fee for
themselves upon the issue of documents, and they were also bound to devolve any tip
they may have received to the chancery treasurer, who could give them something back to
his liking. However, secretaries could allow the ushers to demand the extra fee, and when
privileges and concessions ‘of value’ were issued the ushers did not even ask for the
permission to do so.27 What shows through is a half-informal, half-unregulated situation.
On the one hand, following distinctively Renaissance cultural mandates, the recipient of a
document—especially if well-off—had to demonstrate  liberalitas and  magnificentia by
generously tipping humbler chancery members;28 on the other hand, the same recipient
probably risked enduring a sort of mild racketeering. As for bribes, the registers recording
25 Ivi; on the high prices of letters of remission in mid-Sixteenth century France (‘two months' wages for
an  unskilled  laborer,  more  than  a  month's  salary  for  a  printer's  journeyman,  and  most  of  a
chambermaid's dowry’) see Zemon Devis 1987.
26 Burns 2010, 141; Burke 2005, 76; Peck 1990.
27 BTMi,  Triv.  1325, f. 92: ‘Item che de lettera alcuna non se possa domandare ne togliere pagamento
alcuno senza  licentia  delli  superiori,  salvo  de  privilegii  et  concessione  de  valore,  per  li  quali  non
possano ne presumano de astringere li homini ad darli se non quello fosse de loro propria volunta; et se
per le altre littere gli fosse dato pur voluntariamente et senza petitione loro alcuna quantita de denari,
che  li  debano  dare  illico  al  thesorero,  quale  gli  dare  per  el  sigillo  quello  gli  parera  honesto  et
ragionevole.’
28 See the cultural climate described in Guerzoni 1999, especially 333-340 and 352-371.
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the meetings of the Sforza Consiglio de Castello (of which at p. 112-113) report a cleric
(Gabriele  Migliavacca)  accusing  two  secretaries  (Filippo  Del  Conte  and  Bartolomeo
Calco) of accepting money in order to produce documents that declared Migliavacca's
defeat in a court case.29
In any case, the chancery normally came into direct contact (and negotiated) with
the public. The fact that letters patent were marketable following both overt directives and
covert  interests  is  fascinating,  because  it  introduces  the  idea  of  a  'documentary
environment' whose characteristics changed with the financial and political situation of
the sovereign and the chancery.  Cash-strapped rulers like Francesco II  were probably
more inclined to comply with the petitions of their subjects in order to make money or to
let corruption conquer the chancery in order to establish a clientele; as a consequence,
periods of political instability could coincide with 'floods' of documents of dubious value.
Vice versa, stable regimes were likely to produce relatively regulated documentary flows,
whose products could have had currency for many years to come. Unfortunately, as far as
Milan is concerned, we cannot rely on substantial sources to investigate the market of
documents until the second half of the sixteenth century, when chancery fees began to be
listed in print. These lists can be studied as documents for social history. The 1551 price
list of the Senate chancery was issued with a preamble that scolded those officials who
deceived  their  superiors  and  ‘the  simple  people’  by  demanding  higher  fees  than
established—that  was  exactly  why  the  price  list  was  published  in  the  first  place.30
Moreover, Mendicant friars, ‘miserable people,’ hospitals and  Luoghi Pii  (the powerful
network  of  Milan's  charitable  trusts)  were  exempted  from the  tax  on  the  sealing  of
documents, and should have therefore only paid for the documents’ actual writing.31 There
were more than twenty typologies of documents that people could have petitioned, which
suggests that the practice became systematic. During the age of Francesco II the situation
was probably similar, albeit less regulated.
To sum up, it is clear that subjects had many good reasons to believe that the
authority would lend an ear to their requests. Whether for a basic need of information, or
for reasons of political opportunity, or for money, the chancery intentionally engaged with
outsiders. What I wish to remark is that such partnership, at least in the case of Francesco
II,  was  not  exceptional  but  systematic.  The figures  emerging from the  Registri  delle
Missive suggest that the flow of petitions was essential for shaping governance, and for
29 Natale 1962–1969, vol. 1 (1962), 78.
30 Ordines excellentissimi Senatus 1743, 38-39.
31 Ibid., 38.
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guiding Francesco and his entourage in the elaboration of their own decisions, and in the
deployment of their own documents.
3. Resistance
Having  demonstrated  that  interaction  between  outsiders  and  the  chancery  was  both
intensive and foundational to the exercise of power, however, it is legitimate to imagine
that  the  relationship  between  the  parts  was  not  always  positive  and  constructive.  If
subjects considered the chancery as an interlocutor, then negotiation was only one of the
possible scenarios: resistance and confrontation were also viable tactics for dealing with
the authorities.
More specifically, subjects were aware of the fact that—as suggested above—the
documentary flow produced by the chancery did not hold an absolute value, and decisions
coming from the authorities were therefore potentially disputable. Furthermore, the limits
of chancery knowledge were well known, and outsiders could either play on them, or
conceal sensible information to gain leverage in the negotiations. In the following pages, I
will illustrate a range of cases—all coming from the the Registri delle Missive—touching
these issues.  I  will  focus first  on subjects  engaging in  documentary conflict  with the
authorities and then, on a more organised episode of documentary insubordination carried
out by the notaries working for the Maestri delle Entrate Straordinarie (the magistracy in
charge of financial affairs). 
3.1. Documents as battlefields
It is appropriate to begin with an apparently banal case that in fact clearly shows the very
relative  juridical  value  of  dispositive  chancery  documents,  as  well  as  the  problems
associated with indiscriminate documentary production. On 5 June 1531 (that is, at a time
when the Duchy of Milan was slowly starting to recover from the disasters of the Italian
Wars) the chancery wrote to the officer in charge of the maintenance of the streets of
Milan,  Giovanni  Ambrogio  Morigia,  to  annul  a  number  of  privileges  granted  to
individuals in the past.
[W]e understand that all the major streets [in and around Milan] are in great disarray,
and  this  happens  because  some  fagie  [districts  of  medieval  origin,  marking  the
outskirts of the city] are currently unstaffed, and also because many [people] claim
they  are  exempt  from such  duties  [of  streets  maintenance]  thanks  to  privileges
granted  by  us  or  by  our  predecessors.  As  far  as  the  [privileges]  issued  by  our
predecessors,  we  say  and  order  to  you  that,  given  the  circumstances,  no  one,
whatever his rank, should believe to be exempt on the basis of letters and privileges
granted in the past (…).32
32 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, l. 10-11, 1531 June 5:for the full transcription of this document, see
275
Privileges of exemption from collective street maintenance had been issued so
carelessly under  the Sforza,  that  it  had become difficult  to  find non-exempt subjects.
Eventually, this led to a drastic 'devaluation' of the privileges, which remained valid only
if  issued  under  Francesco  II.  We  can  also  speculate  that  in  case  of  uncontrolled
proliferation of a certain kind of document, it was much easier to claim its possession
regardless of the actual reality. Indeed, from the letter, it is not clear whether those who
affirmed to hold the privileges also materially showed them to the Sforza (or municipal)
officers, or just took advantage of a generally confused situation. 
What is sure is that the subjects often resorted to tactics of hard obstructionism
and trickery in their interaction with the authorities. Nothing demonstrates it better than a
chancery letter dated 9 July 1525. This document is particularly interesting, because it
brings together the issue of the chancery's lack of knowledge about the situation of the
Duchy's peripheries, the question of the purely instrumental use of the petitions’ language
of deference,  and the cheek—I cannot think of a more appropriate term—with which
subjects  dealt  with  a  supposedly  intimidating  authority.  The  letter,  addressed  to  the
Referendario of Cremona, reads:
Because we did not know the regulations of the merchants of [Cremona], during the
past days we issued a letter in favour of our Milanese merchants, authorising them to
export fustian [cloth] from Cremona;  but since we have been informed that such
authorisation is forbidden by the said regulations, we want this order of ours to annul
the former and to be observed against the authorisations that were granted because of
the petitioners' importunity and malice.33
The situation is very interesting. A group of Milanese merchants wished to profit
from the export of fustian from Cremona, but local regulations forbade them to do so. To
elude the prohibition, the merchants tried an ingenious (and elaborate) tactic: they wrote a
petition seeking the support of Francesco II, hoping that nobody in the Sforza entourage
was aware of the monopoly of Cremona on the export of its own fustian. The merchants
clearly hoped to gain time for their business while the authorities (both central and local)
would have amended the error. The petition must have had a state-of-the-art deferential
tone  because  it  succeeded,  but  its  language  (as  the  chancery  later  reckoned)  was
completely  instrumental.  The  Milanese  merchants  probably  made  profits  before  the
chancery contacted the  Referendario  of Cremona. Moreover, either the merchants sent
their petition under false names, or they clearly doubted that the authorities would punish
them for their audacity. In any case, subjects knew remarkably well the weaknesses of the
the Appendix section, document n. 6. 
33 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 234, 1525 July 9: for the full transcription of this document, see the
Appendix 1 section, document n. 7.  
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authorities they interact with.
Among these weaknesses, one that gave subjects great leverage in their disputes
with the authorities was represented by the  littere contraditorie  ('contradictory letters'),
i.e. the chancery issuing two (or more) conflicting decisions on a single question. This
issue,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  originated  in  the  chronic  lack  of  coordination
between the various Milanese chanceries—which testifies once again to the existence of
more,  mutually  independent  documentary  flows—and  it  was  so  serious  that  Cicco
Simonetta used it as the main argument in re-writing the Ordines sometime after the death
of Francesco I Sforza.34 Littere contraditorie created wearying clashes, because subjects
knew they had the legally valid chance to resist the pressure coming from the centre,
damaging its authoritativeness. A very telling example of this comes from a chancery
letter  dated  15 January 1523,  and addressed  to  one  Giovanni  Giacomo de  Busti  (his
capacity is not stated:)
The noble Cesare Pelizono, our Referendario in Pavia, tells us that it was customary
for his predecessors to always collect the money belonging to our Camera, coming
from all the fines and the condemnations done in that city and territory; and now,
[Pelizono tells us] that you [de Busti], in the shadow of a letter of ours, usurp such
office, and refuse to yield it to him (…); we order that, from now onwards, you must
let the  Referendario collect the said fines and condemnations, and this despite any
letter that we conceded to you, which letters we revoke and annul; [we order you to]
hand back to the Referendario the book of the fines and of the condemnations, that
you must have with you (…).35 
The situation is intricate, and it is worth describing it step by step. On one side, we
have  Referendario Pelizono claiming, on the basis of  custom, a prerogative—collecting
money from fines and condemnations—that he should have logically held by right, since
he was the Sforza representative in peripheral territories for what concerned financial
affairs. on the other, we have de Busti exercising the same prerogative, apparently without
the title to do so, but (crucially) in possession of a chancery letter that made his position
strong enough to confront Pelizono. In this confusion, the chancery decided to annul its
letter to de Busti and to rule in favour of the custom boasted by Pelizono. But did the
chancery even have any memory of its earlier letter? And, in turn, could it verify the
existence of such custom in its  archive? Similarly to the previous case,  subjects look
34 ASMi,  Carteggio Estero,  Venezia, 1315, undated (but circa 1466): ‘Ultimo me pare sia da havere una
grande et bona advertentia circha lordine de le lettere et de la cancellaria, per che in molti lochi se fano
lettere cossi per vostra Excellentia [duchess Bianca Maria] quanto per lo prefato Vostro Illustrissimo
figliolo [duke Galeazzo Maria], et per diversi cancelleri et secretarii et facilmente poteriano accadere de
le cosse contradictione per non saper luno quello che facia laltro, per il che me pare se voria sopra de cio
fare qualche regule etordini, ad cio che inconvenienti et contradictione non potessero accadre [sic].’
35 ASMi, Registri delle missive, 220, l. 119, 1523 January 15: for the full transcription of this document,
see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 8.  
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skilled at making their own case assuming that it was possible to trick the chancery. 
The final episode I would like to discuss sees Francesco II and the chancery in
greater difficulty. On 1 November 1522, the chancery wrote to the Maestri delle Entrate
Straordinarie:
We understand that in Monte di Brianza, in the parish of Incino and its surroundings,
there are many rebels who, pretending to hold safe-conducts, reside in our state and
also enjoy their [properties] as if they had been loyal to us, whereas they were [loyal]
to our enemies. Therefore, because we do not want them to remain unpunished for
their  wrongdoing,  we  order  you  to  investigate  these  people  thoroughly,  and  to
confiscate all their goods on behalf of our camera, notwithstanding any safe-conduct
they hold coming from anyone, unless [the documents] are issued by us and signed
with our own hand (…).36 
Here, we find an apparent connection between the loss of control over an area (the
parish of Incino and its surroundings, bordering with Venetian territory and traditionally
averse to the authority of the Visconti and the Sforza) and the loss of control on (or even
knowledge of) the documents circulating there.37 Having had intelligence of unidentified
rebels holding equally unidentified safe-conducts, the letter describes the scenarios the
chancery considers plausible—that is, it indirectly tells us what the chancery expects the
rebels to have concocted. Firstly,  the chancery writes that safe conducts coming from
anyone but the duke are not valid, thus admitting the possibility that someone else (local
institutions?  An  influential  local  figure?)  was  issuing  documents  that  were  de-facto
recognised  around  Incino,  even  though  they may have  been  strictly  speaking  illegal.
Secondly, the chancery points out that the safe conducts must bear the duke's signature to
be considered valid, thus admitting at least two other possibilities: one is that the same
Sforza chancery issued safe-conducts without the duke's personal authorisation—more
than likely, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 (pp. 241-242); the other is that the rebels were
forging ducal documents, a tactic that (as we shall soon see) cannot be discounted either.
Each  of  the  three  possibilities  demonstrates  that  the  central  authorities  lacked  the
resources and knowledge necessary to control the documentary landscape and, so, to hold
a tight grip on their dominion.
3.2. Battling insubordinate notaries
In  the  last  episode,  the  chancery  wanted  the  Maestri  delle  Entrate  Straordinarie  to
cooperate in information gathering. It may appear strange to entrust a financial institution
36 ASMi, Registri delle missive, 220, c. 44, 1522 November 1: for the full transcription of this document,
see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 9.  
37 The toponyms 'Monte di Brianza' and 'Incino' no longer exist. Monte di Brianza was a confederation of
local communities located some 50 kilometres North-east of Milan; the parish of Incino corresponds to
the town of Erba. For the peculiar political status of the areas, see Beretta 1911 and  Zenobi 2013.
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with the political task of chasing anti-Sforza rebels, but the Maestri  were in fact one of
the better-informed bodies operating in the Duchy of Milan. The reason for this is simple:
the  Maestri  were meant to channel extraordinary income to the ducal  Camera from the
confiscation of valuables and estates of rebels.  Charting political  opponents  and their
properties foresaw a great deal of intelligence including, from a documentary point of
view, the continuous compilation of lists and inventories, together with a great interest for
notarial  records.  The confiscation  of  goods was one of  the  pillars  of  Ancien  Regime
governance: despoiling the assets of dissenters to reward partners and allies was one of
the most effective ways to create (factional) consensus.38 During regime changes, the role
of the  Maestri  became more important than ever, because the acquisitive behaviour of
sovereigns  was  at  its  peak:  on  one  hand  opponents  abounded,  on  the  other  building
political consensus was crucial. 
However, as we have learnt throughout this dissertation, the unity of institutions
can never be taken for granted, least of all during periods of turmoil. The loyalty of the
Maestri and of their apparatus to Francesco II was always in discussion, and instability
crucially involved the management of records. It may well be only a coincidence, but it is
nevertheless  a  fact  that  the  first  two  letters  transcribed  in  the  earliest  Registro  delle
Missive  deal  with  a  striking  case  of  documentary  conflict.  In  the  first  letter,  on  18
September 1522, the chancery wrote to the Maestri:
To fix the disorder and the damage to our affairs caused by the notaries working for
the [Maestri  delle Entrate Straordinarie], we write them the attached letters, which
we want to be read at your [that of the Maestri delle Entrate Straordinarie] presence;
we order you (…) to make sure that within four days the said notaries give to our
dear  Rasonati della Camera Extraordinaria  and also to our  Referendarii Generali
the  authenticated  inventory  of  all  the  existing  and  confiscated  goods  and
condemnations  that  find  themselves  among  their  records  (…)  so  that  it  may be
possible to take action against the debtors, and draw up the appropriate writings.39
At first sight this letter simply points to a simple bureaucratic inefficiency: the
notaries  working  for  the  Maestri  were  slow  in  transmitting  their  paperwork  to  the
Rasonati  and  Referendari, so some generic ‘debtors’ remained at large. But the second
letter, addressed directly to the notaries—i.e. the above-mentioned ‘attached letter’ which
the chancery wanted to be read in the  Maestri's  presence—throws a different light on
situation:
Our dear Referendarii Generali advise us that they are experiencing huge difficulties
in acquiring the estates and goods of the rebels that are due to our Camera, because
the writings [concerning those estates and goods] are not in their possession (...). And
38 For Milan during the sixteenth century see Maifreda 2010.
39 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 1, 1522 September 18: for the full transcription of this document,
see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 10. 
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they say this is because you [i.e. the notaries working for the Maestri delle Entrate]
do  not  want  to  hand over  the  inventory describing  the  goods  confiscated  to  the
rebels–as it is your duty; and we find this very hurtful and displeasing, because it
greatly damages us, and we are stunned that you take such small care of our bursino
[treasury? literally little pouch] (…).40
Firstly, the generic ‘debtors’ of the first letter prove to be rebels. And secondly,
what looked like ordinary inefficiency is re-framed as a deliberate tactic of resistance on
the part of the notaries (‘you do not want  to hand over the inventory’). These elements
combined reveal a politically-charged situation: some sections of the apparatus supervised
by  the  Maestri were  intentionally  impeding  the  gathering  of  information,  probably
because they wished to protect the rebels. But while the protection enjoyed by the rebels
of Incino—analysed at the end of the previous sub-section—seemed to have a local basis,
here  the  opposition  to  Francesco II  was  rooted  at  the  core  of  the  central  authorities.
Francesco and the chancery were certainly alarmed, because the tone of their message is
unusually blunt  (especially if  compared with the language of governance analysed in
Chapter 4:) the letter threatened the treacherous notaries with expulsion from office and a
monstrous fine of five-hundred golden ducats. 
During the following years, the Sforza leadership would continue to claim rights
on  the  documentation preserved by recalcitrant notaries. In January 1523, for example,
Milan  lamented  the  'hiding'  (occultatione)  of  notarial  documents  of  interest  to  the
Camera all over the Duchy.41 And on 1 August 1531, the chancery contacted the Pretore
of Pavia:
Because of some extreme needs of ours, we are forced to try every means in order to
obtain  some  money without  disappointing  anyone;  hence,  you  will  immediately
order your notaries (…) to hand over all  the fines and condemnations relating to
financial affairs, and the confiscations of goods carried out until now (…).42
It is worth noticing that in this case the chancery looks almost apologetic: it seems
to  treat  as  an  exceptional  favour  something  that  the  Sforza  leadership  should  have
claimed by right. 
4. Competition
The  behaviour  of  the  Maestri  delle  Entrate  Straordinarie  suggests  that  'documentary
resistance' to authority was not limited to individual (or groups of) subjects, but occurred
40 Ibid., ll. 1-2, 1522 September 18: for the full transcription of this document, see the Appendix 1 section,
document n. 11.
41 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 141, 1523 January 27.
42 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, l. 19, 1531 August 1: ‘Per li extremi nostri bisogni siamo constretti di
procurare ogni via possibile per potersi senza iniuria di alcuno prevalere de qualche summa de dinari,
pero senza dilatione comandareti alli notari vostri civili et criminali che sotto pena de scutti ducenti da
essere  applicati  alla  camera  nostra  vi  debbano  subito  consignare  tutte  le  multe  e  condemnationi
pecuniarie e confiscationi de beni fatti da qui indreto (…).’
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also at an institutional level. This is a reminder that the ducal chancery did not have a
monopoly on the management of documentary flows; in fact, any political-administrative
body with an established jurisdiction could compete for prerogatives, these latter entailing
the exercise of wordpower—a strong documentary presence. From the early 1500s, the
Senate set itself as the greatest institutional novelty in the Duchy of Milan (see above p.
31), and the depth of its impact can be can be usefully assessed from a documentary point
of view. 
In this section, I will examine the documentary competition between Francesco II
and the Senate. More specifically, I will focus on the institutional process of 'interination'
(interinazione)   whereby  the  Senate  rejected  (or  approved)  decisions  coming  from
Francesco, working directly on documentation provided by the ducal chancery (4.1). I
will take into consideration one case of rejection (4.2) and one case of approval (4.3) in
order  to analyse how the actual  balance of power between Francesco and the Senate
found representation in the interination process. The results of the inquiry on interination
will also allow me to resume and enrich the arguments I made in Part III on the extended
authorship  of  ducal  documents,  and  the  source  criticism  on  documents-monuments
developed   in  Chapter  6.  But  before  getting  to  the  core  of  the  analysis,  it  is  worth
summarising  the  main  steps  and  reasons  of  the  rise  of  the  Senate.  Indeed,  we  have
repeatedly  come  across  this  institution  throughout  the  dissertation  without  actually
focusing on its history.
4.1. The rise of the Senate and the right of interination as a documentary 
ceremonial
The Senate of Milan was founded by king Louis XII in November 1499, at the beginning
of  the  first  French  domination  (1499–1512).43 Throughout  the  twentieth  century,
historians have mostly considered the foundation of Senate as the mere unification of the
two  Sforza  Consiglio  Segreto and  Consiglio  di  Giustizia mainly  because  the  new
assembly  had  the  political-administrative  functions  of  the  former  and  the  judicial
functions  of  the  latter.44 More  recently  Stefano  Meschini  has  challenged  this  view,
maintaining  that  the  Senate  was  modelled  on  the  then-flourishing  French  regional
parliaments and boasted several characteristics that had little (or nothing) to do with the
43 For a full analysis of the Edict of Vigevano–the document that established the institutional structure of 
Milan and its Duchy under the French–see Meschini 2002, 30-47.
44 The essential book on the Senate remains Petronio 1972: Petronio supports the idea of a Senate with
strong Sforza origins. Another more recent, valuable book on the Senate is Monti 2003–see pp. 48-63
for an overview of the Senate's functions.
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Sforza political tradition.45 In addition, the French saw the presence of the local assembly
as a means to compensate the destabilising potential of a 'foreign' domination like theirs.
The Senate was retained after the return of the Sforza, but the key-point is that it was
meant to represent a distant king rather than to assist a present duke, and was therefore
devised  as  largely  autonomous  and  independent—this  made  for  a  high  potential  of
competition. 
Nevertheless, the Senate grew strong enough to survive the French, and this put
both Massimiliano and Francesco II  in a very difficult  political  situation.  In fact,  the
dukes inherited a very cumbersome assembly that in theory could have guaranteed a form
of political stability, but in practice had based its success right on the disappearance of
the Sforza, and on the occupation of their former spaces of manoeuvre. The choice was
between dismantling the Senate or  finding a balance to  coexist  with it.  Massimiliano
attempted to eliminate the Senate, and this was probably one of the reasons for his fall.
Hence, when Francesco and Morone took power in 1522, they were keen to retain the
assembly right at the centre of their projects. 
The  Constitutio  issued on May 1522 (which made public the new governmental
system of the Sforza restoration, see p. 31) described the re-erection of the Senate as a
unilateral  act  of ducal authority.  The crucial  passage regarding the Senate displays  as
many as four imperative dispositive verbs: ‘we order, establish, proclaim, and decree, that
there will be one only supreme Magistracy, or supreme council, in all our Duchy and
dominion.’46 However, it is clear that Francesco II and his party were too weak to impose
the new institutional order of the Duchy out of their sole will. Despite being formulated
as the resolute decision of Francesco, this measure indicates the need to yield power to
other political players in exchange for consensus. 
The fundamental tool the Senate maintained in the passage from the French to the
Sforza was the right of interination, i.e. the power of rejecting or approving some of the
more controversial decisions of the sovereign (or of the governor who acted on the latter's
behalf.) It was, evidently, an especially powerful tool, and in fact it was to become one of
the major bones of contentions in the political struggles between the Senate and Spanish
governors during the second half of the sixteenth century.47
When and with what results the Senate exercised the right of interination certainly
45 Meschini 2008, 145.
46 Landus 1637, 145: ‘Ordinamus, sancimus, edicimus, ac decernimus, quod unus tantum sit supremus
Magistratus, sive supremum consilium in toto nostro Ducatu, et Dominio Mediolanensi (…).’
47 See Sella 1984, 43-48.
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is a relevant issue, but what is important for my analysis of documentary competition
between institutions  is  how the Senate exercised it.  Indeed,  interination represented a
delicate institutional process  based on the partly ceremonial handling of writings. The
Sforza  chancery  generated  paperwork  related  to  the ducal  decisions  that  were  to  be
scrutinised by the Senate, and transmitted it to the Senate chancery, which in turn worked
with the assembly to prepare a response, whether positive or negative.  The outcomes of
this procedure were significant, because they offered the chance to test the strength of the
contenders. But before the case-by-case outcomes, how significant was the functioning of
the procedure itself? This has never been studied, but it can provide some meaningful
insights into the relations of power between Francesco II and the Senate. 
In order to answer the question, we have to go through the archival series analysed
in Chapter 6, the DDS and the Cimeli. Here, five letters patent show the material signs left
by  the  procedure  of  interination,  thereby  enabling  detailed  reconstruction  of  that
procedure as composed of four stages. First, the secret chancery produced a letter patent
in its entirety (fig. 7.1, p. 285), and transmitted it to the Senate. Secondly, the Senate
examined the act and, if it found its legitimacy uncertain, forwarded the document to an
office called Fiscus, with the request for technical advice regarding the act's conformity to
legislation; a secretary of the Senate noted the request on the back of the document (fig.
7.2, p. 286). With the name Fiscus, the Senate chancery referred to the Avvocati Fiscali
('fiscal lawyers'), a group of officers that assisted the public authority throughout financial
disputes.48 Thirdly,  a  member  of  the  Fiscus answered  the  Senate's  request,  writing  a
second note underneath the first, with a motivated response. (fig. 7.2, p. 286). Finally, in
case of approval,  the chancery of the Senate issued a document that corroborated the
measure originally taken by the duke (fig. 7.3, p. 287). Chart 7.2 (p. 284) sums up the
procedure for the five letters patent I examined.
As is clear from the unfolding of these four steps, the Senate carried out an actual
'conformity check' on Sforza documents, seeking technical and legal advice from one of
the Duchy's central magistracies. From the content of the letters patent, it can be argued
that the Senate stepped in when Francesco II acted arbitrarily in according graces (as in
Cimeli, 17), redistributing confiscated estates and the income deriving from duties (DDS
13, DDS  72,  Cimeli 60),  or  granting  concessions  and  immunities  (Cimeli 45).  It  is
important to point out that the response of the  Fiscus was not binding. The  Avvocati
Fiscali  offered their legal expertise, but they always ended their notes stating that the




Fig. 7.1: Cimeli 45 – Sforza chancery letter patent
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Fig. 7.2: Notes on the back of Cimeli 45 (Sforza chancery letter patent). The first note
(top) was written by the secretary of the Senate Giacomo Cattaneo (Ia: Catanaeus); the
second note (bottom) was written by a member of the Fiscus, Diamante Marinoni (Dia
Mar)
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Fig. 7.3: Cimeli 45 – Senate letter patent
Senate was to have the final call on the matter. Therefore, the Senate made a political (and
not simply technical) inspection leading to the approval or rejection of decisions taken by
Francesco. 
Equally revealing is the form of this supervision. Indeed, the documents submitted
to  the  Senate  were  fully-validated  original  documents.  The  negotiation  between
chanceries on a specific measure could have easily happened exchanging drafts, with the
Fiscus assisting  as  third  party.  By contrast,  interination  was  set  as  a   'documentary
ceremonial' in which the Senate made a solemn judgement directly on letters patent, i.e.
the  supposed  objectification  of  ducal  authority.  With  the  expression  'documentary
ceremonial,' I wish to echo the Michèle Fogel's Les cérémonies de l'information on early
modern  France.49 In  her  book,  Fogel  maintained  that  the  ceremonials  through which
information  and  decrees  were  published  by  the  authorities  in  early  modern  France
constituted  a  fundamental  political  moment.  In  her  account,  the  study  of  these
ceremonials  enhance  our  understanding  of  the  nature  and  the  goals  of  French  royal
authority. A similar case can be made for early-sixteenth century Milan, with regard to
this specific side of communication between Francesco II and the Senate. The modes of
the  passage  of  documents  from  the  Sforza  chancery  to  the  Senate  chancery  always
followed the same 'ritual'—this is why they can be considered a ceremonial—and were
devised to have a distinct political value.
The  Senate  let  the  Sforza  chancery  produce  a  finished  charter—with  all  its
solemnities and bureaucratic requirements—before physically acting on the charter itself,
by marking its back with the signs of the interination procedure. This fact is significantly
paradoxical. On the one hand, Francesco II made a document/monument whose implicit
ideological  purpose—as  analysed  in  Chapter  6—was  that  of  expressing  an  idea  of
unilateral and  unchallenged imposition of authority. On the other hand, however, when
the procedure of interination unfolded, the document/monument was materially handled
by  the  Senate  for scrutiny,  and  possibly  for  being  rejected,  which constitutes  a
contradiction in terms.
In the following pages, I will analyse in detail two letters patent of the  Cimeli
series (Cimeli  60 and  Cimeli  45) that underwent the interination procedure, one with a
negative and one with a positive response. This allows me to illustrate in detail the modes
of the competition between Francesco II and the Senate; furthermore, seeing ducal letters
patent from this perspective allows additional considerations on their monumental nature,
49 Fogel 1989.
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and on the problems associated with their authorship. 
4.2. The case of letter patent Cimeli 60: a document-monument resists its 
'demolition'
From a material point of view, letter patent Cimeli 60 is, by all means, the grandest piece
of evidence I encountered during my research. Firstly, with its 54 centimetres of width
and 44,5 centimetres of height, it  is the biggest; secondly,  it  is made of a remarkably
resistant, yet elegant, type of parchment, almost intimidating to handle; thirdly, and most
importantly, it bears a pendant seal held in a lavish brass box, finely decorated with the
Sforza arms sided by the bucket and burning logs on one side, and with the  colombina
(literally 'little  dove,'  another  typical Sforza emblem) on the other.  On a visual  level,
Cimeli 60 certainly deserves its modern status as cimelio (memorabile), or—as we have
been repeatedly defining letters patent like this—of document/monument, celebrating the
authority of Francesco II (figg. 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, pp. 290-292).
This is confirmed by the patent’s contents. On 7 July 1525, Francesco decided to
donate  to  Ferdinand  of  Avalos,  Marquis  of  Pescara,  the  estates  around  the  town  of
Alessandria  previously  confiscated  from  some  anti-Sforza  rebels,  the  sons  of  one
Galeazzo Trotti.50 As the principal lieutenant of Charles V in northern Italy, Avalos was
one of the most important figures in Lombardy at the time. The letter patent makes clear
that the donation was a reward for Avalos ejecting the French from the Duchy of Milan, a
few months after the victorious battle  of Pavia.  Hence,  Francesco, at  the apex of his
political stability, was elegantly acknowledging the aid of a valorous imperial captain.
The situation looks absolutely unproblematic.  
However, as soon as we push ourselves beyond the overall narrative and the most
basic data of Cimeli 60—author, object, and beneficiary of the juridical act—we begin to
notice a number of complications. For example, the text states that the confiscated estates
that Francesco II was donating to Avalos had already been granted to a Senator, Giacomo
Filippo Sacchi. As a consequence, in order to make the new donation, Francesco not only
had had to annul the previous donation to Sacchi, but also three fifteenth-century eviction
decrees (decreti de evictione) that prohibited such an arbitrary move. On the one hand,
Francesco tried to bolster his authority by pointing out that he was acting out of his own
will,  exercising  his  full  and  absolute  power  (proprio  motu  et  de  nostrae  potestatis
50 The inventory of the Cimeli fond and the file in which the charter is enclosed, actually put 1526 as the
year of issue, probably because after the date ‘MDXXV’ there is a mark that could well resemble an
additional  ‘I.’ However,  Ferdinand  of  Avalos  died  on  December  1525,  and  the  charter  bears  the
signature of Girolamo Morone, who was arrested in October 1525 and never re-entered the Sforza court.
Therefore, 7 July 1525 is the correct date.
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Fig. 7.4: Cimeli 60
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Fig. 7.5: Front of the brass box containing the pendant seal of Cimeli 60, decorated with
the Sforza coat-of-arms sided by the emblem of the buckets and burning logs
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Fig. 7.6: Back  of the brass box containing the pendant seal of Cimeli 60, decorated with
the Sforza emblem of the colombina ('little dove')
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Fig. 7.7: Signature of Francesco II on Cimeli 60. The blank space between the words
sigilli and appensione suggests that the charter's scribe did not want to overwrite the
signature. Therefore, the charter may have been signed before the writing of the tenor
plenitudine et absolute titulo).51 On the other hand, he clearly expected trouble from the
Senate. Indeed, a clause in the document stated that Avalos would have received other
estates  of  the  same value,  had  the  donation  been  invalidated.  Thus,  competition  and
uncertainty were inbuilt in the document itself. 
The  fears  of  Francesco  II  were  justified.  The  man  he  was  depriving  of  the
previously-granted  estates,  Giacomo  Filippo  Sacchi,  was  a  powerful  and  influential
figure. We have already briefly encountered him (pp. 55-56): one of the most prominent
members of the Senate, he would soon become its President in 1528, and would hold that
post until his death in 1550. Going against him, for a weak duke like Francesco, was
pretty unreasonable. So why risk such a daring operation? A hypothesis could be that the
estates confiscated to the Trotti brothers constituted the only prize worthy of a key-figure
like Avalos,  and Francesco felt forced to sacrifice Sacchi's interests in the short term,
however problematic this choice may have been. Maintaining a good relationship with a
lieutenant leading a foreign army right on the territory of the Duchy of Milan was crucial,
because soldiers' abuses were common and potentially disastrous.
Moreover, there is a tiny but important material detail right on the body of Cimeli
60  that  further  complicates  the  scenario.  Indeed,  the  huge  signature  of  Francesco  II
overlaps with the last line of the text, but the text does not overwrite it (fig. 7.7, p. 293).
The writer wrote the first word of the last line, sigilli, but then realized that he could not
write  the  following  one,  appensione,  without  overwriting  the  signature.  The  word
appensione was then written after the signature, leaving a wide blank space. Therefore,
Francesco may well have signed a blank parchment—indeed the corroboratio  mentions
no signature, the importance of the act notwithstanding—and the details of the donation
were negotiated only later in the process of document-making. So who did actually set the
terms of the donation? Francesco, someone in the chancery,  or maybe Avalos himself
dictated them from his political and military position of strength? Once it is clear that the
personal signs of validation were either scarcely relevant (the signature), or a collective
tool in the hands of the chancery (the seal), we cannot overestimate the agency of the
declared author of a letter patent.
Paradoxically,  it  may  well  have  been  the  precariousness  of  the  situation  that
determined  the  very  solemn  form of  Cimeli  60.  In  an  attempt  to  satisfy  a  recipient
(Avalos) that could not be disappointed, and to present the Senate with a  fait accompli,
51 For the use of this juridical and rhetorical device, see Black 2009. Black argues that ‘in Francesco [II]'s
hands, plenitude of power was applied with less attention to established conventions (…) [plenitude of
power] was now used for deficiencies of all kinds, including mere technicalities’ (pp. 184-185).
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the  solemnity  of  the  act  was  purposely  thought  to  be  inversely  proportional  to  its
legitimacy.  In  addition  to  the  impressive  material  features  analysed  above,  the  letter
patent had already been dated, registered in the books of the Camera, and signed by Gran
Cancelliere Girolamo Morone and first secretary Bartolomeo Rozzoni. In other words, it
was as if the ducal chancery had full and exclusive control on the issue of the donation.
However, this was not the case.
The solemn make-up of the charter did not impress the Senate, which stepped in
very quickly, physically obtaining the charter for scrutiny on the same day it was issued.
Indeed, a secretary of the Senate chancery (named Ravazolus) wrote a note on the back of
the donation: ‘1525, day 7 July,  evening. Before giving the  sought-after approval, the
Fiscus shall see and oppose [the donation].’52 It is worth noticing that the Latin verb used
for 'oppose' (opponere) has no neutral nuances: the Senate was not asking for advice, but
rather  requesting a  motive to  quash the whole business.   A  Fiscus officer  (named  P.
Paulus) obliged and duly summarised a series of legal reasons invalidating the donation.
We do not  know how this  confrontation between Francesco II  and the Senate
ended. Indeed, in the Cimeli series, there are no other documents indicating whether the
conditions the  Fiscus suggested for concluding the deal were accepted by the parts, or
further negotiated. What is sure, however, is that the afterlife of this document contradicts
its tormented history. The Cimeli, just like the DDS, is a showcase series set up to glorify
the authority of those sovereigns or institutions that issued its documents. But in the case
of the donation to Ferdinand of Avalos, the archivists selected the exact opposite: a letter
patent that, behind its impressive appearance, had had its very production and outcome
disputed between many parts. Francesco and his chancery, the Senate and the Fiscus all
materially acted on the donation, while Ferdinand of Avalos and Giacomo Filippo Sacchi
probably  directly  influenced  its  making  and  undoing.  Eventually,  the  letter  patent
survived its own juridical 'demolition,' at least in the eyes of later observers. This is yet
more proof that documents-monuments—as I argued in analysing the unfinished letters
patent of the  DDS—were conceived for conveying an image of themselves that do not
match the tension behind their production.
4.3. The case of letter patent Cimeli 45, and the letters patent of the Senate
The  Senate  did  not  show  its  influence  only  in  opposing  unwelcome  measures  by
Francesco II and his party. Even when interination ran smoothly and there was no reason
to confront the duke, the Senate was eager to remark its authority on a documentary level.
52 ‘1525, die 7 iulii, vespera. Antea devenire ad petitam approbatione, fiscus videat et opponat.’
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This  is  the  case  of  Cimeli  45,  a  rare  file  preserving  not  one  but  two letters  patent,
physically bound together. The first is the duke's concession to the city of Milan of the
right to hold a tax-free weekly market; the second is the Senate's confirmation of the
concession (figg. 7.1 and 7.3, pp. 285 and 287). 
In this case, the interination procedure took place uncontroversially. The Sforza
chancery issued the ducal letter patent on 19 July 1530 and the Senate examined it eight
days later, on 27 July. A secretary of the Senate forwarded the concession to the Fiscus
with the following note: ‘The approval of this grace has been requested. It has been said
that [the concession] must be forwarded to the Fiscal [lawyers], so that they can judge
whether  there  is  something  to  object’—this  statement  being  evidently  much  more
compliant  than  the  one  used  in  Cimeli 60.53 The  fiscal  lawyers  found  the  act  fully
legitimate. Surprisingly, they did not provide a legal motive for justifying their approval,
but rather a political (and even slightly emotional) one, claiming that Milan deserved the
concession as acknowledgement for the accidents endured during the recent wars.54 
The  establishment  of  a  market  in  the  city  must  have  been  perceived  by  the
Milanese as a much-awaited sign that the dreadful devastations of the previous decades
had come to an end. This is so true that even the journal of  brothers Giovanni Giacomo
and Giovanni Pietro da Fossano—two notaries who recorded memorable events taking
place in Milan from the early 1500s up to 1559—devoted an entry to the first market-day
on 13 August 1530.55 As a consequence, the Senate not only gave the go-ahead to the
ducal decision but also issued its  own letter  patent confirming it—possibly to  visibly
sponsor  a  popular  act.  However,  it  would  be  nearly  impossible  to  distinguish  the
document  coming  from  the  Sforza  chancery  from  the  one  coming  from  the  Senate
chancery if we did not know that the signature Ia. Cataneus at the bottom-right corner of
the confirmation identifies Giacomo Cattaneo, who worked for the Senate and not for
Francesco II.56 Indeed, the Senate’s letter patent imitates the one issued by the Sforza
chancery. It bears Francesco's intitulatio, and displays the seal with his name and coat-of-
53 ‘Petita approbatione presentis Graciae. Dictum fuit, cum fiscalibus dari debere, ut videant si quid 
opponendum sit.’
54 ‘Cum  ista  Magnifica  Communitas  tantis  infortuniis  affecta  sit,  multisque  sit  de  Illustrissimo  et
Excellentissimo  principe  benemerita,  merito  hoc  sibi  tribuendum  fuit:  eapropter  Fiscus,  cui  nihil
opponendum occurrit, se remittit Reverendissimo Senatui.’
55 The journal is still unpublished, but it represents a precious source for the events occurring in Milan
during (and beyond) the Italian Wars, as seen from a first-hand perspective. BAMi,  Trotti  422, c. 80:
‘Memoria como uno sabato che fu sino [sic] adi 13 agosto 1530 si comenzo afare il mercato de bestie
sopra il pasquaro de Santo Ambrogio in Milano in quello grado et modo se fa a Monza.’ For some
general notes on this kind of journals (also known as  libri di ricordanze,) more numerous in Tuscany
and Veneto than in Lombardy, see Mordenti 1985; Grubb 2009. For a Lombard case, see Covini 2010. 
56 Landus 1637, 159.
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arms. The corroboratio lists the usual orders to make, register and seal the document, as
if Francesco had directed the process of document-making. The narrative of the text takes
Francesco's point of view on the interination procedure itself. Francesco affirms that he
has issued the concession, and that the Senators have examined it; since they have made
no  objections,  he  issues  the  confirmation  of  the  concession.57 If  we  accepted  such
narrative passively, the situation would be slightly paradoxical: why should Francesco
have  issued  the  concession  in  the  first  place,  if  he  knew he  needed  to  issue  also  a
confirmation of his own decision?
Even  the  archivists  of  the  Municipal  Historical  Archives were  struck  by  this
confusing ambiguity. Initially, one of them correctly wrote that the confirmation of the
concession came from the Senate. Later, however, someone (or maybe the same person)
amended what they thought was an error (fig. 7.8, p. 298). The results of my research
allow me to to affirm that the letter patent was certainly produced by the chancery of the
Senate. Indeed, similarly to the case of the letters close analysed in Chapter 5 (pp. 169-
174),  the  Senate  simulated  the  duke's  authorship  in  order  to  give  form  to  its  own
documents. 
To demonstrate it beyond doubt, we can turn once again to the DDS. Here, seven
documents are signed by secretaries of the Senate: two, by the above-mentioned Giacomo
Cattaneo;58 one,  by  Stefano  Gusperti  (St.  Gusp.);59 two,  by  Princivallo  Monti
(PrincivallusM);60 and two, by Benedetto Patellani (B. Patellan.).61 All these letters patent
show two  systematic  differences  with  the  documents  coming  from the  Sforza  secret
chancery.  Such differences may look minimal to us now, but they were crucial in the
'period  eye'  perspective  of  their  intended  recipients,  especially  when  they  needed  to
retrace the exact origin of the document in  their  hands.  The first  difference is  in the
intitulatio: Senate documents do bear the name of Francesco II and his title as duke of
Milan, but always lack the other titles that sometimes appear in the documents of the
secret chancery.62 However, this shortened formula is necessary but not sufficient to mark
57 ‘Mediolanensibus nostris diem ebdomedarium concessimus quo mercari possit (…) perquisita tamen
prius  à  questoribus  nostris  sententia  an  illud  concedendum  esset  (…)  cum  nihil  obiectum  fuisse
confirmate sunt (…).’
58 DDS, 13, Pizzighettone, 1524 September 13; Milan, 1534 May 29.
59 Ibid., Milan, 1531 August 8. In 1531, Gusperti defines himself as secretary of the Senate in a letter to
the duke: ASMi, Diplomatico, Autografi, Referendari, 221, 1531 December 28.
60 DDS, 13, Bologna, 1533 February 13; Milan, 1534 December 3. Monti is among the secretaries of the
Senate since 1527: Landus, Senatus mediolanensis, 159.
61 DDS, 13, Milan, 1535 February 15; Milan, 1535 September 9. Of Benedetto Patellani, we have the letter
of appointment as secretary of the Senate: ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 224, l. 1, 1529 December 5.




Fig. 7.8: Envelope of Cimeli 45, describing both the Sforza chancery- and the Senate
letter patent. The second paragraph begins with the words '[a]ttached [is] the decree of the
Senate' ([u]nito il decreto del Senato), but an archivist barred the words 'of the Senate,'
because letters patent issued by the Senate are almost indistinguishable from that issued
by the Sforza chancery.
an  incontrovertible  distinction,  because  sometimes  Sforza  chancery  documents  also
adopted  it.  Hence,  the  second  and  most  important  difference  stood  in  the  signature.
Documents coming from the Senate never show Francesco II's huge signature; documents
coming from the Sforza chancery always do. There is only one exception to this clear-cut
divide, but it is easily explainable. On 22 October 1535, the secret chancery dispatched a
letter patent that did not bear Francesco II's signature. The date is not coincidental: the
duke would die a few days later, and he was probably already unable to sign with his own
hand (see p. 181-182).
What emerges is a very contradictory state of affairs. On the one hand, both the
substance and the form of interination prove that the Senate held a remarkable power in
the competition with Francesco II. Indeed, the 'documentary ceremonial' of interination
foresaw that Francesco exposed himself with the issue of fully-validated letters patent,
thus offering the Senate the chance of judging them overtly, with something similar to a
public trial. On the other hand, its great authority notwithstanding, the Senate still relied
on the appropriation and imitation of ducal authorship in its documents, and did not coin
its  own documentary symbolism—like  many lords  did  in  late-medieval  Italy as  they
wanted to emancipate themselves from the communal past of their dominions.63 Finding a
reason for this mismatch is not easy: probably the Senate continued to find a framework
of ducal authorship more apt to convey authority. In any case, such mixture of document
forms  and  of  document  producers  further  confirms  that  there  existed  a  collective
dimension of document making; that documents could materially become a battleground
for the balance and competition between different powers; and that outsiders did not saw
Sforza authority as a rigid monolith that could be either obeyed or fought, but as a ductile
palimpsest on which to introduce their own motions.
5. Appropriation: a case of letter forgery
Speaking of appropriation and imitation introduces the last section of the chapter. Until
now, we have seen subjects, communities and institutions cooperating, negotiating and
competing with the chancery, and occasionally resisting it. But in addition, there existed a
tactic that stood out from this ordinary interaction: the forgery of documents.
If, as seen in Chapter 4, the deployment of chancery documents around the Sforza
dominion was one of  the  most  effective  ways  to  manifest  power,  then  counterfeiting
63 Attilio Bartoli Langeli has famously summarised the gradual transition of Lucca from a communal to a
seigneurial regime through the transformation of the form of the documents issued during the 'crypto-
lordship' of Castruccio Castracani degli Antelminelli (1314–1328): Bartoli Langeli 1985, 53-55. For the
full study, see Mosiici 1967.
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documents was a viable option to accomplish objectives. As Miriam Eliav-Feldon has
effectively shown in her  Renaissance Impostors, the practice of document-forgery was
widespread,  and many figures  specialised in such 'profession,'  like beggars  known as
bianti or pitocchi in Italy, or jarkmen in England. Not for nothing Tomaso Garzoni, in his
famous La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo, devoted a chapter on bolle
(letters patent) focusing less on their lawful making than on their systematic forgery.64
Yet,  succeeding in  counterfeiting  a  document  was not  just  a  matter  of  replicating  an
object. Since writings—as I hope to have demonstrated—drew a consistent part of their
meaning from context (for example the time and the mode of their distribution,) would-be
cheaters  had  to  re-create  a  whole  situation,  and to  show a  deep familiarity  with  the
communication strategies typically adopted by the authorities.
Therefore, I wish to conclude this chapter with the analysis of the most singular
episode I found in the Registri delle Missive, a dramatic story of forgery that took place in
the territory around Pavia between April and May 1523. Our knowledge of the events
rests on the transcription of two chancery letters. The first, dated 30 April, reads:
We  have  just  been  informed  that  someone  went  through  the  territories  and  the
villages of our Dominion, depicting our ducal arms, causing a grave damage to our
subjects, and pretending to have received the commission from us; and we know that
we did not issue such letter [...] we have ordered the noble Angelino de li Conti de
Gambarana to investigate such fraud, and jail anyone who could be held responsible,
and alert us. Now, having executed our order, the said Angelino has found that one
Master  painter,  Battista  da  Marliano,  went  [through  the  Dominion]  with  forged
letters, depicting the said arms, and has brought him to you [the Pretore of Pavia];
since we want to punish this infraction, we attach here the said letters, and we send
them to you, with the order of interrogating thoroughly the said Master Battista, to
find out the author and the accomplices of the falsification of the said letters and of
the seal; and once you have instructed the trial against him [Battista], you will do
against him what justice requires; and finding that the said Master Battista deserves
to die for his wrongdoing, you will hang the said letters to his neck while executing
him, so that he will be of example for all the others; and before doing so, you will
first alert us or our Suppremo Cancellario.65
Counterfeiting a document in order to pretend having a commission to paint the
ducal coat-of-arms on the walls of subject towns and villages: we are in front of a sort of
peculiar  'meta-forgery,'  forging as  a  prerequisite  for  forging.  The operation  set  up by
Battista da Marliano and his accomplices may seem too complicated and bizarre at first
glance. But in fact, the offenders must have concocted their plan basing themselves on
64 For an overview on document forgery in the medieval and early modern world see Eliav-Feldon 2012,
215-217. Bianti  and pitocchi are mentioned in Raffaele Fianoro's Il vagabondo–first edition 1621: see
Camporesi  1973,  97-100.  Jarkmen  are  mentioned  in  Kinney  1967.  On  bolle,  their  makers  and
counterfeiters, see Garzoni 1996, vol. 1, 316-318.
65 ASMi, Registri delle missive, 220, ll. 267-268, 1523 April 30: for the full transcription of this document,
see the Appendix 1 section, document n. 12.
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experience, appropriating and reproducing the methods of the authority. Indeed, Silvio
Leydi points out that in the series of regime changes between 1499 and 1525, both the
Sforza and the French relentlessly restored their  symbolic  supremacy over the public
spaces of the Duchy any time they re-conquered territory.66 The reasons for what he calls
‘auto-representative fury’ was simple: the contenders were convinced that even the sole
existence of the depiction of alien coat-of-arms in their field justified enemy interferences
and counter-attacks.67 In the case of  Massimiliano Sforza, we have detailed evidence on
how 'basic  visual  controls'—as  Evelyn  Welch effectively define  them—were  restored
through  ‘a  saturation  of  images  which  claimed  whole  cities  (…)  as  seigneurial
possessions:’68 There  are  notarial  records  testifying  that  the  duke  hired  painters  to
methodically tour the Duchy and mark the walls of buildings with Sforza emblems.69
Therefore, subjects probably grew so accustomed to painters showing up in their
towns that some impostors could think of cheating them looking perfectly credible. This
is fascinating, but it also raises two questions. Why would anyone risk a punishment for
depicting the Sforza arms around the Duchy? And how could Battista da Marliano and his
accomplices hope to get away with it? It is possible to make a series of educated guesses.
As to why they did it, Battista and partners probably forced subject towns and villages to
pay a fee for having the Sforza arms painted. Indeed, the ducal letter alludes to ‘a grave
damage’ for  the cheated subjects,  and since  the age  of  the Visconti  newly-conquered
towns were expected to paint the viper's arms on communal gates, towers and assembly
halls at their own expenses.70 As for getting away with their unlawful plan, the impostors
probably counted on the fact that nobody (neither the central authorities, nor its peripheral
representatives)  would  have  bothered  to  chase  them for  a  pro-Sforza  demonstration.
Possibly  they  thought  that,  even  if  discovered,  they  could  easily  negotiate  with  the
authorities a division of the sum obtained. 
However, the impostors are likely to have gone one (big) step too far when they
decided to forge the ducal commission in order to pursue their goals. Indeed, Francesco
II's merciless reaction to the appropriation and imitation of his documents is as significant
as the tactics conceived by the cheaters. The duke may have tolerated the unauthorised
painting of the Sforza arms in the dominion, even if someone else was making money out
66 Leydi 1999, 26-28.
67 As a document issued under Massimiliano Sforza declared: ‘(...) ne videatur ipsos Gallos et barbaros
aliquod ius habere in ipso dominio pro existentia armorum positorum per eos diversis in locis’. Cited in
Leydi 1999, 27. The expression ‘auto-representative fury’ is at p. 26.
68 Welch 1995, 6.
69 Leydi 1999, 26-27.
70 Welch 1995, 6.
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of it;  what he absolutely could not tolerate was the falsification of letters bearing his
name, and the diffusion of such letters throughout his territories—as seen in Chapter 4,
this act constituted a practice meaningful in itself. The text of the chancery letter is very
clear: the  Pretore of Pavia should have interrogated Marliano in order to discover who
forged  the  letter  and  the  seal,  the  rest  of  the  plan  being  of  lesser  importance;  and
ultimately, it was for the falsification of the letters—and not for the painting of the arms
—that Marliano was put to death. Francesco even came to devise a disturbing, 'living'
pittura infamante  (defaming portrait) to be staged during the culprit's agony; he should
have had the counterfeited letters hanging from his neck while dying.71 The reason of this
humiliation was explained both in the first (30 April) and second missive (12 May) to the
Pretore, the latter confirming the sentence: the macabre death of Battista should have
been of example for the rest of the population. No one should have ever dared to forge
ducal  documents.  If  in  this  episode I  am insisting on Francesco's  direct  agency,  it  is
because he followed the events personally. Indeed, he added an autograph statement at the
bottom of both letters. In the first, the duke urged the  Pretore to do justice as soon as
possible  (‘Do what justice requires,  and soon;’)72 in the second one,  he re-stated that
Marliano's death would have discouraged future counterfeiters to follow his steps (‘You
will do justice, because so is our will. Transeat in exemplum ceteris.’)73
Analysing the documentary interaction between the chancery and its outsiders—a range
of figures, groups and institutions ranging from local communities to the powerful Senate
of Milan—allows us to further problematise the status of chancery documents, the role of
the chancery itself, and the nature of Sforza government. Outsiders deployed a range of
documentary tactics  that  acted in  contrast  with the chancery's  strategies:  'negotiation,'
'resistance,'  'competition,'  and 'appropriation.'  Let  us  conclude with a summary of the
insights gained so far.
With  regard  to  tactics  of  negotiation,  I  have  underscored—and,  importantly,
quantified—the massive  role  of  outsiders'  petitions  in  shaping government  policies.  I
have also drawn attention to the somehow underestimated fact that the issuing of a vast
array of Sforza documents was based on the payment of fees, a 'documentary market' that
must have encouraged an intense cooperation between chancery and outsiders. These two
71 On defaming portraits, see  Ortalli 1979.  On the theatrical aspects of public executions in pre-modern
London, see Dillon 2008: 122-124.
72 ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 270, 1523 April 30: ‘Fate quello quello vole iustitia & presto.’
73 Ibid., l. 273, 1523 May 12: ‘Exequireti la iustitia, che cossi è mente nostra. Transeat in exemplum 
ceteris.’
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elements combined demonstrate that chancery documents, even though they materially
bear  the  marks  of  the  authority  of  the  duke,  very often  originated  directly  from the
requests of outsiders. When the Sforza leadership agreed to such requests, it did so not
only for careful political calculation, but also for cogent financial reasons, and because it
needed  to  reward  interlocutors  in  order  to  be  recognised.  As  a  result,  the  chancery
consistently worked as a centre for mediation as much as (if not more than) a centre for
the top-down imposition of power.  This,  in turn, shows the extent to which authority
could be inherently negotiated between parties.
This  last  statement  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  analysis  of  resistance  tactics.
Outsiders were more than willing to challenge the Sforza authorities precisely on the field
of writings, showing no reverential fear whatsoever. At all levels—from casual subjects to
smart merchants, from peripheral liaisons to central officers—outsiders show themselves
aware of the chancery's 'documentary weaknesses'  and were very skilled in exploiting
them. It is important to stress that this made the value of official documents inherently
relative and volatile, rather than absolute as we conceive it today, in our bureaucratic
culture. As I pointed out above, the 'documentary environment' of Renaissance polities
must have been very dynamic, and more or less stable depending on the balance of power
between central authorities and peripheral forces. 
As for the category of competition, I have investigated the documentary aspects of
the  interaction  between  Francesco  II  and the  Senate  of  Milan.  The  Senate's  right  of
interination can be seen as a 'documentary ceremonial,' during which the Senate examined
letters patent issued by the Sforza chancery. This procedure had paradoxical implications.
As seen in Chapter 6, letters patent are the documents/monuments par excellence, and
their  make-up  was  devised  precisely  for  imposing  a  straightforward  image  of
unchallenged  authority,  discouraging  any  form  of  criticism.  However,  the  Senate
scrutinised letters patent, materially handled and marked them with requests of advice
from the  Fiscus,  with the authority of rejecting them even if  they were already fully
authenticated  (the  case  of  Cimeli  60): all  this  is  yet  more  proof  that  the  processes
happening  around  chancery  documents  can  change  the  most  apparent  meaning  of
documents  themselves.  Even in  case  of  approval  (the case of  Cimeli  45),  the Senate
issued its own letters patent to corroborate Francesco's decisions, showing the importance
of  exerting  wordpower. Once  again,  the  nature  of  authority  emerging  from  this
'documentary dialectic' is complex and multifaceted.
Finally, in recounting and discussing a peculiar case of forgery, I have argued that
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counterfeiters not  only had the ability to  reproduce the physical  features  of chancery
documents (the tactic of forgery probably being much more pervasive and practised than
we may think,)  but  also knew how important  it  was to  stage the whole performance
(whose meaningfulness I have analysed in Chapter 4) of delivering them to subject towns
and villages. In so doing, counterfeiters denote a deep knowledge of the strategies of the
Sforza leadership; in addition, they demonstrate that they believed that, if caught, they
could have negotiated the unlawfulness of their actions, thus implying that the authorities
could be very flexible in their reactions.
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Conclusion
With the chancery seen from outside,  we have come to the end of this thesis. I have
explored the chancery of Francesco II from a variety of angles: I have begun by revealing
its most basic features (structure, size and hierarchy, Chapter 1), and then I have focused
on some behaviours and the socio-political background of chancery members (Chapter 1
and Chapter 2 respectively). Subsequently, I have focused on the social,  political,  and
cultural practices undertaken in the chancery (Chapter 3), thus enlarging the pictures to
outsiders, who (as we have seen) played a fundamental role in the very functioning of the
chancery.  After  having established the  importance  of  informal  practices  over  abstract
structures,  rigid  rules,  and  ideal  representations,  I  have  analysed  as  a  performance
meaningful in itself one of the chancery's chief activities—that is, the act of deploying
documents around the Duchy of Milan (Chapter 4). Finally, I have shifted my focus to the
material letters close and letters patent (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), asking if and how the
highly dynamic picture that has systematically emerged throughout the thesis affected the
nature  of  chancery  documents—and,  conversely,  if  and  how  a  material  analysis  of
chancery documents can improve our understanding of such dynamic picture.
In these last pages, I will illustrate four main contributions that my thesis hopes to
make to  Renaissance scholarship,  from the most  particular  (relating to  the history of
Milan)  to  the most  general (regarding a multi-dimensional  conception of Renaissance
authority and power as seen from the vantage point of written political culture.) Before
ending with this last point, I will also explain why my chosen case study has generated
research results that may be relevant for other cities and states, even though—as I pointed
out in the introduction—its major peculiarity consists in  being situated in a context of
crisis that was exceptional under many respects.
The most particular contribution of my thesis is a constructive re-evaluation of the Sforza
restoration under Francesco II, between 1522 and 1535. With my study—the first ever to
deal with Francesco II's chancery, which has entailed a remarkable amount of archival
work  on  previously-untapped  sources—I  demonstrate  that  considering  the  Sforza
restoration  simply  as  a  period  of  'decline'  is,  by  all  means,  limiting.  Firstly,  I  have
highlighted a number of elements of strong  continuity between the Sforza golden age and
the age of Francesco II—the overall organisation of the chancery, the resilience of the 'old
boys network'  of chancery members,  the enduring role of the chancery as a centre of
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scholarship and as a self-standing community with a civic role in Milan—which all testify
to  Francesco's  will  to  act  as  a  legitimate  sovereign,  his  political  and  financial
precariousness  notwithstanding.  Secondly,  I  have  shown  that  even  the  elements  of
discontinuity—the  progressive  disappearance  of  specialised  chancery  branches,  the
appearance of alien presences in the Sforza chancery network, the decrease in volume of
the correspondence with the peripheries of the duchy in the years 1531–1535—should not
be interpreted (as they have been) as a 'melancholic' retreat of Francesco from power, but
rather  as  a  realistic  re-positioning in  the rapidly changing institutional  balance of the
Duchy of Milan. Actually, my claim is that Francesco and the Sforza party had an active
role  in  fostering  such  new  institutional  balance.  They  established  the  role  of  Gran
Cancelliere, promoted the rise of the Senate and the  Maestri delle Entrate, and built a
secret-chancery  structure  that  would  remaine  unchanged  after  Francesco's  death.
Significantly, all these institutional features would characterise the political-institutional
life of early modern Milan up until the eighteenth century. Scholarship on early-sixteenth-
century Milan, which has seen a substantial rise since the early 2000s, has completely
ignored the role of the Sforza party in Milan's transition from the medieval to the early
modern world, focusing exclusively on the history of the two French dominations, and on
the dynamism of the rising Milanese patriciate and civic institutions/identities.1 Therefore,
my thesis contributes to the re-discovery of early-sixteenth-century Milan from the little-
known perspective of socio-political relations and interactions.
From a methodological point of view, this first contribution of my thesis certainly
is the most canonical. As a matter of fact, taking inspiration from the Italian documentary
history  of  institutions  (DHI),  I  have  conducted  a  documentary  history  of  the  Sforza
restoration, and I have come to the conclusions outlined above. In the process, however, I
have  also thrown light  on two themes  that  the DHI,  concerned as  it  is  with  abstract
political-administrative structures, tends to overlook.2 One is the broad social, political
and cultural role of chancery members (not only secretaries, but also lower-ranking clerks
and coadjutors.) As I have argued, they were veritable 'shareholders' of power, because
they had strong political and economic ties with Francesco II, something which partially
undermines  the  meaning  of  the  official  chancery  hierarchy.  The  other  theme  is  the
importance of socio-political networks (much more than technical skills) in determining
the composition of the body of the chancery members, which similarly advises against an
1 For the discussion on the achievements and gaps of the historiography on early-sixteenth-century Milan,
see pp. 35-37, nn. 44-51
2 For the discussion on the achievements and limits of the DHI, see pp. 19-21, nn. 12-18, and p. 35.
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overly rigid structural approach to chanceries. The insight gained from the first part of my
thesis  invites  us  to  consider  chanceries  less  as  isolated  institutions  than  as  dynamic
groups, regulated less by rules than by informal practices. This is why I focused on this
last concept in the central part of my thesis.
This leads to what I regard as the second main contribution of my work, which can be
summarised as follows. There is an elementary mechanism—the concrete act of making
and delivering official documents—that, despite being absolutely basic and fundamental
for the exercise of power, has been almost neglected by scholarship, in the (conscious or
unconscious) conviction that chanceries were too rigidly regulated to host meaningful
political and social processes. And there is a presentist bias towards chanceries, seen as
bureaucratic offices at the sole disposal of well-defined authorities, that historians have
not  really challenged—either  because they are unaware of such bias,  or because they
deem it  as  scarcely  relevant.  However,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  as  a  result  of  that
elementary mechanism of power,  and  as a consequence  of how chanceries concretely
functioned,  that  today we have much of the evidence through which we know about
political-institutional history (and history in general.) Therefore, we need to take chancery
practices—the concrete, material processes by which official documents were made and
delivered—from the margins to the centre of historical analysis. My thesis attempts to do
precisely this; and it has, I hope, the potential of completely changing our perspective on
what a chancery and its functions really were. 
To  deal  with  this  research  problem more  effectively,  I  have  coined  the  term
'wordpower' (defined as the will and ability to produce written documents so as to set up
an interaction between the duke and his party on one side, and subjects and interlocutors
on the other.) If we keep a classic perspective on chanceries—relying only on structures,
rules and representations—wordpower presents itself as a tool  of  the authority (in our
case, tendentially reified in 'the duke,')  used by the authority with an overwhelmingly
pragmatic aim: exercising top-down governance.  This is  the perspective of traditional
political-institutional  history.  However,  as  soon as  we focus  on practices,  wordpower
becomes much more complex. Firstly, the collective dimension of the use of wordpower
enriches the one strictly controlled by the sovereign and his inner circle. And secondly,
the exercise of wordpower on the part of the sovereign and his inner circle acquires a
markedly symbolic/representational dimension, to the detriment of the pragmatic one. Let
us step back and review the evidence and some examples I found and used to support
307
these last claims. With regard to social practices, an against-the-grain reading of fifteenth-
century Sforza chancery  Ordines demonstrates  that  the chancery,  despite  being called
secreta ('secret') was in fact systematically open to outsiders of all ranks, who could often
easily  meddle  in  chancery  activities.  Moreover,  as  far  as  more  specifically  political
practices are concerned, another source (the memoir  Informazioni sopra le incombenze
dei segretari ducali) explicitly testifies that decision-making processes at the Sforza court
foresaw a continuous and informal exchange—often unsupervised by the duke—between
chancery insiders  and influential  outsiders,  the  authority  of  the  latter  resting  on very
volatile  relations  of  power.  In  addition,  as  anticipated  above,  a  variety  of  sources
underscores the fact that the chancery was by no means only a centre of documentary
production, but also (and consistently) a vivid centre of scholarship, and a socially-varied,
autonomous community gathering around a chapel in the heart of Milan. These last two
traits of the chancery may not directly affect the nature of wordpower, but are further
proof  that  it  is  impossible  to  conceptualise  the  chancery  as  a  standard  political-
administrative  office  managed  by the  authority  as  if  in  a  social  vacuum.  Finally,  by
carrying out a critical reading of the contents and language of the Registri delle Missive, I
have shown that the deployment of Francesco II's documents in the peripheries of the
Duchy of Milan was less an exercise of actual governance than a symbolic practice—very
meaningful in itself, as demonstrated by the abundant funding Francesco allocated to it—
undertaken to affirm a minimum degree of jurisdiction over the Sforza dominion. As a
result of this research, I have come to the conclusion that the chancery was an open and
dynamic  socio-political  hub  of  information  and  communication,  and  that  its  main
function  was  not  only  that  of  coercive  imposition  of  orders  coming  from above  on
acquiescent  subjects,  but  rather  one  of  mediation.  The  multiple  tactics  enacted  by
chancery outsiders that have emerged in the last chapter confirm this stance very well.
Subjects relentlessly tried to orientate Sforza policies through the writing of petitions, and
the chancery encouraged them to do so either to gain money or precious information. The
existence of a documentary market, with chancery products issued upon the payment of
fees, certainly promoted a mutually beneficial exchange between chancery insiders and
outsiders.  Even  the  episodes  of  open  confrontation  between  the  chancery  and  its
interlocutors can be seen as a rougher form of mediation. 
The third main contribution of this thesis is, I hope, to have shone new light on the forms
and  materiality  of  chancery  documents  as  products  of  lively,  politically  and  socially
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mixed, interactions. This is in contrast with the approach of classic diplomatists, who see
documents in a sort of social and political vacuum. As we have seen, Jacques Le Goff
overtly criticised his colleagues for having been 'too passive' before documents, accepting
their  most  apparent  monumentality without  making the  effort  of  scrutinising  and de-
constructing them—that is,  without revealing the actual relations of power underneath
their formal and rhetorical surface. I have made such effort. With an approach that I have
defined as 'new diplomatics,' I have read documents not only as static finished products,
but also as the embodiment of multi-staged and collaborative processes; and even when I
have looked at documents as finished products, I have not treated them as mere containers
of text, but as textual objects whose material forms are highly meaningful. 
Therefore, I have investigated how the collective and representational character of
wordpower is reflected in chancery documents. In the former case,  what has strongly
emerged is  a question of documentary authorship.  I  have highlighted that,  while both
Sforza  letters  close  and  letters  patent  always  propound  the  personal authorship  of
Francesco II, such authorship could be consistently shared. Having authority in the Sforza
orbit meant having access to Francesco's authorship. More interestingly, though, through
a series of micro-case-studies, I was able to establish the remarkable extent to which the
epistolary identity of Francesco could be independent from his person. Firstly, as far as
letters close are concerned, Sforza secretaries were allowed to write and dispatch letters
with Francesco's autograph signature even when Francesco was physically far away from
them, whether because they used blank sheets where Francesco had already inscribed his
signature,  or  because  they  actually  imitated  it.  The  Senate  itself,  an  institution  that
Francesco  did  not  control  directly  (and  with  which  he  was  often  in  competition)
unproblematically made use of ducal authorship in its own letters. Secondly, as far as
letters  patents  are  concerned,  the  situation  is  even  more  fluid.  I  have  defined  these
documents as 'jigsaws,'  because I  have shown that  they were constructed through the
apposition  of  a  number  of  elements  essential  to  their  validation  (marks  of  authority,
formulae, bureaucratic notes,) which all nominally recalled the person of the duke, but
were  in  fact  controlled  and  managed  by  different  people,  and  put  in  place  without
following regulated procedures. As a result, every single letter patent has its own history,
and Francesco's  actual 'quota' of authorship in each one varies greatly.
Moving on to the meaningful forms of chancery documents, I have dealt with two
different problems—once again, I have divided my analysis to deal first with letters close,
and then with letters patent. With regard to letters close, I have focused on how Francesco
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II  micromanaged  the  use  of  autography  (choosing  between  autograph  signatures,
autograph statements, and holographs) depending on rather precise circumstances. What
is clear is that Francesco was aware that the performance of his own writing (and even his
writing's  calculated  degree  of  readability)  was  an  act  that  was  meaningful  in  itself,
capable of changing the tone of the message he was sending. Moreover, considering the
processes of authorship-sharing discussed above, the use of autography was a significant
material act of authorship re-appropriation on the part of the duke. With regard to letters
patent,  instead,  I  have focused on the lack of standardisation of the charters'  material
form. This characteristic of letters patent clearly suggests that their form mattered. And
indeed, especially in the section on the illumination of letters patent, I have shown that
the design of documents often resulted from the relationship (and negotiation) between
the Sforza chancery and the documents' recipients, with the latter keen to pursue  their
own self-promotional iconographic programmes.
The result of the problematisation of both authorship and materiality of chancery
documents  is  to  question  their  very  nature.  Nineteenth-  and  early-twentieth-century
scholars,  following  their  own  positivist  mindset,  were  quick  to  classify  Renaissance
chancery  products  as  state-of-the-art  'public  records:'  documents  created  following
regulated procedures in official settings characterised by specialised functions, and by a
clear  separation  from their  outside.3 Similarly  to  what  happened  with  the  essentially
bureaucratic notion of chanceries, scholarship has not revised this early interpretation. By
contrast,  my thesis  decisively opens  up  a  new perspective  on  the  study of  chancery
documents.  It  rejects  (or at  least  attenuates)  their  rigid function as official  tools fully
controlled  by  the  authorities,  instead  insisting  on  their  inherently  fluid  processes  of
creation and usage. In so doing, I suggest that Renaissance chancery documents have
much less in common with public records as we conceive them today than with other
kinds of Renaissance and early modern texts—literary and non-literary books, pamphlets,
public proclamations, private letters, and so forth—whose collective and social character
has  been  highlighted  by  recent  and  successful  scholarly  trends  with  a  distinctively
material orientation, such as the study of manuscript culture and scribal publication. It is
my  contention  that  future  research  specifically  focusing  on  chancery  documents—
whether  called 'new diplomatics,'  as  I  have advocated,  or otherwise—will  necessarily
3 See my discussion of the early-twentieth-century construction of the Sforzesco archive (Introduction, pp.
39-40).Or–to  mention  a  substantial  example–the  monumental,  state-sponsored  series  of  domestic,
colonial, and foreign  Calendar of State Papers  published in England from the 1850s. One volume is
devoted to Milan: Hinds 1912.  
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have to  engage with these trends as much as  with classic  diplomatics  and traditional
political-institutional  history.  As  extensively  explained  in  the  introduction,  chancery
products  need to systematically undergo the 'social-oriented'  kind of material  analysis
from which book history has so much benefited, and that has then spread to the study of a
vast array of textual objects.4 
To conclude my point about the form of chancery products, it is worth mentioning
that the question of the materiality of political-administrative documents did not matter
only in pre-modern times, but recently made the news in the United Kingdom. The House
of Lord's decision to end the 'thousand-year-old tradition' of printing Britain's laws on
parchment from April 2016 has aroused criticism from a number of MPs, from the press,
and also from part of the general public—and it may therefore be repealed. What is at
stake is the durability of the writing material on which laws would be printed (5,000 years
for parchment versus 200 years for standard archive paper, argues  The Telegraph,) but
also—and  perhaps  more  importantly—the  abandonment  of  what  media  outlets
significantly define as a  practice  that divides opinion and provokes different reactions.5
On the one hand, using parchment for making records is clearly anachronistic, absurdly
expensive, and also politically incorrect (given the unnecessary killing of animals.) On
the other hand, though, some conservative parts of English society—hence the protests of
The  Telegraph—continue  to  consider  the  historicity  and  prestige  of  such  practice  as
highly meaningful.    
Before proceeding to the last comparative point of this conclusion, in which I discuss the
most  general  lessons  we  can  learn  from  the  chancery  of  Francesco  II  Sforza,  it  is
appropriate to anticipate an objection that could logically arise against the arguments I
have made so far. How can I ground a new notion of chanceries, and a call for a 'new'
diplomatics, on the basis of a case study that is situated in a period of exceptional crisis
like the Italian Wars in the Duchy of Milan? In the introduction to the thesis, I claimed
that early-sixteenth-century Milan, characterised by repeated  regime changes and by a
highly  volatile  political-institutional  context,  would  have  constituted  an  interesting
'laboratory' for doing documentary history. But how representative can this laboratory be?
I wish to respond to this objection in two ways. First of all, by showing that my initial
hypothesis  was  correct:  the  instability  of  early-sixteenth-century  Milan  has  actually
4 For the discussion on the material analysis of textual objects other than chancery documents, see pp. 21-
25, nn. 29-39.
5 Hughes 2016, Mason 2016. 
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allowed us to get historical insights that would have been more difficult to scope, had I
studied a period of stability. And secondly, by showing that it has indeed been possible to
make multiple comparisons with other case studies throughout the thesis. 
One first important subject that the crisis of the Sforza restoration has enhanced is
the importance of socio-political networks as the elements through which the body of
chancery members came to be constituted (Chapter 2). It is precisely because Francesco
II's troublesome history as duke is marked by two radically different political projects that
we can appreciate how each of those projects was necessarily supported by a different
chancery network. On the one hand, the chancery network of the heyday of Francesco
(1522–1525)  was  strongly  Sforza-biased:  the  objective  was  to  re-affirm  the  old
prerogatives of the Sforza dynasty, and the ranks of the chancery were therefore filled
with old-time loyalists—or their descendants. On the other hand, the chancery network of
the last years of Francesco (1531–1535) reflects his will to re-position himself and his
party in the political landscape of the Duchy. A number of chancery newcomers did not
have any former allegiance to the Sforza. Rather, they represented the rising influence of
Spanish-imperial elements in the government of the Duchy. Another glaring proof of the
crisis as a revealing factor is the very existence of a fundamental source, the memoir
Informazioni sulle incombenze dei segretari ducali  (Chapter 3): as a matter of fact, the
most insightful descriptive source on the golden-age Sforza chancery,  cited by all  the
most important Sforza chancery scholars, was written in the early 1520s because of the
need to remember how the chancery functioned after decades of political turmoil. Moving
on to Chapter 4, it is the fact that a disgraced and cash-strapped duke like Francesco II
made a great economic effort for document-delivery—regardless of the scarce political-
administrative results obtained—that convincingly supports the argument that the act of
deploying chancery document  around the  Duchy of  Milan  was  less  a  functional  and
logistic endeavour than a symbolic (yet fundamental) practice of authority. Moreover, as
far  as  the  materiality  of  letter-writing  is  concerned,  the  great  variety  of  Francesco's
autography strategies is consistently caused by his unique relationship with Bernardo Cles
(who had been Francesco's protector, educator, mentor, and political ally,) which in turn
derives from Francesco's exiled years in Trent. more generally, Francesco systematically
resorted  to  the  use  of  autography in  his  correspondence  with  Cles  and  the  Gonzaga
because he considered himself as the lesser correspondent. The debito of writing (with his
own hand) therefore fell on him. These elements were all crucial to get a clear perspective
on the variety of  textual  practices.  Finally,  in  Chapter  7  the study of the interination
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procedure  as  a  revealing  documentary  ceremonial  is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that
Francesco II is the only Sforza duke to have an institutional competitor as strong as the
Senate to engage with. This led to the elaboration of the process of interination—and of
the 'documentary ceremonial' connected to it, which in turn has given us the opportunity
to obtain compelling evidence of how letters patent, supposedly document/monuments
(and therefore authoritative, untouchable) were not treated as such by contemporaries.
Let us now pass to the features that place my case study within the wider context
of Renaissance Italy and Europe, thus making it relevant for a broader scholarly debate.
Firstly, in underscoring the importance of the social and political practices undertaken in
the  chancery  (Chapter  3),  I  have  worked  on  two  sources—the  mid-fifteenth-century
chancery Ordines and the Informazioni—that do not refer to the age of Francesco II, but
to the chancery of the previous century. As I pointed out in the introduction, scholarship
typically considers this chancery as one of the most functional and 'modern' of the Italian
Renaissance  (especially  with  regard  to  the  management  of  diplomatic  information.)
However, despite this supposed functionality and modernity, my study of practices has
clearly shown that, even in the golden age, the chancery was nonetheless systematically
open to the agency of outsiders. This suggests that the porosity of the chancery was not
connected to exceptional forms of crisis; rather, it was inherent in Renaissance written
political culture in general. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4, I have demonstrated that the merely symbolic function of
document-delivery was not a trait that applied only to weak rulers like Francesco II, who
could not afford the actual enforcement of their own orders. Even in a 'super power' like
the rising Spanish empire, officers made a distinction between the successful delivery of
letters (understood as the establishment of a minimum, but often sufficient,  degree of
jurisdiction) and their actual execution (a desirable, but not necessary, occurrence.) The
parallel between Milan and Madrid is so strong that also the terminologies used to define
the  distinction  match:  in  the  former  case,  acceptare  a  letter  coming from the  central
authorities was different from obedire  or  exequire  it; in the latter case,  cumplir  a letter
was different from  obedezer  it.  Generally speaking, I have also shown that systematic
difficulties in controlling state peripheries are not to be found only in war-torn polities
like the early-sixteenth-century Duchy of Milan or in trans-continental dominions like the
Spanish empire, but also in the Venetian Terraferma—a manageable area controlled by
one of the most powerful cities in Europe at this stage.
Turning to epistolary practices (Chapter 5), my main source of comparisons has
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been Tudor England. I have mentioned Shakespeare's Twelfth Night to show that letters'
recipient must have been profoundly aware of the meanings encapsulated in the non-
textual forms of the letters they received, and I have shown that Lady Arbella Stuart, just
like Francesco II, consciously chose between an informal and a presentation italic hand,
depending  on  the  circumstances.  Furthermore,  regarding  the  remarkably  extensive
sharing of sovereign authorship, I have once again shown that it was not a trait due to a
particular lack of authority on the part of Francesco: Tudor poet John Skelton satirised
Henry VIII (certainly not a powerless or irresolute king) for his inability to control the
letters written on his behalf; and Gonzaga-scholar Deanna Shemek has drawn attention to
the 'web of relations' that composed the written voice of Isabella d'Este, one of the most
powerful women of the Renaissance. Shifting the focus from letters close to letters patent,
I have found evidence of the use of pre-signed papers and of the collective management
of the ducal seals (including the private signet-ring of the duke, the corniola secreta) not
only for  the  age  of  Francesco II,  but  also for  that  of  Ludovico  Sforza—traditionally
considered the most despotic and authoritarian of the Sforza dukes.6 
In Chapter 7, I  have shown that Francesco II's  heavy reliance on petitions for
policy-making was by no means exceptional, but can be observed in fourteenth-century
Bologna as much as in the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza during the eighteenth century. In
addition, the practice of gathering sensible information informally, relying on unofficial
local intermediaries—as I argued Francesco and the Sforza leadership did through the
reception of petitions—was not an emergency solution proper of unstable governments,
but a strategy enacted by regimes in early-modern- and modern England and India. I have
also highlighted that the market for documents as a strong factor of exchange between
chancery  insiders  and  outsiders  can  be  continuously  found  in  Milan  from  the  mid-
fifteenth-  to  mid-sixteenth-century;  and  that  the  blurred  difference  between  lawful
payments and unlawful bribing was common in Milan as much as in early modern Seville
and  London,  where  'corruption'  (whether  in  the  world  of  trade  or  at  court)  was  not
perceived as an infraction to rules, but as a normal way of doing business. Finally, in
dealing with the forgery of  documents,  I  have underscored that  such practice was so
common as to constitute a 'quasi-profession,' not only in the politically unstable Duchy of
Milan of the 1520s and 1530s, but also elsewhere, with figures specifically known as
bianti, pitocchi and jarkmen operating all over Italy and England.7
6 The supposed authoritarianism of Ludovico has been recently put into question by Letizia Arcangeli: see
Arcangeli 2003a. 
7 See p. 300, n. 64.
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Therefore,  the  Sforza  restoration  may  well  be  considered a  peculiar  research
setting, but this does not make it an isolated one. To echo a famous expression used by
Italian  micro-historian  Edoardo  Grendi,  Francesco  II's  chancery  constitutes  the
'exceptional  normal'  (eccezione  normale):  a  case  study that  may look  unique  at  first
glance, but in fact offers the chance to illuminate broad trends—especially considering
that  late  medieval  and  early  modern  Italy  was  characterised  by multiple  comparable
crises, each one generating a sheer amount of historical evidence.8 As I pointed out at the
end of the introduction the advantage of focusing on single case studies and doing micro-
history is precisely the possibility of addressing broad historical problems and re-casting
some  accomplished  and  unchallenged  historical  teleologies  through  the  close
investigation of well-delimited objects. In my case, the word 'object' is to be understood
both  figuratively (in  the  sense  of  'subject')  and literally  (with  regard  to  the  physical
chancery documents I have examined.)
Now that I have expounded why it is possible to establish significant analogies
between my case  study and other  regimes,  I  can  focus  on the last  and more  general
contribution of my thesis. With a study of a Renaissance chancery, of its documents and
of the written political culture surrounding them, what I have in fact tried to achieve is a
broader, solid, and evidence-based reflection on Renaissance  political culture tout-court
—that  is,  on  the  nature  of  power.  As  I  pointed  out  in  the  introduction,  one  of  the
fundamental  aims  of  my  work  was  offering  a  first  example  of  cultural  history  of
bureaucracy.  A  history  that  does  not  take  the  documentary  interface  between  the
authorities and their  subjects as a trans-historical phenomenon—immanently based on
impersonality, hierarchy and rules—but rather as an excellent vantage point to grasp a
number of otherwise hidden socio-political dynamics.
With regard to this, for example, my thesis provides a solution to—or a way out
for—the first historiographical debate I examined in the introduction to this thesis (pp.
18-19).  Let  us  recall  it.  In  the  late  1950s,  Federico  Chabod  argued  that  the  Italian
Renaissance states were the first  to show distinctively 'modern'  traits  of centralisation
thanks  to  the  early  development  of  bureaucratic  systems  made  of  offices  (with  their
chanceries) and officers. In response, Chabod's critics denied the actual effectiveness of
such centralisation, instead focusing on the persistence of institutional pluralism, and on
the importance of private networks for the functioning of political-administrative affairs.
What emerges from my case study, and from a cultural-historical approach to bureaucracy
8 See Grendi 1997, especially p. 512, and Id. 1994. 
315
in  general,  is  that  these  two  apparently  irreconcilable  views  can—and  should—be
reconciled and overcome to explore a new dimension of Renaissance politics. Political-
administrative writing and its government were undoubtedly central in state-building, as
Chabod  argued.  The  point,  however,  is  that  state-building  by  writing  was  not  an
exclusively  top-down  phenomenon—with  the  authorities  imposing  it  on  their  mostly
recalcitrant subjects—but also worked bottom-up, with subjects keen to orientate state-
building  by  writing  in  many  different  ways.  The  fact  that  chanceries consistently
functioned through socio-political networks, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, is perhaps the
best synthesis of the seemingly antithetical stances of Chabod and his critics.
Classic political historiography, with its institutionalist view of 'the State,' tends to
see power as  a  strictly one-dimensional  entity,  held by small  and compact  elites  that
impose it on masses. My thesis decisively rejects this view, as it shows the outstanding
extent to which power was multi-dimensional, inherently based on negotiation, sharing,
moves and counter-moves. However, my thesis also tries to go beyond the 'revisionist'
opposition to the institutionalist view, which has limited itself to put into question the
smallness  and  compactness  of  the  said  elites,  without  changing  the  substance  of  the
problem—that is, without questioning who actually held shares of power and how power
was exercised  in  practice.  To the  contrary,  the  perspective  I  have  proposed could  be
defined as 'post-revisionist' (or 'integrationist') insofar as it invites to consider not only the
political agency of the elites, but also that of multiple social spheres.9 Chapter 7, based on
the study of documentary interaction between authorities and subjects as seen from the
latter's perspective, constitutes the clearest example of my argument—for example when,
as anticipated above, I highlight the way in which subjects of every rank were able to
substantially influence the policies of the central authorities through petitions. But the
entire  thesis,  with  its  systematic  de-construction  of  political  structures,  official
hierarchies,  formal rules, and the material  monumentality of documents,  points in the
same direction. My analysis of the social practices that physically opened the chancery to
a wide range of outsiders (Chapter 3), for instance, demonstrates the desirability of a (so
far  under-explored)  social-historical  approach  to political-administrative  processes  of
decision-making.
There  are,  of  course,  other  instances  of  post-revisionist  political-institutional
9 For a discussion on classic institutionalist political historiography, see Burke 2005, 76-79, and Blanco
2008. For the opposition between classic institutionalist political historiography and revisionism, see De
Vivo 2012, 357-358. For a wider discussion on revisionist historiography dealing with a number of early
modern European case studies, see Benigno 1999, 3-59.  
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histories that explicitly consider  power as an essentially dialogic,  collaborative entity.
However, they are still a minority.10 I hope that my micro-cultural-history of bureaucracy
has  made  a  convincing  contribution  to  this  way of  interpreting  pre-modern  political
culture. I regard it as convincing for two major reasons. Firstly, because it has taken as
object of study a chancery—that is, the institution that for today's scholars still represents
the  stronghold  of the above-mentioned one-dimensional character of power.  Secondly,
because it has focused on the materiality of documents—that is, the  embodiment  of the
above-mentioned  one-dimensional  character  of  power—as  a  means  to  support  its
'integrationist'  stances.  Ultimately,  I  hope  to  have  corroborated  the  initial  research
hypothesis  of this thesis:  investigating (i)  the processes happening behind and around
chancery documents, and (ii) the traces these processes left on the documents' material
body does unfold novel perspectives on political and institutional history. 
10 Early examples are Najemy 1991 (Republic of Florence) and Grendi 1993 (Republic of Genoa). More
recent works are Hindle 2000 (early modern England), and Beik 2005 (Louis XIV's France). Studies
focusing on the spatial dynamics of cities like Rome and London also tend to highlight the mix of
different social spheres: Nussdorfer 1997) and Harkness and Howard 2008.   
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Appendix 1 – Documents
(the parts in italics are those cited and translated in the thesis's text)
Document n. 1 
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 132, 1524 June 6)
Commissario Taxarum Novarie
Ancora che ragionevolmente dovessimo permettere / che quelli che non hanno notificato
lo oro, argento /  et robe de Francesi, et altri nostri Inimici, nel /  termino et secundo la
dispositione de le /  cride sopra cio facte in quella Cita fussero /  puniti, Niente di meno,
volendo noi piu / placitamente si aga, ve dicemo che siamo / contenti che cum nova grida
proroghiate altri / tre giorni seguenti a ditte Cride ad manifestare / et exequire quanto in
epse prime se contene. / Et allora volemo, et vi commettemo che / procedate contra quelli
sarano Inobedienti  senza  ulla  remissione  /  et  rispecto  ad  la  executione  /  de  le  pene
contente in ditte Cride, che cossi / e mente nostra. Mediolani, 6 Iunii 1524.
Document n. 2
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 162, 1524 September 21)
Praetori Bassignane
Siamo  advisati  da  Messer  Gioanne  de  Cani  nostro /  Commissario  ultra  Po  contra
Rebelli, che non /  vogli admettere le sue cride, ne fare cosa /  che se ricerca in questa
Impresa, como se ibi / non se tractasse del interesse nostro, cosa che /  molto ni spiace,
perho Ti dicemo sotto pena / de nostra disgratia, che debbi non solo admettere / le cride
et darli li Processi et Indicii haverai / per qualuncha via contra dicti Rebelli o / suspecti,
etiam che fussero de Bassignana, /  ma circa ciò fare quanto sarai ricerchato da dicto /
nostro Commissario, nel che manchando, ne faremo / tale demonstratione, che ni serai
malcontento. Pizleonis, XXI septembris 1524.
Document n. 3 
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 121-122, 1524 May 24)
Communi et hominibus Canobii
Siamo remasti molto admirati che ce habbiati mandato / homini tanto obdurati ad venire
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ad compositione  /  de subvenirne in  questi  nostri  urgenti  bisogni,  sapendo /  pure che
volemo restituire li dinari et havemo al /  fine voluto che la bonta et clementia nostra
habbia / comportato la loro obstinatione, che unde speravamo / havere di voy adiutto al
meno de 1000 Ducati, se siamo / acomodati in 500, quali haveti ad pagare in la nostra /
Thesoreria generale per mano del nobile Gabriel Modono / Potesta nostro in quella Terra,
o  de  chi  ve  parira./  Qui haveti  le  vostre  quietanze et  dipo  [sic]  vi  sarano  /  fatte  le
assignatione come alli altri, di modo che / indubitamente rehareti li vostri dinari. La bona
/ nostra dispositione verso voy ni ha fatto essere / contenti di la prefata summa, et cossi
di bono /  animo havemo acceptato il Iuramento de la  /  fidelita da epsi vostri nuncii a
nome  vostro  /  con  oppinione  che se  bene  la  necessita  vi  ha  fatto /  fare  qualche
ostentatione in favore de nostri Inimici / et ribelli, non sarno pero mutati li animi vostri /
da la solita vostra fede et devotione verso noy, / in le quale vi exhortiamo ad perseverare
perche / ni trovareti bono et iusto principe verso voy. / Resta che vi exhibiati prompti al
pagamento de li / dicti 500 Ducati che si ne possiamo valere in alcuni / grandi bisogni al
Commune beneficio de tutto il Stato, / et che fciati come li altri subditi che ni hanno /
subvenuto, quali si sono valsi de le megliori / borse per aiutarne in tempo, facendo poi
reimborsare / de quelli che se scodeno alla giornata de li / manco habili. Mediolani, 24
Maii 1524.
Document n. 4
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 71-72, 1523 December 29)
Sfortino Sfortie et Ioanne Paulo Lonato seu eorum locumtenentibus
Laltro heri di commissione nostra el Magnifico nostro suppremo / Cancellario vi scripse
non dovestovi molestare el /  loco di Basgape, per essere Tanto vicino ad Melegnano /
dovi  sono nostri  Inimici,  che  facilmente  presentendo [sic]  la /  contributione loro,  gli
haveriano possuto inferire /  qualche molestia de focco o sacco  et molte / Cause alhora
scriptevi per esso. Al presente havendo / inteso che non haveti voluto non solo obedire / a
dicte  lettere,  ma  havete  retenuti  li  messi  che  ve / le  portavano,  ne  habiamo  preso
grandissimo dispiacere, / et pero vi Commettemo che subito alla havuta / de le presente
vogliate  fare relassare li  dui  messi /  predicti per  vui  retenuti,  et  non molestarli,  ne /
lassareti  molestare da altri  el  prefato loco de /  Basgape per  cuncto de contributione,




(ASMi, Registri Ducali, 141, l. 18, 1527 September 28)
Canonicis et Capitulo ecclesiae Sancti / Stephani de Rosate
Alli  giorni  passati,  essendo  vacata  la  Prepositura  di /  quella  vostra  Ghiesa,  et
desiderando summa- /  mente  che  fosse  pervenuta  nel  Venerabile /  Giovanni  Antonio
Rozono  nepote  del  Egregio /  Domino  Bartholomeo  Rozono  secrettario  nostro /
Dilettissimo,  vi  scrivessimo  in  exhortatione  perche / lo  elegesti  al  ditto  loco;  ma
ritrovandosi / ad quel tempo quella nostra Terra in potere / de nemici, non solamente non
presumesti de / fare tale electione, ma neanche di accettare / le nostre litere per timore
d'epsi Inimici, / cum promessa pero che quando essa / Terra fosse stata in faculta nostra
che non /  haresti manchati de compiacerni et per / tanto essendosi hora recuperata ditta
Terra / et havendo inteso con non mediocre dispiacere /  che haveti fatto altra electione,
ce e parso /  con le presente exhortarvi ad revocare ditta /  electione con protesta che
quanto haveti / fatto se intenda essere nullo et di novo / non obstante ditta electione ad
gratificatione /  nostra essere contenti  di  elegere con unanimo /  consenso et  servate le
debite  solemnitate  /  el  predicto  Giovanni  Antonio  alla  Propositura  sopradetta,  /
Inducendolo al Possesso de tal beneficio et / manutenendolo in quello con la perceptione /
de frutti et proventi debiti et soliti, perche / oltra sara bene provisto alla Cura de / ditta
Giesia ad noi fareti tal piacere / che acchaschandone occasione ve ne / saremo grati. Datae
Laudae XXVIII Septembris MDXXVII.
Document n. 6
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 225, ll. 10-11, 1531 June 5)
Ioanne Ambrosio Morigiae Iudicii Stratarum Mediolani
Per il Vicario Duodeci de provisione / et Iudice de le Strate havemo inteso / che tutte le
stratte mastre sono molto / desordinate, el che procede si perche gli / sono alchune Fagie
che non hanno patrono, /  si etiam per che li sono multi che allegano /  non son tenuti à
tali charichi per vigore / de suoi privilegii a lor concessi per noi / et predecessori nostri;
inherendo alle lettere / sopra cio scritte per nostri Antecessori Te / dicemo et significamo
che la mente nostra / e che, attesa la qualita de tempi, niuna /  persona de quale grado
voglia si sia / sii preservata exempta per vigore de / qualunque lettere et privilegio a lor
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heri / retro concesse de aptatione de strate, / ponti, atzini, et evacuatione de fossi, / et altre
cose dependente de strate,  /  ne tu  admetterai  diffensione alchuna /  per vigore de tale
exemptione.  /  Imo procederai  contra  li  delinquenti  /  secondo li  ordini  et  statuti  della
nostra / Inclita citta de Milano, per che al beneficio / et comodo Comune è conveniente
che  /  chadeuno  li  contribuisca  remosta  [sic]  /  ogni  Immunitate,  et  cosi  volemo /  sii
exequita senza perho preiuditio / nel resto de dicta Immunitate et / privilegio. Mediolani
V Iunii MDXXXI.
Document n. 7
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 221, l. 234, 1525 July 9)
Referendario Cremone
Ignari de li ordini de mercadanti di questa  /  Cita concedessimo alli di passati alcune /
lettere ad Alcuni mercadanti milanesi di / potere condure fuori depsa fustanei; doppoy, /
essendoni significato Tale cosa essere contra / la forma de dicti ordini, volemo siano
observati / le presente lettere nostre in contrario, non obstante le / quale credemo fossero
concesse per importu- /  nitate de supplicanti, et cum loro malitia. Datae Mediolani, die
VIII Julii 1525.
Document n. 8
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 119, 1523 January 15)
Ioanni Iacobo de Busti
Havendone facto intendere el nobile Cesare Pelizono nostro / Referendario di Pavia che
per li antecessori sui / sempre e stato solito exigerse tutte le mulcte et / condemnatione de
dicta Cita et contado spectante /  alla Camera nostra, et hora che tu sotto umbra de /
nostre lettere gli usurpi quello ufficio, Instandone / ad volerlo reintegrare secundo el suo
consueto / et de sui predecessori, Nui considerata la / domanda sua honestissima, per le
presenti nostre Te / dicemo et commettemo che da qui in ante non / presumi intrometterti
in  exigere  dicte  mulcte  et /  condemnatione,  ma  lassi  la  Cura  ad  epso  nostro /
Referendario, et questo nonostante alcune lettere ti / havessimo concesso, le quale per le
presente  revocamo /  et  annullamo,  Remettendo  in  mano  depso  /  Referendario  il
Quinterneto de le multe et condem- /  natione quale haverai presso di te, ad cio / non
essendo exacte le possa exigere et renderne / conto ali agenti de la Camera nostra. Et in
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ciò non / mancarai perché cossi e nostra mente. Mediolani, die XV Januarii 1523.
Document n. 9
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 44, 1522 November 1)
Magistratis extraordinariis
Intendemo che in Monte Brianza, plebe de /  Incino et parte circonstante, sono molti /
nostri ribelli i quali sotto pretesto de diversi / salvi conducti ardiscano dimorare nel /
stato nostro e anche goldino il suo, como se /  fossero cosi stati a nostri servitii, como
sono / stati a quelli de Inimici. Pero volendo / provedere che non vadino impuniti de loro /
errori, vi dicemo debiate ben investigare / quali sono questi tali, et mandare in nome / de
la Camera nostra ad apprehendere tutti li / loro beni, non obtante salvi conducti quali /
habiano  da  qualunche  persone  salvo  da  noi /  proprii,  et  sottoscripti  da  nui  proprii,
mandando /  li  nomi de Tutti  loro alli  dilecti  nostri  deputati  /  de rebelli,  acio possano
procedere contra le / persone loro secondo rechede la Iustitia. Et in cio non mancharete.
Viglevani, Kalendas novembris 1522.
Document n. 10
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, l. 1, 1522 September 18)
Dominis Magistratis extraordinariis
Per fare provisione al desordine et detrimento qual segue / alle cose nostre per colpa de
li notari di quello nostro / Magistrato gli scrivemo le alligate, quale volemo se / legano in
vostra presentia, comettendovi che sotto pena / de la privatione de vostri officii vogliate
provedere /  che in termino de quattro giorni li  dicti  notari diano /  alli  Dilecti  nostri
Rasonati de la Camera extraordinaria, /  et anche alli nostri Referendarii generali,  la
nota auctentica /  de tutte  le  descriptione,  apprehensione de beni,  et  condemnatione /
quale se ritrovano presso di loro, et quale accadera farsi / in lo advenire, ad cio per esse
si possano fare fare le /  debite executione contra li debitori, et acconziare / le scripture
opportune. Papie, XVIII Septembris 1522.
Document n. 11
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, ll. 1-2, 1522 September 18)
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Notariis Magistratus extraordinari
Siamo  advisati  da  li  Dilecti  nostri  Referandarii  generali  che  /  trovano  grandissima
difficultate in scodere li fructi et / ficti de li beni de rebelli spectanti alla Camera nostra /
per che le scripture non sono in sue mane, libri de li /  rasonati depsa Camera, il che
dicono procedere perche / voy non voleti darli la notta de le descriptione et / apprensione
depsi beni, come e il debito vostro, la quale / cosa cognoscendo quanto danno ni porti ni
e stata / molestissima, et se siamo molto maravigliati che tegniate / si pocho cuncto del
bursino nostro como seti obligati / per il locho vi habbiamo dato. Pero vi comandiamo /
sotto pena de la privatione de vostri officii, et de / cinquecento ducati d'oro da essere
applicati alla camera / nostra per ciascuno de voi ogni voota, che contrafareti / a questa
nostra  voluntate,  che in  termino de quattro /  giorni  debbiate  dare nota auctentica alli
predicti  nostri  /  Rasonati  de  la  Camera  extraordinaria  de  tutte  /  le  descriptione,
apprehensione de beni, et condemnatione / quale vi trovate presso di voi facte da qui
indreto, / et il medesimo volemo faciate de tutte le condem- / natione, apprehensione, et
descriptione quale accadera / farsi per lo advenire, notificandole a dicti Rasonati / nel
ditto termino dopo ni haverete notitia, et ancho dandone copia autentica dil tutto ad epsi
Referendarii / se la vorano ad ogni loro richesta. Papie XVIII Septembris MDXXII.
Document n. 12
(ASMi, Registri delle Missive, 220, ll. 267-268, 1523 April 30)
Pretori Papie
Novamente essendone stato referto che alcuni / sotto pretexto de nostre Commissione,
andavano / per le Terre et loci dil Dominio nostro ad / depingere le arme nostre Ducale,
in grave danno /  de subditi nostri; et sapendo che non haveamo / concesse tale lettere;
per provedere ad tali incon- / venienti, deputassimo il nobile Angelino de /  li Conti de
Gambarana,  quale  havesse  andare  /  ad  inquirere  tale  fraude,  &  Trovando  alcuno /
delinquente li facesse destenere, et poi ne dasese [sic] / aviso. Hora in exequtione de
nostre  Commissione, / havendo  il  predicto  Angelino  ritrovato  uno  certo  /  Maestro
Baptista da Marliano depintore, quale cum /  lettere falsificate andava depingendo dicte
arme, / et facto lo consignare in le forze vostre, volendo / provedere ad tale excesso, ve
indirizamo / qui incluse le dicte lttere, Commettendovi che / cum ogni diligentia debbiate
examinare el predicto / Maestro Baptista et cercare de sapere lauctore / et complici de la
falsificatione de ditte lettere / et sigillo, et servato il debito modo de / ragione, et formato
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el  processo  contra  epso / ne  farete  quello  ne  vorra la  iustitia,  et /  Trovando che  el
predicto Maestrro Baptista de ragione /  per dicta causa meriti la morte, gli farete /  in
lultimo supplicio suo, apendere epse lettere / al Collo, a cio che a tutti li altri Trisa passi /
in exemplo, et avanti veniati ad effetto prima / del tutto ne darete aviso ad noi, o al nostro
/  suppremo Cancellario.  Mediolani,  ultimo aprilis  1523.  /  Fate  quello  vole  Iustitia  et
presto.
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Appendix 2 – Glossaries
Glossary 1 – Diplomatics
Dispositio Dispositive clause: the most essential part of the text*, through which
the author of a letter patent formalises his/her will and establishes (or
acknowledges)  a  juridical  act,  determines  its  nature,  contents,  and
modes. (VID, 57)
Eschatocol The  final  part  of  a  letter  patent's  text*.  It  always  bears  the
corroboratio, the date, the ducal seal, and the secretarial signature(s);
and it possibly bears the ducal signature, notes of registration, and the
plica. (VID, 54)
External features The formal elements of the document that can be studied only on the
original  document,  or  on  its  exact  reproduction  (writing  material,
handwriting, decoration.) (VID, 45)
Internal features The formal elements of the document that have to do with its text*
(language, style, formulae.) (VID, 51)
Intitulatio Intitulation: the element of the protocol* specifying the name of the
author of the letter patent and his/her titles. (VID, 54)
Jussio The order — written or oral — of creating a letter patent. (VID, 86)
Plica Turn up:  the  reinforcement  of  the  bottom part  of  the  letter  patent,
obtained by folding the parchment. The plica is typically made to tie a
pendant seal. 
Protocol The initial part of a letter patent's text*. It bears the intitulatio*, and 
possibly the salutatio*. (VID, 54)
Tenor The ensemble of protocol*, text* and eschatocol*. (VID, 53)
Text The part of the tenor* directly relating to the juridical act. It contains
the causes that brought to the establishment of the juridical act,  the
dispositio*,  and  the clauses  intended to precise  the contents  of  the
juridical act and to ensure its observation. (VID, 53)
Salutatio Greeting: The element of the protocol* through which the author of
the letter patent greets its recipient. (VID, 56)
Glossary 2 – Sforza Administration
Camera The financial hub of Sforza administration.
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Commissario Sforza  Commissari  ('Commissaries')  were  officers  in  charge  of
specific  matters,  usually  (but  not  always)  appointed  in
exceptional/emergency situations. 
The Commissari appearing in this dissertation are the Commissari del
Sale  ('Commissaries  of  the  Salt'),  a  Commissario  delle  Tasse  ('Tax
Commissary'), a Commissario contra Rebelli ('Commissary against the
Rebels') and a generic Commissario for the town of Novara.
Governatore The Sforza officer in charge of military affairs in a peripheral town
(and/or area) of the duchy.
Podestà / Pretore The Sforza officer in charge of judicial affairs in a peripheral town
(and/or area) of the duchy.
Rasonati de la 
Camera
Accountants working at the Camera.
Referendario The Sforza officer in charge of financial affairs in a peripheral town
(and/or area) of the duchy. The  Referendari Generali  are the central
officers coordinating the activity of the Referendari. 
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